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ABSTRACT 
The subject has been studied under eight chapters. In a 
very brief introductory chapter an attempt hasbeen made to 
delimit the scope of the subject-matter. As the title 8uggests 
not all the newly-independent countries within the Oommonwealth 
have been discussed but an attempt has been made to ~ring in at 
least one country from each part of the four corners of the 
Continent. The study has been limited to the newly-independent 
countries mainly because of their relative political and consti-
tutional instability following the attainment of independent 
status, with tbe result tbat quite often emergency powers have 
had to be invoked to restore a measure of stability. 
It is believed that a subject is bette. appreciated by an 
understanding of its history, bence the first chapter .ea18 with 
the historical develo,ment of emergency powers. All eommGnwe.lth 
countries in Africa bad at one time or another been under tbe 
colonial control of Great Britain and the colenial administrat.ra 
bad found it necessary to provide tor and use emergency powers 
to deal with a number of situations. There is DO doubt that the 
emergency powers in the new nations are part of their colonial 
heritage. 
Th. various types of emergency legislation which are toand 
in the countries within tbe area of atudy are di.c088ed in 
chapter ~ in sucb • way as to briD« .at tbe scope and cOBtent 
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of the powers which they confer on the executive during a period 
of emergency. Chapter Three deals with the pr~ctical operation 
of these powers and the situations which bad led to their use. 
Some of the illustrations bring out clearly the dQ~ers inherent 
in the use of such wide discretionary powers. The Fourth Chapter 
deals with the effect of emergency powers on citizens' rights. 
A declaration of an emergency invariably leads to the suspension 
or denial of some vital rights of the citizens. The next chapter 
(Chapter V) deals with the role of the judiciary during emergency 
periods and to what extent they have been able to stand against 
the possible excesses of the Executive in operating emergency 
powers,as well as the danger and extent of possible involvements 
of members of the bench. In the chapter which follows,broad 
aspect of checks on the exercise of emergency powers is discussed. 
The point is whether the various types of checks or safeguards both 
constitutional and institutional are sufficiently effective in 
preventing the encroachment of totalitarianism. 
Chapter Seven discusse. the effect of military intervention 
in politics and to what extent they are able to cope with the 
various problems of government, even by use of emergency powers. 
The last chapter, as well as giving a brief summary of the 
general trend of the discussion in preceeding chapters, indicates 
the reasons why the present writer believes that the present 
prevalent reliance on emergency powers by the governments ot the 
new nations is merely one of the growing pains which must 
lessen and eventually disappear as the new nations mature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The expression "Emergency Powers" connotes the powers, 
over and above those recognised as existing when the ship of 
state is proceeding on an even keel in fair weather, available 
to a government in times of crisis. Formerly 'crisis' in this 
connection was generally assumed to be limited to war, insur-
rection and riots, but as the conception of the duties of the 
state has been enaarged, and as the technique of the revolu-
tionary has improved, the concept of 'crisis' has been en-
larged to include any serious threat to the safety of the 
state and its social and economic stability, so that it is no 
longer unusual to find constitutions which center emergeDcy 
powers on the government to deal with dangerous or difficult 
situations in peace-time. Thus, for instance, the Britisb 
Emergency Powers Act, 19~, was intended to meet threats to 
essential public services and was brought into operation 
during the coal strike of 1921, another sectional strike of 
1924, the general strike of 1926 and the dock strike of 1948. 
The British Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Act, 
1945, sought to provide the government with extra-ordinary 
powers to deal with the transition from a nation in arms 
fighting for its existence to the peace-time welfare state~~ 
world War II. New powers were again conferred upon the~ovt.to 
I ! • I . . • •• c •••• 
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meet an economic crisis hy the ~upplies and Services (F'.ssential 
~owers) Act, 1947 which gave carte blanche to the government to 
el'Eure that "the whole resources of the community are available 
for use and are used in a manner best calculated to serve the 
interests of the community." It is clear from all this that the 
meaning of 'crisis' or 'emergency' in the present context has been 
extended to cover any situation deemed dangereus to the welfare 
of the public. 
There has been a corresponding change in the nature of 
emergency powers. Whereas forMerly they consisted mainly in 
enhanced powers to employ force, they now include powers to 
legislate by executive decree, to curtail basic freedoms, to 
conscript wealth and talents of the people and in federal states, 
the concentration of powers of regional ~overnments at the centre. 
In the followin~ par:es, it is proposed to attempt a study 
of emergency powers in some of the newly-independent states of 
Africa within the Commonwealth; the nature of the legislation 
conferring these powers, the circumstances in which they have been 
invoked and may be invoked and the control over the authorities 
who exercise such powers. It ia also proposed to deal with the 
tendencies envisaged by the exercise of these powers in the 
administration of law and order with a view to finding out whether 
the democratic prinCiple is in danger of subversion in a democratie 
state during a period of emergency and whether any safeguards 
-~-
against the possible encroachment of totalitarianism could be 
adopted withol1t seriously interfering with the exercise of such 
powers when circumstances demand such exercise. 
As all the le~al systems of these States in Africa are, in 
varyin~ degrees,based on the co.mon Jaw, it will he helpful to 
an appreciation of the suh,;ect to ma),e some occasional comparisons 
with the law of emer~ency in other common law countries. 
If emergency powers prove a threat to civil liberties in 
countries of which democracy is a well-established product, they 
cannot be innocuous in states where dernoc~acy in its modern 
connotation as accepted in the Western world, is not yet fully 
acclamatised and where public opinion is neither sufficiently 
educated nor developed to withstand incursions into human rights. 
"For if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done 
in the dry."l 
It has been said that "in the eternal dispute between govern-
ment and liberty, crisis means more government and less liberty.,,2 
One is at times confronted with the vision of a dictator, in the 
name of emergency, attempting the role of a universal Providence, 
as happened in Ghana to some extent under the Nkrumah Regime, and 
the Chief Justice of a Supreme Court straining all his intellectual 
1. St. Luke, Chapter XXIII, verse 31. 
2. C.T. carr, Concerning En~lish Administrative Law, p. 9~. 
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nerves to justify tile role. "If bad cases make bad law, emer-
1 gencies may make even worse." Hence the importance of a study 
of emergency powers in Africa where democracy under the stress 
of emergency real or otherwise, tends to be controlled or guided, 
and in the 10n8 run, probably subverted. The course of democracy, 
like that of true love, has never run smooth: that its course is 
more winding and rougher in most of the newly-independent African 
states at the present time is undoubted, but that the situation 
will improve in due course and the reasons for such optimism will 
be the topic of the conclusion of this atudy. 
Within the last decade, there have come into existence thirty-
eight independent states in Af'rica. Of' these, eleven are English 
speaking, thAt is, they were former dependencies of Great Britain. 2 
At Independence, each of these countries freely opted to remain 
within the eoamonwealth. Therefore, they are. all literally within 
the definition of "newly-independent African states within the 
Commonwealth," but both time and space make it impossible to deal 
with each and everyone of these states in this study. An attempt 
has,however, been made to include in the choice of countries at 
least one from each part of Africa. BeSides, in spite of the 
divergencies of historical development and of cultural patterns 
among the eleven independent members of the Commonwealth in Africa, 
1 • Ib i d. p. 65 . 
2. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
fvlalawi, 7.ambia, Botswana and Lesotho. 
... 
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certain common features are noticeable, particularly in respect 
of the sub.iect-matter of this study, This simiJarly can he traced 
back to the fact that dllrin~ the days of colonial rule, the 
colonial ad~inistrAtors responsihle for the ~eneral poltcy in 
administering the ~ependencies of Britain in Africa believed that 
what was ~ood for the goose was also ~ood for the gander. Firm 
adherence to such a beli.eve, of-course, saved a lot of energy 
and time of findin~ out whAt mi~ht be more preferable for the 
good of the 'gander'. 
The threat of elements within a nation suffiCiently strong 
to disrupt the life of a country and jeopardise the existence of 
the prevailing form of government is a problem of accelerating 
importance in a modern world and even more so in the newly-
independent African states. In many of ~hese states constitu-
tional sanction has been found for meeting the threat of such 
subversion by the most strin~ent measures. In defence of the 
use of these measures, some leading African statemenUihave 
expressed the belief that it is sometimes necessary to suspend 
constitutional safep:uard in order to preserve the security of 
the State." A legal system can be the refuge of private power 
as well as the avenging arm of government interference. It is 
a question of probable dangers and more African governments face 
- 8 -
the danger of governnent weakness than of ~overnment stlength."l 
The problem if'; how to reconcile the democratic idea of the 
freedom of the subject with the need for the preservation of the 
state and there is real difficulty in discovering when and where 
to draw the line that divides the individual's legitimate 
interests from those of the state. A totalitarian government 
may handle the situation without emharrassment but the apparent 
necessities evoked by danger often conflict ~ravely with the 
postulates of constitutional democracy. 
Political philosophy has set the modern state the task of 
resolving this confljct. Hence it is becoming more accepted 
that internal disturbance may ';ustify the proclamation of a 
state of puhlic emergency and the promotion of measures which 
might seriously derogate from the fundamental liberties of the 
subject. But there is some douht as to the extent to which 
highly restrictive or emergency measures may legitimately be 
taken to repress incipient revolt or resentment that is 
animated by sentiments of separate group identities, particular-
ly in the new nations of Africa where there is the all too 
frequent phenomenon of sectional self-assertiveness among the 
polyethnic communities. The need for Government security might, 
1. per President Kaunda of l~mbia, I~ading article in the 
"Newstateman" (I~ndon) of 25/7/69. 
-
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if pursued in too sinr,le-minded a manner, lead to a situation 
where personal liberty could be overlooked or even jettisoned. 
\yhile emergency does not create power, it may furnis h the 
occasion for the exercise of power. The constitutional question 
presented in the li~ht of an emergency is whether the power 
possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to 
particular conditions. The government can move against those 
who take arms a~ainst it whether nationally or internationally 
and whether literally or figuratively. The constituted authority 
has the right of self-preservation. Those who run the state have 
onerous responsibilities and private rights may have to be sub-
ordinated to the puhlic good. 
The central purpose of the legislature is in respect of 
state security and it necessarily provides all the means of 
establishing all the legal machinery and legal provisions con-
sidered necessary and appropriate for the purpose. The respon-
sibility for the practical measures taken in order to protect 
the country must, therefore, belong to the F~ecutive. The 
prosecution of a war or the suppression of subversion is of 
necessity an' executive function and has always been so conceived, 
hence under the delegated power and sometimes by direct enactment, 
the very widest discretions are vested in the Executive. What 
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the power will enable the Executive to do at any given 
time depends upon what the exigencies of the time may be 
considered to call for or to warrant. The meaning of the 
power may, of-collrse, be fixed as it usually is, but as 
according to th~t meanin~, the fulfilment of the object of 
the power must depenrl on the ever changing course of events, 
and the practical application of the power will vary accordingly. 
The fact remains that ~overnments do eQuip themselves 
with emergency powers in readiness to meet any emergency, 
however it may arise, and there is no doubt, as will be 
shown in the following pages that emergency power when 
wielded can extend to every matter and activity so related 
to the emergency as substantially to affect every aspect of 
life within the state. 
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CHAPTEtt ONE 
HISTOUICAL PERSPECTIVE 
One of the first overseas regions to be discovered by 
Europeans, tropical Africa, was one of the last to be controlled 
by them. It was long thought of less as an asset than an obsta-
cle, since it stood in the path of every India-bound mariner, and 
it was to India and tithe Indies" that most sixteenth-century 
mariners were bound. If it could be got around without the nece-
ssity of providing numerous ports of call - as indeed it could be 
once the Portuguese discovered how to turn wind and current to 
their advantage - so much the better. Though the demand of the 
Americas for the African slaves later took many Europeans to the 
west coast of Africa, few settlements were founded other than 
forts where attacks from hostile tribes could be repelled, slaves 
rounded up, ships repaired and revictualed, and sick mariners 
given a chance to convalesce. Even as lute as the eighteenth 
century there v.s little thought in anyone's mind of establishing 
a reign of law over the raided hinter-lands. As for the East 
coast, once the excitement of the Great Discoveries was over, 
the Europeans lost interest in it. They found that the Arabs 
had for centuries been doing a steady business in East African 
slaves and ivory and were in DO mood to b~d it Over. It was 
not till the early nineteenth century that European Governments 
began to take a close interest in Tropical Africa. 
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Slnve~anrl slave trade, at 10n~ last, were coming to be 
seen for the evil things they were, and Christian nations on 
hoth side of the Atlantic were willing to join forces in exci-
sing them from their social systems. As far as West Africa was 
concerned, the task presented no very serious difficulties. The 
sea-borne slave traffic could be and was suppressed by naval 
action, from reasonably accessible Atlantic bases. In East 
Africa the matter was different. The Arabs did not share the 
moral scruples of the Christians concerning the slave trade, 
and saw no reason for denying themselves the handsome profits 
to be derived from it. Nor were the slave-running Dhows much 
troubled by the naval patrols, sent to intercept them; the short 
sea passage between the major east coast slave ports and 
those of Arabia made interception much more difficult than 
it proved to be on the Atlantic slave run. The only way to 
destroy this trade, it was soon a~reed, was to discover its 
source of supply. It was the search for these, more than any-
thing else probably, that underlay the explorations of the 
tropical interior of Africa in the middle and late nineteenth 
century. From these explorations came, first, the realisation 
that, with local exce~tions, the native people were living 
outside the broad stream of human progress; and, second, the 
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belief that, ~iven stRhle Ilncl humane .rrovernments, the greater 
part of their territory coulcl he developed to the mutual profit 
of both the developed nncl the developer. To the Christian 
churches, the realiSAtion WRS A call to misSionary enterprise. 
Scarcely had the explorers returned before the missions were 
claiming the kingdoms of Africa for God and His Christ. Indeed, 
some of the early missionaries were as much explorers as 
preachers, teachers and doctors. 
Before lon,r" nationals of every leading stat.e in Europe 
were running loose in land that was still largely unmapped and, 
on that account, was often supposed to be no man's land. One 
thing was soon a~reed upon: whether it. was a matter of develop-
ing natural resources or evangelizing people, some form of 
government sponsorship, or at least government protection, was 
needld. Al t.hongh few of the F.uropean governments were eager to 
give such sponsorship or protection, they were reluctant to see 
others provide it and thereby acquire perhaps important new 
national advantages. 
And so the whole region of tropical Africa, with the excep-
tion of the already sovereign Liberia and Ethiopia, Came to be 
staked out among the major F.uropean powers. The period of the 
partitioning took less than forty-years. The results were often 
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as unhappy for the ~overned as they were unflatterillg for the 
governors. Whil e lofty hum8.ni tarian principles were voiced in 
the council chambers and on the lecture platforms of Europe, the 
practices adopted by the men were frequently neither lofty nor 
very humane. "\ihoever has handled the treaties to which ignorant 
chieftains affixed their wavering XIS as symbols of their accep-
tance of the white man's rule cannot escape the conviction that 
varying degrees of deception must have been employed to persuade 
Africans into signing papers which they could hardly understand."l 
The task of 'humanizing' the society of tropical Africa and 
raising its low levels of production and consumption vas found 
to exceed the financial resources of most of the colonial powers. 
Almost wit.hout exception, the cost of hnning African colonies 
proved greater than the revenues derived from them. In the 
circumstances the colonizing powers were generally only too 
willing to leave the initiative in economic matters to such 
private companies and individuals as were able to put up the 
necessa-ry carital and find the necessary manpower. In some 
instances, they left the initiative in political affairs as well 
to private companies and individuals. Also, they were often 
willing to condone treatment of the African that was out o£ 
-1. H. R. Rudin, "Africa in Perspective" Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. VII (1953), No.2, p. 121. 
- 15 -
harmony with their protestations of concern for his life and 
liberty. Some of the methods used to recruit labour and keep 
it differed from those of the slave driver in nothing but name, 
and resistance to them by the conscript not infrequently led to 
counter measures of the most brutal sort. 
The Establishment of British Imle 
A. Central and East Africa 
It is over one hundred years that David Livingstone by his 
historic journey across ~frica, drew the attention of the western 
world to the state of the Centrnl African peoples. Fired by his 
achievement, explorers from Britain and other European countries 
made their way into the interior of the countries now called 
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi. With them and after 
them went miSSionaries, traders and administrators. 
The peoples they found were menaced by famine and the prey 
of inter-trihal warfare. Over them all was the shadow of the 
slave traffic. The slavers, ~rabs based on 7~nzibar, were active 
throughout all the country of tile Great Lakes and steadily 
expanding their operations southwards into Central Africa. 
The British Government made repeated representations against 
the traffic to the Sultan of Zanzibar, who at that time claimed 
dominion over the whole of the East African territories; but 
beyond that the Government was not prepared to go. The German 
- 16 -
Government, however, supporte~ its nationals more directly, and 
in 1885, following the conclusion of a number of treaties with 
local chiefs, they declared a Protectorate over a large part of 
the Sultan of Zanzibar's mainland territories in what is now 
Tanganyika. This raised the whole question of the extent of the 
Sultan's domains an~ in 1886, his assent was obtained to an 
agreement whereby his authority was limited to islands of 
Zanzihar, Pemba and Nafia, tor,ether with a ten-·mile wide strip 
along the coast. The inland territories were divided into 
British and German spheres of influence, and an Anglo-German 
treaty of 1890 extended this division westward to give Britain 
special rights in Uganda. In the same year Zanzibar was declared 
a British Protectorate. 
In 1887, the Imperial British East Africa Company began to 
operate in East Africa and was granted a charter in the following 
year, the Sultan having awarded them a concession of the mainland 
between the rivers Tana and Umba. '!be Company's activities were, 
however, the reverse of profitable and in 1893 they determined 
to withdraw from Uganda: but their administrator there, captain 
F. D. (later J~rd) lugard, held this to be a breach of faith with 
the Africans with whom agreements had been made: and, largely 
as a result of his energetic representations at home, the 
British Government assumed the responsibilities laid down by the 
Company and declared 8 Protectorate over Buganda in 1894, 
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cxten~in~ it two years later to Bunyoro an~ other outlying 
rortions of the British sphere of influence. A Protectorate 
over tlte eRS tern part 0 f the company's term tori es then called 
the ~ast African Protectorate, was established in 1895. 
F'urther south the course of events were not dissimi.lar. 
The missionaries who followed Livingstone to Lake Nyasa in the 
early eighteen-sixties were quickly forced out by the activities 
of the slave-traders and the fierce int.er-trihal warll with which 
they had to contend. In 1874 and 1875, however, the Church of 
Scotland established a mission at Blantyre aml the Free Church 
01' Scotland one at Livingstonia and these achieved a pO\ferful 
influence with the Africans. In 1878 the African Lakes Company 
was first established at Livingstonia as a trading and transport 
concern, working very largely on behalf of the mission. Other 
pioneers followed, missionnries, traders and coffee-planters. 
In 1883 a consul was accredited to "the kings and chiefs of 
Central Africa" and settled at I,ivingstonia, and a second waS:' 
established at 7~mba. 
In 1891 an Anglo-Portu~uese Convention recognised British 
administration in the whole of the country adjoining Lake Nyasa. 
Five years later the slave trade had been extinguished and most 
of the country pacified. TIle territory west of Nyasaland was 
included in the rather vaguely defined region covered by the 
charier granted in 1889 to the British South Africa Company -
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and the boundaries of British influence were still extremely 
vague. 
On the Gold Coaat, the Ashanti invasion of fhe coastal states 
bad interrupted trade and seriously threatened the security of 
the European forts,none of which were strong enougb to withstand 
an Ashanti attack. Because the Company's forts were proving 
useless as a means for stopping illetal trading in slaves, its 
days were numbered. In 1819, the British government sent its 
own representative, Joseph Dupins 1 to negotiate directly with 
ABhanti and then in 1821 it abolished the Company altogether and 
assa.ed control of its forts and settlements on the Gambia as 
well as on the Gold Coast. 
With the abolition of slave trade, British merchants in the 
Niger and Slave Coasts had to turn to 'legitimate' trade. They 
sought to replace the sale and conveyance of humans with the 
export of palm oil, ivory and ti.ber. 
stde by side with the search by Europeans for trade-routes 
and for objects of a new and legitimate commerce, there was the 
beginning of the first really Christian activity in West Africa. 
Earlier Roman catholic missionary efforts had only touched Vest 
Africa briefly and at one or two acattered points. The" 
begiDDing of the nineteenth century, bowever, saw the establish-
ment of flourishing Church of England (Anglican) and Metbodist 
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missions in Sierra Laone. The 1820's saw the coming ot 
missionaries of other denominations and by the 1840s all the main 
Protestant denominations were represented in the Gold Coast, 
Dahomey and western and Eastern Nigeria. 
From 1836 - 1849, Britain interfere. forcefully along tbe 
Niger coast in order to encourage the growth of 'legitimate' 
trade. With naval aSSistance, its several agents attempted, by 
the expedients of treaties and subsidy, to persuade city-states 
and trading houses to cease dealing in slaves. They also obtained 
agreements that were deSigned to ensure British supremacy. In 
the Gold Coast colony, a eommittee of merchants in London was 
given powers of administration, but in 1843 tbe Crown resumed 
responsibility. Tbe Colony then consisted only of forts and 
settlements, but British influence bad been incA"easing for some 
years and in 1843 a series of Protectorate treaties were nego-
tiated with the Fante and other tribes and provision for the 
governMent of the country wa. made under the British Settlement 
Act, 1843, and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843. 1 
On a number of occasioDs, British officials interfered more 
actively in the affairs of the.e coastal entrepots. Tbey removed 
those indigenous leaders who chose to oppose the growth ot 
Britain's he.itant informal but I'Owiag paramountcy. FOr exa.ple, 
1. 6 & 7 Vic. cc. 13 & 94. 
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in 1849, Lord Palmerston sanctioned the removal of Avanta, the 
high priest of Bonny (Nigeria) after Avanta had aroused Africans 
1 
against British merchants and property there. Pressed by aboli-
tionist interests in Britain, tree traders, and the commercial 
communities of both England and the Niger Coast, Lord Palmerston 
finally settled upon a policy of intervention. In 1849, he there-
fore appointed a consul to the states bordering the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra. 
, 
In 1861, as a means ostensibly of bringing 
about the abolition of the slave trade, the British Government 
decided to occupy Lagos. By a treaty dated August 6, 1861, King 
Docemo of Lagos ceded to the Crown the port and island of Lagos 
with all rights, profits, territory and appurtenances whatsoever 
thereunto belonging. 
FOr the opening Qp of trade with the interior, the United 
Africa Company was formed in 1879 to enable the various British 
concerns to establish some form ot unity and to combat the 
increasing French penetrations. At the Conference of Berlin in 
1885 (vhich marks the beginning of the "scramble for Africa") 
the supremacy of British interests on the lover Niger and the 
British claim to a aphere ot inlluence in Nigeria vas interna-
tionally recognised. The British Government was slow to undertake 
any governmental functions, though the Oil Rivers Protectorate vas 
1. Dike, Tra.. pp. 88-92. -
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declared later in the year. Steps were taken to suppress slave 
raiding in the North, for which the Emirs themselves were largely 
responsible. A force under Captain <later Lord) Lugard occupied 
Kano, Sokoto and very soon the whole of the NOrth. The Emir. 
agreed to the abolition of slave raiding and accepted British 
protection. 
For some years the British Government left its responsibili-
ties largely to the Royal Niger Company, which received a Royal 
Charter in 1886, and established government services and a 
constabulary. In 1889 the Charter was revoked and in 1900 the 
administration of its territory was brought entirely under United 
Kingdom Government control. 
THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT. 
A. Crown Colony Syate .. ; 
Tbe British have always believed in being master in their 
colonial bouse, thus it was the practice ot tbe British govern-
ment to control the external relations and poEicies of each 
African colony and to assume responsibility for the protection 
of each colony. Equally, it was its practice to reaerve the 
right to make law8 for the colony, to appoint the Governor and 
to decide the extent ot his executive powera and reverse his 
decision whenever it saw fit. 
Quite early in the history of Britain's African colonies 
provision was made for the Governors of them to receive advice 
-23-
on the exercise of their powers from legislative bodies known as 
assemblies or councils. The membership of fhese bodies was, to 
begin with, mainly "official", that is, it consisted of men 
appointed by the Government and, for the most part, government 
(civil service) men. The "unofficial" minority was made up, 
largely, if not always entirely, of representatives of special 
interests or special groups. Initially, African interests were 
represented by Europeans, usually missionaries; but increasiatly 
they came to be represented by educated Africans. The official 
members were nominated; the unofficial, either nominated by the 
Governor or elected. 
Over the years, the 'unofficial' membership of these 
legislative bodies was increased, the basia of its selection 
broadened, and its role enlarged. Also, the legislative power 
of these bodies w~ increased by a continuous process of 
devolution. However, their power always fell short of that of 
the British Parliament. This 'standard model' bas been 
cbaracterised tbus: 
"It may debate and vote on legislative proposals 
put before it. It may criticize annaal esti .. tes. 
And it may question the government on detailed matters 
concerning its admini.tratioD. Critioi •• fro. un-
otticial members may often lead lovernment to modify 
it. orilinal proposals, but it Deed Dot do so. The 
otticial members have to vote tor tbe government pro-
posala and where they form tbe .~jority they can always 
outvote the unofficial membera."·l 
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While the legislative council was everywhere "the most 
conspicuous feature in the progress of the British dependencies 
1 towards the stage of Responsible Government", this: progress was 
not without the help of a second legislative in~tution early 
introduced by the British into their colonial administration, 
namely, the Executive Council. For this COuncil, in Lord Hailey's 
words, "may be said ••••• to have provided the bridge over which 
the legislative Council passes on its way to gain control of the 
2 
executive agencies of rule." In some territories the bridge was 
built before there was any traffic to use it, that is so say, 
before the legislative council was set up. Usually the two were 
set up slde by slde. The membera of the Executive Council, drawn 
usually from the ranks of the senior government officials, were 
expected to advise the Governor on problems of administration. 
As in the case of the Legislative Council, the Governor was under 
no obligation to accept the advice tendered to hiaL 
At firat the "unofficial" as well as the official members 
of these British colonial legislative bodies were Europeans. In 
the years following World War II, African representation increased 
substantially in almost every colonial territory. Then followed 
the introduction of participation by Africans into the Executiy. 
Council, the gradual removal of the official members and the 
removal of the Governor's reserve powers of legislation in the 
fields of defence and external affairs. 
1. Lord Hailey, AtrJ-~ p. 288. 
2. Ibid. 
-
-
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Progress towards eventual responsible and self-government was 
not without difficulties, however, and each step taken towards 
this goal increased national consciousness. In one senSe the 
introduction of African majority rule fulfilled the long standing 
dreams of the African elite. But in the post World War II 
period it became a focus of discontent. 
B. The Indirect Rule: 
The technique of ~overning African people through tradi-
tional chiefs and tribal institutions is one of the distinctive 
features of British Colonial Administration. Tbe father of the 
system, which is known as Indirect Rule, was Lord Lugard, fore-
most exponent of the "Dual Mandate". Like his contemporaries, 
Cecil Rhodes and Sir Harry Johnson, he was largely responsible 
for adding extensive areas in East and west Africa to the Empire. 
Lord Lugard later ju&tified these annexations on the ground of 
economic necessity. 
"AB 10n~ as our policy is one of trade, we are compelled to 
seek markets, for old ones are being closem to us by hostile 
tariffs, and our great dependencies, which formerly were 
consumers of our goods, are now becoming our co .. ercial rival •• 
It is inherent in great colonial and commercial Empires lit. 
ours that they go forward or backward •••• We are accountable to 
posterity that opportunities which now present themselves of 
extending the sphere of our industrial enterprise are not 
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neglected, for the opportunities now offered willO£ver occur 
again. ,,1 
In those days when the soldiers and merchant adventure.s 
were opening up Africa, there was no nonsense about "Trusteeship" 
of Africans and 'paramountcy of native interests'. Nevertheless 
faced with certain objective problems, the British had to estab-
lish a limited 'partnership' with the indigenous ruling elements. 
This was necessary in order to set up some rude form of govern-
ment to administer the extensive territories acquired in West 
Africa after the military power of the feudal autocracies in 
Northern Nigeria had been broken. 
The difficulties of maintaining 'law and order' were 
increased by the fact that for many years after the British 
occupation the country was still far from being pacitied. Many 
tribes were hostile and guerrila bands were in control of areas 
beyond the British garrisons. Without the co-operation of the 
traditional ruling class in holding the country together, anarchy 
would have resulted. The effects of tropical diseases upon 
Europeans were more deadly in those days than now, when hygenic 
methods and prophylactic measures insure against ... most results 
of these diseases. 
In the early days of this c~ few white men could be 
induced to settle in the colonies. Furthermore, the Home 
1. Lord Lugard: 'lbt Rise ~f our East,. ~tr.~ cIlllElnt~re, Vol. II 
p. 585. 
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Government was still deeply involved in the Boer War. The War 
office was in no position to send the re-inforcements which would 
have enabled Lulard to establish military occupation over every 
part of the country. It was in these circumstances that Indirect 
Rule came into being. Lugard was obliged to improvise with the 
resources at his disposal, in the hope things would turn out well 
as the British gradually consolidated and extended their grip. 
So instead of banishing the Sultans, Emirs and other rulers, 
Lugard called all the leading men in each chieftaincy together and 
appointed them rulers of their people, under the overall British 
control. The experiment succeeded beyond expectation. Many 
changes were eventually made to the system and the re-organised 
governmental systems of Native Administration was eventually 
extended throughout Africa. 
The essence of Indirect Rule was thus to govern through the 
traditional source of authority, the European official being there 
to advise and to supervise. In other words, the Chiefs became 
instruments and agents of the occupying power. They could be 
dismissed by the Governor if they tailed to carry out his ordera. 
African nationalist often bitterly criticised the system as 
one which either perverted the role of the chiefs by making him 
a British government officer, or one which propped up forces ot 
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1 African feudalism. But to its more idealistic exponents it was 
but a specialised road to self-government. Lugard wrote: 
"Liberty and self-govern.ent can best be secured 
to the native population by leaving them free to 
manage their own affairs through their own rulers." 2 
Rise of Nationalism: 
Nationalism in west Africa did not spring from opposition 
to settlers as in East and Central Africa so much as from the 
development of new classes who were detached, in part, from tribal 
society and made susceptible to European ideas by their role in 
the new trade which gradually supplanted the slave trade. 
Tbe earliest manifestation of African nationalism occurred 
in the Gold Coast in 1868, when the Fanti chiefs attempted to 
establish a confederation in order to defend their people against 
the warlike Ashanti on the one hand, and the political encroach-
ments of the British on the other. Alarmed by the aspirations 
ot the Gold Coast Africans to construct an independent, modern 
state on the West Coast of Africa, just at the ti~e Wben the 
Imperialist ~owers were conspiring to carve up the continent and 
consolidate spheres of influence, the British Lieutenant-Governor 
at cape Coast immediately se. about to destroy the confederation. 
The first thing he did was to order the arrest, on a charge of 
'conspiracy' of three of the leading cabinet Ministers of the 
African Government. 
1. Padmore, A(riQ& (1949) pp. 111-128. 
2. lugard, 'lhtL~l __ M.Qda~~ t,." Brii;ish Trop~_c.~.~ Africa (1922). 
-
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"This dangerous conspiracy must now be destroyed ~or good, 
or the country will become altogether unmanageable", wrote the 
Governor in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Although the arrested men were subsequently released on the orders 
of the Home Government, the Con~ederation was declared illegal. 
The British authorities in the Gold Coast threatened to "persecute 
any person or persons committing any overt acts on the part of the 
Confederation, especially the levying of taxes, assumption of 
judicial powers, and molestation of peaceful inhabitants following 
their lawful calling. nl 
With the spread of education, more and more of the younger 
natural rulers were becoming informed and imbued with pOlitical 
ideas approximattac those advocated by the Westernised intellectual 
classes. Africans trained in mission schools were being absorbed 
into the civil services. It became obvious that such an enlightened 
and intellectually vigorous middle-class community, acquainted with 
British political ideas and institutions, could not be fobbed off 
with indirect Rule. They were not prepared to tolerate the 
existing British dictatorship exercised by the GOvernor. This led 
to the introduction of Africans into the Lesi.lative COUncils. 
The administration, however, did not satisfy the Africans and they 
continued their agitation ~or a wide desree ot representation. 
1. Magnus samp, sO,n1 Gold eol!t Men ~~~airs.; C8sely Hayford, Gold kO!ll:o,.N.t.t. Y,l.ID:tUJl11oQ~; Jlladmore, A~r~~~. 
-
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By the time of World war I, which seemed to spell the begin-
ning of the end of European Imperialism and led to the enunciation 
of doctrines like 'national self-determination', there were several 
short-lived internation.l movements between American Negro reformers 
and African nationalists, which stressed the 'Pan-African' ideal. 
Their aims were modest. The immediate object was the increased 
participation of Africans in the colonial administration, and not 
under native administration buttheir ultimate goal was clear, "that 
in time, Africa be ruled by consent of Africans." 
Colonial rule represented the dominance of a privileged 
~inority and one moreover which was immediately distinguishable by 
the colour of its skin. Besides, in the last resolve and sometimes 
~ith little attempt at .isguise, the rule of the minority had been 
established and was inevitably sustained by force; and it was the 
actions of this minority, in fact its very presence, which set in 
train the s • .tes of social changes which gave birth to the nation-
alist movements. While these were, at first, limited to the 
coastal towns, particularly in West Africa, the ideas ortginated 
by them and the arguments they advanced were taken up and discussed 
in the innumerable local societies which were to be found wherever 
there was a concentration of the literate. 
The crUCial peant came when the recognition of rights vas 
bO longer requested but demanded, and it was World War II which 
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brought matters to a head. The war itself acted as a catalyst 
speeding up the economic and social changes which arose out of 
the very nature of the colonial systems. Administrative pressure 
to produce raw materials, closer government control of economy, 
an increase in the growth rate of towns and perhaps, above all, 
inflation without rise in incomes, servedto arouse more people 
than ever before. Support for the nationalist leaders spread 
inland from the coast, and often this new support implied change 
to a more radical leadership. African literates perceived the 
defeats and humiliations 8uffered by Britain in the early years 
of the war, and at the end of the war, the continent witnes.ed 
the return of thousands of ex-service men, .en who were experi-
enGing the aspiration towards re-hirth. ConditioDs were ripe 
for a change. Disturbed by the growing wave of anti-imperialist 
movements, the British Government in several of the colonies used 
its emergency powers to strike at political movements, associations 
and societies. 
The Development of Emergency Powers 
In carrying out their poliei.. of nineteenth century 
colonial expansion, Britain resorted to the sixteenth century 
method of granting Royal Charters to trading companies. These 
monopoly companies were the one8 that really laid the foupdations 
of most of the present British possessions in Africa. 
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The idea of a chartered company exercising the powers of 
government was a very old one in the British Empire - e.g. the 
~:ast India Company - but it bad fallen out of use largely because 
the early chartered compan~e8 had pressed monopolies of trade in 
the areas under their control which conflicted with the free-trade 
principle which became established in Britain during the nine-
teenth century. 
Under the charters of these companies was the provision 
empowering them to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the territories. Thus the Companies made laws for 
the territories under their jurisdiction, maintained their own 
armed forces, signed treaties with native rulers and declared war 
and peace. The Company agents carried the Union Jack into the 
hinterland of their territories at a time when the Imperial 
Government was not in a position to assume administrative respon-
sibilities for the territories. However, the Home Government 
supported the activities of the Companies by putting the services 
of the Royal Navy at its disposal in crushing all Native resistance 
to the predatory policy of the traders, who not only robbed but 
ill-treated the Natives. From time to time the tribes rebelled 
and burnt down the buildings of the Companies. On several 
occasions duria, this period the Royal Navy came to the assistance 
of the British traders. 
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In 1889, Cecil John Rhodes acquired a Royal Charter, which 
conferred greater powers of government than had hitherto been 
1 granted to any trading company. It provided inter alia, 
"S. 3 - 'ftle Company is hereby further authorised and empowered, 
subject to the approval of one of our Principal Secretaries of 
state (hereinafter referred to as "OUr Secretary of state") from 
time to time, to acquire by any concession agreement grant, 
treaty, all or any rights interests authorities jurisdictions 
and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including powers 
necessary tor the purposes of government and the preservation 
of public order in or for the protection of territories, lands 
or property comprised or referred to in the concessions and 
agreements made as : .afore.sid or affecting other territories, 
lands or property in Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and 
to hold, use and exercise auch territories, lands, property, 
rilhta, interesta, authorities, jurisdictions and powers res-
pectively for the purpose of the Company and on the terms of 
this Charter. 
S. 10 - The Company shall to the best of its ability preserve 
peace and order in such ways and manners as it shall consider 
necessary, and may with that object make ordinances (to be 
approved by our Secretsry o~ State) and may establish and main-
2 tain a force of police." 
1. Charter of the British south Africa Company, October 28, 1889. 
2. Published in 'London Gazette' of ~oth December 1889. 
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Instances are not unknown of trading company agents taking 
the law into their own hands and deliberately provoking war with 
the natives in order to find an excuse to use the Company's armed 
forces against the tribesmen and annex their lands. 
When the British Government officially began to administer 
its territories in Africa, the Foreign Office merely gave a 
general guide to the OOnsul. As a general guide for policy, the 
Consul had to turn to his instructions from the FOreign Office. 
Details were lett to him on the assumption that the man on the spot 
was the best qualified to take the initiative. Thus by Order-in-
Council, the Consul was empowered to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the territory. He, like the trading 
companies, could rely on naval aid from time to time for the 
punishment of any outrages. "In the exercise of the powers and 
authorities hereby conferred upon him, the High Commissioner may, 
amongst other things, from time to time by Proclamation provide 
for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and 
generally for the peace, order and good government of all persons 
within the limita of this order including the prohibition aDd 
punishment of acts tending to disturb the public peace. nl 
With the establishment of the Crown Colony system of 
government, the power to make special laws for the defence of 
the territory was specifically reserved to the Governor. Royal 
1. See IV Order-in-Council May 9, 1891 - Protect.rate of South 
Africa. 
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Instructions gave the Governor power to declare martial law and 
direct immediate trial by court martial of all persons owing 
allegiance to the British Government, who should be taken in arms 
in open hostility to the government or in the act of opposing its 
authority by force of arms or in the actual commission of an overt 
act of rebellion against the estate or in the act of openly aiding 
and abetting the enemies of the British Government. These powers 
were, therefore, to be used during the existence of any war~ in 
which the government might be engaged as well as during the 
existence of open rebellion against the authority of the government. 
With the rise of nationalism and agitation by educated and 
literate Africans for more representation in the government, the 
Governor-in-Council's power to legi81ate for preservation of 
public order found ample scope. 
In West Africa, because land had not been alienate. to 
European settlers, there was no nece8aity for Pass Laws and other 
forma of legislation tor controlling and regulating block labour 
on the lines of those passed in the Southern African territories 
and Kenya. Nonetheless, repressive legislation of a political 
character are not wanting. In the teeth of the strongest opposi-
l.-Professor Hood Phillips, a hiatory of the Criminal Law of England 
Vol.l, p.214 sums up the position when he 8ays "What on rare 
occasiona hasbeen called martial law aince 1628 by British Con-
stitutional writers has been a 8tate of affairs outside Great 
Britain, in which owing to civil ce..ation, the ordinary courta 
were unable to function and it vas therefore necessary to estab-
lish military tribunals. It i8 .erely an extended application 
of the principle ••• that the Executive is empowered to take any 
measures necesaary for the preservation of public order." 
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tion from the African members of the Legislative Council of the 
Gold Coast, the Criminal Code Amendment Ordinance, generally known 
as the "Sedition Ordinance", was introduced in 1934. Under this 
law the importation of any books, newspapers or documents which 
in the opinion of the Governor contain seditious writings, or 
the possession of them, would render the importer or possessor 
liable to imprisonment for three years. The innocent receiver 
of such 'seditious' or prohibited publication was also made liable 
to imprisonment for one year. 
Just bet·ore World War II, a similar Sedition Ordinance was 
enacted in Sierra Leone, together with three others: Incitement 
to Disaffection Ordinance and Deportation Ordinance and an undesir-
able Literature Ordinance. They were designea to curb political 
and industrial organisation or the masses of the people for better 
social and economic conditions. The regulations gave the Governor 
power to order the arrest, imprisonment and deportation of 
'undesirable' Africans without the right of trial before a Court. 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended. Then followinc the 
enactment of these measures, a number of African political leaders 
were imprisone~without trial under the autocratic powers vested 
in the Governor. This kind of dictator~al law was quite frequently 
imposed on the people with the support of the British Government. 
There are records of punitive expeditions sent to assist Governors 
to suppress insurrections. The Secretary of state for the 
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Colonies considered it necessary that any tribe which committed 
overt acts of violence should be punished promptly. The punish-
ment should be followed by such occupation as would ensure that 
the effects of the punishment would not be lost. FOllowing the 
rising by the Munshi in the Katsina country of Northern Nigeria 
in 1907, Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State at the time minuted: 
"I am afraid that we must recognise that 'punitive 
expeditions' cannot conform in all respects to the 
rule of civilised warfare. I have always opposed 
them for that very reason ..•• But we must use 
the weapon occasionally in an unsettled hinterland, 
and then the burn inK of villages and crops and the 
carrying off of stock are not 'reprehensible', they 
I 
are part of the machinery." 
In the other parts of British Africa, the position was not 
better. The comparative absence of tropical diseases and the 
much more temperate weather of the South, East and Central Africa 
had attracted vast number of European settlers. Tbis eventually 
created racial problems which were absent in west Africa. Though 
the vast majority of Africans were unlettered, their illiteracy 
had not prevented them from developing a racial and national 
consciousness. One reason was that in Africa news spread quickly 
and political ideas moved with an on-rush. In most of these 
territories, the political and 80cial aspirations of the Africans 
1. 00.446/62/14060 minute 3. August 1907 quoted by Hyam 
OPe cit. p. 21. 
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found expression tbrough the local Congress. Tbeir agitation 
against any discriminating legislation in politics, educational 
and industrial fields often led to enac~ment of repressive 
measures. An illustrative instance was the enactment of the 
Collective Punishment Ordinance of 1909 of Nyasaland. l 
In March, 1922, the champion of the East African Association-
the pioneer African political organisation in Kenya - was 
arrested for no other reason than that it rallied displaced 
tribes-men and tried to protect their land rights. After World 
War I, the British Government had begun to evict Africans frem 
the hilblands in order to make room for white settlers. Following 
the arrest of the leaders of the East African Association, there 
had been a general strike and it .eemed that the wbole African 
population had gathered sponteneously outside the police head-
quarters at Nairobi to demand the relea.e of their leader. 
There was tension, and the strain on the nerves of the police 
was great. There was firing and seveeal of the Africans were 
killed and wounded. The news flew over the country and the 
District Commissioner, tearing a general uprising immediately 
patrolled the territories with armed police; all meetings were 
banned and 80me leading nationalists were deported. 2 
1. No.5 of 1909. An ordinance whicb wa~re-.nacted as part 
of emergency regulations in 1959 - See Chap. 3. 
2. KenY8tta, Kenya: ~e. ~Lot Conflict. 
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Thus the Ordinance-making power of the Governor-in-Council 
covered legislation providing for extensive emergency powers, 
and it wa.·, this ordinance-making power that was frequently used 
in the Colonies up until World War II. 
Co-existe~,' with the power of the Governor-in-COuncil to 
legislate in the territory is the power of the Imperial Govern-
ment to enact any legislation specifically for any of its 
dependencies or to extend the operation of any enactment to any 
of its dependencies, by virtue of an Order-in-Council made in 
pursuance of power contained in the enactment. The system of 
crown colony government was built to accommodate this principle. 
Hence the mechanism of Crown colony government could be described 
as the inter-action between the imperial government and the 
colonial administrators. 
At the outbreak of World War II, the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act, 1939 was passed in Britain. This Act empowered 
"His Majesty •••. by Order-in-Council (to) make Regulations as 
appear to him necessary or expedient for securing the public 
safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public 
order and the efficient prosecution of the war and for maintain-
ing supplies and .ervices essential to the life of the 
communi ty. " This Act was extended to all Sri tish overseas 
dependencies or colonies by Order-in-Council made under Section 
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4 of the Act. Thus the Emergency Powers Order-in-Council 19391 
became the foundation of all definitive emergency legislation in 
the African countries within the commonwealth. 
The Emergency Powers Order-in-Council 1939 authorised the 
Governor to proclaim a state of emergency if be thought that there 
was a serious threat to public order, whereupon he would acquire 
virtually autocratic legislative and executive powers over 
persons and property. Section 3 of the Order-in-Council provided: 
"1be provision of Part II of this Order shall have 
effect in any territory in which they shall from time 
to time, in case of any public emergency be brought 
into operation by proclamation made by the Governor 
and shall continue in operation until a further pro-
clamation directing that they shall then cease to have 
effect except as respects things previously done or 
omitted to be done." 
The relevant part of Part II for the purpose of this study -
Section 6 - provided that: 
"(1) The Governor may make such Regulations: as may 
appear to him to be necessary or expedient for 
Securing the public safety, the defence of the 
territory, the maintenance of public order and 
the suppreSSion of mutiny, rebellion, riot and 
tor maiDtaiDin~ supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community." 
1. G. N. 56 of 1939. 
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This legislation was amended by the Emergency Powers Order 
in-Council 19561 by the substitution of a new section 3. The 
amendment provided that "if the Governor is satisfied that a 
public emergency exists he may be proclamation declare that the 
2 provision of Part II of this Order shall come into operation 
until the Governor by a further proclamation directs that they 
shall cease to have effect except as regards things previously 
done or omitted to be done." 
(2) A Proclamation under subsection (1) of this section 
may, if the Governor thinks fit to be made so to apply only to 
such part of the territory as may be specified in the Proclama-
tion (in this section called 'the emergency Jrea') in which case 
Regulations made under the said Part II shall, except as other-
wise expressly provided in such Regulations, have effect only in 
the emergency area: provided that for the avoidance of doubt it 
is hereby declared that the expreSSion 'the territory' in the 
said Part II shall not be construed as referring only to the 
emergency area." 
The difference between the repealed S. 3 and the new one 
would seem to be that (a) the ne~S.3 expressly gave the Governor 
a discretion to determine whether an emergency exists and (b) it 
empowered the Governor to proclaim an emergency in part only of 
a territory. 
This provision for an emergency and emergency powers shows 
the vesting of extraordinary powers, both executive and legisla-
1. S. 1. No. 731 of 1956. 
~. Essentially the same as Part II of the 1939 Or"r-in-Council. 
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tive in the hands of a single functionary without any safeguard 
for fundamental rights, and it would thus seem to be a legal and 
official confirmation of powers which had been utilized all 
through the early years of colonial administration at the ini-
tiative of the Governor. The powers given to the Governor sur-
passed by far the powers given in England to the British Govern-
ment and the servants of the Crown under corresponding laws and 
regulations. 
Although, the original Order-in-Council was passed at the 
time of World War II, the fact that it remained unrevoked and 
subsequently amended long after the war, put it in the category 
of permanent legislation rather than a temporary measure as its 
British parent Act was. Most emergencies which were proclaimed 
in the Colonies sub •• quent to the enactment of the Act were pro-
claimed under the Order-in-Council, and emergency powers which 
have been evolved and used in all the Britlab Colonies bave 
been based on and sometime originated from the precedent 
provision in Part II of the Emergency Powers Order-in-COuncil 
1939. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TYPES OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION 
The literal meaning of emergency one might say is a time 
of crisis and stress for there is no doubt that a period of 
emergency is a period of unusual strain which makes demands of 
and imposes great burdens on the state. The nature, magnitude, 
intensity and impact largely depend on two main faetors, viz, 
its phase and its cause. The greatest and gravest of emergencies 
can possibly result only from an armed conflict between nations 
whether it is called war or not. But an emergency need not 
necessarily arise with the outbreak of an armed conflict. There 
are, for instance, other conditions of emergency like the threat 
of internal subversion, which may be, though often is not nece-
ssarily related to armed conflict; the emergency caused by a 
breakdown in the economy; emergency caused by riots, strikes in 
strategic serviees and industries, and generally by the break-
down of law and order. 
The types of emergencies which stand out in modern times, 
however, may be classified under three main headings: 
1. The aotual conduct of war or the preparatton 
to meet its imminent occurrence. In this 
eategory may be conveniently placed not only 
international warfare but also internal armed 
conflict, i.e. civil war. 
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~. The threat or presence of internal sub-
version which may not necessarily be related 
to armed conflict. 
3. The emergency caused by a breakdown or poten-
tial breakdown in the economy. 
Most modern constitutions do not address themselves very 
specifically to any of these three great emergencies. In fact, 
in the African Constitutions under discussion, there is a 
I juxtapOSition of the word 'war' with 'emergency'. But they 
do grant the Government the power to declare war and to provide 
for the common defence of the State, and they speak in some 
detail on the subject of emergency. 
The three types of emergencies do not possess the same 
characteristics nor is the judicial attitude towards them always 
comparable. For example, while some independent African states 
permit detention without trial durin« times of war as well as 
peace, other nations of the world have limited such power to 
times of war only. It may well be that the African approach 
merely gives recognition to the realities of modern international 
relations, where the formal declaration of war is increasingly 
anachronistic in an era when military success may depend almost 
entirely on surprise and when external conquest may be most 
1. See S. 70, Nigerian Constitution 1963. Also S.ll E.P.A. 
1961, Ghana "emergency" includes any crisis. 
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effectively pursued by methods of internal subversion. 
The fact remains that modern Governments do equip them-
selves with emer~ency powers by means of le~islation, in 
readiness to meet any emergency whether arising out of war 
involvement due to external aggression or local emergency due 
to internal upheaval. 
In the newly independent African States within the 
Commonwealth, there are four main types of legislative provision 
for dealing with emergencies. They are:-
(1) The colonial legislation of pre-Independence 
period which was passed by the Imperial 
Parliament for all its dependencies. 
(2) Local legislation enacted by the independent 
sovereign Parliament of the state 800n after 
independence to replace the colonial legislation. 
(3) Emergency-type legislation, which are regarded 
as permanent statute law which may be used at 
any time, whether or not there is in existence 
or in force a proclamation of emergency as 
provided for in the Constitution. 
(4) Public Security measures which may include the 
ordinary law and order measures but possibly 
with extra provision contering enhanced power 
on certain ofticers of law. 
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1. The Colonial l~gislation. 
1 We have already discussed how the need arose for the 
enactment of emergency legislation by the Imperial Government 
in Britain for its dependencies. The Emergency Powers 
Order-in-Council 19~~ as amended by the various subsequent 
orders from 1956-6~ was the basis and origin of specific 
legislative provision for emergency powers in African countries. 
This statute which w.s very similar to the British Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, was intended to be a 'te~orary' 
measure, in the sense that it could only be brought into 
operation after a proclamation that a state of emergency vas 
in existence and must cease to have effect as soon as the 
emergency ceased to exist. Some of the independent African 
Countries, in particular, Kenya and Malawi still retain the 
Orders-in-Council and because of this, it is necessary to 
give the text and see the extent and scope of the legislation. 
2 The Emergency Powers Order-in-Council 1939, authorised 
the Governor to proclaim a state of emergency; if he thinks 
that there is a serious threat to public order, whereupon be 
would acquire virtually autocratic legislative and executive 
powers over persons and property. 
1. See Chapter 1. 
2. G. N. 56 of 1939. 
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Section 3 of the Order provides: 
"The provision of Part II of this Order shall have effect 
in any territory in which they shall from time to time, in case 
of any public emergency be brought into operation by proclama-
tion maae by the Governor, and shall continue in operation 
until a further proclamation directing that they shall cease 
to have effect except as respects things previously done or 
omitted to be done." 
1be relevant part of Part II for the purpose of this 
study provides: 
"section 6(1) The Governor may make such regulations as 
may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the 
public sarety, the defence of the territory, the maintenance 
of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion, riot 
and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the lire 
of the community. 
2. Without prejudice to the ~enerality of the powers coo-
ferrea by the preceeding subsection, the reKulations may, so 
rar as appears to the Governor to be necessary or expedient for 
any of the purposes mentioned in that sub-section: 
(a) Make provision for the detention of persons 
and the deportation and exclusion of persons 
from the terricory ••••••••• 
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(b) authorise 
i. the taking of possession or control, on 
bebalf of His Majesty of any property or 
undertaking. 
ii. the acquisition on behalf of His Majesty 
of any property other than land. 
(c) authorise the entering and search of premises. 
(d) provide for amending any law, for suspending 
the operation of any law for applying any law 
with or without modification. 
(e)provide for charging in respect of the grant or 
issue of any licence, permit, certificate or 
other document for the purposes of the regulations, 
such fee as may be prescribed by or under the 
regulations. 
(f) provide for the payment of compensation or re-
numeration to persons affected by the regulations. 
(g) provide for the apprehension, trial and punish-
ment of any persons offending against the regula-
tions, provided that nothing in this section shall 
authorise the making of provisions for the trial 
of persons by Military Courts." 
This Order was amended by the Emergency Powers Order-in-
Council 1956.1 But the only substantive change was the sub-
stitution of a new Section 3 which provides: 
1. S. 1, 1956 No. 731. 
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"(1) If the Governor is satisfied that a public emergency 
exists he may be proclamation declare that the provisions of 
I Part II of this Order shall come into operation until the 
Governor by a further proclamation directs that they shall 
cease to have effect except as regards things previously done 
or omitted to be done." 
(2) A Proclamation under sUb-section (i) of this section, 
may, if the Governor thinks fit be made so to apply only to 
such part of the territory as may be specified in the procla-
mation (in this section called "emergency area") in Which . 
case regulations made under the said Part II shall, except as 
otherwise expressly provided in such regulations, have effect 
only in the emergency area: provided that for the avoidance of 
doubt it is hereby declared that the expression 'the territory' 
in the said Part II shall not be construed as referring only 
to the emergency area." 
The difference between the repealed section 3 and the 
substituted one would seem to be that (a) the new section 3 
expressly gives the Governor a discretion to determine whether 
an emergency exists and (b) it empower8':the Governor to 
proclaim an emergency in part only of a territory. 
The Pro_is ions above show the vesting of extraordinary 
powers, both executive and legislative in the hands of a simple 
functionary without any safeguard against ab.... The powers 
1. ESsentially the same as Part II of the 1939 Order. 
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given are so extensive that they allow any degree of inter-
ference with the citizen. This legislation still constitute 
part of the law of some African States, with such alterations 
as are necessitated by the grant of independence in the first 
place and later by the conversion of such state~ into republics 
within the Commonwealth. Now, in both Kenya and Malawi, where 
the Orders have been retained, it is the President who proclaims 
a state of public emer~ency and the President who is authorised 
to make whatever regulations may be considered necessary for 
the purposes mentioned in the provisions of the statute. 
2. Local ~nactments 
In all the newly independent African states within the 
Commonwealth, the colonial emergency legislation was maintained 
and was provided to be maintained until such a time as the 
Sovereign Parliament of each state thought fit to replace them 
by its own legislation. Of the African states within our 
particular area, only Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda have enacteu 
specific emergency legislation to replace the colonial Orders-
in-Council. 
Shortly after independence, the operation of the Orders-
in-Council in Ghana was terminated by a new Emergency Powers 
Act, 1957. The 1~57 legislation was, however, repealed by the 
1 Emergency Powers Act, 1961 which is now the current statute. 
1. Act 56 - Sec. 12. 
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It provides, inter alia: 
"1. If the President is satisfied that a state 
of emergency exists in Ghana or in any part of 
Ghana, he may, with the approval of the Cabinet, 
by le~islative instrument, proclaim a state of 
emergency in the whole of Ghana or in that part 
of GhanR where the emergency exists, as the case 
may be. 
~. (1) Where a state of emergency is proclaimed 
in the whole of Ghana under Section 1 of this 
Act it shall be forthwith communicated to the 
National Assembly. If the National Assembly 
is not sitting and is not likely to sit within 
ten days after the proclamation the President 
shall summon the National Assembly to meet Dot 
later than ten days after the proclamation is 
made. 
(2) If the state of emergency is proclaimed in 
part only of Ghana it shall be communicated to 
the National Assembly at once if it is sitting 
or, if not, as soon as it meets. 
3. (1) On the making of a proclamation under section 
1 of this Act, the President with the approval 
of the cabinet may, by legislative instrnment, 
make such regulations as he may consider nece-
ssary or expedient for securing the public 
safety, the defence of Ghana, the maintenance 
of public order, the efficient prosecution of 
any war in which the Republic may ~. engaged, 
and for maintaining supplies and services 
essential to the community in the whole or any 
part of Ghana. 
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(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-section 
(1) regulations may be made under this section for 
the following purposes -
(a) in the case of an emergency affecting the 
whole of Ghana -
(i) the detention of persons or the 
restriction of their movements; 
(ii) the deportation and exclusion from 
Ghana of persons not being citizens 
of Ghana; 
(iii) the prevention of assistance to an 
enemy in case of war. 
(b) in the case of an emergency affecting only 
part of Ghana, the detention of any person. 
for the commission of any act in relation 
to the state of emergency and the exclusion 
Of any person from the emergency area; 
(c) in the case of an emergency affecting the 
whole or any part of Ghana -
(i) taking possession or control, On behalf 
of the Republic, of any property or 
undertaking; 
(ii) the acquisition of any property other 
than land; 
(iii) entering and search any premises; 
(iv) amending any law, or suspending the 
operation of any law; 
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(v) charging, in respect of the grant or issue of 
any licence, permit, certificate or other documents 
for the purposes of the regulations, such fee as 
may be prescribed by or under the regulations; 
(vi) payment of compensation and renumeration to 
persons affected by the regulations; 
(vii) imposing penalties for the breach of any of the 
regulations not exceeding imprisonment for five 
years or a fine of ~500 or both; 
(viii)the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons 
offending against the regulHtions. 
(3) Where a state of emergency is proclaimed in respect of 
a part only of Ghana regulations made under this 
section shall only apply in that part. 
(4) Regulations made under section J of this Act -
(a) may empower authorities or persons specified in 
the regulations to make orders or rules for any 
of the purposes for which regulations are autho-
rised by this Act to be made; 
(b) may contain such incidental and supplementary 
provisions as appear to the President with the 
approval of the cabinet to be necessary or 
expedient for the purposes oi ~he regulHtions. 
7. Regulations or other instruments made under the prOVisions 
of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything incon-
sistent there.tth in any law; and any provision of a law which 
may be inconsistent therewith in any law; and any provision of 
a law which may be inconsistent with any such regulation or 
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instrument shall, to the extent of such inconsistency have no 
effect so long as the regulation or other instrument is in 
force. 
11. In this Act, unless the context otherwise require -
"emergency" includes any emergency arising out of any action 
taken or immediately threatened whether in or outside Ghana 
by any person or persons and from its nature or acale likely 
to be prejudicial in Ghana to the public safety or public 
order or public health, or to deprive any substantial portion 
of the community of the essentials of life, or to interfere in 
any way with Government services and also includes any 
emergency arising out of an event due to natural eauses with 
or without human intervention;" 
In Uganda, the colonial Emergency Powers Orders-in-
Council were continued in existence until the 26th February, 
1963,1 several months after independence had been granted, 
when the National Assembly enacted the Emergency Powers Act, 
1963,2 section 6 of which provides that: 
"On the cOllmencement of this Act the Dnergency 
Powers Orders-in-Council 19a9 to 1961, shall 
cease to have effect as part of the law of 
Uganda." 
1. Uganda (Independence) Order in Oouncil had provided that 
t6ey would cease to have effect on March 9, 1963, if not 
repealed earlier by Parliament. 
2. cap. 307. 
-
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The provisions of the Emergency Powers Act, 1963 of Uganda 
on a superficial reading,seem very similar to the Ghana Act of 
the same name and to the Nigerian Act too. But in each of the 
states, there are substantial differences which make it necessary 
to quote in detail some of the provisions in order to appreciate 
the differences. 
alia: 
The Emergency Powers Act, 1963 of Uganda provides, inter 
"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise 
requires - 'emergency proclamation' means 
a proclamation under section 30 of the Con-
stitution declaring that a state of public 
emergency exists. 
3. (1) Wherever an emergency proclamation is in 
force the Governor-General may make such 
regulations as appear to him to be nece-
ssary or expedient for securing the public 
safety, the defence of Uganda, the main-
tenance of public order and the suppression 
of mutiny, rebellion, riot and for maintain-
ing supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred 
by 8ub-section (1) of thi8 section, emergency regulations 
may so far as appears to the Governor-General to be nece-
ssary or expedient for any of the purposes mentioned in 
that sub-section -
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(a) make provision for the detention of persons or the 
restriction of their movements, and for the deportation 
and exclusion from Uganda of persons who are not citizens 
of Uganda. 
(b) authorise-
(i) the taking of possession or control on behalf 
of the Government of any property or undertaking; 
(ii) the acquisition on behalf of the Government of 
any property other than lKnd. 
tc} authorise the entering and search of any premises 
(d) provide for amending any law, for suspendiug the operation 
of any law, and for applying any law with or without 
modification; 
(e) provide for charging, in respect of the grant or issue of 
any licence, permit, certificate, or other document for 
the purposes of the regulation, such fee 8S may be pre-
scribed by or under the regulations; 
(f) provide for payment of compensation and renumeration to 
person affected by the regulations; 
(g) provide for the apprehension, trial, and punishment of 
persons offending against the regulations: 
ProVided that nothing in this section shall authorise the 
making of provisions for the trial of persons by Military Courts. 
(3) Emergency regulations may provide for empowering such 
authorities or persons as may be specified in the regulations 
to make orders and rules for any of the purposes for which such 
regulations are authorised by this Act to be made, 7 3 
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and may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions 
as appear to the Governor-General to be necessary or expedient 
for the purposes of the regulation;. 
(4) Emergency regulations shall specify the area to which they 
apply, and may coniain provision for the exclusion of persons 
from the area so specified if it consists of only a part of 
Uganda. 
4. (l)Emergency regulations and any orders or rules made in 
pursuance of emergency regulations shall ba~e effect notwith-
standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law; 
and any provision of a law which may be inconsistent with any 
emergency regulation or any such order or rule shall, whether 
or not that provision has been amended, modified or suspended 
in its operation under section 3 of this Act, to the extent 
of such inconsistency have no effect so long as such regulation 
order or rule remains in force." 
In Nigeria, the Emergency Powers Act, 1961 whicb became 
law on March 30, 1961 replaced the colonial legislation. By 
section 6 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1960, 
the Emergency Powers Orders-in-Council 1939 to 1959 were retained 
in force until "the thirtieth day of March, 1961, or such 
earlier date as may be prescribed by the Parliament of the 
Federation of Nigeria." In order words, this emergency legis-
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lation was to be on the statute book before the necessity to 
use it should arise. It provides, inter alia that: 
"3.(1) During a period of emergency, the Governor-
General-in-Council may make such regulations 
as appear to him to be necessary or expedient 
for the purpose of maintaining and seCUring 
peace order and good government in Nigeria 
or any part thereof. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the 
powers conferred by sUb-aection (1), the 
regulations may, so far as appear to the 
Governor-General-in-Council to be necessary 
or expedient for any of the purposes mentioned 
in that sub-section -
(a) make provision for the detention of persons 
and the deportation and exclusion of persons 
from Nigeria or any part thereof. 
(b) authorise-
(i) the taking of posseSSion or control on 
behalf of the Government of the Federation 
any property or undertaking. 
(ii) the acquisition on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the Federation of any property 
other than land. 
(c) author i.e the entering and search of any 
premises. 
(d) provide for amending any law, for suspending 
the operation of any law and for applying any 
law with or without modification. 
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~e) provide for charging in respect of the grant or 
issue of any licence, permit, certificate or other 
document for the purposes of the regulations such 
fee! as may be prescribed by or under the 
regulations. 
(f) provide for payment of compensation and renumeration 
to persons affected by the regulations. 
(g) provide for the apprehension, trial and punishment 
of persons offending again8t the regulations. 
(h) provide for maintaining such supplies and services 
as are, in the opinion of the Governor-General-in-
Council, essential to the life of the Community. 
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall authorise 
the making of provision, for the trial of persons by Military 
Courts. 
(3) Tbe payment of any compensation or renumeration under 
the provisions of such regulation shall be a charge upon the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, 
(4) Regulations made under this sub-section shall apply to 
the whole of Nigeria or to such part or parts thereof as may 
be specified in the regulations. 
4. Regulations made under section 3 may provide for empowering such 
authorities or persons as may be specified in the regulations to 
make orders and rules for any of the purposes for which the 
regulations are authoris.d by this Act to be made and may contain 
sucb incidental and supplementary proviSions as appear to the 
Governor-General-in-Coancil to be' necessary or expedient for the 
purposes of the regulations. 
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6. Every regulation made under section 3 and every order or 
rule made in pursuance of such a regulation shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any 
law; and any provision of a law which is inconsistent with any 
such regulation order orrule shall, whether that prOvision has 
or has not been amended modified or suspended in its operation 
under this Act, to the extent of such inconsistency have no 
effect so long as such regulations order or rule remain in force. 
7. Every document purporting to be an instrument made or 
issued by the Governor-General-in-Council or any other authority 
or person in pursuance of this Act, or of any regulation made 
under section 3 and to be signed by or on behalf of the Governor-
General-in-Council or such other authority or person, shall be 
received in evidence and shall until the contrary is proved, 
be deemed to be an instrument made or issued by the Governor-
General-in-Council or that authority or person." 
It is obvious that draftsmen of the Local enactments have 
substantially re-enacted the colonial legislation, and this 
accounts for the similarities in wording and provision between 
the three countries under consideration. However, several 
additions and divergencies have been made in the local enact-
ments. The Ghana legislation is much more comprehensive than 
those of Nigeria and Uganda. Whereas, in Ghana, there is 
specific distinction between a 'national' emergency and 'local' 
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emergency, no such distinction is particularly stressed in 
either of the other two countries. The powers which may be 
assumed in a national emergency, that is, an emergency involving 
the whole of the country, are far more extensive than those 
I 
necessary for a localised emergency. Therefore, whereas in 
Ghana when a state of emergency is proclaimed in a particular 
area, any regulations made will apply only to that area, in 
both Uganda and Nigeria regulations may be general in terms and 
then specified to any area in which the need should arise. 
Only in Ghana is the penalty for breach of a regulation 
specifically laid down,2 and thus defining the scope of 
judicial interference and only in Nigeria is it provided that 
the payment of compensation and renumeration to persons affected 
by any regulations shall be charged on the Consolidated Revenue 
FUnd. 3 It is assumed that this unusual provision is made in 
order to ensure the minimum possible delay in ensuring payment 
and moreover provide a measure of security for those who will 
be innocently affected since the Consolidated Revenue Fund is not 
subjected to annual parliamentary approval. 
A difference of some importance also occurs in the Nigerian 
enactment. It is provided that regulations may authorise the 
deportation and exclusion of persons from Nigeria or any part 
thereof, without any specification as in Ghana and Uganda, that 
1. Sec. 3(2)(a) and (b). 
~. Sec.3(2)(c)(vii) E. P. A. 1961 Ghana 
3. Sec.3(3) E. P. A. 1961 Kigeria. 
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such persons must not be citizens of the country. While it is 
quite acceptable that the provision may mean that a citizen may 
be deported from one part of the country to another, yet the 
lack of specification could create some important practical 
difficulties where an order is made purporting to deport or 
exclude from the country a citizen of the country. No country 
is legally bound to accept nationals of other countries, the 
situation could, therefore, arise that if no country is prepared 
to accept a deported Nigerian citizen, the latter is placed 
in the unenviable position of spending his life on the seas 
unless the deportation order is revoked. Where the citizenship 
of the deported person is in doubt, of-course, the burden of 
proving that he belongs to any particular country lies on him. 
Lastly, there are notable differences in the proviSions 
for laying regulations before Parliament, which we shall con-
sider later. l There is no doubt, however, that all the enact-
ments confer very formidable powers on the Executive. Taking 
a purely legalistic approach, the power of the executive to 
make rules and regulations having legislative effect is derived 
from the express mandate of parliament. 
Perhaps the only consolation is in the fact that the 
powers created for the executive can be of only temporary 
duration. 
1. See Chap. Six. 
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Emergency-type legislation: 
Most of the countries within this area of study leave it to 
the Executive to declare or proclaim a state of public emergency, 
but within a stated period of time, the Executive must obtain 
Parliamentary confirmation of its decision. Amongst the grounds 
on Which a declaration of emergency might be justified is that 
1 
"democratic institution are threatened by subversion." It is 
to deal with this type of emergency that some of these African 
states, in particular Ghana and Tanzania, have enacted a standing 
legislation to be used as and when the occasion arises without 
the need necessarily to proclaim or declare a state of public 
emergency. These enactments provide the Executive with the power 
of preventive detention. The preventive detention legislation 
of both Ghana and Tanzania, called Preventive Detention Acts,2 
are very similar indeed and the differences are so few that it 
is proposed to quote here on~ that of Tanzania as an example 
of the scope of suc~ legislation. Besides, the Ghana Act bas 
now been repealed. 
The Preventive Detention Act, 1962,3 of Tangayika provides, 
inter alia: 
"2 - (1) Where -
1. See S.70(3)(c) of Nigerian Constitution 1963. 
~. Preventive Detention Act 1958 of Ghana as amended by 1961 
Act and 1964 Act. 
3. Act No. 60 of 1962. 
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(a) It is shown to the satisfaction of the President 
that any person is conducting himself so as to be 
dangerous to peace and good order in any part of 
Tangayika or the security of the state, or 
(b) The Presiuent is satisfied that an order under this 
section is necessary to prevent any person acting 
in a manner prejudicial to peace and good order in 
any part of Tanganyika, or the defence of Tanganyika 
or the security of the State, the President may, 
by order under his hand and the Public Seal, direct 
the detention of that person. 
(~) Unless the President is satisfied that it is not 
feasible or practicable to reQuire that any particular item of 
information shall be "iven on oath, he shall require that any 
information on which he satisfied himself that a person is 
conducting himself or acting in any manner aforesaid or that 
it is necessary that an order be made, as the case may be, 
shall be given on oath. 
~. No order made under this Act sball be questioned in 
any Court. 
4. (1) An order under this Act shall constitute an 
authority to any police officer to arrest the person in respect 
of whom it is made and for any police officer or prison officer 
to detain such person as a civil prisoner in custody or in 
prison; and such person shall, while detained in pursuance of 
the order, be in lawful custody. 
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(2) The President may make regulation -
(a) applying to persons detained under orders made 
under this Act, any of the provisions of the 
Prisons Ordinance or of any rules made thereunder 
relating to convicted criminal prisoners and dis-
applying in relation to such persons any of such 
provisions relating to civil prisoners; and 
(b) prohibiting, regulating and controllins visits to, 
and correspondence to or from, such persons; 
and where the President makes any such regulations, 
the Prisons Ordinance andany rules made thereunder 
shall have effect in relation to such persons 
subject to the provisions of such regUlations. 
5. The President may -
(a) rescind any order made under this Act; 
(b) direct that the operation of an order made under 
this Act be suspended subject to such conditions, 
if any, as may be specified in such direction. 
(i) requiring the person in respect of whom the order 
is made to notify his movements in such manner, 
at such times and to such authority or person 
as may be so specified; and 
(ii) requiring him to enter into a bond with or without 
securities for the observance of any Such con-
ditions aforesaid; and if that person fails to 
comply with a condition attached to such a 
direction, he shall, whether or not the direction 
is revoked, be detained under the original order. 
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6. A person detained under this Act shall, not later, than 
fifteen days from the beginning of his detention, be informed of 
the grounds on which he is beinp-: detained and shall be afforded 
an op~ortunity of making representations in writing to the 
President with respect to the order under which he is detained. 
7. - (1) There shall bean Advisory Committee which shall 
consist of 
(a) a Chairman and two members appointed by the 
President, and (b) Two members appointed by 
the Chief Justice. 
(2) A member of the Advisory Committee may resign his 
membership by writing under his hand addressed to 
the person by whom he was appointed. 
(3) The quorum of the Advisory Committee shall be three, 
of whom one shall be the Chairman, one shall be 
another member appointed by the President and one 
shall be a member appointed by the Chief Justice. 
(4) The President shall refer to the Advisory Committee 
every order made under the Act -
(a) where representations have been made in pur-
suance of section 6 as soon as may be after the 
making of such representations. 
(b) where no such representations have been made, 
within a year of the order being made and 
thereafter at intervals not exceeding a year 
(unless such order has previously been rescinded)~1 
and shall inform the Committee of the ground on 
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which the order was made and such other matters 
relating to the person detained as are relevant 
to his continued detention, and shall provide the 
Committee with a copy of all representations made 
by the person detained. 
(5)The Committee shall be afforded an opportunity of inter-
viewing any person detained under the order referred to 
them under this section, at any place where such person 
is detained. 
(6)The Committee shall advise the Presiuent whether, in 
their opinion, an order made under this Act should be 
continued or rescinded or suspended, but the President 
shall not be required to act in accordance with the 
advice of the Committee. 
Unlike its Tanganyika counterpart, the Ghanian legislation 
waS to be temporary, as preventive detention was never intended 
to be "part of the permanent system of government,,,l and 
therefore, five years duration was stipulated though this could 
be extended by resolution of Parliament for a further three years. 
In 1963, the Act2 was given a fresh five years term. tly its 
provisions, the President was empowered to order the detention of 
any citizen of Ghana - in Tanzania it is "any person" - if 
satistied that it was necessary to prevent h!m from acting in a 
manner prejudicial to the security of the state. 3 The detention 
1. W. p. No. 7/61 p. 34. 
~. Act 17. Preventive Detention Act 1958 as amended by 1962 and 
1963 Preventive Detention (Amendment) Acts. The 1964 Act, 
Act 240, 1964 which amended and consolidated the existing law 
has now been repealed. 
3. See 2 P. D. A. 196~. 
-68-
could be for an initial period of five years - whereas there 
is neither a minimum nor a maximum period in Tanzania - which 
the President could extend for another five years at any time 
before the expiration of the initial period. As in Tanzania, 
the detainee could make representations in writing to the 
President, but unlike Tanzania, the right of access to the 
court was not expressly forbidden. 
Whilst only Ghana and Tanzania of the African States 
within the area of this study have 80 far enacted specific 
preventive detention legislation, there is provision in the 
Constitution for all of them for the enactment of such laws, 
when it is necessary in the interest of public security and 
the defence of the state. The qu~~tion must, therefore, in-
evitably arise whether or not a nation should have preventive 
detention legislation as a regular feature of law. Must a 
nation depend, particularly when an emergency is not in exis-
tence, for protecting the security of the state or public 
order or the supplies of commodities essential to the community 
on laws of preventive detention? Or should the nation 
perfect the ordinary criminal law machinery, by suitably 
amending existing laws if their constitutionality has become 
questionable; by reinforcing them if their provisions are 
discovered to be insuffiCient; and by improving the intelli-
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gence, prosecution and other means of the Executive, if these 
are unequal to the task of bri~g offenders to book under the 
ordinary criminal law? 
The opinion of the African leaders are well illustrated 
in the following extracts. President Nyerere of Tanzania,l 
whilst realising that preventive detention is a very serious 
matter because "it means thAt you are imprisoning a man, when 
he bas not broken any written law, when you cannot be sure of 
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he has done so ••••• Few 
things are more dangerous to the freedom of a society than that. 
For freedom is indiviSible, and with such an opportunity open 
to the Government, the freedom of every subject is reduced." 
Yet, he believed that in preserving national security other 
principles conflict, and "our ideals must guide and not blind 
us", and, therefore, he would rather have legislation which can 
be speedily made operative. He asserted, 
"In the idealistic sense of the word, it is 'better' 
that 99 guilty men should go tree rather than one 
innocent man being punished. But in the cirCUmstances 
of a nation like ours, other factors have to be taken 
into account. Here, in this Union, conditions may 
well arise in which it is better that 99 innocent 
people should suffer temporary detention than that 
one possible traitor should wreck the nation; it 
would certainly be complete madness to let 99 guilty 
men escape in order to avoid the risk of punishing one 
innocent person."2 
1. Speech inaugurating the University, Dar-es-Salaam as quoted 
by rranck; COmparatiy!......CO~.!I'tJ_t~J!~11 _P~5»_~!!'s p. 231. 
2. Ibid. 
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That is as may be, but if the nation were so much in 
danger which must be obvious to the majority of the nation, 
might it not be more representative of mass will to have a 
declaration of an emergency as provided for in the Constitution, 
thus bringing into operation the emergency legislation which is 
sub,iect to control by the representatives of the people in ,the 
National Assembly rather than have power concentrated in the 
hands of one man, the President, on whom alone such extensive 
discretionary power has been conferred and the exercise of 
whose discretion is virtually absolute, in spite of the provi-
sion for an Advisory Committee?l 
On the same question, President Kaunda of Zambia, wrote: 
"When a state of war exists, all nations restrict 
certain freedoms in the interest of national survival. 
The new states of Africa are in such a condition of 
national mobilisation. They are at war against 
terrible though impersonal enemies. There is not 
time for endless debate and arguing ~which the 
procedure for proclamation of a state of public 
emergency in accordance with constitutional pro-
visions would entail-l. Decisions have to be taken 
quickly and decisively. Inevitably, therefore, the 
Legislat"re ceases to be the major force of power. 
It is not unimportant as a forum of national debate 
and a sounding board of public opinion. But most 
leaders in the new Africa £ind themselves having to 
take initiatives and formulate policies which in the 
1. This will be discussed under Safeguards to abuse of Power 
in the Chap. Six. 
-71-
older societies of the West woula emerge from the 
somewhat leisurely process of parliamentary debate 
•••••• I believe that men may be truly free when 
serving dedicated nation which in the interests of 
survival has to control to a certain extent their 
freedoms."l 
One cannot quarrel with the last sentence of this opinion 
because it is in recognition of this necessity that most nations 
provide for emergency by legislation but one cannot say that it 
is sufficient justification for extra-emergency-type legislation 
as a permanent feature of the law. It could well amount to 
the citizenry livin~ in a permanent state of-emergency. 
Other Public Security Measures 
Apart from the definitive emergency legislation which can 
be brought into operation only after a proclamation that a 
state of emergency exists, and those permanent emergency-type 
legislution mainly meant to be used to deal with subversion or 
threatened subversion by internal forces within the State, most 
countries have othee legislation directed at preserving public 
order generally, which may be used 88'.0 integral part of the 
plan to deal with emergency. Under this heading must come the 
various Public Order Acts, Preservation of Public Security 
legislation and also the ordinary Criminal law of the land. 
It is not proposed to dwell on the latter but it is proposed 
to have a look at one of the other types of legislation. Such 
1. Colin MorriS, A humanist in Africa: Letters to Oolin 
Morris by Kaunda p. 108. 
-
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powers as are conferred by this type of legislation are usually 
in addition to and never in derogation of whatever powers may 
be conferred by the actual emergency legislation. Thus, after 
the end of the l<1au Mau &nergency in Kenya in l~60, it was pro-
posed to transform a few essential emergency powers into ordinary 
law and the Preservation of Public Security Act was enacted. The 
Act which is in three parts defines "preservatiou of public 
security" thus: 
,,~. In this Act ...•••••••• includes -
(a) the defence of territory and people of Kenya; 
(b) the securing of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual; 
(c) the securing of the sa£ety of persons and 
property; 
(d) the prevention and suppression of rebellion, 
mutiny, violence, intimidation, disorder and 
ervince, and unlawful attempts and conspiracies 
to overthrow the Government or the Constitution; 
(e) the maintenance of the administration of justice; 
(f) the provision of a sufficiency of the supplies 
and services essential to the life and wellbeing 
of the community, their equitable distribution 
and availability at fair prices; and 
(g) the provision of administrative and remedial 
measures during periods of actual or apprehen-
sible national danger or calamity, or in conse-
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quence of any disaster or destruction arising from 
1 
natural causes." 
Then the Act empowers the President to bring into 
operation by notice published in the Gazette, part II of the 
Act if it appears to him "that it is necessary ru,' the preser-
2 
vation of public security to cb so, tt section 3 SUb-section 2 
of which provides:-
"Where a notice under sub-section (ii) of this 
section has been published, and so long as the 
notice is in force, it sball be lawful for the 
President, to the extent to which this Act is 
brought into operation, and subject to the Con-
stitution, to make regulations for the preservation 
of public security." 
The power to make regulations is very extensive indeed 
and may cover any of several matters which can also be covered 
during a period of emergency. In fact this situation is 
visualised in the Constitution itself because the language 
used in section 29 o! the Republican Constitution 1964 is 
virtually the same as the provi~ion for an emergency. It 
states: (in part) 
n(l) If at any time it appears to the Pre&ii.dent 
that it is necessary for the preservation of 
pUblic security to do so, he may by notice 
published in the Gazette declare that Part II 
1. A definition very similar to the definition of 'emergency' 
under S. 11 of the E. P. A. (Ghana), 1961. 
~. Sec. 3(1). 
.. 
-74-
of the Preservation of Public Security Act 1~60 
shall come into o-peration in Kenya or in any part." 
'!be various matters, among others, on wl1ich regulations 
may be made are specified in Part II of the Act. Regulations 
may make provision for - Section 4. Sub-section (~) 
"(2) - (a) the detention of persons; 
(b) the registration, restriction of movement 
(into, out of or within Kenya), and compulsory 
movement of persons, including the imposition 
of curfew; 
(c) the control of aliens, including the removal 
of diplomatic privileges; 
(d) the censorship, control of prohibition of the 
communications of information or of any means 
of communicating or of recording ideas or 
information, including any publication or 
document, and the prevention of dissemination 
of false reports; 
(e) the control or prohibition of the acquisition, 
possession, disposition or use of any movable 
or immovable property or undertaking; 
(f) the compulsory acquisition, requisitioning, 
control or disposition of any movable or 
immovable property or undertaking; 
(g) requiring persons to do work or render services, 
including the direction of labour and supplies, 
the conscription of persons into any of the 
disciplined forces (including the National 
Youth Service) and the billeting of persons; 
(h) 
(i) 
(j) 
-75-
the control and regulation of harbours, ports and 
the movement of vessels; 
the control and regulation of transport by land, air 
or water; 
the control of trading and of the prices of gOOd 
services, including the reguldtion 01' the exportation, 
importation, prouuction, manufacture or use of any 
property or thing; 
(k) amending, applying with or without modification or 
suspending the operation of any law (including legis-
lation of the Organisation) other than this Act or 
the Constitution. 
(1) any matter, not being a matter specified in any of 
the foregoing paragraphs of this sub-section, for 
which provicion is necessary or expedient for the 
preservation of public security." 
Thus, if the specified matters should have inadvertently 
left any subject matter affecting the citizens or their lives 
out of the long and particularly comprehensive list, as one might 
think, the i'inal paragraph of the sub-section gives a 'cover-all', 
and the only limitation to this overwhelming delegation of 
powers woulu seem to be contained in section ~ sub-section 3, 
(Part II) of the Act, which states: (in part) 
"Provided that, subject to sub-section (4) of this section, 
such regulations shall not make any provision which -
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(i) is inconsistent with or in contravention of Section 
16 of the Constitution (which protects the right 
to personal liberty); or sub-section 26 of the 
Constitution (which provides protection 'from dis-
crimination), or any other provision of the Con-
stitution; or 
(ii) purports to amend, modify, or suspend the operation of, 
any written laW other than regulations made under this 
Act." 
This proviso would, therefore, seem to distinguish the 
operation of powers under this Act from the operation ~ powers 
under the proper emergency legislation which allows derogation 
from both sections 16 and ~6 of the Constitution by measures 
which are 'reasonably justifiable' for the purpose of dealing 
with the emergency situation that exists." However, sub-section 
(4) of this section immediately excludes from the proviSO, 
emergency of war, and also-any measures relating to land rights 
if such measures are reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. It states: 
"(4) The proviso to sub-section (3) of this section 
shall not apply during any period when Kenya 
is at war or to any regulations in so far as they 
apply to the parts of Kenya to which section 19 
of the Kenya Independence Order-in-Council 1963 
applies." 
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Similar circumstances -to }:enya, gave occasion for the 
enactment of the Malawi (Nyasaland) Preservation of Public 
security Act, 1960. At the end of the crisis of 1959 and the 
revocation of the Emergency Powers Orders-in-Council 1939-59 
anrl regulations made thereunder to deal with the situation, it 
was felt that there was need for some transitional emergency-
type powers for the restoration of security and public peace. 
The enablin~ ~rovisions of the Act are the same as in 
Kenya, but whereas the provision in Kenya allows any regulations 
to be made coverin~ any matter not specified in the Act if it 
is "necessary and expedient", in Malawi, such regulations are 
allowed only if they appear to the Minister "to be strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation in Malawi." It 
would seem that the discretion allowed in Malawi is less exten-
sive than in Kenya, perhaps this is so because it is the 
President on whom the powers are conferred in Kenya whilst in 
Malawi, it is the Minister, though no voubt in practice a 
Minister would most likely undertake the responsibility on 
behalf of the President of Kenya. 
The definition of public security in Malawi is less compre-
hensive than that of Kenya, and noticeably does not specify the 
securing of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. 
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Perhaps this also accounts for the absence of such provision 
as the proviso to section 3 of sub-section 3 of the Kenya Act, 
which prevents derogation from certain fundamental rights. 
In section 2 Preservation of Public Security Act 1960 of 
Malawi, public security includes "the security of the safety 
of persons and property, the maintenance of supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community, the prevention 
and suppression of violence, intimidation, disorder. and crime, 
the maintenance of the administration of justice and the 
prevention and suppression of mutiny, rebellion and concerted 
defiance of and disobedience to lawfully constituted authority 
and the laws in force in Malawi." 
However, it is not always the need for transitional 
provisions following a period of emergency which has necessi-
tated all or by any means a large majority of the security 
measures in Africa. There is, for instance, in Ghana, a 
Public Order Act l which has nothing to do with emergency 
as such but which deals with a number of measures which may be 
used in dealing with an emergency situation. It contains 
provisions for dealing with public meetings and processions 
by giving enhanced powers to the Police, provision for imposi-
tion of eurfews in the interest of maintenance of peace, 
penalties for carrying or possession of arms and ammunition 
and several other related matters. 
1. Act 58, 1961. 
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It must be remembered that the ordinary law too may confer 
on the Executive powers more numerous and equally as 'vide as 
those conferred by the emergency legislation strictly so named, 
and as already mentioned, action under the ordinary law may 
constitute an integral part of the plan to deal with an emer-
gency. Thus, the banning of a party may take place under the 
Criminal or Penal Code, as for instance, the banning of the 
Congress Part in Nyasaland (Malawi) under Section 70 of the 
Penal Code. 
It will thus have been observed that the diffarence 
between the ordinary law or public security measures and 
emergency laws of the newly independent African States within 
the Commonwealth would seem to be more of degree and procedure 
rather than of kind. Under the semi-emergency laws and public 
security measures, the executive enjoy as much power to cope 
with an emergency as they do under emergency laws properly so 
called; it i~ therefore, for this reason that they have been 
classified as emergency legislation. The point of importance 
is that all these laws confer vary wide discretion, sometimes 
dangerously wide, on the executive. 
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COMfvlENT 
The year 1960 was the great year of African independence, 
though the graduation ceremony began a few years earlier. 
By 1964 virtually the whole continent had become independent. 
The first step after independence was for the new rulers to 
consolidate their power. Beset by economic and social problems 
to which solutions must be found, the new rulers must do what 
they can with what they have at hand. Political activity can 
still erupt into violence at a moment's notice and as a result 
Governments are disposed to tighten rather than relax their 
grip. That most of the newly-independent African States 
within the Commonwealth have used similar means to keep the 
wheel of Government on an even keel is probably more due to 
their common heritage than the need to emulate one another. 
As regards emergency powers they have all followed by and large 
the precedent set by the Emergency Powers Orders-in-Council 
J9a9-56. In fact, the Independence Constitution of each state 
provides that these Orders shall remain in force after inde-
pendence until and unless replaced by legislation passed by 
1 the Sovereign Parliament of the Independence state. Thus 
they all retained the colonial legislation for a transitional 
period, but almost all of them have replaced that enactment 
with local legislation. 
1. E. g. Sec. 6 o~ the Nigerian (Independence) Constitution 
1960. 
-
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It has been seen, however, that while all of them 
have emergency le~islation of a temporary nature which 
the Consitution allows to be brought into operation only 
on a proclamation of a state of public emergency in accordance 
with constitutionally laid down procedure, many of them 
have enacted emergency-type legislation of a permanent 
nature which can be brought into operation at any time 
I 
on the ground that it is necessary for public security. 
1. E. g. Preventive Detention Act 1962 of Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
USE OF EMERGENCY POWERS 
The issue during an emergency is how to reconcile the 
democratic idea of the freedom of the subject with the need 
for the preservation of the state. TWo major attitudes have 
in the cour;;je of centuries become established. The attitude 
which lays emphasis on the Duty rather than Right of the 
subject and therefore regard the state as being more important 
than the individual, and the attitude which believes that the 
correct emphasis should be on night rather than Duty and which 
asset-tsthat the individual does not exist merely to serve the 
ends of the state. Each has its own justification. Undue 
glorification of human rights tends to make the individual lose 
his sense of social obligation towards his fellow men and yet 
in order to achieve the good of the whole community, there must 
be active participation and co-operation between the Governors 
and the governed. 
Nevertheless, the government must be able to move against. 
those who take arms against it, whether nationally or inter-
nationally as well as protect the security and essential 
services for the community. The constituted authority has the 
right of self-preservation. Those who run the state have 
onerous responsibilities and private rights may often have to 
be subordinated to the public good. 
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The central purpose of the legislature in respect of defence 
is the protection of the state and it necessarily provides all 
the means of establishing all the legal machinery and legal 
provisions considered necessary and appropriate for the purpose. 
The responsibility for the practical measures taken in order to 
protect the country must belong to the Executive. The prosecu-
tion of a war or suppression of sub.ersion is of necessity an 
executive function and has always been so conceived, hence as we 
have observed, under the delegated power and sometimes by direct 
enactment, the very widest discretion are vested in the Executive. 
common experience shows that in times of emergency the Executive 
is authorised, according to its opinion, to give directions or 
determination in derogation of the freedom of action and the 
personal rights of men and of associations of men. The reason 
is that administrative control of the liberty of the individual 
in aspects considered material for the purpose of the emergency 
is regarded as a necessary or proper incident of fighting the 
emergency. 
One man may be suspected of treasonable propensities and 
restrained and yet another may be prevented from free association. 
What the power will enable the Executive to do at any given 
moment or time depends upon what the exigencies of the time may 
be considered to call for or warrant. The meaning of the power 
may, of course, be fixed 88 it usually is, but as, according to 
that meaning, the fulfilment of the object of the power must 
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depend on the ever changing course of events; the practical 
application of the power will vary accordingly. 
The fact remains that th~Governments have equipped them-
selves, like most modern Governments, with emergency powers 
in readiness to meet any emergency whether arising out of war 
involvement due to external aggreSSion or local emergency due 
to internal upheaval. There is no doubt that emergency power 
when wielded can extend to every matter and activity so 
related to the emergency as substantially to affect every 
aspect of life of the citizens within the state. 
, 
AlProclamatton 
of emergency, ipso facto, confers extensive and vast discre-
tionary powers on the Executive. It is now proposed to con-
sider the practical application of such powers. 
PRE-INBBPENDENCE. THE NYASAlAND CRISIS. 
It would seem that in large measure emergency powers were 
used by the colonial masters mainly to curb anti-government 
activities, which were regarded as subversive. Between the 
years following the end of the second World War and the begin-
ning of African decade of independence, 1960, there were no 
less than twenty-nine declarations or proclamations of states 
of emergency in British dependent territories. l It is 
impOSSible, therefore, to cover all these proclamations to 
illustrate the practical application of emergency powers, 
hence, it is proposed to take the Nyasaland criSis of 1959 
1. See D.C. Holland in "Emergency Legislation in the Common-
wealth" in 13 Current Legal Problems (1960) p. 148 
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and the Kenya Mau ~iau l'mergency of 1!J5", - 60 as illus trat i ve 
examples. 
On Narch 2, 1959, the Governor of Nyasa1and (now Ha1awi) 
proclaimed a state of public emergency within Nyasaland Protec-
torate, whereupon rart II of the Emergency Powers Orders-in-
Council 1956 cause into operation within the territory and the 
Emergency Regulations, 1!J59, were made thereunder. 
TIle causes of the need for the emergency are many and pro-
bably go back to the beginning of British rule in the territory, 
but the immediate and probably main cause was political dis-
affection with the Government by Africans on the creation of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, added to the fact that 
African demand for representational party with the whites in the 
legislative Council was rejected by then Colonial Secretary, Mr. 
lennox-Boyd. The African enthusiasm for freedom and the end of 
the "stupia so-called Federation", translated itself into 
belligerence. By the end of 1958, an atmosphere of tension 
pervaded the territory. The C~ngress Party - the main African 
party, and its leaders felt that they had eXhausted the available 
channels of constitutional protests. The GOvernment had ignored 
their protests and the Oolonial Secretary had refused to give 
nationalist delegatio~s any cause to rejoice. As the settlers 
ceaselessly imprecated the nationalists and demanded repression 
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of their govern~ents, so the nationalists grew increasingly 
restless. Thereafter, series of branch meetings of the Congress 
were being held and deliberate disobedience of instructions 
issued by the police and/or District Commissioners appeared 
to form part of a carefully co-ordinated plan of resistance. 
It is not clear whether violence was either contemplated or 
planned. At any rate, there were some reported incidents of 
violence and towards the end of February 1959. The Governor 
asked for and received police reinforcements from the other 
Central African States, then the Congress Party was banned, 
and following this, several of its leaders and members were 
arrested. 
At the time of the proclamation, the official reason 
given by Governor ~rmitage was that "day by day it had become 
increasingly apparent that the Congress was bent on pursuing 
a course of violence, intimidation and disregard of lawful 
authority"l. Later he added that the Congress had plotted to 
2 
murder all whites resident in Nyasaland. 
1. Quoted in Cmnd 814 (1959) p. 87. 
2. Nyasaland, State of Emergency Omnd 707 (1959) The 
Commission of Inquiry (the Devlin Commission) found 
absolutely no form of evidence to sUbstantiate the 
allegations of a "murder plot". See Omnd 814 (1959) 
pp. 86 - 88. 
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The Emergency Regulation, 1959, made pursuant to the 
proclamation provided a comprehensive code giving the admini-
strative authorities extensive powers over persons and property. 
One of the main regulations was I~gulation 44 which authorised 
detention without trial. Under the regulation, the Governor 
could make a detention order whenever he was satisfied that 
it was necessary for the purpose of maintaining order. There 
was no time limit imposed for such detention, but the Governor 
was required to review the order at six monthly intervals in 
order to consider whether it should be revoked, varied, or 
suspended "having re~ard to the circumstances of the case." 
In addition, the Governor could revoke or vary the order or 
suspend it subject to such conditions as to residence, employ-
ment, association with other persons or other similar matters 
at any time as he thought fit. Furthermore, a person detained 
had a right to make representation in writing to both the 
Governor and an Advisory Committee. 
The Advisory Committee was to consist of persons nominated 
by the Governor, the Chairman being a person who held or had 
held high judicial office and was to meet in camera; it was 
the duty of the Chairman of the Committee to advise the 
detainee of the grounds of the detention order made against 
him. The safeguards thus provided for the detainee corres-
ponded closely to those provided by Defence TIegulation laB of 
• 
• 
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the United I\ingdom during the last war. Al though Regulation 
52 authorised the Governor to dele~ate any of the powers con-
ferred on him hy the regulations, it would seem that the power 
of detention was not delegated. 
However, the same He~ulation ~4 provided that any autho-
rised officer may mRke a 28 day detention order, if he had 
reason to believe that there were grounds for detention under 
this Regulation. The Report of the Nyasaland Commission of 
Inquiryl under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Devlin (as he 
then was) pointed out that the Regulation did not say whether 
or not this sort of order was renewable by the authorised 
officer, but that nevertheless, "in some cases the period of 
2 28 days had been repeated." 
By Re~ulation 26, it was provided that if a person, upon 
being questioned by an authorised officer of a member of Her 
Majesty's Forces, failed to satisfy the questioner as to his 
identity or as to the purpose for which he was in the place 
where he was found, the questioner reasonably suspecting that 
that person had acted in a manner prejudicial to the public 
safety or to the preservation of peace or was about to commit 
an offence against the Regulation, he could detain him pending 
1. Omnd 814 (1959) The commission was set up to investigate 
allegation of abuse of use of the emeriency powers (Hence-
forth referred to as Devlin COmmission and Report). 
2. Ib id p. 91. 
• 
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inquiries. The period of detention under this Regulation could 
vary from 24 hours to seven days according to the status of the 
person making the arrest! 
In their report, the Devlin Commission stated that they 
understood that bw the middle of May, 1989, about 1,000 persons 
had been detained, most of them under the 28 days orders on 
suspicion of subversive behaviour. l In this connection the 
Commission gave evidence in support of their much publicised 
statement that Nyasaland was at the time a police state. They 
pointed out that trom a number of African witnesses who were 
nervous of giving evidence betore them, they gained the impre-
ssion that it was unsafe tor anyone in Nyasaland to criticise 
the policy of the Government. 2 
The Report pointed out that tbe Regulations made no pro-
visions as to the manner of making arrests tor the purposes of 
preventive detention. 3 However, tbe Commission understood the 
view of the Government to be that the person making such an 
arrest was subject to the same obligations and had the same 
powers as if he were arresting for a crime. And it would 
appear trom the Report that in several cases more force bad 
been used than might have seemed strictly necessary in tbe 
1. Omnd 814 (1959) p. 130. 
2. Ibid. p. 91 
3. Ibid. p. 92. 
-
• 
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circumstances. In some cases, the person arrested was retused 
any reason for his arrest by those effecting it. The evidence 
of one special constable before the Commission concerning the 
arrest stated: "We were sent out to arrest him and that was 
1 
our job; we did not have to tell him anything about why." 
'!be Commission concluded: "We think that it is quite eviaent 
that unnecessa ry and illegal force was used in making a 
2 
number of arrests". 
Another of the main Regulations was Regulation 46 which 
provided that: 
"Any authorised officer, police officer or member 
of Her Majesty's FOrces or any person acting under 
the direction of such oftic.r or member of Her 
Majesty's FOrces may ••••••••• it he suspects that 
any evidence of the commission of an oftence against 
these Regulations or against the provisions of the 
Penal Code or any other law is likely to be found ••• 
(a) enter and search any premises (b) search any vessel, 
aircraft, train or vehicle or individual whether in a 
public place or not, and may seize anything found there-
in or on such individual asthe case may be." 
Tbis Regulation was extensively used to round up members 
of the Nyasaland National Congress Party which on March, 3,1959 
became an unlawful society under section 70 of the Penal Code, 
1. Ibid. p. 95. 
2. Ibid. p. 126. 
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and the membership of which therefore, became an offence under 
the ordinary law as from that date - an example of the combined 
use of powars given both by the ordinary law and by emergency 
law to deal with an emergency situation. Tbe searches which 
took place under this Regulation frequently led to confiscation 
of implements without any arrangement being made for their 
return or payment of compensation. For a man whose annual 
ibcome was about !20, !3 of which may have gone in poll tax, 
the loss of an implement such as an axe or chopper was a very 
seriOUS matter and caused considerable hardship. 
In addition to being used for purposes of effecting pre-
ventive detention and arrest for an offence under the Penal 
code, Regulation 46 was also used in connection with Regulations 
26 and 11 for the purpose, according to the Devlin Commission,l 
of imposing a form of collective punishment upon troublesome 
villages. Regulation 26 has already been discussed. 
Regulation 11 provided: 
(1) If as respects any area, it appears to the Governor or a 
Provincial Commissioner to be necessary or expedient that 
special precautions should be taken to prevent malicious injury 
to person or property, he may by order declare such an area to 
be a special area for the purpose of these Regulations. 
1. Cmnd. 814 (1959) pp. 136 - 137. 
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(2) It shall be the duty of any person in a special area to 
stop and submit to search by a competent authority when called 
upon to do so, and if any person fails to stop when challenged 
or called upon to stop by a competent authority he shall be 
guilty of an offence and may be arrested by any competent autho-
rity without warrant. 
(3) It shall be lawful for any competent authority in order 
(a) to effect an arrest under sub-regulation 2; or (b) to 
overcome forcible resistance offered by any person to such 
arrest; or (c) to prevent the escape from arrest or the rescue 
of any person arrested asatoresaid, to use such force as, in the 
circumstances of the case, may be reasonably necessary, which 
force may extend to the use of lethal weapons." 
On March 9, 1959, special areas were declared under this 
Regulation ostensibly tor the purpose of dealing with the pro-
blem created by the erection of road blocks. The Devlin 
commission pointed out that it was only too easy for persons 
to emerge from hiding at the sides of roads tor the purpose of 
re-erecting dismantled road blocks and run away at the approach 
of security torces. "Under the ordinary law", the Report or the 
commission state', "torce.· can be used to restrain a person once 
he had been arrested; this Regulation make. it clear that force, 
including lethal torce, can be used in order to ettect the 
arrest."l 
-1. a.n4 814 (1959) pp. 131 - 2. 
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In addition, Regulation 15 empowered any member of Her 
Majesty's Forces or any police officer to require any person to 
remove any barricade from a road, and Regulation 40 empowered any 
person upon whom powers were conferred by those Regulations to 
use all force reasonably necessary for the exercise of ~he power. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Reg. 11 was in 
fact not used for the purpose of dealing with trouble at road 
blocks, for which purpose it appeared to have been unnecessary, 
but had been used instead, according to the Devlin Commission for 
1 the purpose of cor donning and searching villages. An area 
would be declared a special area under Reg. 11, a search would 
take place under Reg. 46 and persons would then be detained 
pending inquiries under Reg. 26. The ostensible purpose would 
be to search tor' '·'Wanted men and evidence against them, but as 
already pointed out, the Devlin Commission regarded it as hardly 
more than incidental to the main purpose of the operation, the 
imposition of a form of collective punishment upon troublesome 
villages. The Report states: "'1bey vere punitive expeditions 
intended to make it p1a1a tbat aidin, with consre •• led to very 
2 
anplea ... t ebnsequenees R • 
Whil.t Regulations 11, 26 and 46 were apparently used tor 
the purpose ot collective punishaent, although they were not 
intended tor that purpose, the Regulation specitically 
-
1. Cmnd. 814 (1959) p. 132. 
2. Ibid. at p. 137. 
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authorising collective punishment was st~ly enough, according 
to the Devlin Commission, not used for that purpose, but for 
the purpose only of obtaining compensation for damage done. 
The relevant Regulation was Reg. 67, which provided; 
"Where it appears to a District Commissioner with respect 
to any area comprised within his District that (a) a crime 
has been committed the inhabitants have failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent the commis8ion of tbe offence 
or to prevent tbe escape of the offender or (b) the inhabi-
tant. or a substantial number of them, are members of or 
are or have recently been active in the furtherance of the 
. 
objects ot an unlawtol society, or bave recently consorted 
with or barboured any members of any such 8ociety, ·the 
District Co.missioner may, with tbe approval of tbe Provin-
cial Commissioner, impose fines on all or any of t.e inhabi-
"1 tents of the area. 
2 As tbe Devlin COmmission pointed out, this Regul~tion con-
terred a discretion wbich was wide enough on the District 
Commissioner to enable him to i~ose a fine practically wherever 
he van ted in view of the fact that the Regulation only required 
it to appear to the District ODmmission.r that a substantial 
number of the inhabitants were members ot that organisation. 
FUrthermore, there vas DO li.i t to the .. ouat of tine which 
could be imposed under the Regulation. Tbe Devlin eo .. ission 
concluded that, in tact, the pover bad rarely been abused. 
1. Similar provision wa made in Kenya during the Mau Mau 
S-ergency ot 1952 - See Reg. 4A ot tbe Emergency Reg. 1952. 
2. Ibid. p. 138. 
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Nevertheless, the fines collected in Nyasaland amounted to a 
little over l30,OOO. When it is borne in mind that thirty 
shillings (30/-) was the average monthly wage lor an Alrican 
in Nyasaland at that time, and that the same sum was also the 
ameunt of the annual poll tax, it will be appreciated that the 
collective fine .ight be a not inconsiderable burden on one who 
might in tact be innocent. Perhaps it is just as well that the 
measures was only temporary in view of tbe abuse inberent in 
such a provision. 
The method of enforcing payment of collective line also 
appears to be questionable. The Regulation provited for en-
forcement ot pay.ent by imprisonment following conviction in a 
subordinate court or any seizure of property by order of the 
1 District Commissioner. The Devlin Report stated that , in tact, 
payment seemed to have been secured in some instances by a 
threat of reprisals in the event ot non-payment. ODe instance 
was cited in which the notification ot tiDe stated 
"Between April 6 and April 9 security forces will 
operate throughout the area in order to apply the 
necessary pressure on all people to pay." 
The Regulations considered are but a small part or the whole. 
Tbey ~pear, however, to be the Rlculations which were pri.arily 
used by the authorities to cope with the e .. rgency declared in 
1. Omnd 814 (1959) p. 139. 
.. 
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Nyasaland and appear also to be the most controversial in the 
discretions and wide powers which they confer on the Executive. 
Other Regulations conferred wider powers to control meetings, 
processions, publications and other similar matters which whilst 
not being unimportant, appear largely to have duplicated powers 
given by ordinary laws and appear not to have caused any great 
controversy. 
Obviously in an emergency situation, assuming the emergency 
to be justified, discretionary powers must be given to the 
executive, tla war cannot be fought on the principles of Magna 
carta,"l but there is danger in regarding every threat to con-
stituted authority, or genuine opposition to government policy 
as a war to be dealt with ruthlessly. 
Whether the discretionary power given by any of the emergency 
regulations in the case of Nyasaland are wider than necessary for 
the purpose of dealing with the situation which existed at the 
time is largely a political question. In view ot the tact, how-
ever, that there was adequate evidence of abuse, and the fact that 
tbey were more directed at wiping out any resistance or threat 
of resistance to governaent policy, one .ost conclude that some 
of the •• asures would see. to have been unnecessary and 
inexpe'-!ent. 
-
1. at. Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 
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THE KENYA I MAU-MAU' EMERGENCY 
To avoid a facile explanation of the events which led to the 
emergency in Kenya, it is necessary to recall the tragic land 
/ -
hunger and the denial of elementary rights to the Kenya African 
which provides the background of the setting. Seldom in world 
history had two nations faced each other on such basis of in-
equality as was to be found in the colony. For some thirty 
years before the crisis, the Kenya African, in the face of the 
bitterest settler opposition, had gradually succeeded in evolving 
a democratic constitutional challenge to the settler system. In 
the post-war years this challenge was embodied in the Kenya 
African Union, which provided the broad mental climate of African 
nationalism. Though an inequivocably democratic organisation 
wedded to constitutional methods, the African Union was inevi-
tably in open disagreement with the coersions of the settler 
system, and opposed to the autocratic nature of the Kenya Govern-
ment, which often regarde. as undemocratic political action which 
in Britain was and has been regarded as basic to the democratic 
way of lire. 
The origin of the Mau Maa crisis or ... r~ncy would se.. to 
be attributable to the deteriorating relations beiween the two 
nations which bad been intensified by the decline of L.perial 
control during the war. On the one hand the Africans were 
growing increasingly restive despite the small gains they had 
already achieved in the post-war world. On the other hand, 
there were settlers who regarded every African political 
movement with disfavour, and confused non-political and 
ordinary crimes with exaggerated reports of various groups of 
African nationalists which from time to time had advocated 
violent means to solving the crying land hunger of the country 
and to win some measure of freedom for the African. There 
was reputed to have been a number of such societies in Kenya 
history; though they had never proved in any real aense a 
challenge to European rule, these groups evoked anxious interest 
in European circles. Warnings ot a secret-semi-pagan organ_ 
1 isation of ruthless t.rrorlats such as Mau Mau was passed to 
the government. In early 1950, there was an outbreak of 
violence by a religious sect. Tbis was attributed to the 
Mau Mau to which was also attributed later outbreaks of arson. 
The Mau Mau was, therefore, declared an unlawful society by an 
Order-in-Council, 1950. 
1. There are several theories as· to the origin of the name and 
the society itself. There are those who maintain that Mau 
Mau has never amounted to a society in the proper in-
coming of the word, See e.g. West Africa sept. 19, 1953, 
p. 574 where in a review of Colin Wills Who killed Kenya? 
the reviewer statea: "He speaks of the Mau Mau Society. 
There ~ is still no evidence of such a society, still no 
evidence of any unifying force behind it other than the 
oath. The separate bands who now operate under the nue 
certainly have no high command or even much contact with 
each other. To d •• cribe the whole .ovement as the work ot 
a society is thoroughly misleading. 
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For some time before the final declaration of emergency the 
settlers had been focusing attention on "Mau Mau outrages" and 
urging the need for strong measures to combat the "crime wave" 
though there was no statistics to justify that crimes of 
violence were increasing at a rate higher than in any of Kenya's 
neighbouring countries of Uganda and Tanganyika. The settlers, 
however, paid great attention to ~ch incidents as occurred, for 1, 
the "Mau 1'lau" was "pledged to drive the white man out or Africa." 
There are some who have sugge8~ed that the campaign against the 
Nau Mau was used as an opportunity of smashing the growing 
strength of African disaffection without provoking too much 
opposition from home (Britain) where liberal public opinion 
would have been shocked by a frontal attack on the Kenya African 
Union, whose huge membership, democratic ideals and constit'u-
1 tional methods had given it a certain immunity from repression. 
On July lOth, 1952, the settlers moved a motion 'in the 
Legislative Council urging the Government "to take the measures 
necessary to improve the situati6n". The situation being 
.' t: 
"outrages" killing of cattle etc "described in detail by the 
settler Press, thereby conjuring up the spectre of Mau Mau. 
On August 24th, 1952, after conSUltation with the Colonial 
secretary, the Kenya Government issued a statement asserting 
that "certain African leaders had declared at public meetings 
1. See R. Parkhurst KENYA: A history of two nations. p. 85. 
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that nothing would satisfy the Afric~ people of Kenya except 
self-government and the eviction of the other races from the 
Colony." Though in Britain this would have been regarded as 
a legitimate expression of opinion, in Kenya it was, of course, 
equated with treason. The Government declared that it would 
not tolerate disaffection, and in conformity with this declara-
tion curtews were impose. between August 21st and September 16th, 
in four areas of the Kukuyu Reserve, and after September 23rd 
on travel in and out of Nairobi; on September 25th, in face of 
the opposition of the Atrican members, eight emergency Bills 
were introduced in the Legislative Council, controlling the 
Press, providing for compulsory registration of societies with 
ten or more members, and giving the police power to make arrest 
without warrant and to seize and destroy publications issued 
without licence. 
On the day following the introduction of these Bills, 
several European+ farms were attacked by African gangs armed 
with knives and spears; two Atrican headmen (perhaps considered 
disloyal to the Ktrican cause) were assassinated. During the 
next tew days there were a number ot other inCidents, and on 
September 29th a gang ot Atricans succeeded in breaking into 
a European tarm. The next day, the African unofticial members 
of the Legislative Council issued a atatement declaring that 
• 
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these incidents were the work of "a localised organisation of 
a few irresponsible gangs", but were being used by the settlers 
who had embarked on "a campaign of misrepresentation by grossly 
exaggerating the extent of crime and subversive activities." 
They complained that the emergency legislation would strengthen 
the position of the European as against the African, and appealed 
for a Royal Commission to investigate the "exaggerated unrest." 
From its inception the emergency legislation acted as 
a stumulus to disorder. Attacks on European farms continued, 
firearms began to be stolen, and Kukuyus suspected of being 
unpatriotic were attacked. 
On October 20th, a date which, as the Colonial Secretary 
explained, was chosen "to coincide" with the arrival of 
British reinforcements, a state of Emergency was declared. 
Repression at once assumed enourmous proportions. The Emer-
1 gency Regulation, 1952, a main Regulation which was amended, 
2 by~' additions, no fewer than five ti.es, was passed. Nearly 
all. the most important leaders of the Kenya African Union, the 
African Trade Unions, the Independent Schools, and other African 
Organisations were arrested and detained under Recu1ation 2(1) 
which provided that "whenever the Governor is satisfied that, 
for the purpose of maintaining public order, it is necessary to 
1. G.N. No. 1103 of 1952. 
2. G.N. No. 1154, 1253, 130', 1346 and 1348 of 1952. 
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exercise control over any person, the Governor may make an 
Order (hereinafter called a detention Order) against any person 
directing that he be detained, and thereupon such person shall 
be arrested and detained." Furthermore by sub-section 6 of the 
same regulation "Any police officer not below the rank of 
Assistant Inspector may without warrant arrest any person in 
respect of whom he has reason to believe that there are grounds 
which would justify his detention under this regulation; any 
such persons may be detained for a period not exceeding twenty-
eight days pending a decision asto whether a detention order 
should be made against him." Thus a person can be arrested and 
detained by a police officer for as long as twenty-eight days 
without any charge being made or brought against him. 
The wholesale arrest of responsible African leaders led 
to panic, and confusion, which necessarily placed poliCies of 
moderation and responsible action "at a discount wbilst opening 
tbe field to any advocate of more drastic polieies. Mr. 
Mathew, leader of the nominated members in the Legislative 
Council, openly complained that he and his collealUes bad been 
placed in "political storage." Being forbidden to talk to more 
than three persons at a time, it was quite impossible for hi. 
and his colleagues to influence the m&8s •• s against violenee. 
Socially, the crisis increased the poverty ot the African, 
strained the already frayed relations between the raCes well 
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beyond breaking point, and still further lowered the prestige 
of the Administra/tion. 
1 Africans were rounded up in increasing numbers; they 
were detained for "screeDing" , were evicted from their lands 
and had their fields confiscated whenever it was suspected that 
villagers were withholding information from the authorities. 
2 To this extent, Regulation 4A which provided both for corporal 
puniShment and collective punishment was extensively used. 
It provides: 
"4A(1) Where it appears to a District Officer with 
respect to any area (hereinafter referred to as 
the affected area) forming part of the Native Lands, 
as defined in the Native Lands Trust Ordinance (cap. 
100) and comprised within his district ----
(a) that any crime as defined by sub-
regulation has been committed and that 
the inhabitants of the affected area have 
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent 
the commission of the crime or to prevent 
the escape of any person who,they bad 
reasonable cause to believe, committed 
the crime; or 
(b) that the inhabitants, or a substantial 
number of the inhabitants, of the affected 
area are numbers of, or are or have recently 
been active in the furtherance of the objects 
1. Ot£icial figures recrod that by Nov. 15,1952, 8,500 
Africans had been arrested; a further 31,450 had been 
nacreened" • 
2. Emergency (Amendment)(No.3) Regulations, 1952 GN No.1253. 
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of, any unlawful society, or have recently consorted with or 
harboured any member of such a society, it shall be lawful for 
such District Officer to take all or any of the following 
action . . . . . 
(i) to seize any cattle or vehicle, as defined in 
sub-regulation (7) of this regulation, for the 
time being within the affected area; 
(ii) to make an order directing that all, or any speci-
fied shops, markets or trading centres within a 
radius of three miles, or such greater distance 
as the Chief Native Commissioner may approve, of 
a specified point within the affected area, shall 
be and remain closed for a specified period or 
periods not exceeding, in the aggregate fourteen 
days; 
(iii) to make an Order directing that all or any dwelling 
in the affected area be closed and kept closed and 
unavailable for human habitation for such period 
or periods not exceeding in the aggregate fourteen 
days, as may be specified. 
2. Every seizure under this regulation, and tbe facts and 
circumstances relating thereto, shall be reported as .OOD 
as possible to the Governor who may direct such inquiry 
into those facts and circumstances and reqUire such further 
report thereon as he considers adequate to enable him to 
exercise the powers conferred by sub-regulation (3) of' this 
regUlation. 
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(3) Upon receiving such report or further report, 
as the case may be, the Governor may make one 
or the other of the following Orders:-
(a) an Order directing that the cattle or 
vehicles so seized shall be released; 
(b) an Order directing that the cattle or 
vehicles so seized or such proportion 
or part thereof as may be specified in 
the Order, be forfeited to the Government. 
On November 20th, 1952, the Government announced that 
immediate retribution in the form of seizure of livestock and 
bicycles would be carried out against any African Community 
which failed to collaborate with the Police. Peasants were 
liable to have their crops confiscated if they allowed crime 
to occur in the vicinity of any European farm or state forest. 
When four cattle were killed and three injured by slashing on 
a European farm near Nyeri, all the male labourers were 
arrested and their cattle seized. When two settlers were 
killed on a neighbouring farm, an area of several hundred 
square miles was declared a prohibited area, the Kukuyu 
families being moved to special camps "as a temporary measure". 
On January 6th, General Sir Bryan Robertson flew to Nairobi ,',.'. 
for the opening of "operation Blitz". Prior to the operation 
all labourers were cleared from a forest at the northern end 
of the Aberdare mountains. No huts were permitted within SO 
yards ot the forest. In one operation a hundred were burnt 
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down "to deny shelter to the outlaw gangs," despite the "con_ 
siderable danger of setting fire to the forest, which was very 
dry." On January 21st, the Colonial Secretary admitted in the 
House of Commons that 4,471 Kukuyu squatters including men, 
women and children, had been evicted from European farms or 
crown forests in the Rift Valley Province. A total of 944 cattle, 
10,577 sheep and goats, 70 donkeys, 57 bicycles, 1 automobile 
and one motor car had been forfeited by per80ns evicted. l 
Three hundred cattle and sheep were rounde. up in Gatundu area 
of Kiambu in February when it was suspected that the villagers 
were withholding information. In the nightmare world, it was 
not surprising that whole African villages fled to the hills 
at the approach of white troops or at the sound of the Circling 
war plane; it was not unlikely that the powers that be, would 
often equate flight with guilt, view the fugitives as Mau Man 
bands and take action without further inquiry. The East African 
standard2 openly reported that "authorised officers" Ilight shoot 
whenever -a suspect failed to stop when challenged. The 
Emergency RegulatioDs gave power of life and death. Tbe New 
York Times3 correspondent in Nairobi declared that "it is bardly 
denied here that a certain number of persons bave been killed in 
one way or another who almost certainly were not Mau Man. There 
is a tendency to shoot down any women heading towards the forest." 
1. Hansard Vol. 505 
2. See Parkhurst: Kenya - A history of two nations p. 96. 
3. Aug. 19, 1953. 
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A British soldier serving in Kenya wrote~ "Prisoners are often 
brutally treated, ma~are shot and none are fed. Apparently 
the Government makes no provision for feeding prisoners. "1 
There were complaints that during the Emergency it was 
common for arrested men to be ordered out of the lorry ostensi-
bly conveying them to a detention camp and told to go, but 
after walking a few yardS they would be shot in the back. Such 
allegations were seldom subjected to the search light of legal 
investigation. One case of murder was, however, tried by 
Court Martial in Nairobi on November ~4th - 27th 19532and widely 
reported in the Press. 
captain G.S.L. Griffiths was charged with the murder of 
an African forestry worker named Ndegva. The prosecution 
alleged that a Company-Sergeant-Major William Llewellyn bad 
asked Griffiths what were his orders concerning shooting on 
the road where be was to establish a road block. "The answer 
he got was that he could shoot anybody he liked, Public Works 
Department or anyone, providing they were black,". The 
prosecution also told that Griffiths' company was going to 
Malaya soon and that Griffiths wished to increase the Company's 
score of killing to 50. Colonel Parker, ASSistant Director 
of Army Legal Services, continued that shortly afterwards three 
1. The African and Colonial World, No.1. p. 10. 
2. The Times Nov. 29 - 30, 1953. See also ManChester Guardian 
30/11/53. The case of Captain Griffiths. 
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African civilians had been stopped at Sergeant-Major Llewellyn's 
post. Griffiths, then a major arrived in a jeep with a Bren-
gun on a swivel mounting. Griffiths, who appeared to be in a 
great rage, asked why the Sergeant-Major had not killed them. 
He examined the passes of the three Africans, and told the 
oldest to walk to the rear of the jeep and the other two to 
walk forward. Tbe prosecution went on: "When they got ten 
yards ahead of the jeep, Griffiths cocked the Bren-gun and 
discharged a burst into their backs and practically blew out 
their stomachs." 
Llewellyn confirmed in evidaDce that the men were shot 
by Griffiths. There was "treaeadous rivalry" between that of 
the King's African Rifles for the highest Score of Mau Man 
killed and some company commanders were offering 5/- and 10/-
a head for everyone killed. Tbe accused, captain Griffiths, 
admitted that he had given men in his command rewards of 5/-
a head for killing alleged terrorists, but denied that he 
deliberately shot the Africans. He alleged that he shot them 
after they had refused his order to halt. The accused was 
acquitted of murder, but the tact remains that not only were 
men shot in the back on the very unsatisfactory excuse that they 
might escape despite the fact that it was admittedtD-'evidence 
that they were sitting quietly by the roadside in the custody 
of two soldiers when the captain came on the scene, but also 
that men could be nonchalantly killed to keep up the scores on 
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a "scoring board." 
Amongst other repressive measures which were introduced 
pursuant to the emergency declaration~egulation 12A(1) of the 
1 Emergency (Amendment) Regulations 1952. It provides: 
2 
"Whenever the Member is satisfied in regard to 
any SChool -
(a) that any member of the management or teaching staff 
of the school, or person acting as such, is a person 
who Is or had recently been associated with activities 
which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public 
order; or 
(b) that any teaching or instruction given or imparted 
in such school to any pupil attending the school is 
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; or 
lc) that any pupil attending whether regularly or othee-
wise, enrolled, at the school is or bas been recently 
associated with activities which are prejudicial as 
aforesaid; or 
(d) that the premises of the school or any part thereof, 
are or have recently been used for activities which are 
prejudicial as afore.aid; he may, by order, direct 
that the school be closed." 
Following a declaration by the Provincial Commissioner for 
the central Province that some Kenya Independent Schools were 
"inefficient, of evil influence, and the chief breeding ground 
1. G. N. No. 1150 
2. Reg. 12A(7) 'Member' means the Member of the Executive 
Council of the COlony for the time being responsible tor 
Education. 
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of the Mau Mau Movement," the Government began the systematic 
closing down of the Independent schools and the persecution 
of the African Orthodox Church. In the months which followed, 
135 schools were closed in the central Province, about 100 in 
the Rift Valley Province, and another 100 in the Nyeri, FOrt 
Hall and Kiambu districts in the Meni and Embu areas. The 
important Teachers Training School was also closed. The 
attitude of the Kenya African who saw the destruction of the 
schools which had taken so much effort to establish and which 
constituted their children's bope tor the future may be 
deduced trom a Government report that Nyeri tribesmen were 
"sullen" and were boycotting the mission .chools, whicb were 
in any case too few to accommodate all tbe children and usually 
too far to travel, if they were allowed. Thus, not only tbe 
father could be punished tor his alleged sin, but the alle*ed 
sin could also be visited on the children. 
Like Nyasaland, wbicb bas been discussed already, tbe 
extent to which the emergency in Kenya, gave rise to extensive 
reppressive use of emergency powers, was formidable. The 
collective punishment regulations of both countries, in 
particular, and other regulations in general, can only be 
justiJ1ed by evidence of absolute necessity. The powee of 
collective punishment intrinK8s the princlple~ of law that 
it is better for one hundred guilty men to go unpuni.hed than 
for one innocent man to sufrer. Where emergency is proved to 
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be necessary in the circumstances, it is clearly a remedy that 
should have been applied with care because of its obvious poten-
tialities for alienating the sympathies of those whose co-opera-
tion is essential. 
'lbe colonial secretary at the time said of Kenya that "1be 
declaration of emergency has enabled the Kenya Government to 
detain the ringleaders and their lieutenants, about 130 ~.I 
altogether. The prisoners will be screened and some may be 
released when the tension is over."1 However, the arrest of 
the alleged leaders did not cause the collapse of the Mau Mau 
Movement, as was apparently exp~ted, and the emergency which 
was thought would last only a few months in fact lasUdfor almost 
eight years. 
It bas: been shown that the colonial government used 
emergency powers in a large measure to prevent and control sub-
versive elements witbin the country. Political disaffection and 
activity which erupted into violence both in Nyasaland and Kenya 
led the administrators to tighten rather than relax their grip, 
even if eventually the grip was relaxed. Most of the newly 
independent African states within the eo .. oDwealth have used 
emergency powers primarily for the same reasons, as we Shall now 
indicate. It has already been pointed out that 80me of the 
countries, in enacting emergency legislation have substantially 
1. Hansard Vol. 505 Co18. 865 - 866. 
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re-enacted the Emergency Powers Orders-in-Council 1939 - 1956, 
whilst some have actually retained the latter as part of their 
law. 
The year 1960 was the great year of African independence, 
thoug~ the graduation had begun a few years earlier in 1958. 
By the end of the decade, virtually the whole continent 
between the Meditterranean and the Zambezi was no longer 
subject to overt political control from outside. Tbe first 
step after independence wastDr the Dew rulers to consolidate 
their power. Beset by economic and social problems to which 
solutions must be found, the new rulers must do what they caD 
with what they have at hand. Political activity can still 
erupt into violence at a moment's notice and as a result the 
governments have been disposed to tighten rather than relax 
their grip. 
All new African Governments are faced with the problem 
of building nations within the arbitrarily drawn geographical 
frontiers that they have inherited from the colonial masters. 
BeSides, the people of newly independent nations often have 
unnecessarily higb hopes and expectations and they are apt 
to be quickly dissillusioned with the first fruits of 
independence. Also, it is difficult to fight the enemies of 
poverty, ignorance and disease according to the Westminister 
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rules. For these reasons and more it would seem therefore, 
that the situation and circumstances which justified the 
colonial "t-lasters" in providing for and using emergency power 
still exists in a different form, and content in the newly 
"weaned" babies of the "Mother-Country". The babies had been 
taught that the effective method by which they could deal with 
organised opposition to constituted authority, insurrection, 
threatened and actual subversion, is by the use of wide dis-
cretionary power pursuant to a declaration of emergency, 
whether such emergency actually exists must be of secondary 
conce~1and alternative methods of dealing with the situation 
should not worry their minds. The lesson would seem to have 
been well taken, as will be seen from the use which bas been 
made of emergency powers in these states after independence. 
POST-INDEP~NDENCE 
NIGERIAN FEDEB,tUSM. 
In a Federal Government l such as Nig •• 1a, any exercise 
of the emergency powers of the Federal Government is bound to 
correspond to a domination of the powers bt the central 
government of tbe regional gov.aD.ents. As professor Wheare 
pointed out: 2 
1. To date Nigeri.{l i8 the only Federation within the Common-
wealth in Afriea. 
2. Wheare-: Federal Goveruaent 3rd FAn) p. 197. 
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"The working of Federal Government in a wartime 
(or emergency) would seem likely to exhibit in 
extreme form the peculiar problems which a federal 
system produces. FOr, while it is the essence of 
federalism to be pluralistic, it is the essence of 
the war power to the unitary, to be centralised 
and regimented, to be, in the modern word 
"totalitarian". 
There is an immediate contrast between the multiplicity of 
federalism with its division of authority, and the unity nece-
ssary if war is to be conducted efficiently.-
A totalitarian government may handle emergency situations 
without embarrassment. But the apparent neaessities evoked by 
danger often conflict gravely with the postulates of constitu-
1 tional democracy. 
Nigeria is a federal realm of the Commonwealth. On 
attaining independence in 1960, it did so as a federation of 
three units called Regions - the Northern, Western and Eastern 
together with a small federal territory - Lagos - containing 
the seat of the federal authority. Nigeria became a Republic 
within the Commonwealth on 1st October, 1963 and by this time 
a fourth Region had been created, the Mid-Western. On May 
2 30, 1967, it became a Republic with twelve states, s·till 
within the eoamonwealth. 
-1. See Harry Groves: "Emergency Powers," Journal of Inter-
national Commission of Jurists (1961) Vol.III p. 1. 
2. See Suspension ot Constitution (Amendment) Decree D.No.33 
As there has been no new constitution, it is proposed to 
discuss Nigeria under the 1963 Constitution. 
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The 1963 Federal Constitution preserved the same basic 
federal structure as that established in 1960, but the former 
has some important innovations in detail, including of 
necessity provisions as to the election and powers of the 
President. Most 1963 sections corresponding to 1960 sections 
are identical, and most of the differences are formal ones 
caused by the replacement of the Queen by the President. This 
rouCh and brief guide has been necessitated by the fact that 
the emergency in Nigeria, which is to be discussed was pro-
claimed before the Republican COnstitution. 
The system is "truly lederal". Each Governmental unit 
is fully equipped to carry out its function in a substantially 
autonomous way, and even the fiscal arrangements have been 
designed as in Malaya and west Germany, to give the Regions 
(states) some financial independence~though as in all modern 
federations the central authority is acquiring a dominant 
financial position. Express legislative powers are vested in 
the federal Parliament, some exclusive and some concurrent, 
and the undefined residue of power is vested in the (RegIOns) 
states. Tbe result is to give the centre more powers than are 
possessed by the centre in Australia and canada. but fewer 
than are possessed by the Centre in Malaysia and India. 
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There is an elaborate set 01' fundamental guarantees. l 'rhe 
constitution to a considerable extent spells out and for the 
rest implies British style responsible cabinet government, 
with its mingling of executive and legislative functions. 
Judicial power is separated, Judges are given a high degree of 
independence and - unusual even in written constitutions - are 
expressly required to be qualified Lawyera. 2 There is a 
central Supreme Court and separate Regional (state) and 
Territory Courts. 
The Nigerian Constitution is eviaently the result of 
adapting to local circumstances general principles and probably 
particular sections taken from many federal models. 3 It has 
been suggested4 that probably MeJ.ay. (a8 it then was) waa, the 
biggest single influence, and t .. t it was the Chief source for 
the provision with which this study ia concerned - the 
emergency power - which reads - 8ecti0870(1) in the Republican 
constitution, 1963, and Sec. 65{1-) of the Old 196Q coaat.itution: 
"Parliament may at any time lIake s~ch lawa for , 
Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to matters 
not included in the Legislative list .. may appear 
to Parliament to be necessary or expedient for the 
purpose of maintaining or a.curing peace, erder end 
good government during any period of emergency." 
1. Chapter III 
2. Chapter VIII 
3. E.g. U.S.A., canada, Austra~ia, Indiaantt ~laya las it then 
was) .,,''.d, , 
4. See Geoffrey Sawer "Emergency powers in Nigeria and Malayan 
Federali •• " in Malaya Law Review Vol.6, No.1, p. 83 at 
p. 84-5. 
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sub-Section (2) confines the operation of sucb laws to 
the emergency period, and sub-section (3) defines "period of 
emergency" as being a period during which 
"(a) the Federation is at war. 
(b) there is in force a resolution passed by each 
Housa of Parliament declaring that a state of 
public emergency exists; or 
(c) there is in force a resolution of each House 
of Parliament supported by the votes of not 
less than two-thirds of all members of the 
House declaring that democratic institutions 
in Nigeria are threatened by subversion." 
If, as has been suggested, the general plan of these pro-
visions is taken from the original Malayan Section 150, in 
particular the form of the extension of federal powers -
r~,~nol 
adding matters otherwise witnua " power-then it is surprising 
that the Nigerian provisions vere not amended when the Malayan 
COnstitution of 1963, section 150 has been amended so that the 
method of extending federal power in an emergency by reference 
to residual powers no longer appears; instead, Parliament is 
then given power to make laws, "with respect to any matter." 
That the Nigerian provisions remain _ unamended is even more sur-
prising in view of the argument put to the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Majekodunmi,l that the only -emergency power" laws, 
capable of ever-riding rele .. ant fundamental guarantees, which 
Parliament could make were those otherwise solely within Region~ 
1. (1962) 1 All N. L. R. 324. 
-118-
power; in so far as Parliament made laws during an emergency 
which it could make in any event, these would be subject to all 
the fundamental guarnatees. The Court in Williams v,Maje-
kodunmi l did not have to determine this question, and refrained 
from doing so. 
On May 20, 196~, the Nigerian Federal parliament carrial 
in both Bousis a resolution: 
tlThat in pursuance of section 65 of the Consti-
tution of the Federation, it is declared that a 
state of public emergency exists aDd this resolution 
shall remain in force until the end of the mouth of 
Decembee, 1963." 
This was an exercise of the power in sub-section 3(b) of the 
1960 Constitution. As the form of Sec.65 of the 1960 consti-
tution had allowed, Parliament had previously enacted an 
emergency Powers Act, 1961, already mentio •• d3 which now ca.e 
into operation. The Federal Parliament resorted to emergency 
powers in order to deal with disturbances 1n the western 
Region which was caused mainly by political disagreement 
between two leaders of the western - baaed Action Group Partl. 4 
1. (Ibid). (1962) 1 All N. L. R. 324. 
2. Now section 70(3)(b) it is difficult to see why both (b) and 
(c) of this section should have been retained, since a 
threat from subversion would also constitute a state of 
public emergency, no greater powers' attend a declaration of 
emergency on the subversion ground, and the latter requires 
a two-thirds majority while the former requires a simple 
majority. 
3. See Chapter 2. 
4. The following historiaal detail is derived from o. I. 
Odumosu, Nigerian constitution~ (1963) J.P.MackiDtosh, 
"Federalism In Nigeria" in (19 2) 10 Political studies 
p. 223. 
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:Jutil February 196~, each Region had been under the pre-
ponderant control of one political party - in the East, the 
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.); in the North, 
the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.); and in the West, the 
Action Group (A.G.). Each Region also elected a preponderance 
of members of the regional majority party to the Federal Par-
liament, while the Northern R.P.C. and the Eastern N.C.N.C. 
had since 1959 been alliel in support of a coalition government 
under the late Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (N.P.C); 
the A. G. accordingly formed the Opposition. In the North and 
East, the tendency had been for the most powerful political 
leaders to remain in the regional spbere and to leave federal 
~tters to senior members of the respective groups. Thus, in 
the predominantly Hausa North, the most powerful local leader 
Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto, a ruler of 
immense local prestige, was the Premier. Tbe predominantly Ibo 
Eastern Region had thrust the orfice on Dr. M. I. Okpara, 
because Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the most important leader of tbe 
N.C.N.C. had chosen to become the Governor-General on the 
achievement of independence. The main offices in the Federal 
Government were inevitably divided between tbe N.P.C. and 
N.C.N.C. 
-120-
This caused a good deal of bitterness in the Western based 
A.G. whose members had taken a leading part in the struggle for 
independence. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the party leader and its 
most influential personality chose to transfer to Federal sphere, 
leaving his Deputy Chief S. L. Akintola, as Western Region 
Premier. But Chief Awolowo continued to behave in many ways as 
if he were the Regional Premier, determining regional party 
policy and endeavouring to determine matters of detailed admini-
stration in western Region Government. Thus tension arose and 
increased not only because Chief Awolowo refused to follow the 
usual pattern of sending the Deputy to the Federal Parliament 
but also having preferred to go there himself, be still wanted 
to remain the dominant figure in the Region. 
The tension between the Federal Government and Opposition 
became tension between the Pederal Government and the Western 
Region and was carried into ~st fields of political dispute, 
including forei~ and economic pOlicy.1 However, while Chief 
Awolowo and ~f A.G. leaders played the game of an all-out 
opposition to the Federal Government with increaSing zest, 
Chief Akintola, who had the responsibility of actually running 
the Western Region, played it decreasing so. It has been 
suggested by the pro-Akintola group that he probably did so 
because he was conscious of the need to cultivate good relations 
1. One expression of the tension was the occurrence threater 
of extensive litigation between the Region and the Federal 
Government. See e.g. Balewa v. Doherty (1963) 1. W.L.R • 
. ~ 949. 
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with Federal Ministries if the western Region was to obtain its 
fair share of the external aid which was being chane lIed through 
the Federal Government. But such good relations appeared to 
other A.G. leaders as treachery to the party and was regarded 
as a delibera-te and personal plan of Akintola's to entrench 
himself and supercede the leader of the party. Hence feeling 
between Awolowo and Akintola became increasingly strained in 
the late 1961 and early 1962. Perhaps the Federal Government 
or some eminent members of it, no more toleraot of systematic 
opposition than other new African governments, happily encou-
raged this development. 
In February 1962, the A. G. split into two groups. A 
majority group following the lead of Awolowo and a minority 
group following the lead of Akintola. Several unsuccessful 
attempts at reconciliation were made including one by the 
Governor of the western Region, who was also a traditional 
ruler (the Oni of Ife) and a leading member of the A. G. 
Ultimately, on 21st May, the Governor made an Order removing 
Akintola from the Premiership and appointing Chief D.S. 
Adegbenro, an Awolowo follower, in his place. The Governor 
did this on petition from a majority of the member. of the 
Regional House of Assembly, the legislature not then being 
in session. He bad acted under Section 33(10) of the Western 
Region Constitution as it then stood, which empowered him to 
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remove the Premier who "no longer commands the support of a 
majority of the members of the House of Assembly." Chief 
Akintola immediately challenged this and commenced proceedings 
in the High Court. l Meanwhile, however, Adegbenro formed a 
government and took over the running of the Regional Government, 
though it is doubtful whether he secured the support of the 
permanent civil service and of the people. 
Perhaps it would have been wiser if the Governor had 
called the House of Assembly into session in the first place 
to vote Akintola out, since he could hardly maintain his 
objection if a majority of the legislature supported Adegbenro. 
When the House of Assembly met on 25th May, and a motion of 
confidence in the Adegbenro Government was moved, it is 
believed that some followers of Akintola immediately started 
a violent demonstration, which ended only after police cleared 
the House. The Governor and Adegbenro urgently approached 
2 the Federal Government for police protection to enable the 
House to meet later on the same day to pass the necessary 
resolution. But the Prime Minister, the late Sir Tafawa 
Balewa announced that while he acknowledged an obligation to 
1. 
2. 
Akintola v. Adelbenro (1962) W.N.L.R. 185 (1963) 
~ W.t.R: 63 (l§ 3) A.C,614 Privy Council. 
Each Region in Nigeria controlled some poliae but the 
principal police force and the only one capable of firm 
and efficient action in this kind of situation was the 
federally cODtrolle. force. 
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maintain the public peace in Ibadan (the capital of the Western 
Region and seat of government) he would not regard as operative 
any resolution which the Regional House might adopt while 
dependent on police protection. This was an unfortunately 
extraordinary attitude to have adopted, as it offered a position 
of advantage to any minority group which chose by violence to 
prevent a regional legislature from carrying on its business. 
Inevitably when the House attempted to meet again, more dis-
turbances were created. On May 29, the Federal Parliament ~ 
carried the declaration of emergency and on the 8ame day about 
1 thirteen regulations were rushed through Parliament made under 
the Emergency Powers Act, 1961, which conferred extensive 
regulation-making powers on the Governor-General-in-Council. 
Thes. regulations concerned the detention of person, restriction 
of persons to specified areas - which was the only regulation 
extensively used - regulation of meeting and processions and 
similar familiar emergency provision. Here we- are mainly 
concerned with the Emergency Powers (General) Regulations, 
19622 , regulations 4, 5, 6 and 7 whose contents were less 
usual in parts. 
"4. - (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the last 
foregoing regulation, the administrator shall be charged 
with the general function of administering the government 
of the emergency area and of exercising the executive 
1. L. N. Nos. 54 - 66 ~t 1962. 
2. L. N. 54 of 1962. 
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authority of the Region on behalf of Her Majesty. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Chapter III of the Consti-
tution of the Federation (which relates to fundamental human 
rights), the administrator may do such things as appear to him 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of exercising his 
general function. 
(3) The Prime Minister may give instructions to the admini-
strator with respect to the exercise of the administrator's 
functions, and it shall be the duty of the administrator to 
comply with the directions. 
5. - (1) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers 
conferred by paragraph (2) of the last foregoing regulation, 
the administrator (but not any other person appointed in 
pursuance of these recplations) may make such orders as appear 
to him to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of maintain-
ing and securinK peace, order and good government in the 
emergency area. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the 
powers conferred by the said paragraph (2) or the foregoing 
paragraph, any order under the foregoing parSKraph may in 
particular, so far as it appears to the administrator to be 
necessary or expedient for the purposelBntioned in that 
paragraph - (a) make provision for the detention of persons 
(either within the emergency area or elsewhere) and the removal 
and exclusion of persons from the emergency area. 
(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this 
regulation shall authorise the making of proviSion for the 
trial of persons by Military Courts. 
-125-
(4) An order under this regulation may provide that the 
order shall have effect for all purpose as if it ware a law 
made by the Legislature of that Region. 
(5) The Administrator shall, as soon as reasonably practi-
cable after an order has been made under this regulation, tran-
smit a copy of the order to the Prime Minister; and .f the 
Prime Minister gives notice to the administrator that the 
prime Minister disallows the order, it shall cease to have 
effect on the expiration of the day on which the notice is 
given, without prejudice to anything previously done thereunder. 
(6) - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) 
of section 99 of the Constitution of the Federation (which 
provides for the Prime Minister and certain other Ministers 
to give directions to the police with respect to public safety 
and order) and of any directions given in pur.aance of that 
sub-section, the administrator (but~ny other person apPointed 
in purauance of these regulations) may give to the officer 
commanding the contigents of the Nigeria Police FOrce present 
in the emergency area such directions with respect to maintain-
ing and securing of public safety and public order as the 
administrator considers expedient; and it shall be the duty of 
that officer to comply with the directions. 
(2) All forces established under the Local 
Government Police Law of the Region or to which that 
Law applies shall be deemed to form part of the 
Nigeeia Police FOrce; ••••••••• 
(3) ............ . 
(7) - (1) Except to such extent and during such period 
(if any) as tbe administrator may direct, no person bolding 
or acting, or purporting to hold or act, in any of tbe otfices 
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established for the Region and specified in the next following 
paragraph shall exercise any of the functions of that office. 
(2) The Offices aforesaid are the office of Governor, 
premier, and any other Minister of the Government of the Region, 
member of the Executive Council, Parliamentary Secretary, 
President or other officer or member of the House of Assembly, 
Superintendent-General of Local Government Police FOrces, and 
any such other offices, if any, as the administrator may direct. 
(3) It shall be the duty of all persons holding -
(a) offices in the public service of the Region 
within the meaning of the constitution of the 
Region; or 
(b)offices ~ connected with aqrcustomary 
Court or Local Government authority established 
by law in the Region; 
to ex.~olse their functions in accordance with any directions 
given to them by the administrator; and without prejudice to 
the generality of the powers conferred ~n the administrator 
'Y virtue of these regulations, he may suspend from office any 
such person as aforesaid who in his opinion fails to comply 
with a direction given under this paragraph, and may appoint 
some other person to act in the place of the suspended person." 
The Prime Minister appointed Dr. M. A. Majekodunmi, a 
member of the senate and a member of the Cabinet as the 
Administrator. The Administrator proceeded to carry on the 
Government and in pursuance of the power granted him under the 
Emergency PowerS (Restriction Orders) Regulation, 1912,1 he 
1. L. N. 65 of 1962. 
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served restriction orders against sevenal persons including the 
western Region Governor and Premier and Minister - which in 
practice made it impossible for the Western Region Government 
to carryon, because the persons concerned were confined to 
various places outside the capital and centre of government at 
!badan and could not have held cabinet meetings nor maintained 
effective contact with the civil service. Furthermore, officers 
in the Re~ional public service and Local Government Authorities 
were required to exercise their functions in accordance with the 
Administrator's directives who might suspend any recalcitrant 
officers. Objection has been taken of this "Hitleric" pro-
vision on the ground that it was virtually subversion of the 
federal nature of the COnstitution by the Federal Parliament. 
1'hus it has been said: "had a deleiate from one of the 
Regions at the last Constitutional Conference been asked 
whether he intended the Federal Parliament ever to have power 
to suspend the most vital parts of a Regional Constitution, be 
would have given a decisively negative answer. l 
Surely this remark is uncalled tor because any delegate 
would surely know that the provisions of section 65 (now 70) 
of the COnstitution were a "blank cbeque" to the Central 
1. Naish, "Some legal Aspects of the Emergency", lbe Laper (A University of Lagos Law Society Publication] Apri 
1963 Vol.l, No.1, p. 30. 
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Government to take over the administration or any of its 
units during an emergency. This agrees with the opinion of 
1 
another writer on Nigerian Law. He said: 
"With respect, any delegate who read the 
provisions of section 70 (old 65) should 
reasonably have realis.d that when power 
was ~iven to the Federal Parliament to act 
generally for peace, order and good government 
of a Region during an emergency, the Regional 
Legislature may temporarily be put out of action." 
The question must, however, arise whether the situation 
at the material time justified a proclamation of emergency 
and the use of the drastic emergency powers. The official 
reason or justification given for the Federal Government 
action was that the government of the western Region was 
paralysad, firstly because there were in existence two rival 
governments which claimed to be duly appointed, and secondly 
because it had been demonstrated that the Western Region 
Legislature could not sit without the occurrence of disturb-
ances which made proceedings impossible. It was said that 
this state of civil war in the Regional Government was likely 
to be communicated to the people at large and so lead to a 
general break down of law and ordu'. Some eye-witness 2 
1. Nwabueze, Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria {lmf4j. 
2. See Naish, op.cit; Also Sawyer, OPe cit, p. 90. 
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have cast considerable doubt on the £ears expressed by the 
Federal Government. However, there is probably no doubt that 
if the Federal Government and its poDice had followed the 
course suggested by the objective consideration. of what the 
West Germans call "federal good £aith",l they would probably 
have prevented trouble and disturbances in the Western 
Legislature and the consequence would have established the 
rightful government. 
. 2 It can be argued, as 1t was, that only widespread rioting 
and unrest over much of a country, or as in this case, over 
much of a Region, can justify a declaration o~ emergency, 
that since the violence was confined to the precints of the 
House of Assembly - the smashing of the chairs in the Chamber 
and the stabbing o£ a Minister - and there was c.lm and quiet 
in the whole of the Region, the situation did not warrant the 
declaration of emergency and the "Hitleric" use of emergency 
powers. But it is not only an actual, but also a potential, 
threat to the life of a state which should justify a declaration 
of emergency, and a Government would be £ailing in its duty 
if it allows an explosive and potentially dangerous situation 
to get ont o£ band be£ore taking adffuate measures to it. 
1. See H. W. Bayer, Die Bundestren£! (1961)pp.23-45, 97-99 
translation. 
2. See Sawyer OPe cit. p. 90. Also the argument in Adegbenro 
v. Attorney-Genaral of the Federation & Ors (1962) 
1 A\~N. L. R. 338. 
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Whether or not the emergency declaration in this instance 
was justified or not must remain a matter of opinion. The 
duration was probably unwarranted in view of the prevalent calm, 
but the resolution was never extended. 
GHANA. 
l,imi ted use has also been made in Ghana of its Emergency 
powers Act, 1961, for the reason that she has a preventive 
Detention Act, which although conferring only one type of 
emergency power - the power of detention - yet has been found 
more useful to deal with alleged subversive activities. l 
However, the Emergency Powers Act was brought into operation 
about a few months after it was enacted in 1961. In september, 
1961, following the "austerity budget", which increased taxation, 
introduced purchase tax and property tax and provided for the 
deduction from wages and salaries at source of income tax and 
an amount in respect of compulsory savings, there was a strike of 
railway and dock workers accompanied by civil disturbances 
centred at Takoradi, Ghana's leading port. The President was 
away at the time and the Presidential Commission felt that strict 
measures were needed to prevent any large scale insurreotion 
and damage to the port which could paralyse the economy that the 
budget had sought to protect. The Presidential Commissionckd,o.re.d. 
l-L ___ '_~"'tf'l"1 ,.......' ____ ......... ' ••••••••••••••• U' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1. Bulletin of International commission of Jurist No. 27 sept., 
1966 p. ~4. In Feb. 1966, the Attorney-General when ques-
tioned about the .amber of detainees put the number at not 
less than 500, while other lawyers estimated the total as 
between 1,000 and 1,500. 
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state of emergency limited to Sekondi-Takoradi alid all land 
in the country vested in the railways and harbours admini-
stration. l On the same day a comprehensive set of regulations 
was made. 2 These imposed heavy penalties for such acts as the 
publication of disturbing reports, incitement to disaffection , 
sabotage and looting. They gave power to control meetings 
and processions, the wearing of uniforms and emblems and the 
movement of traffic. Tbey also authorised the requisitioning 
of property, the entry and search of premises, and ·.the 
detention and removal of trouble makers. 3 Various executive 
instruments were made under the ordinary law - an example of 
the combination of emergency legislation and the ordinary law 
to achieve the desired end. One imposed a curfew in Sekondi' 
T8koradi between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. and the other restored the 
censorship of the Ashanti Pioneer newspaper which had been 
4 lifted only a few months previously. The state of emergency 
was revoked by the President on his return to Ghana after 
having been in force for nine days. 
1. L.1 143. 
2. Emergency Regulations, 1961 (L.I. 144). 
3. It is interesting to observe that although, by virtue of 
S.3(3) of the Emergency Powers Act,the!regulations only 
applied in the emergency area, their wording was entirely 
general. 
4. L.l 155 and 156 of 1961. 
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Almost exactly a year after, the need was felt for the use 
of emergency powers following the assassination attempt on Or. 
Nkrumah at Ku1ungugu in August, 1962, by a police officer. The 
vast popularit, and overwhelming support which the President 
and the Convention Peoples party of which he was leader had, 
had obviously decreased; it would appear that even the presence 
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, which had been extensively 
used as we shall discuss later, had not been sufficient to keep 
the populace in the state of mind at which they would be too 
afraid to oppose the President. The stringent and comprehensive 
set of regulations which had been made in 1961 was substantially 
re-enacted as the Emergency Regulations 1962,1 the only 
addition being Regulation ~ which provides: 
"2(1) No person shall do any act or publish anything 
likely, 
(a) to be prejudicial to the public safety or the 
maintenance of public order; 
(b) to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite 
disaffection against, the Government as by law 
established; 
(c) to undermine the authority of, or the public 
confidence in, the Government as by law established, 
(d) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the 
inhabitants of Ghana; 
(e) to promote feelings of ill-will or boatility 
between different classes of the population of 
Ghana. 
1. L. I. 215. 
-133-
(2) Any person who commits an offence against this 
regulation shall be liable: 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment fOr 
term not exceeding one year or to a fine not 
exceeding one hundred pounds or both such 
imprisonment and fine; or 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding ten years or to a 
fine not exceeding one thousand pounds or to 
both such imprisonment and fine. 
(3) For the purpose of this regulation, the word "publish" 
includes publication by means of words spoken and written, 
pictorial re~resentRtions, grammophone records, cinema films 
and the sound tracks thereof. The effect of this provision 
read in conjunction with Regulation 1. - which prohibits 
publication of misleading reports - would seem to produce 
complete '~ag~in~' of all means of communications. 
THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT. 
The Ghanian Act l was originally expressed to be limited 
in duration but it remained in operation for eight years, even 
though it was limited to expire after five years, that is on 
2 18th July, 1963~ ______________________________ ~ ______ __ 
1. Preventive Detention Act, 1958 (No. 17). 
2. It was in fact repealed by the National Liberation CoUncil 
following the coup which overthrow Nkrumah regime in 
February 1966. See Preventive Detention (Repeal) Decree 
1966. N.L.C. No. 30. However, not all the Nkrumah 
detainees were released. See Protective Custody Decree 
N.L.C. Decree No.2 1966. The emphemistic title r 
of the decree does not detraet from the total surrender 
of personal liberty involved in the promulgation of the 
Decree. 
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During the passage of the Bill througb Parliament, 
Government speakers said: 
"the only person who need be alartled about it are 
those~ are either attempting to organise violence 
terrorism or civil war or who are acting as fifth 
columnists for some foreign power interested in sub-
version in Ghana .••• the Bill has. been deliberately 
drafted so that the Government can deal resolutely 
and without delay with any attempt to subvert the 
State by force. The Government are determined not 
to be caught unprepared, as a number of other states 
have been, by subversion either from within or without 
•••••••••• in order to preserve the due procesS of law, 
it may on occasion be unfortunately necessary to take 
special powers."l 
"The Government are seeking power to interfere with the 
rights of any citizen of Ghana, if that citiaen is conducting 
Himself in such a way as to interfere with the defance of Ghana, 
to interfere with the security of the State and with the 
relationship of foreign states in Ghana. The MemberS of the 
OJposition will concede the fact that it is at times necessary 
to adopt undemocratic methods to preserve democracy. ,,2 
The nature of the subversive acts feared by the Government 
was eXplained in considerable detail in a white Paper issued 
in 1959~ The Act had not been brought into USe immediately, 
but after some four months, in ~ovember, 1958, a detention 
-1. 
2. 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Part Deb. Off. Report. 14th July, 1958. 
Minister of Local Government, Ibid. 15th July, 1958, Cols 
513-514. 
w. p. No. 10/59. 
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order was made in respect of fowrty-three persons, In the 
following month a further order was made in respect of two 
prominent members of the Opposition, R. R. Amponsah and 
M. K. Apaloo, who had been unanimously found by an indepen-
dent tribunal to have engaged in a conspiracy to carry out 
an act for an unlawful purpose revolutionary in character. I 
The white paper alleged that the persons detained in November 
were members of the secret societies respectively known as the 
Zenith Seven and the Tokyo Joes, which were plotting to 
overthrow the Government by viol_iee and were linked with 
2 
certain member. of the opposition party. Alter a detailed 
description of the ramifications of the alleged plot, with 
.up~ortln~ evidence elicited by three public tribunals of 
en"uirY, various criminal prosecutions and other means, the 
white paper concluded with the following summary of the 
Circumstances which in the Governments view, justified the 
enactment and use of the Preventive Detention Act: 
1. Report of the Granville Sharp Commission, Acera, 1959. 
2. w. P. No. 10/59 cit p. 37. 
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"By no means every piece of evidence and information can 
be fitted into an exact place in an overall scheme. Broadly 
speaking, however, the overall plan is clear. It was to seek 
foreign support by allegations of corruption, known to those 
making them to be false, and to incite more violence in 
Ghana by circulating forged and false documents and rumours 
which v,uld set one racial group against another. Money 
and material for revolutionary purposes were to be sought 
from abroad and the help of those fundamentally opposed to 
African independence enlisted. The plot was to be tr~gered 
off by the use of such persons as Benjamin AWhaitey,1 whom 
it was thought could command Army support, or by the use of 
criminal elements such as were to be found among the "TOkyo 
Joes". The Prime Minister and other Ministers could then 
be assassinated without those wbo were in fact bebind the 
assassination being revealed. When, in November, 1958, 
those associated with the first assassination plot were 
detained, R.R. Amponsah immediately declared that he and the 
Opposition generally were totally opposed to violence and 
the allegations made against the persons detained were a 
r~frame-up" by the Government to get rid of their political 
opponents. At the very time he made this declaration, he 
was, as the Granville Sharp Commission has found, himself 
actively engaged in another plot to assassinate the prime 
Minister. ,,2 
The White Paper gave four instances of the difficulty of 
relying on" criminal prosecutions rather than preventive 
detention dn combating subversive acts of this kind: 
(1) One of the tribunals of enquiry investigated 491 
alleged incidents of extortion, violence and intimidation in 
.Ashanti." Effort. were made .ubsequently to institute prose-
cution in regard to these cases, but in fact, the lap8e~~ 
.... " .. ,,,", 
1. Benjamin Awhaitey was tried before a Court-Martial. 
2. W. P. No. 10/59 at p. 46. 
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which had occurred and the reluctance of witnesses to come 
forward when they were not certain that they might not again 
be victimised at a later date, prevented any effective prose-
cutions and only a few convictions were obtained. l 
(2) TWo opposition members of Parliament from Togoland were 
prosecuted with eight others for conspiring to attack persomwith 
armed force. The trial lasted over two months and the members 
of Parliament, with three others, were found guilty. The con-
victions were quashed on appeal on the ground of misdirections 
2 by the trial Judge. 
(3) R.R. Amponsah was tried for sedition on a charge of 
making public accusations that police officers in conjunction 
with the Government were conniving at the printing of extra 
ballot papers for the rigging of elections. He was acquitted 
on the ground that under the law as it existed the words were 
not seditious. 3 
(4) Although Amponsah and Apaloo were found by the Granville 
Sharp Commission to have engaged in a conspiracy to carry out an 
act for an unlawful purpose revolutionary in character, no such 
offence was to be found in the Criminal Code. 4 
All the reasons merely confirm that the Government was in-
tolerant of the slow but fair process of the Rule of law, and 
rather than correct whatever deficiencies there might be within 
the ordinary criminal law of the land, it preferred to rely on 
"emergency" power. This is supported by the tact that in 1960, 
the use of the Preventive Detention Act was extended to criminal 
gangsters whose activities were not political. 
1. W.P. No. 10/59 pJ 29. 
2. Ibid p. 25. 
3. Ibid p. 32. The law of sedition waS altered in 1959 to 
include *D act of this nature. 
4. W. P. No. 10/59 p. 17. 
-138-
By the end of 1960 it is believed that three hundred and 
eighteen persons had been made the subject of preventive deten-
tion orders. l In 1961, fifty persons were detained under the 
Act following the declaration of emergency. They included four 
opposition members of Parliament and Dr. J. B. Danquah,2 and 
Mr. J. E. Appiah, Deputy leader of Opposition. On November 6th 
1963, the re-enactment of the 1958 Act empowered the continued 
detention, for a further five years, of many who had already 
been in prison since 1958. The Internatioaal Commission of 
Jurists commented: 3 
"It is impossible to see respect for human rights 
and the Rule of Law when a man may be detained for 
ten years without ever being accuaed of any crime, 
let alone being tried and c.nvicted." 
In an authentic letter dated 14'ebruary 20th, 1965, addressed 
to the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Great 
uritain,4 smuggled out of a detention prison in Accra, the 
writers gave an eye-opening and informative account of the use 
of the Preventive Detention Act. The opening paragraphs read: 
"Mr. Prime Minister, 
We helpless detainees of this prison ••••.•••.•• We 
also take this opportunity to draw your attention to our 
said and distressing state, to appeal to you and through 
you to the 700 million peoples and their several govern-
ments of the Commonwealth to come to our aid so as to 
secure for us release from what appears virtual imprison.ent 
for life for no otber~rime· than tbat of political 
opposition and the f!ct that tbe core of us. do not share 
1. See Bennion Constitutional law of Ghana (1962) p. 224. 
2. E.l.172 of 1961. Dr. bQDquah was the Un1ted Party candidate 
in the Presidential election of 1960. He died in detention 
on February 4th, 1965. 
3. Bulletion of Inter. Comm. of JUrists, NO. 18, MAr.1964 p.lO. 
4. Shortly after the labour Party won the General Ele ction.,Ict(gq... 
The letter was first reported in the Times ~~ch 3rd 1965. 
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the clear neo-communists ideas of Presiaent Kwame Nkrumah and 
his associates. 
None of us has been convicted of any crime, yet many of 
us have already completed close on 7, 6, 5, 4, or 3 years of 
imprisonment, as the case may be, in conditions of severity 
worse than those laid down by law and accorded to convict 
prisoners •....•• Here we number nearly 600: 
(a) Members of Parliament and other leading figures and suppor-
ters of the party in opposition to Nkrumah's party at indepen-
dence and subsequently brought tegether in the United Party of 
Ghana; their arrests began in November 1958 in an atmosphere 
of great calmness in the country but generally accompanied by 
specious allegations of activities prejudicial to the security 
of the state. 
(b) So called Criminal Detainees arrested in the later months 
of 1960(followi~ a ghastly crime of robbery with violence and 
murder in Accra,) they are mostly persons of known criminal 
records. 
(c) • number of CPP members and supporters previously used by 
government and party leaders for shady activities (including 
criminal ones), frauds and extortions, their detentions were 
arranged by their principals to prevent the leakage of those 
activities as the persons became disgruntled. 
(d) Personal enemies of government party leaders, regional 
and district commissioners who exercise the power of submitting 
names of persons to be detained. 
(e) A body of paid government party workers - the propaganda 
unit' of the CPP Headquarters detained in 1962 because they are 
suspected of being supporters or sympatbisers of their fallen 
party leaders, Adamafio, Ako Adjei and Kori Crabbe. 
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(f) A number of very highly placed police-officers dismissed 
and later detained following an attempt to shoot President 
Nkrumah by a junior police officer in January 1964. 
(g) Other persons detained upon spiteful but false reports 
made against them by personal enemies who happen to know what 
to say to get a person imprisoned under the Preventive Detention 
Act without inquiry, including persons detained so that their 
wives might become available for interested suitors, or their 
properties misapp~d by false claimants or their businesses 
destroyed. 
There is a large number of persons unclassified. For some 
time now the government bas dispensed with the statutory for-
mality of giving to persons detained grounds of detention 
within five days as provided by the law. Quite logical since 
the Ghana Courts, under the leadership of Chief Justice Sir 
Arku Korsah - a registered member, of the CPP - have abdicated 
their power of protecting qhananian citizens against imprisonment 
on trumped charges by conducting the trial called for under 
Habeas Corpus application. So persons are merely removed from 
their homes and sent into the prisons without being given any 
information whatever as to the reason for the action against 
them."l 
Whilst it is not here suggested that all the allegat~ons 
in the letter were true, there were official confirmation of 
the number of detainees, several of whom were undeniably 
political opponents of the eX-President Nkrumah. 
The International Commission of Jurists publishet their 
observations of the Ghana legislation. Their concluding obser-
vations were as follows: 
1. Quoted by K. A. Busia, Africa in search of democracy 
(London) (1968) 129 - 131. 
See also Times March 12, 1965. 
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"WithOIlt going into the political questions as to whether 
there existed or exists in Ghana a situation calling for legis-
lation providing for preventive detention, it is apparent that 
there are certain factors in connection with the Ghana Act which, 
from a legal point of view, are not satisfactory. 
(i) The maximum duration of the preventive detention seems 
long especially when it is taken into account that there is no 
indication that the term of detention comes up for regular 
review by the executive ••••••. 
(ii) On account of the inability of the detainee to face his 
accusers and put his case there appears to be an infringement 
of a rule of natural justice; written representatiODs, it is 
submitted, are not enough. 
(iii) There is no independent tribunal before whom the 
detainee can make his objection. 
(iv) Those persons detained give the appearance certainly 
of being drawn very considerably from one political party. 
(v) If the Akoto and Yanderpuye (two of fhe detainees) 
casesl are typically illustrative, the specific details filed 
on the grounds of detention appear inadequate. 
(vi) Because of the narrow subjective interpretation of the 
words "if satisfied", the Courts have precluded themselves from 
investigating the grounds of the President's satisfaction. 
Judicial review, therefore, does not seem to have provided in 
Ghana a strong safeguard for the liberty of the subject".2 
It will be seen, from the accounts of the use of the legis-
lation which will be discussed later, that preventive detention 
can and did become a perpetual weapon of punishment and re-
E,ression. 
1. TO be discussed later - See Chap. 5. 
2. Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, Vol. 
3 No. 2 (Winter) 1961, pp. 65 - 81. 
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TANZANIA 
Tanganyika, like Ghana, has made more use of its preventive 
detention legislation than of powers which may be conferred by 
emergency legislation after a proclamation or declaration of a 
state of emergency. As already noted earlier, the TanganYi.ka 
legislation follows closely the Ghananian counterpart, with the 
notable difference that any order of detention made under the 
1 Tanganyika Preventive Detention Act, 1962, cannot be subject 
of review in any court of law. 2 AS originally enacted the Act 
contemplated the enforcement of its provisions by the Minister 
of Home Affairs, but with the attainment of Republican status, 
one of the incidents of such status was the transfer of the 
Ninister's power to the President. 
In April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a United 
Republic3 for which the name of Tanzania was adopted in October 
1964.4 Under the Articles of Union interim constitutional 
arrangements (in the form of modifications of Tanganyika's 
republican constitution of 1962) were introduced whereby Zan-
zibar was to have what wa. essentially the status of a federal 
unit (though the word 'federal' was not used) with the United 
Republic. lbere was reserved to parliament and Executive of 
the United Republic exclusive authority for all matters in and 
for Tanganyika and for certain specified matters in and for the 
United Republic as a whole. The executive power in relation to 
all matters in Tanganyika and all Union matters in the Republic 
vests in the President. Union matters are those agreed to in 
April, 1964, inter alia, the constitution and government of the 
United Republic, external affairs, defence and emergency powers. 
1. Act No. 60 of 1962. 
2. Sec. 2. 
3. Union of Tanganyika and zanzibar Act 1964 No.22 of 1964. 
4. United Republic (Declaration of Name) Act 1964 NO. 61 of 
1964. 
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The only emergency as such which has been proclaimed in 
Tanzania since independence was in zanzibar following the reWo-
lution in 1964. The Government of the Sultan of zanzibar, 
Seyyid Janshid bin Abdullah, and his Prime ~linister Shiekh 
Huhammad Hanadi was overthrown on January 12, 1964 by a "Revo-
lutionary Party" which seized power and proclaimed the estab-
lishment of a Republic on the same day. The revolution was 
carried out by about 200 men who were led by i'Field Harshall" 
JOWl Okello and who seized armouries and swiftly over-powered 
the police station which surrendered a:Cter all-day fighting. 
A broadcast on January 12 announced that Sheikh Abud Karume, 
leader of the Afro-~hirazi Party, had been installed as Presi-
dent and that a new Government had been formed. 
Among the causes given :Cor the revolution by observers 
were the ff:l 
(a) The Afro-Shirazi Party's resentment at being prevented 
from governing and even taking part in a coalition government 
with other parties, although it had gained 54 per cent of the 
votes in the elections of July, 1963. 
(b) The reported intention of the Suitants Government to intro-
duce Egyptians as officers and advisers; 
tc) Rising unemployment, largely as a result of Indonesia's 
curtailment of close imports from zanzibar; and 
(d) The dominance of Arabs as landowners over A:Cricans as 
tenant farmers. It was thought that the timing of the revolu-
tion might have been connected with the banning of the Onma 
party.2 
1. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1964) p. 19951 n. 
2. The Umma Party led by Sheikh 'Habu' was banned on Jan.4 
because it had re:Cused to register as required by a new law. 
Sheikh 'Babu
' 
hi.self left the country and arrived at Dar-es-
Salam on Jan.9. He was made the Minister of Ex~ernal Affairs 
and Trade under the new govt. fr. the revolution. 
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The new Government immediately began to round up and "screen" 
supporters of the former regime suspected of possessing weapons; 
declared illegal the two coalition parties which had supported 
the previous Government,l all their property being seized, and 
banned the Sultan from the island for life. It was reported 
that about 2,500 persons were in prison or in detention and 
refugee camps, of whom about 400 were "strictly political 
prisoners" The country was proclaimed a one-party state on Jan. 
30 by the President and this was confirmed by Sheikh "Habu" , 
who declared that he had joined the AfrO-Shirazi Party and had 
asked all his followers in the Umma Party to do the Same. 
FOllowing the revolution, a state of emergency was proclaimed 
and this led to the introduction of preventive detention with-
out limit by Presidential Decree. 2 Section 2 provides that 
where "the President is satisfied that any person is conducting 
himself so as to be dangerous to the peace and good order in any 
part of Zanzibar or is acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
defence of Zanzibar or the security of the Republic, "he may 
order that the person be detained~ This was followed by a round 
up of the members of the Nationalist Government which had been 
ousted by the revolution. 
After the Union with Tanganyik~ President Nyerere of 
Tanganyika announced that political prisoners in zanzibar would 
not be released, nor would the property confiscated by President-
ial decree be banded back to the owners. During the May Day 
Celebrations of 1965, a plebscite~s held which confirmed 
President Nyerere as the President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania and the President of the island of Zanzibar as the 
vice President of the Union. FOllowing this, a further release 
of detainees took place and a Home office Ministry official 
1. The Times, February 3, 1964. 
2. Decree No. 3 of 1964. 
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stated in uar-es-~alaam on October 8, that only 22 persons 
were still being held under the preventive detention legis-
lation. They include 11 former members of the Nationalist 
Government of zanzibar. l 
In mainland Tanzania, according to a var-es-Salaam report 
2 
of January 28, 1968, the number of persons cetained under the 
Preventive Detention Act, 1962, was also given as 22 including 
eight members of the former Government of zanzibar and six 
Goanese&leged to be spying for portugal. Of the forme~ 
Sheik Muhammad Shamte Hamadi, the former Prime Minister, and 
Mr. Ubusih Jalah, former Minister of Communications, Works 
and Powers, ~re released on February 20, 19683 • It had 
however, been reported on January 1, 1963, that ~w. Abdulla 
Kassim Hanga who had been Minister of Local Government~ho 
had left the country in August 1967 had been arrested. Mr. 
Oscar Kambona alleged in London on January 4, 1968 that 
nearly 200 persons had been arrested in Tan.ania and were 
detained without trial, and that President Nyerere was using 
the Preventive Detention Act to muzzle members of his own 
party; an allegation reminiscent of the Ghananian allegations 
against ex-President Nkrumah. President Nyerere of Tanzania 
himself, whilst not denying the allegation admitted that he 
signed several detention orders, because he believed that in 
preserving national~curity,"our ideals must guide and not 
blind us." He asserted that "in the idealistic sense of the 
word, it is 'better' that 99 guilty men should go~ee rather 
than one innocent man being punished, but in the circumstances 
of a nation like our other factors had to be taken into account. 
1. See Keesing Contemporary Archives Oct.9-16 (1965) p.21,OOO 
2. Times (London) January 28, 1968. 
3. See Keesing op.cit Nay 24 - 31 (1969) p.22375. 
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Here, in this Union, conditions may ,well arise in which it is 
better that 99 innocent people should suffer temporary detention 
than that one possible traitor should wreck the nation. It 
liould certainly be complete madness to let 99 guilty men escape 
in order to avoid the risk of punishing one innocent pereon."l 
It would appear, therefore, that preventive detention was 
and has always been regarded more as a punitive than preventive 
measure in Tanzania, no less thanR~s in Ghana under President 
Nkrumah. 
Shiek Abeia Ka.ume, Vice President of the United Republic 
but generally described as the President of Zanzibar by the 
island's 8.lthori ties, stated on April 25, 1968, that he wanted no 
further integration with Tanzania; that the current interim 
constitution providing for internal self-government on Zanzibar 
and Pemba was to continue indefinitely, and that no free elections 
would be permitted on the islands for "at least 50 years". He 
claimed that there were no "counter-revolutionaries" in Zanzibar 
and that no one was held under the Preventive Detention Act. 2 
But on November 20, 1968, a curfew was imposed for 10 hours 
on zanzibar Town in Wiat WlS officially desaribed as a "mock 
emergency" with the People's Defence Force (of about 3,000) and 
police patfolling the streets aftermwn - an unprecedent action 
since the revolution of 1964. 3 
UGANDA 
Emergency powers in Uganda, as in all other eX-British 
territories were formerly granted and governed by the Emergency 
powers Order-in-Council 1939 to 1961, which remained in effect 
for a short while after independence; however, the Uganda 
1. Speech inaugurating the University oar-es-Salaams quoted 
Frqnck: op.cit. p. 231. 
2. Keesing's contemporary Archives (1969) p. 22375. 
3. See Keesing's contemporary Archives (May 1969) p. 22375. 
, 
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(independence) Order-in-Council provided that they would cease 
to have effect on March, 9, 1963, if not repealed earlier by 
Parliament as in fact they were by the Emergency Powers Act, 
1963 which came into force on February, 26, 1963. 
The operation of the powers conferred by the Act may be seen 
in the legislation made early in 1963 when~ a result of distur-
bances in some areas of the Kingdom of TO~o, a proclamation was 
made by the then Governor-General, Sir Walter coutts,declaring 
that a state of public emergency existed in the Iaaza district 
of Busongora and Isaza of Bwamba. Following the proclamation, I 
the Emergency Powers (General Provisions) Regulations, 19632 was 
enacted. These regulations were very similar in substance to 
the Nigerian provisions of the previous year, perhaps because 
of the similarity of the federa1 3 structure of both countries. 
The most unusual provision of the regulations provided that 
the Minister of Internal Affairs shall have power to appoint an 
administrator for the "Emergency Area" and the Administrator 
was enabled to make rules and Orders by statutory instruments 
and to delegate any of his powers to his deputies, assistants 
and~ents. Various special offences were~eated and special 
powers conferred on the police and army officers. The Minister 
was empowered to make detention Orders and to make rules speci-
fying the conditions of detention and to establish a tribunal to 
review such Orders according to the Constitution. The ~tinister 
was also empowered to make deportation and exclusion Orders. 4 
1. L.N. No. 47 of 1963. 
2. L. N. No. 48 of 1963. 
3. The constitution of Uganda had some important federal chara-
cteristics: the country comprised five "federal states" (the 
four kingdoms and the territory of Busoga) and ten "districts", 
plus the territory of Mbale. Each federal state bad certain 
special provisions entrenched by the constitution of Uganda 
and alterable only by the legislat*re of each state. Each has 
its own ruler, Executive council of Ministers and legislature. 
4. L.N. 44, 45 of 1963. 
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The Administrator was empowered to take possession of land 
and to requisition any other property in the interests of pubiic 
safety or to maintain essential supplies and services. l 
PrOIJerty other than land could be sold by the administrator as 
if he were the owner, but land and building bad to be restored 
to the owner at the end of emergency. With regard to compensatio~ 
the regulations were of special interest: failing agreement 
between the owner and the administrator, compensation payable 
was assessed by a valuation board of three members appointed by 
the Ninister, whose assessment was stat~1D be final. 
The emergency in Uganda which gave much more scope for the 
use of emergency powers, however, was as is now generally acce-
pted politically inspired. The situation is of particular 
interest because it illustrates the use of emergency powers 
following a one-man revolution. 
The crisis followed the adoption by Parliament on February 
4, 1966 of a motion by Nr. Dauda Ocheng (Chief Whip of the 
Opposition Kabaka Yekka Party) which aimed at the suspension of 
Colonel Idi Amin, second in command of the Armed Forces, pending 
a police investigation into his activities, and which by impli-
cation was based on serious allegations of bribery and corruption 
against Dr. Obote and the other f.linisters. 2 
On February 22, 1966, the Prime Minister, Dr. Obote, issued 
a statement headed "statement to the Nation by the Prime Minister", 
declaring that in the interest of national stability and public 
security and tranquility he had taken over all powers of the 
Government of Uganda. He thereupon dismissed five of his 
Ministers and immediately had them arrested and put under 
detention. On February 24, Dr. Obote disclosed that he had been 
1. Emergency Powers (Requisitioning) Reg. 1963 LN. 50 of 1963. 
2. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1966) p. 21272. 
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forced to take "certain drastic measures" because of events 
and "unwelcome activities of certain leading personalities", 
who had plotted to overthrow the Government; that during his 
tour of the Northern Region early in the month an attempt was 
made to overthrew the Government by use of foreign troops; and 
that certain members of the Government had requested foreign 
missions for military assistance consisting of foreign troops 
and arms for the purpose of invading the country and overthrowing 
the Government of Uganda. Therefore, he suspended the consti-
tution but preserve all the main organs of Government. He also 
later divested both the President and the Vice President of 
their offices and of their authorities which he vested in him-
self. 
Immediately thereafter the President of Uganda, the Kabaka 
of Buganda, was forcibly ejected from state house, his official 
residence, Then on April, 15, 1966, at an emergency meeting of 
the National Assembly, a resolution approving the action taken 
by the Prime Minister, abolishing the "Constitution which came 
into being on October 9, 1962", and adoptiDB a new constitution 
"as the constitution of Uganda until such time as the constituent 
Assembly~tablished by Parliament enacts a constitution in place 
of this Constitution", was approved. 
The most important changes brought about by the new consti-
tution were those limiting the rights of the constituent kingdoms, 
and in particular of the largest among them, Buganda. Specifi-
cally, the Kabaka's right to appoint local chiefs was made 
subject to the advice of the ventral Government, and Buganda's 
right to certain revenues reverted to the discretion of the 
National Assembly. Although some members of the Lukiko (the 
Parliament of Buganda) had demanded a trade boycott in order to 
force Dr. Obote to revert to the previous constitution, the 
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Buganda Prime Minister, Mr. Hayanja-Nkanji, said that this 
could not be done and that the conventions of modern dipolomacy 
would have to be followed. l Thus the opposition of the Govern-
ment of Buganda was subsequently expressed in two different 
actions: (i) a letter by the Kabaka to U. Thant, the United 
Nations Secretary-General and (ii) a demand by the Lukiko that 
the Uganda Central Government should leave the territory of 
2 Buganda by May 30. 
The Kabaka's letter appealed to U. 'fhant to use his good 
offices over Dr. Obote'sseizure of power on the ground ~ inter-
national friction. In support of his appeal, the Kabaka quoted 
a U. N. General Assembly resolution of December 1960 which 
stated that the disruption of national unity was incompatible 
with the purposes and principle of the U. N. Cb.rt.r.~ 
'lbe demand that the !,'ederal Government should leave Buganda 
within a week made by the Lukiko on May 23, after it had declared 
the previous day that the abrogation of the 1962 constitution had 
cut the Kabaka's Government off from Buganda, which, however, 
insisted on recognising the old Federal COnstitution. 
Refuting the Lukiko's statement, President Obote declared 
on r.'lay 22, that his Government would continue to exercise its 
full executive and other Rowers in Buganda and that Buganda's 
1. The correspondent of the Financial Times reported from 
Kampala on April 17 and 25 that the~ramatic introduction" 
of the new constitution had been widely supported by local 
government and political leaders and had been welcomed 
"almost everywhere in Uganda" as "marking ~he end of a long 
period of uncertainty", although the Buganda Government was 
maintaining its opposition. 
2. Uganda's two largest towns, Kampala, the capital and Entebbe, 
both lie in Buganda territory. 
3. The Kabaka's letter was reported in The Times May 3, 1966. 
-151-
attitude would have to be "firmly stamped out for the good 
of the country and the public interest." The next day, after 
the Lukiko had demanded the departure of the Uganda Govern-
ment from Buganda territory, and a clash had occurred near 
Kampala between police and dissident Baganda in which five 
persons were reported killed, Presiaent Obote's Government 
proclaillecla state of emergency in Buganda. l 
:t-lr. Amos. Sempa, who with five other members of the Lukilo 
had refused to take the oath under the Constitution, and three 
Buganda country chiefs were immediat4tly arrested, and Kampala 
Radio declared that the Lukiko's demand was "tantamount to an 
incitement to violence" and that the KalIaka's letter to U. Thant 
was~n act of rebellion and treason." 
A Government statement announced on ~my 24 that its troops 
had taken control of the Kabaka's palace2 in order to seize 
a large supply of arms stored there "without the Government 
knowledge" and possibly "brought into the country illegally 
for the express purpose of overthrowing the Government." 
While the fighting gradually died down the following day, 
President Obote announced that although the situation was aa1m, 
the emergency regulations would remain in force. 
FOllowing the proclamation stricter emergency powers than 
those already operating in certain parts of Toro were put into 
operation including detention under Regulation 1 of the 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations, 19663 • This vested 
power of detention on the Minister whenever" be is satisfied" 
that it was necessary for the purpose of maintaining public 
order. 
1. L. N. No.4 of 1966 
2. Mr. Onama (Minister of Defence) stated on May 26 that the 
Kabaka had esc~ed arrest. He was later reported to have 
turned up in Tanzania from where he proceeded to wndon. 
3. s. I. No. 65 of 1966. 
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One of the Kabaka's brothers, Prince Henry Kimera, who 
had escaped when the Kabaka's palace was attacked and had 
1 
reached London, alleged on June 21, 1966 that an estimated 
15,000 of the Kabaka's subjects had lost their lives in the 
events of May, 1966, and that another 8,000 were in detention. 
Mr. Sam Odaka, the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, then 
on a visit to London, on June 29, 1966 described the report 
of detentions and casualties as "exaggerated" and said that 
the Government estimated the number of death at 58, while of a 
total of about 705 persons held at the peak of the crisis only 
55 were still in detention. 2 
At a ceremony marking the 4th Anniversary of Uganda 
independence on October 9, 1966, the President announced that, 
while no further measures would be taken to enforce Ugandan 
unity, the state of emergency in the Kingdom of Buganda would 
not be lifted until further administrative changes had been 
made. In fact, even after the Constitutional changes proposed 
in June 1967 had been finallymopted by Parliament sitting as 
3 
a Constituent Assembly on September 8, 1967 .nen Uganda 
officially became a Republic, Parliament extended the state 
4 
of emergency threeUmes, each time for a further period of 
six months. 
1. The Times (London) June 21, 1966. 
2. Guardian June 29, 1966. 
3. By the new Constitution the four hereditary kingdoms 
abolished, whilst the name of Buganda was completely 
the other three retained their names as provinces. 
were 
removed . 
, 
. ~ 
4. On November 3, 1967; April 25, 1968; November 1968. 
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Under the emergency regulation, a number of persons con-
tinued to be detained, including 21 men and women formally 
discharged in the High Court at Kampala on July 1967 after 
being accused of treason and of plotting to kill President 
Obote, his }1inisters and to instal the Sir Edward !vlutesa as 
the Emperor of Uganda; }ir. Abubakar Hayanja, a former l-iinister 
of Education in the Kabaka's Government and a leading member 
of the Opposition in Parliament, and Mr. Rajat ~eogy, the 
editor of the magazine Transition. l According to a notice in 
the o££icial gazette,2 the total number of persons detained 
under these regulations was 15, including the sister o£ the 
late Kabaka. There is no doubt that these numbers have been 
greatly swelled by new detentions~llowing the attempted 
assassination of President Obote in December 1969. 3 President 
Obote was shot at and injured en-,the race by an unnamed gunman 
in Kampala on December 19, at the close of a Conference of 
Delegates of the ruling Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.). 
Vice-President John K. Babuta immediately assumed control o£ 
the Government and declared a national state o£ emergency. 
~le Democratic Party (the of£icial Opposition) and all other 
parties except the UPC were immediately banned. Thus Uganda, 
by a strol{e of the use o£ emergency power became a one-party 
state. Under the emergency regulations civilians were ordered 
to hand to the police any privately owned guns or ammunitions 
by noon on December 24 and were warned not to carry sticks or 
offensive weapons. In a number of clashes between police and 
1. On Feb.,l, 1969, both Mr. Mayanja and !>lr. Neogy were acquitted ~ 
by the Chie£ Magistrate in Kampala o£ charges o£ sedition 
arising out o£ a letter written by Mr. r-tayanja and published 
in Transition. Immediately a£ter the acquittal both men were 
re-nrrested for further detention under the emergency regu-
lations. 
2. L. N. Feb., 17, 1969. 
3. See Guardian Dec.20, 1969. nle attempt wqs presumed to have 
been as a result of the death of ex-Kabaka, Sir Edward 
l-Iutesa whose ceath in London was announced on Nov. 21, 1969. 
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troops on tile one hand and ci vilians on the other some 
Africans werereportcd injured. 
Parliament approved the declaration of the emergency 
on December 22. Meanwhile about 10 leading opposition 
politiciaas had been arrested. They included the President 
of the Democrat ic Party, Sir lVilliam lVilberforce, former 
Vice-President of Uganda, the Publicity Secretary of the 
Democratic Party and Miss Nahrija Mpo~ogome, sister of the 
late ;::;ir Edward Frederick Nutesa, the former Kabaka of 
Buganda. 
KENYA 
-
Barely had independence been attained when the Government 
of Kenya had to brinl iAto operation its emergency legisla-
tion, the Preservation of Public Secarity Act, 1960. This 
was caused by the continued unrest in the North Eastern 
Region occupied by Somalis who had been demanding secession 
and re-unity with their tribesmen across the border in 
Somalia. The agitation had been going on even during the 
colonial administration and was particularly intensified 
during the months preceding the grant of independence to 
Kenya. l 
In fact, on August 25, 1963, talks at the invitation of 
the British Government took place in Rome between the 
representatives of Britain and the Somali Republic. The 
talks were unsuccessful in that the British Government, 
1. An e~mple of trouble engendered as a result of the 
arbitrary~a.limination of boundaries by the Colonial 
Administrators. 
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though legally responsible for Kenya until independence, 
declined to make any decision in the dispute;the Northern 
Frontier District. Incidents began and continued to occur 
in the region including attacks by Somali tribesmen on border 
posts in which some soldiers were wounded and a Somali leader, 
hr. Abdul Khalif, suspected of co-operating with the Kenya 
Government was kidnapped and removed to Somalia. The continued 
unrest in the region and the activities of nomadic bomali bands 
of armed shiftas caused 1'1r. I(enya,,-ta to call an urgent cabinet 
meeting at Gatunda on uecember 25, 1963. After the meeting the 
Government proclaimed a state of emergencyl throughout the 
region and set up a five mile deep prohibited zone along the 
Kenya - Somali border, excluding the settlements of Mandera 
and EI Wake 
These is no irrefutable evidence that the measures taken 
have been used in any respect other than for combating attacks 
from Somali Shifta and preventing people from harbouring or 
consorting with people who might aid the Shift~ raids. 2 
Perhaps the minimal use can be explained not only by the fact 
that the emergency was necessitated by the need to tight an 
1. L.N. of 1963. The declaration was app~ed by the Housa of 
Representatives on Dec. 31 but in senate the Kenya African 
Dev. Union (K.A.D.1.1) Opposition at first voted against the 
declaration, thereby preventing it." approval by the consti-
tutionally required 2/3 majority; after the intervention of 
Mr. Mboya (Minister of Justice) however a second vote was 
taken on which the Opposition abstained the measures the 
being approved. 
2. President Kenyatta agreed to lift the emergency on the North- . 
Eastern Region on Feb. 21, 1969. See: Keesing's contemporary 
Archives (May 1969) p. 23347. 
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an outside enemy, but also by the fact that under the 
Public Security (Detained and Restricted Persons) Act,l 
the President may make regulations for detention and restric-
tion without the necessity for an emergency proclamation. 2 
In fact, it was under this statute that a vast number of new 
regulations3 have been made and operated. These regulations 
provided for detention, government control of movement and the 
imposition of curfews. 
The new regulatioms were first applied or operated on 
August 4, 1966 against six officials of the Kenya People's 
Union (K.P.U.) who were arrested by Special Branch Officers 
and' were detained. Itolr. Oginga Odinga, leader of the 
Opposition Party immediately accused the Government of resor-
ting to "desperate and cowardly tactics of detention" and 
alleged that Kenya had been placed in a family of dictators 
together with"Salazar of Portugal, Verwoerd of South Africa and 
Ian Smith of Rhodesia".4 Mr. Odinga was himself ari!ested and 
detained for questioning. Mr. Arap Moy, the Minister of Home 
Affairs alleged that Mr. Odinga had travelled to Uganda under 
1. Mr. Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General introducing the 
constitutional amendment incorporating the Bill, explained 
that it was not designed to oppress people and impose a 
rule of tyranny, but sought to protect the stability and 
security of the state in case of war, internal disorder, a 
breakdown of economic system, or natural disaster." All 
of which are already accommodated under the Preservation 
of Public Security Act. 1960. 
2. An amendment was made in the Constitution shortly after the 
attainment of Republic to accommodate this provision of the 
Constitution (Amendment) No. 3 Act 1966 Act No.18 of 1966. 
3. E.G. Public Security (Detained and Restricted Persons) 
Regulations 1966. L. N. 212 of 1966. 
4. Keesiqs Contemporary Archives 1966 p. 21718. 
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an assumed name, and that he (Odinga) had gone there to 
collect money "from a certain foreign mission" in order to 
finance the K.P.U. lie added, "'Ibe Kenya Government will 
not tolerate funds coming into thbs country for subversive 
ends and to disrupt the peaceful country that we are trying 
to build."l Nr. Odinga denied the accusations, describing 
them as "sensational fabrications" and"saying that the 
purpose of his visit had been to consult lawyers in KampalR 
on the detention of 
mente According to 
supporters in their 
nine members of his party by the Govern-
a report, the K.P.U. were losaingtheir 
2 hundreds. 
The recent banning of the Kenya Peoples Union (K.P.U.) 
and the imprisonment of its leaders, including ~w. Oginga 
Odinga, .... severely damaged Kenya's image as a state in 
Africa reasonably democratic and tolerant of opposition. 
The political crisis had its immediate cause in the assassi-
nation of Nr. Tom Mboya, ~tinister of Economic Planning. The 
assassination seemed suddenly to release fears and hostilities 
which up to July 1968 had somehow been contained and controlled 
by the dominant ethic of Kenya unity and progress. Suddenly 
it became plain that there were deep and bitter suspicions 
of Government intentions, and of those of the dominant 
Kikuyu members in particular. But the roots of the crisis 
are embedded in the fragile complexity of Kenya Society, in 
forces which existed long before independence and in align-
ments and realignments which arethe product of the 
political struggles since then. 
1. Official Report. House of Rep. Deb. Oct. 11, 1966. 
2. New York Times October 9, 1966. 
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~1AlAWI : 
Throughout the period of preparation for independence 
in l'-1alawi, there was much activity at all levels as new ideas 
were put into practice and the many irksome functions of 
government amended or done away with. Politically, the 
Nalawi Congress partyl increased its hold on the country and 
grew into one of the best-organised political parties in 
Africa, bacl{ed by an active party propaganda newspaper, the 
i"lalawi News. Small oppos i tion group continued to spring up 
but these were soon overwhelmed by the party machine which 
had also, by this time, founded a militant wing of party men 
known as the league of Nalawi Youth, under the Leadership of 
Aleke Banda. 2 
During the first half of 1964 when the country was in 
c 
the midst of intensive preparations for the independence 
celebrations, violence broke out in some districts of the 
country between followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
league of Nalawi youth. For many years the Jehovah's Witnesses 
misSionaries, most of whom were Americans, had been working 
in the country, assiduously gaining adherents to their l>~"ntt 
pacificist and fundamentalist doctrine. An important corner~ 
stone of this ideology is the rejection of all allegiance to 
governments or political parties, and, in the days of 
colonial administration, the activities of these missionaries 
1. This party was but a successor to the proseribed Nyasaland 
African Congress. It was reorganised in 1959 towards the 
end of the Emergency and it was made claar that Dr. Banda 
would be invited to lead it Dnce he was released from 
detention. He was released on 1st April, 1960. 
2. Not a relation of the President. 
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were always looked upon as subversive element by the govern-
ment. with a change in government, however, the Jehovah's 
witnesses remained opposed to political parties of any sort and 
resisted demands from the Malawi Congress Party that they 
become card-carrying and paying members. In the Mlanji 
districts there were a number of inciaents between these two 
factions, resulting in burning and a number Qf deaths. After 
the intervention of Dr. Banda, pressure was called off and the 
incidents stopped. With independence on the door-step, it was 
obviously felt that it was unwise to create an emergency situa-
tions, but the embers were already there and could be fanned 
into flame. 
The independence celebrations were merely a formal acknow-
ledgement of a situation that had, in effect, existed in Malawi 
since the beginning of 1964, for with the demise of the 
Federation, the Nalawi Congress party had been in full control 
of the country's affairs since then. But while the formal 
transfer of power is accompanied by enthusiasm, independence 
bring its own confusions. 
During the colonial period the frustration 0, being under 
the restraints of "government" was turned aginst the colonial 
power and the promise of independence aroused much expectation 
of freedom from such restraint. Politically, as this is ~ 
usually at the root of all emergency situations, the leadership 
of the country found itself in the unaccustomed position of 
being the object of criticism in place of the colonial admini-
stration, and there were evidently a number of people within 
the party ranks ready to exploit grievances arising from the 
non-fulfilment of imagined, or real, epportanities. For tbe •• 
men, power at last represented tbe reward for much work and 
energy. 
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Dr. Banda's call for more work and economies in all domestic 
fields in order to make Malawi economically selr-surricient, 
his efforts to spur the economy by treating with the Portuguese 
who controlled ~1alawi 's main outlet to the sea, the port of 
neira; his seeking to preserve economic links with Rhodesia and 
South Atrica; were at variance with what a large group o~ the 
population had grown to expect. within the Cabinet, Dr. Banda's 
cllier Lieutenants - Chipembere, Chiume, Chirwa and Yatuta 
Chiaiza - had become increasingly dissatisfied with the role 
in which they found themselves. They resented being treated 
by Dr. Banda as being incapable of directing policy within their 
own Ministries and craved for greater responsibility and powers. 
Shortly arter the return of Dr. Banda in August 1964 from 
his post-independence tour of Britain - he attended the second 
summit conference of the organisation of African Unity in Cairo 
on his way back and reiterated his independent approach about 
the call for stronger sanctions against South Africal - dis-
sension wi thin the "oabinet heightened and in an effort to 
forestall an open revolt he threatened his cabinet that he 
intended to sponsor preventive detention regulations, based 
largely on those that bad been in force during the closing 
stages of the colonial period and to which he himself had been 
subjected. But this did not avert the breach in cabinet for in 
late August, the breach came: Chiume, Chirwa, Augustine 
B\vanausi (who had replaced Colin Cameron2 as Minister of Works) 
Willie Chokani (Ninister of Labour) and Chisiza (Minister for 
Home Affairs) forced a confrontation with Dr. Banda. They 
1. See Pike, Malawi (1968) p. 164. 
2. Colin cameron was one of Dr. Banda's rew European supporters 
throughout the independence struggle and resigned his port-
folio in protest against Dr. Banda'S threat to introduce 
preventive detention regulations. 
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presented a list of grievances and asked him to revise his 
policies. 
Initially, Dr. Banda agreed to consider these requests and 
he asked them to submit all their grievances in writing for his 
consideration. \{hen the dissiaent Ministers presented their 
grievances in writing, these had expanded and it was probable 
that the tone of the docUll!ent was openly hostile, for Dr. Banda 
later referred to it as a "BiUof Indictment". On september 
3, 1964, Dr. Banda confronted his Hinisters, and what transpired 
was later related by him to the ~mlawi Parliament on September , 
8. 
"That is why it was in this mood, a mood of defiance, that 
I met my l\1inisters last Wednesday •.••••• Naturally they wanted 
to know what my decision was. I told them I had not made a 
decision. I was still thinking about it. "No", you must decide 
today, they said. '!be tickey must go, Skinnerl must go, you must 
Africanise, you must have nothing to do with Portugal, Mozambique 
and FOrmossa but instead Peking China must be recognised 
immediately and all the rest of it". I told them 'No' I wasn't 
going to do any such thing. 'You cannot force me to do anything', 
I told them. ,2 
After he had asked for and got a vote of confidence, the 
Prime Minister dismissed Cliume, darwa and Bwanausi from the 
cabinet, also Mrs. ROse Chibambo, a leader of the League of Malawi 
~omen and a Parliamentary Secretary, for her complicity. ChisiKa 
1. A reference to the Skinner Report on the African civil 
service, which had recommended the pegging of salaries 
and which Dr. Banda had accepted. 
2. G. P. Murdock, Africa - its Peoples and their CUlturel 
History, P. 231. 
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and Chokani resigned in sympathy and when Chipembere returned 
. 1 from Canada, he too res1gned. 
Following this, the Public Security Regulations2 used 
during the last stages of colonial rule were brought into 
operation as provided for by Section 3 of the Preservation 
3 
of Public Security Act, 1964, which states: 
3. - (1) If at any time the Minister is satisfied that 
it is necessary for the preservation of public security so 
to do, he may •••..•• declare that the provisions of sub-
section (2) shall come into operation and thereupon those 
provisions shall come into operation accordingly ••••• " 
Sub-section (2) empowers the Minister to make regulations for 
several specified matters including detention, restriction, 
prohibition of assemblies and in general anything that is 
required for the exigencies of the situation. 
The Regulations inevitably provided for detention, -
"3 - (1) 1be Minister may, if he considers it to be necessary 
for the preservation of public order so to do, make an order 
against any person directing that he be detained. 
(2) Any person in respect of whom a detention order has been 
made may be arrested without warrant by any administrative 
officer, police officer or any member of the Armed Forces of 
Halawi. 
(3) The Minister may at any time revoke or vary any detention 
order or may direct that the operation of such order be sus-
pended subject to such conditions, if any, as the Minister may 
think fit, and may at any time revoke any such direction or 
suspension or vary such conditions." •••••••.•• 
1. See Kessing's Archi,ves (1965) Col.20331. Dr. sanda des-
cribed the Ministers as men of "avarice and ambitition" who 
would have murdered him in cold blood. 
2. G. N. 70/1964. 
3. cap. 14: 02. 
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The regulations also provided for restriction orders which 
were called "Control Orders" - reg.4., control of fire arms 
and explosives, and the use of force, including lethal 
weapons in order to arrest or prevent the escape of an 
arrested person. The latter provision is most surprising in 
the fact that such use is not confined only to members of the 
armed forces and the police but also to "any administrative 
officer", a term which is no where defined in neither the 
main Act itself nor in any of the subsidiary legislation. 
nle situation might have indeed been fraught with danger 
since some of the ex-ministers, particularly Chipembere, 
enjoyed a considerable personal following within the country, 
and the Prime Hinister probably genuinely felt that the 
introduction of these measures would have the phychological 
effect of preventing a deterioration of the situation. But 
within a few days there were several inciaents of violence 
and clashes between pro-ex-Ministers group on the one hand 
and members of the Malawi Young Pioneers and League of Malawi 
youths on the other. ft~or one whole day - September 15, the 
Zomba township area was completely in the hands of the dis-
sidents and all African Civil Servants remained at home to 
(they said) protect their families from acts of intimidation 
1 by pro-Banda sUPlorters. The offices of the Malawi Congress 
Party were burnt down and the recently raised Malawi national 
flags flying outside government buildings were hauled down 
and burnt. The aftermath was the fleeing from the country of 
the dismissed Ministers, except Chipembere. But shortly 
afterwards, he was restricted within three miles radius. of his 
2 home at Malindi under the regulations. He escaped from 
1. See Keesing's op.cit. Sep. 15 (1964) Col.20331. 
2. Chipembere refused to accept this restriction order and soon 
slipped out to the Mangoche Hill where he formed an army and 
rein a series of morning battles with the security forces. 
A price of f500 was placed on his head. 
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restriction and after an abortive coup in February 1965, he 
I fled the country, but his departure did not end the 
insurrection which he left behind. 
Hefore the crushing of the abortive Chipembere insurre-
ction, Dr. Banda tightened his grip of leadership. By a 
Constitutional Amendment passed in November 1964, provision 
was made for preventive detention, )then'such detention "was 
reasonably required in the interest of defence, public 
safety and public order," and is authorised by law. Although 
no preventive detention lesislation was enacted, the autho-
risation of law required was given in the Security Regulations 
made in February of the following year.2 The provisions 
empower the Minister to make a detention order if he 
"considers it to be necessary for the preservation of public 
order," a phrase that seems to leave him a much wider scope 
than the words used in the constitutional amendment. Persons 
in respect of whom such orders are made can be arrested 
without warra-nt. Detention may be for an indefinite period, 
but the Minister may suspend a detention order subjecting 
the person against whom it is made to re&trictions relating 
to his employment, residence, contacts with other persons, 
movement and possession. The effect of a suspended detention 
order appears to be potentially very similar to the house 
arrest orders frequently resorted to by the South African 
Government. 
1. He went originally to Tanzania, then to the United states 
where be was until 1968 wben be returned to Africa- to 
live in Dar-es-Salaam. 
2. Public Security Regulations, 1965 G. N. 43 of 1965. 
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Perhaps the most reminiscent (of colonial d~ys) provision 
of the regulations is that by which a person may be arrested and 
detained for a period of 28 days even without a detention order 
being made. Reg. 3(7) reads, 
"Any authorised officer may, without warrant arrest 
any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe that there 
are grouna;which would justify his detention under this regula-
tion and any such person may be detained for a period not 
exceeding 28 days pending a decision whe.her a detention order 
should be made against him." 
In addition to all these powers certain areas may be dec-
lared to be special areas where additional precautions may be 
taken. 1 
The extensiveness of these provisions need hardly be 
emphasised. But what must cause some apprehension is the fact 
that tnere appears to be a laci of the kind of sareguards, as 
we shall see later,2 which Judges in free courts of law can 
use to ensure that objective standards are employed in assessing 
the requirements of the safety and stability of the state. 
The resulting position in Malawi is that people will live 
in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation - there is no fixed 
duration or operation procedure to the regulations, An unknown 
number of people are held in detention camps. The President 
stated at one time that some of them will be detained for life if 
necessary. However, on the occasion of the inauguration of the 
Republic on July 16, 1966, 230 political detainees were released 
1. Within a ~w months virtually the whole of Northern part of 
the country had been declared special areas: The whole 
District of FOrt Johnston and Kasupe - G. N. 54/1965. 
2. Chapter 6. 
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leaving an unknown number still in detention. l 
Thus, President Handa reverted to repressive measures and 
method of colonial administration mainly to crush opposition 
which he considered subversive, but with an increase in intensity. 
NO\i by the innovations in the Republican Cons ti tution, legisla-
tion of the utomost repressive type can be introduced by a 
simple Act of Parliament or regulation, in a state where there 
is virtually no Opposition. Thus the Government does not need 
any longer to resort to Constitutional amendment as it had to 
when preventive detention was introduced as a permanent feature 
of government, nor need a formal proclamation of emergency be 
made before wide discretionary powers of the emergency legisla-
tion type are conferred on the Executive. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that little use bas been made of the Emergency Powers 
Orders-in-Council 1939 ~ 1962. 
ZAMBIA 
Zambia not only inherited colonial powers of dealing with 
an emergency but also a situation where it was already in use at 
the time it achieved independence. Serious disorders and clashes 
costing many hundreds of lives occurred in the areas around 
Chinsali, in the Northern Province and Lundazi, in the Eastern 
Province, towards the end of July and August 1964 as a result 
of the activities of an African sect known as the Lumpa Church. 
The Lumpa Church had been founded in 1955 by Mrs. Alice 
Nulenga 1 a Bemba tribes woman,who called herself Alice Lenshina 
(the nam~ being a Bemba corruption of the Latin Regina) and who 
claimed to have died in 1953 and subsequently been resurrecte •• 
1. Bulletin of Internation Commission of Jurist No. 27 Set', 
1966 p. 24. In February 1966, the Attorney-General when ' 
questioned about the number of detainees put the number at 
not less than 500, while other lawyers estimated that the 
total is between 1,000 and 1,500. 
-167-
Saying that she had been "ordered" by God to be baptised, 
she joined the Church of Scotland as Alice lnbishi and later 
married Peter Mulenga, a political organiser. In 1955, sbe 
claimed to have been told by God, in another vision~to found 
a Church for Africans in order to end what she called the with-
holding of "certain divine revelations" from the African, 
allegedly practised by the European Christian Churches. In 
setting up the Lumpa Church, which with its strong African 
Nationalist appeal was joined by thousands of nominal Roman 
Catholics and members of the Church of Scotland, she evolved 
a set of 12 "Commandments" which were simple direct and easily 
understood by her uneducated followers. They included the pro-
hibition of polygamy, smoking and drinking, to which was later 
added a ban on political activities. B)'tthe most important 
of these "Commandments" - "Thou' shall not make medicine or 
make use of witchcraft" she laid the basis for the sects exclu-
siveness, as whoever was not of the Lumpa Church fell, in the 
eyes of its members, under suspicion of witchcraft; this in 
turn led to an attitude of intolerance, intimidation and 
terrorism on the part of the Lumpa followers. 
According to a statement on August 5, 1964 by Dr. Kaunda, 
the Prime Minister of Zambia (as he than was), the Lumpa Church, 
whose strength he estimated at 30,000, had helped African nation 
alis. during its first seven years of existence, and had not 
issued its injunction to take no part in politics until 1962. 
He admitted that Lumpa followers had suffered attacks at the 
hands of "Zealous" members of his United National Independence 
Party, but stated that he had given instructions not to molest 
the sect. These first clashes had resulted from the refusal 
of the Lumpa Church supporters to buy UNIP membership cards; 
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after the establishment of the V.N.I.P. Government they also 
came to regard the police, troops, and eventually all non-
members of their sect as enemies against whom a "holy war" 
had to be waged. 
After a meeting with Mrs. lenshina, Dr. l(aunda issued an 
ultimatum requ1r1ng the Lumpa members to lay down their arms 
and leave their fortified villages by July 20, 1964. A few 
days after this ultimatum, however, renewed clashes broke out, 
leading to the intervention of security forces. When on July 
24 specially trained riot police entered a fortified village 
in the Chinsali District, an European Assistant Inspector and 
an African Constable were killed. 
In view of the deterioration of the situation more than 
1,000 troops were sent to aid the police in Chinsali during 
the next few days and at the request of the Prime Ninister, 
the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, assumed emergency powers on 
1 July 27, 1964. These powers were assumed by the President 
when Zambia became independent as a Republic within the 
Commonwealth on October 24, 1964. 
Among the powers that were assumed under the Emergency 
Powers (General) Regulations 1964, included the power of 
detention, restriction and conscription for service. AddreSSing 
the legislative Assembly on July 29, 1961 on the extensiveness 
of these powers, Dr. Kaunda explained: 
"The situation has continued to deteriorate, with unprovoked 
attack upon the police and upon the inhabitants of villages 
1. G. N. 374 & 376. 
2. Nat. Assembly Deb. July 29, 1964. 
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adjacent to the Lampe. settlements. I believe that even 
thOU6h there may be further casualties (Reservists had been 
called up) within the next few days, in the long term this 
will mean a saving of lives. We wish to be cruel now in 
order to be kind in the future." 
On AUbuSt 3, the wmpa Church was declared an unlawful 
organisation, the penalty for continued Lur.lpa activity being 
a term of imprisonment of up to seven years. It \Vas added 
that the order would be revoked in a month's time if law and 
order liere restored, and that r-Irs. l.enshina would be arrested 
and would have to answer criminal charges. On August 12, 
Nrs. l.enshina surrendered and was taken to a detention 
camp, with several of her followers. 
A Commission of Inquiryl was set up to enquire into the 
Lumpa Church disturbances and its report was published in 
September, 21, 1965. The report blamed both the Lumpa 
Church and the provincial officials of the V.N.I.P. tor. 
having caused the unrest, stating: "The local U.N.I:P. 
view was that (Nrs. Alice) I.enshina was 'trying to set up a 
state within a state &ld that ,various anti-V.N.I.P. leaders 
(Welensky, Nkambula, Mchello and TShombe) were eDcouraging 
her to do so. On the other hand, the Lumpa Church leaders 
were becoming more firmly convinced that V.N.I.P. was 
determined to eradicate the Church.,,2 '!be report absolved 
the party's national leadership and President Kaunda from 
any responsibility, saying, that they had "tried every means 
to avoid the showdown", but recommended that mnsideration 
should be givenb the bringing of criminal charges against 
1. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Lumpa 
Disturbances 1965, Lusaka Government Printers. 
2. Report of the Tribunal on Detainees, 1967, Government 
Printers, Lusaka. 
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Lenshina. At the same time, the emergency was extended for a 
further six months by the National Assembly,l and Mrs. Lenshina 
and husband were restricted" to a remote part 01' the country 
in their own and the country's interest ll • President Kaunda 
declared that as the security of the country was his IIfirst 
responsibility", anyone who misbehaved would be restrictet to 2 . 
certain areas or detained. 
Following the Rhodesian Unilateral declaration of Indepen-
dence, further security measures were introDuced and approved. 
These included regulation for deportation, cesorship and 
immigration controls,3 and a further extension of the emergency 
was approved. President Kaunda stated that this was necessary 
for three reasons: (a) the increasing number of people being 
drawn to the Lumpa sect, particularly in the Copperbelt 
district and thus constituting a threat to security in that area 
(b) the Rhodesia situation which made it necessary to secure 
'lifelines' to the North and (c) continued industrial unrest 
in the Copperbelt area. 'rhus, although there was still need 
to ensure political stability, the emphasis had shifted more 
to economic security. Thus following this, several foreigners 
were ordered to be deported for allegedly causing racialism 
and industrial unrest. 4 The use that has been m~de of these 
regulations have been mainly directed ~t foreigners who may have 
been suspected of passing information to the Rhodesian Govern-
ment or suspected of being in sympathy with the smith Regim~ 
FOr instance, all Rhodesians publications were banned and 
several detention and deportation orders were mude for contra-
vening the emergency regulations by distributing Rhodesian 
- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. See Keesing's contemporary Archives ~965~6 p. ~1511. 
~. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. TWo British subjects successfully challenged the legality of 
the orders in the Kitwe Magistrates Courts but were imme-
diately served with new Orders. 
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material and also for allegedly conspiring with agents of a 
foreign power to use information lito cause alarm and despon-
dency among the public" and with having "obtained or collected 
information relating to public security in Zambia" for the 
benefit of a foreign power. 
The attitude of the President to the use of such extensive 
emergency measures is \ell illustrated in his own words. He 
wrote, ",{hen a state of war edsts, all nations restrict certain 
freedoms in the interest of national survival. 'file new states 
of Africa are in such a condition of national mobilisation. 
1bey area war against terrible though impersonal enemies. 
There is not time for endless debate and arguing". He was quite 
definitely sure that he did not consider detention without 
trial of anybody, whether citizens or foreign nationals, during 
a period of public emergency, as being contrary to international 
la~.2 However, already there~e indications that a number of 
the emergency powers created within the last ~w years have 
subsequently and sometimes within a matter of weeks been modi-
fied or repealed. 
1. ~Iorris, A humanist in Africa: letters to Colin Morris by 
Kenneth Kaunda p. 108. 
2. See 1968 Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law p. 1. 
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~RAL CO~1ENTS 
The threat of elements ,d thin a nation sufficiently strong 
to disrupt the life of a country and jeopardise the existence 
of the prevailing form of government is a problem of accele-
rating importance in the modern world and even more so, probably, 
in the newly-independent African states. The actuality of such 
elements may stem from a variety of causes. Perhaps the most 
common is the~sloyalty to the existing form of government, 
often accompanied by theresire to effect change by violent 
methods and means. Other muses may be strong disaffection with 
certain government policies, communal demands for states within 
a federation on linguistic or religious or racial lines, and 
the presence of powerful lawless elements with political 
motivations. 
All the newly - independent Commonwealth African Governments 
are~raced with the problem of building nations within the 
arbitrarily drawn geographical frontiers that they have 
inherited from the colonial powers.l It is difficult to fight 
the enemies of poverty and ignorance and disease according to 
the westminster rules. The people of these states often have 
unnecessarily high hopes and expectations and they are~t to 
be quickly disiliusioned~th the first fruits of independence. 
Therefore, the situation and circumstances which justified the 
colonial 'Nasters' in providing for and using emergency powers 
still exist in a different form and content after independence. 
The effective method, they have been taught, by which to deal 
with organised opposition to constituteA authority, insurrection, 
threatened subversion of the state, and generally t he main-
tenance of the wheels of development, is by the use of wide 
1. E. g. Kenya and Somalis on its Eastern border wishing to be 
united with their tribesmen accross the border. 
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discretionary powers, emergency powers; whether such an 
emergency actually exists is of secondary concern. It is not 
difficult to imagine a threat of subversion. "Emergency can 
be real or they can be conjured up to bolster the use of naked 
force ~l 
Emergency powers were used time and tir.1e again by the 
colonial administrators in situations which were in no way 
as grave as .cet"- time emergency and for purposes which were 
sometimes not connected or necessary for the purpose of dealing 
with the situation that existed. It is now being used by the 
successors to power in the same way and for basically the same 
purpose, that is, to remain in power at all cost. 
The creation and operation of powers of arrest without 
warrant and the power to detain for limited periods without 
trial is perhaps almost inevitable in periods of emergency. 
There were such powers in the united Kingdom and the older 
Commonwealth countries in the emergency created by the two 
world wars. It is perhaps also almost inevitable~at the.e 
powers should be developed in the young emerging nations of 
the Commonwealth when situations arise which could wreck the 
stability theF are~ying to build. 
In actual practice, governments in Africa, a; W! have seen, 
. 
have not been speQ~ in the exercise of the power of preven-
tive detention, especially out of allvpes of emergency powers, 
a power that should be used in a free society only in serious 
emergencies. As President Nyerere of Tanzania expressed~ 
1. Professor T.O. Elias "Report of Committee I Committee on 
Human Rights and Government Security" African Conference 
on the Rule of law - Lagos Iftw 11.61. 
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" nlis is a desperately serious matter. It means you 
are imprisoning a man when he has not broken any \\I'i ttell law, 
when you cannot bewre of proving beyond any reasonable doubt 
that he has done so. You are restraining his liberty, and 
making him suffer materially and spiritually, for what you 
think he intends to do, or is trying to do, or for what you 
believe he has done."l In Africa, as seen already, the 
euphemism discernible in the term 'preventive detention' does 
not appear to contribute to the physical co .... ort or the 
spiritual well - being of the detainee~en, as happens often, 
he is treated like a convicted prisoner. 
The last Prime Hinister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, who claimed that the Government of a country had need 
of a certain power to curb subversive activities, in order to 
protect itself and its citizens from being destroyed, see~d 
to have W""ftshed his hands off responsibility \\'hcn he Slit! in 
relation to the abuse occasioned by such extra-ordinary grant 
of pO\ver that the pO\ver could be easily abused and that he as 
Prime Ninister could not give any guarantee that such a power 
would not be abused. 2 
There is danger when the peoples of a nation are made to 
live in a perpetual state of emergency, and it is difficult 
to accept the reali ty or otherwise of some of the various 
emergencies alleged to have given rise to the necessity to 
confer \yide powers upon the executive. 1b.e greatest threat 
to personal liberty arises, as we have seen,when the executive 
exercises the emergency powers of detention and restriction. 
1. Speech inaugurating the University Dar-es-Salaam: Franck 
Ope cit. 
2. Federal Parliament Debate 7th September, 1963. Col.2683. 
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TIluS, the question arises whether a nation must have preven-
tive detention legislation as a regular feature of the law? 
Hust a nation depend, particularly in normal times, for 
protecting the security of the state or public order or the 
supply of commodities essential to the community on laws of 
Preventive Detention? Or should a nation perfect the 
ordinary criminal law machinery by suitably amending existing 
laws if their constitutionality has become questionable: by 
re-inforcing them if their provisions are~scovered to be 
insufficient and by improving the intelligence, prosecution 
and other meSDS of the Executive, if these are dnequal to the 
task of bringing offenders to book under the ordinary 
criminal law? This question, involving an assessment of 
social realities and Government resources and of balancing 
these with the need to maintain and strengthen the democratic 
principle in the African policy can not without amgree of 
egotism be answered by a single individual. 
Various excuses are given by African Leaders for the 
enactment of a detention law as a permanent feature of law 
and its use inumes other than strictly public emergency 
periods. Perhaps none is as convincing as the explanation 
based on the inadequacy of the security machinery of the newly 
independent Commonwealth African states. l The belief 
e~~ressed by the Ghana Government during President Nkrumah's 
regime that preventive detention could be a humane alternative 
to prosecutions could not have been intended to be taken 
seriously. The suggestiou is that the full ~igours of the 
law are not exacted when a person is detained, whereas had 
1. By the President of Tanzania speech quoted by Franck: 
comparative constitutional proceas p. 290. 
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he been tried and found guilty he was likely to face a 
maximum penalty which could be capital punishment. The 
assumptio. here is that all detainees are undoubtedly guilty 
of crimes known to the law. l 
One would have thought that in a great majority of cases 
the objective of detention is to nip subversive design in the 
bud. Even if preventive justice is regarded as a punitive 
measure and therefore an alternative to criminal prosewution, 
it would have logically followed that the citizen would be 
granted an optioB in the matter, that is to say, to be 
detained indefinitely or to stand his trial. 
The eradication of acts and elements which interfere with 
the security of a nation may necessitate, as already pointed 
out, the use of wide discretionary emergency powers, but more 
frequently in the newly-independent African states within the 
Commonwealth, instances abound which suggest that the pre-
servation of national security is not always the guide for 
action, and that in its stead has been substituted for the 
test of what is considered generally 'subversive', what is 
seemingly over critical or only politically unpopular. 
The discretion of the administrator must be tempered by 
the realisation of the justification for the creation of the 
powers. When nations are engaged in struggles for their 
national stability and integrity that which interferes with 
the task must be checked, but unless that which is suppressed 
is in fact obstructionist, the executive thereby endangers the 
national security in that the GOvernment sits on an 
unerupted volcano which when it erupts destroys not on~ the 
edifice but also its foundation. 
1. statement by the Government on 1961 conspiracy W. P. No. 
7 of 1961. p. 34. 
See also West Africa December 16, 1961. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMERGENCY AND THE CITIZEN'S RIGHTS 
The o-eneral and traditional ~titude of the English man 
o 
to\vards constitutional affirmation of fundamental hwnan rights 
has been of disapprobation. Let us recall some of the 
statements indicative of this attitude. We may start with 
Jeremy Bentham's scathing comment on the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Nan and the Citizen: 
"took to the letter, you find nonsense - look beyond the 
letter, you find nothing •••• there are no such things as 
natural rights - no such thing as natural rights opposed to, 
in contradistinction to legal ••.. Natural rights is simple 
nonsense •.•• nonsense upon stilts."l 
Again the opinion of the Indian Statutory Commission 
with respect to the question of sareguards for minorities is 
typical. 
"l-lany of those who come before us have urged that the 
Indian constitution should contain definite guarantees for 
the rights of individuals in respect of the exercise of 
their religion and a declaration of equal rights for all 
ci tizens. lve are aware that sllch provisions have been in-
serted in many constitutions, notably in those of the 
European states formed after the war. Experience, however, 
has not shown them to be of any great practical value. 
Abstra~t declarations are useless, unless there exists the 
will and means to make them work. "2 
1. Anarchical Fallacies: Works (Bowring), vol.II, pp. 497, 
500-501; md see further de Smith, "FUndamental Rights in 
the Commonwealth" 10, I.C.L.Q. (1961) pp. 84. 
2. Report, Vol.II, Cmnd. (1930), pp.23-24. Popularly known 
as Simon Commission after Viscount Simon who was its 
Chairman. 
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commenting on this opinion the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform said , "With these 
observations wemtirely agree, and a cynic might indeed, 
find plausihle arguments, in the histDry during the last ten 
years of more than one country, for asserting that the most 
effective method of ensuring the destruction of a fundamental 
right is to include a declaration of its existence in a con-
stitutional instrument. But there are also strong practical 
arguments against the proposal which may be put in the form 
of a dilemma: .fbr either the mclaration of rights is of so 
abstract a nature that it has no legal effect of any kind or 
its legal effect will be to impose an embarrassing restriction 
on the power of the legislatare. nl 
TIlis trend has continued in the writings of several 
eminent lawyers. Thus Sir Ivor Jennings wrote: 
"In Britain we have no Bill of Rights, we merely have 
liberty according to the law, and we think - truly I believe -
that we do the job bettertbao any country which has a Bill 
~f Rights or -a Deelaration of the Rights of Man." 2 
"The ideal constitution •••• would contain few or no 
declarations of ri~hts, though the ideal system of law would 
define and guarantee many rights. Rights cannot be declared 
in a Constitution except in absolute and unqualified terms3 
unless indeed they are so qualified as to be meaningless. It 
1. H. L. 6 and H. C. 5 Session 1933-34, p. 216 
2.Tbe Approach to self-government, (1956) p. 20 
3. Modern Constitutions 1960 (0. U. P.) p. 70. 
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Opposition by other commentators has been induced by the 
stated civil liberty in modern times, especially in countries 
where Bills of Rights have been ~ittell into the constitutions 
and by the constitutional juris1rudence of the Supreme Courts 
of the United states and India. Moreover constitutional 
provisions with respect to individual rights take various fOnDS 
and might deceive the unwary, since besides having varying 
substantive contents, they are not uniform in their effects. 
They may be in the nature of mere statements of the objectives 
'J 
that ere intended to be or must be pursued.... On the other hand 
they may take the form of strict rules of law designed to 
confer rights on the individual with a corresponding duty on 
others, including state organs, to respect these rights, or to 
restrict the competence of the legislative and the executive 
organs of the ,state for the protection of individual interests 
the individual mayor may not be accorded the right to take 
action in the Courts to safeguard those rir;hts and interests. 
Again, it is said, the English man regards a Constitution 
as a strict legal document in which there is no place for 
political manifestos or creeds and above all he .feels that hi.3 
own country's method of ensuring individual liberty is better 
and more secure than any devise attempted elsewhere in the 
'HOI' ld. Hence Dicey was able to ffiy that for practical purpos es 
the Habeas Corpus Acts were "worth a hundred constitutional 
articles guaranteeing individual liberty."3 
1. See Wheare, op.cit. Chap. :3 and de Smith op.cit. p. 86. 
2. As the provisions to the Preamble to the Indian constitu-
tion of 1950 and the Directive Principles of Social 
Policy in Art. 45 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Ireland 1934. 
3. The Law of the Constitution, 15th Edn. p. 199. 
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In the United Kingdom the law relating to the liberty of the 
subject is embedded in the Common Law. For example, the right 
to personal freedom is secured by the famous writ of habeas 
corpus. Whenever any person is detained against his will, 
whether by an organ of Government or by a private individual, 
provided it is not pursuant to a sentence of the courts, the 
detained person or anyone on his behalf is entitled to apply 
to any of the Judges of the Higb Court to determine whether 
his detention is lawful or not. The Court will then by means 
of this writ command the detainer to bring the detained before 
it, and, unless the detention is shown to be lawful, the Court 
will set him free at once. 
Any person may say or write whatever he pleases so long 
as the matter is not defamatory or obscene, treasonable or 
seditious or otherwise likely to provoke a breach of the peace. 
People can move freely as long as they do not commit a nuisance 
.' !\ . 
or trespass on private right of property or otherwise contra-
vene the ordinary police arrangements for the regulations of 
traffic and public order, and do not infringe the laws 
relating to riots and unlawful assembly. Respect tor· 'funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the Individual in the onite·d 
Kingdom does not, therefore, depend on a Bill of Rights. yet 
an Englishman cannot be successfully Challenged·· if he asserts 
that these rights and freedoms are no better protected in a~ 
country in the world. l In the light of this, his lack of 
sympathy for Bill or Rights and his traditional antipathy far 
constitutional affir.ations ot fundamental human rights are 
understandable. 
1. See D. C. 'Hollaad ~Per.oDal lib.rty in ~ae CO .. oDwealth" 
11 Current Legal Problems. p. 151. 
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Until very recently the entire Commonwealth was outside 
the movement to embody within their written constitutions 
provisions designed to protect fundamental human rights. The 
English attitude, the United Kingdom being the mother of the 
Commonwealth, could not have failed tomlp bring about this 
state of affairs. However, Britain soon bad to change its 
attitude in tropical Africa when it was realised that some-
thing more than the negative approach to fundamental rights 
was being demanded by these countries. Ironically, much of 
the credit for this change is due to the Council of Europe, 
which thereby made a greater impact on Africa than it ever 
did in Europe. 
The Council had drafted a Convention of Human Rights 
designed to give legally enforceable effect to the aspirations 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of BaaaD Rights. The 
United Kingdom Dot only ratified it but rather surprisiDlly, 
extended it to forty-two of her dependencies, including all 
those in Africa exc,pt Southern Rbodesia. 
The practice of proteA)tinS one or two indiwl:dua1 rights 
in Co.-onwealth Constitutions was first developed in the 
Australian md Northern Ireland Constitutions. 'ftlis was con-
tinued in India in the Government of IDdia Act, 1935)after 
the Simon Commission and the Joint parliamentary Co.-ittee 
had rejected themquest for a Bill of Rigbts to be written 
into the Constitution, and later continued by the united 
KiBldo. Government in Ceylon in 1947 and GbaDa, 1957. 1 But 
what constituted a decisive chaDge of attitude by tbe United 
Kingdom Government was the incorporation of a comprehensive 
set of tunda.ental rights into the Niserian Constitution in 
1959.2 
1. S. 1. No. 1533 of 1957; Pt. II, Art. 5-13. 
2. Nigeri .. Constitution 1960 Cbap. III. 
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It is believed that the first suggestion for the inser-
tion of clauses guaranteeing fundamental rights in the Consti-
tution was prompted by the allegation.at certain sections of 
the community were&nied some of these rithts in parts of the 
country and by local political rivalries. When it ... first 
suggested by an alliance of two parties, the Action Group 
(A. G) and the National Council ot Nigeria and Cameroons (N.C. 
N.C.)2 their main aim was to have a measure which would enable 
them and their supporters to operate treely in the Northern 
Region, largely dominated by the NortheroPeoples Congress, 
the third major political party. Hence they suggested that, 
"the amended Constitution should contaiD a declaration ot 
certain basic human rights ••• for Nigerian Citizens in all 
parts of Nigeria." Tbis suggestion ... di •• l.s.d by the 
Colonial Secretary who sealed his disapproyal by ridiculing 
some ot the clauses of the proposed "Charter of Haman Rights."3 
At the 1957 Conference, one of the parties, the Action 
Group (A. G) again sponsored the question of iDcorporation ot 
a Bill of Rights in the ConstitutioD and it was agreed without 
much difficulty that ODe ahould be written into the COnstitu-
tion. In sucgesting clauses for the proposed Bill, the Com-
missionmt up under the Chair.aaahip of Sir HeDry WilliDck to 
consider proposals relied on the proviSions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and almost all the riChts aDd 
freedo .. reco..ended were copied from the CoDveat10n. 4 
1. For events leading ap to the SUClestieD at the laDdoD 
CoDference, See Odumosu: lbe Nileriaa CoDstitutioD (1963), 
Holland "BomaD Rights 1D Igeria i (i91!) 15 e.L.p.lS9. 
2. See generally £Sera, ConstitutioD DeVelo:_ent in Ni,eria~961' 
Ch.S and AWO: Chief Awolowo's X.lobietraPh: (1961) p. 20 • ~ 
3. See: The Memoirs of LOra Cbandos (196 ) p. 410. 
4. Omnd. 505 ot 1958. 
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The 1958 constitutio .. l Conference accepted practically all 
the Commission's recommendations. Hence the couatry got a 
Bill of Rights before independence in 1960. Tbe Republican 
Constitution retains the provisions. 
It is not easy to discover the reasons for this significant 
shift in the traditional English attitude with respect to con-
stitutional affirmations of fundamental rights, but it is 
believed thattbe recommendation of the Willinck Commission was 
decisive in influencing the Government's acceptance of the 
bill of rights. 
In Uganda, writing fundamental rights into the constitution 
I 
proved attractive to political leaders on the eve of independeDCI 
because of the acuteness of the rivalry between parties, 
regions and individuals. The Munster Oom.ission badl8co .. ended 
verbatim reproduction of the Nigerian prOvisions 88 wll as the 
establishment of a Council of state Gl the Kenya pattern. 1 
'lbe latter recoauneDdation was rejected since it was fe It that 
a Bill of Ri~hts contained ample sateguards agaiDst discrimi-
nation. 2 Tbe paramount intention of Uganda's Bill of Rights 
(which though modelled after the Nigerian. provisions .. not 
a verbatim reproduction of the latter as envisaged by the 
Munster Co.-ission) .~ to limit the powers of the government 
lest it yielded to the temptation as in so.e African countries 
to adopt an increasingly arbitrary or authoritarian approach 
to its powers and responsibilities. The immigrant Communities 
particularly the Asians, (with their i~ortant co .. ercial and 
proprietary interests), found the provision: for the protection 
of property rights especially ~ttractive. 
1. Deport published in EDtebbe, 1961. -
2. o.ad. 1523 pp. 29-30 Constitutional Report. 
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Kenya's inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
was almost a matter of course, since none of the political 
parties dissented from it. Mr. Donald Ngala who headed the 
former Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U) delegation told 
the 1962 Constitutional Conference that the proper working of 
democracy and the Rule of law demanded such an arrangement. lbe 
Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U) for its part had always 
regarded a Bill of Rights as less objectionable than regionalism,' 
as_nding to promote national unity rather than disunity. More-
over, K.A.N.U. leaders were intent on demonstrating to the 
suspicious elements in the country and to the outside world their 
dedication to the Rule of law. AJJ in Uganda, the immigrant 
communities, more notably the Europeans (with their considerable 
tarming interests) welcomed the protect ian attorded by constitu-
tional guarantees. The result was the adoption ot the Ugaadan 
provisions adaptedwhere necessary to render them applicable to 
Kenya. An unusually stitf method of entrenchment was employed 
but the Republican Constitutional Amen ... nts1 baYe since relaxed 
the entrenchment provisions to bring them into line with what 
obtains in other countries. 
In the former Nyasaland (Malawi) attitude to fundamental 
rights was at first cautious. At tbe Constitutional Conference 
ot 1960, it was decided that ODnatitutional guarant.es ot lUnda-
2 
mental rights would be pre.ature. The 1962 Conterence, howeYWr, 
reversed this decision; 1bere wa. a general agreement that the 
proposed constitution sbould contain a Bill ot Rights based on 
d . 3 the Ugan a provis10D8. It is noteworthy that Dr. Kamuau Banda 
who led the Malawi Congress Party to the Conference did not 
object to an enforceable Bill of Bights; but he .a. it not as 
a protection tor minorities, the true guarantee~r whom was the 
1. 1964, Act. 28; 1965 Act 14. 
2. Report, 1960 o.nd. 1138 p. 8. 
3. With certain modifications. Report of Nyasaland CoDstituti~ 
Conference, CIIlod. 1887 pp.8, 21-23. 
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goodwill of the majority and democratic justice. l 
Yet not long after Independence, voices might be heard in 
Malawi that the people of Mal~ever wanted a Bill of Rights. 
It was a British idea, amgrettable one at that, bearing in mind 
that the British Parliament is sovereign; it was indefensible 
to deny to others their right to a Parlia.ent as sovereign as 
in Britain. This point of1dew appeared to have von the day 
when the proposed changes in the Constitution for a republic 
2 did not provide for a Bill of Rights, but they appeared in the 
Constitution after all in the torm of particularised specifi-
cation. 3 
Therefore, the clausas ot Bills of Bights in Commonwealth 
African are tairly unitorm and such\variations as are~aod have 
been dictated either by local conditions or by drafting improve-
ments. 
Perhaps it is noteworthy to mention here certain of these 
distinctive variations. The right to property is accorded 
better protection in Kenya, Uganda, zaabia and in Malawi is one 
01 the rights specitically mentioned. In Nigeria, co~ulsory 
acquisition of property ia allowed provided adequate compensa-
tion is paid and any person claiming intereat in the property 
has acce_s to the eoart tor tbe determi.ation of bi. iatereat or 
amount of compensation. This right cannot be derogated during 
an emergency under the specitic constitutional provisions but 
4 presumably under the general provision it may. In those other 
1. ~. at p. 8 
2. Time. October 18, 1965. 
3. Malawi Constitution 1966 - Sec. 2(1) (i-1ii). 
4. Provided that the .easure is "reaso.ably justifiable in a 
democratic society." Constitution ot Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1963. S. 27. 
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countries, compulsory acquisition is not permitted unless the 
acquisition is "necessary in the interest of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality, health, town and country 
planning or themvelopment and utilisation of any property in 
such manner III to promote public benefit If •••• and the necessity 
must be such as to afford reasonable justification for the 
causing of any hardship that may result to any person having 
an interest in the property. 
Also, as is not the case in Nigeria, provisions designed 
to safeguard equality of treatment in all the Constitutions 
prohibit discrimination on tbe grounds of, inter alia, race. 
The 1950 Constitution of the old Gold Coast prohibited 
racial discriminationl but this was repealed by the 1954 
Constitutlon. 2 It re-appeared in the Independence Constitution 
of 19573 which further protected the £reedom of conscience, 
while also regulating the procedure tor compulsory acquisition 
of property for which adequate compensation must be paid. These 
clauses werelpecitically entrenched though a year later the 
Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act removed these entrench-
ment provisions. The explanation was that it was desirable that 
tile Parliament of Ghana should be mvereign. 'lb. Prille Minister 
at the time (Mr. Kwame Nkrumah aa he tbenta8) intervened in the 
debate to say that the ricDl independence Constitution had been 
accepted with the gr.atest miSgivinls and onlY to avoid 'uadue 
delay in the grant of iadepend.nce. 
1 • S • 1. 1950 No. 2094. S. 50. 
2. S. 1. 1954 No. 551 S. 36 
3. S. 3(2). 
4. Cited by Rubin and Murray, The Constitution and Government 
of Ghana (2nd Edn.) p. 8 Par I i8lle Iitii '.:" Debates orticial 
Report vol. 12 p. 5. 
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The Republican Constitution of 1960 true to design did 
not contain a Bill of Righ.but Art. 13(1) provides that 
immediately after bis assumption of office, the President shall 
make a solemn declaration before the people to uphold certain 
fundamental principles, most of which do not pretend to accord 
specific personal rights to the individual. l 
The precise legal force of this Declaration was in i8sue in 
2 He Akoto and Ora. The appellants were detainees under the 
Preventive Detention Act, 1958 who bad applied unsuccessfully 
for habeas corpus. Tbe Court -.. held that the President's 
satt~faction required by the Preventive Detention Act would not 
be reviewed. One of the grounds of their application was that 
1. "That freedom and justice should be honoured and maintained 
"Tbat the Union of Atrica should be striven tor by every 
lawful means and when attained, should be faithfully 
preserved. 
"Tbat the Independence of Ghana should not be surrendered or 
diminished on any grounds other than the furtherance of 
African Unity. 
"That no person should suffer discri.1nationm grounds ot 
sex, race, tribe, religion or political belief. 
"That Chieftaincy in Ghana should be guaraateed and pre-
served. 
"That every citizen of Gbana should receive his fair share 
of the produce yielded by the development .t the country. 
"That subject to sucb restrictioDs as aay be necessary for 
preserving public order, .orality or health, DO peraon 
should be deprived of treedom of religion or speech, of the 
right to move and asse.ble without hinderance or of the 
right of access te Courts of Law. 
"That no person should be depriY8d of hi. property save 
.where the public interest so requires and the law so 
provides." 
2. (1961) G. L. R. 523. 
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Art. 13(1) o£ the Constitution was contravened by the detention 
law. The Supreme Court held that the contention that the 
Preventive netention Act was invalid because it was repugnaat 
to Article 13(1) of the Constitution was misconceived. The 
court likened the Presidential declaration to the Coronation 
oath taken by the Queen of England during the COronation 
service. The Court went on: 
"In our view the declaration merely represents the good to 
which every President must pledge himself to attempt to aChieve. 
It does not represent a legal obligation which can be enforced 
by the Courts •••• Tbe declaration, however, imposes on every 
President a moral obligation and provides a political yard-
stick by which the conduct of the Bead of the state caD be 
measured by the electorate."l 
The position in Ghana seem. to be that since the President 
was not bound by any legal oblisation to uphold any rights of 
the individual citizen at any time, be was even less likely to 
be restricted during an emeriency. FOr even in Nigeria, where 
fundamental rights are entrenched, it is accepted that they aay 
be affected during an emergency. The contention in the case of 
2 Williams v. Hajekodunmi, was that the only e.ergency power 
laws capable of over-riding relevant fundamental guarantees 
which Parliament could make were those otherwise solely within 
Region power, and in so far as Parliament made laws durios an 
emergency which it could make in any event, these would be 
subject to all the fundamental guarantees. Tbe opinion of the 
court expressed by Bairaman F. J. was that: 
"If Parliament can make a law which restricts movement at 
all time, it can make one which restricts movement only during 
periods of emergency: for the greater includes the les8."3 
1. (1961) G. L. R. 523 
2. (1962) 1 All N. L. R. 324 
3. (1962) 1 All N. L. R. at 324. 
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The Military Coup d'etat did not affect this position either 
in Ghana or Nigeria because the military governments promulgated 
a number of decrees which infringed on the fundamental rights. 
In any case, the period of military government may be legally 
regarded as a period of emergency whether declared or not. 
Ghana's declaration may be usefully compared with Tanzania's 
Constitution. The latter recites the rights ot the individual 
and the duties of the state and goes on to claim that: 
"such rishts are b .. t maintained and such duties 
equitably disposed of in a democratic society where 
the government is responsible to a freely elected 
Parliament and where the Court. of law are rree and 
impartial. "I 
However, as Britain demonstrates, the absence of a Bill of 
Rights is not fatal to the observance of the rights of the 
individual as long as it is recognised that the right to 
liberty of the citizen must be protected and cannot be arbitra-
rily withdrawn from him. 
The state demands protection for its very existence and for 
the orderly functioning of its institutions, such as the Courts 
of Law, the Legislature and the organs of Government. It also 
requires that the individual shall not abuse his own liberties 
at the expense of the liberties of his fellow citizens. Tbe 
issue is how to reconcile the idea of personal liberty of the 
subject with the need for the preservation of the state. 
Personal liberty is defined 8S the freedom of every la~ 
abiding citizen to think what he will, say what he will, and to 
go where he will on his lawful occasions without let or hindraace 
1 from any other persons. 
This is true in normal times but obviously an exception to 
this rule must be made in times of emergency. Hence all the 
1. See Lord Denning: Ereedom under the law (1949) p. 5 
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Constitutions of the African countries under consideration, 
contain provision for derogation from certain of these funda-
mental human rights during periods of emergency. 
The rights and freedoms guaranteed are in most part 
declaratory of existing rights and privileges. They include 
the right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, 
slavery and forced labour, right to personal freedom, to be 
informed promptly of reasons for arrest or detention or to be 
brought to trial without delay, to a fair hearing in the 
determination of eivil rights and obligations, to be presumed 
on a criminal charge innocent until proved guilty, to be 
informed promptly and in detail of the nature of all.,ed 
offence, to adequate time and facilities, to defence 
personally or by legal representatives, to examine witnesses 
called by prosecution, to private life and family life, 
freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of movement, 
freedom from discrimination based on tribe, place of origin, 
religion or political opinion and right to property, freedom 
of expression and of associatioa. 
The main concern of this study is, therefore, which of 
these rights can be derogated fro. during an e.ergency, and 
the efficiency of these rights in safeguarttDC the liberties 
of the individual in these countries during an emergency. 
Section 29 of the Nigerian Constitution provides for 
derogation of certain fundamental rights during a period ot 
emergency. It states: 
"(1) An Act of Parliament shall not .e invalid by reason 
only that it provides for the taking, during periods of 
emergency, ot measures that derogates fro. the provisions ot 
section 18, 21, 22 or 28 ot this Constitution, but DO such 
measures shall be taken in pursuance of any such Act during 
any period of emergency save to the extent that those 
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measures are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of 
dealing with the situation that exists during that period of 
emergency. 
Provided that nothing in this section shall authorise any 
derogation from the provisions of section 18 of this Consti-
tution except in respect of deaths resulting from acts of 
war or any derogation from the provisions of sub-section (7) 
of section 22 of this Constitution." 
The rights which can be derogated during an emergency, 
therefore, are, the right to personal liberty, the freedom 
from discrimination, the right of access to the Courts and 
the right to life, provided, however, that such aeasures as 
are taken are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of 
dealing with the particular situation. 
It must be borne in mind that all other rights l not 
provided for derogation during an emergency period are already 
caught in the provision that nothing shall invalidate any law 
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the 
interest of public defence, health and law and order. UD-
doubtedly, with regard to these rights measures reasonably 
justifiable may be adopted without even the necessity of a 
2 formal declaration of a state of emergency. Consequently 
it would seem that in Nigeria, OD1~ the right to protection 
from inhuman treatment and slavery are safeguarded from 
violation during an emergency or under the pretext of one. -
l??? • ", a 
1. Sections 23 - 27. Constitution of Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1963. 
2. Cf. Cbike Obi v. D. P. P. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 182. 
3. Sections 19 and 20. 
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As in Nigeria, so in all the other countries under 
consideration. In Kenya, it is provided that: 
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of an 
Act of Parliament shall be held to be inconsistent with or 
in contravention of section 16, section 20, section 23, 
section 24, section 25 or section 26 of this Constitution 
when Kenya is atWlr, and nothios contained in or done under 
the authority of any provision of Part III of the Preserva-
tion of Public Security Act shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of those sections of this cogsti-
tution when and in so~r as the provision is in operation 
by virtue of an Order made under Section 29 ot this 
constitution. HI 
Thus, right to personal liberty, freedom of movement, 
freedo~ of association and assembly, freedom trom discrimi-
nation,treedom of expression and the right Dot to be subjected 
to search of person or property are not inviolate during a 
period of emergency. Althougb there is no provision of 
reasonable justifiability to the power of derogation given in 
the above mentioned section, all the individual sections 
themselves contain the proviso that they can only be deroga-
ted by measures which are reasonably justitiable in a demo-
cratic society. Since a measure which may be reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society may not neces.arily 
be reterable to a particular Situation, it would seem that a 
measure introduced durin. an emergency need not be parti-
cularly necessary for the purpaae of dealing with the 
emergency at the material time. ot course, it is quite 
possible that the tramers of the Constitution have deliberate-
ly lett out any re.triction in 8ub-sectio. I ot .ection 27 
1. Sec.27(1) Kenya Constitution 1964 88 aaeDded by 18/1966. 
See now 8ec.83 ot the Constitution ot Republic of Kenya 
which re-enacts the previous proviaion. 
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in order to allow any measures whatever to be taken, subject 
only in any emergency under the Preservation of Public 
Security Act to the provisions of that Act. The latter appears 
to be the position because derogation of the rights under 
each section by reference to conditions specified in the 
sections do not necessarily coincide with the existence of 
a declaration of a state of public Emergency. It seems that 
all that is required is that the derogation is reasonably 
required in the interest of defence, public safety order, and 
health. 1 
2 The Constitution of Uganda, 1967, in Article 21(5) 
provides that, "nothing contained in or done under the 
authority of an Actor Parliament shall be held to be incon-
sistent with or in contravention of article 10, 15, 19 or 20 
of this Constitution to the extent that the Act authorises 
the taking duriig any period when Uganda is at war or any 
period when a declaration of a state of public emergency 
under this article is in force, of measures that are nece-
ssary for the purpose of dealing with the situation that 
exists during that period: 
Provided that the provisions of this clause shall not 
apply in relation to anything c •• tained in or done under t.e 
authority of any instrument baving the force of law that is 
made under the provisions of an Act of Parliament, duringa 
period when a declaration of a state of public emergency is 
in~rce by virtue of a resolution of the National ASsembly, 
unless the Assembly has, by a like resolution, affirmed that 
that instrument shall h~ve effect during that period." 
1. cr. e.g. Sec. 24(2) which allows freedo. of assembly and 
association to bemrogat.d provided that the law -is 
reasonably required in the interests of defence etc." 
2. Tbis replaces the 1966 Constitution - Art. 145 of 1966 Con-
stitution provided that it may be replaced by another COn-
stitution enacted by the National As sembly.Cbap.III con-
tains the funda~ental human rights provisions. The Con 
stitut on came into force on September 8, 1967. 
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The sections referred to by this provision deal with 
protection from discrimination, protection of freedom of 
movement, the right to secure protection of law and the right 
to personal liberty. Uganda too, has deviated from the usual 
'reasonably justifiable' clause and now prefers that the 
measures be merely "necessary" for the purpose of dealiag with 
the situation that exists. This term it is submitted is even 
more vague and much more extensive than "reasonably justifiable" 
for what is necessary may be more than may be reasonable. It 
is true that under the normal ordinary law, the detence of 
necessity has always been subjected to the text of reasonable-
Dess but it is not too difficult to imagine occasions when an 
act or measure which is unreasonbale might be necessary. 
In Zambia, the Constitution makes provision tor derogation 
from fundamental rights and freedom during a period of 
emergency. It provides,l that "tit Nothing contained in or 
done under the authority of an Act ot Parliament shall be held 
to be inconsistent with or in contravention ot Section 15 or 
25 ot this Constitution to the extent that the Act authoris •• 
the taking, during any period when the Republic is at war::,' 
or any period when a declaration under Section 29 of this 
constitution2 is in force, of measures that are reasonably 
I 
justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation " 
that exists during that period." 
This provision which is in terms similar to the Nigerian 
provision allows derogation trom the right to be protected 
trom discrimination on the grounds of race, tribe, origin etc. 
and the right to personal liberty by •• aaures which are 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances. 
1. Sec. 26(1) Constitution of Zambia 1964. 
2. Sec. 29 relates to declaration of emergency. 
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Neither the Constitutions of Malawi nor Tanzania have 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rilhts. In 
Tanzania, provision for human rights is contained in the pre-
amble which reads in part: 
"Wbere freedom, justice, fraternity and concord are founded 
upon the recognition of the equality of all men and of their 
inherent dignity and upon the recognition of the rights of all 
men to protection of life, liberty and property, to freedom 
of association, to participate in their own government and 
receive a just return for their labours ••••••• 
"Whereas such rights are best maintained and protected and 
such duties are most equitably disposed in a democratic 
society where the government is responsible to a freely elected 
Parliament representative of the People and where the Courts 
1 
of law are free and impartial." 
Hence it was not considered necessary to have these rights 
specifically entrenched by the Constitution and it therefore 
followed that there was no necessity for particular provisians 
speCifying the occasions when fundamental rights .. y be adver-
sely affected by authorised legislation. In fact, unlike 
Ghana, the President is not even required to subscribe' to a 
particular oath to upbold civil liberties. Be need only take 
and subscribe,.· to "such oath as may be prescribed by Parliament 
for the due execution of bis office.,,2 
Malawi resembles Ghana more in this respect that its 
constitution lists the fundamental principles of Government on 
which the "Government of the Republic ahall be fouaded·,3, inter 
1. Preamble Interim Constitution of the United Republic 
of Tanzania 1965. 
2. section 8. 
3. Section 2(1) Republic of Malawi." Constitution 1966. 
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alia that: 
"(iii) The Government and the People of Malawi shall con-
tinue to recognise the sanctity of the personal liberti" 
enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and of adherence to the law of Nations. 
(iv) No person shall be deprived of his property without 
payment of fair compensation and only where the public interest 
&0 requires. 
(v) All persons regardless of colour, race or creed 
" should enjoy equal rights and freedoms. 
This declaration of principles is, however, not absolute 
for it is provided that, 
"Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any 
law shall be held to be incoDsistent with or in contravention 
of sub-section (1) to the extent that the law in question is 
reasonably required in the interests of defence, public safety 
and public order."l 
There is no doubt that should any measure be challenged in 
Malawi on the ground that it violates any of the "principles 
of Government", the cbances of its success must depend solely 
on wbether such a measure is 'reasonably require.' in the 
circumstances. There is little to distinguish what .ay be 
'reasonably justifiable' and what may be 'reaeoaably required' 
for a particular aituatieD. 
Whilst it is not proposed to discU8a all the fundamental 
human rights because this would ineVitably take us outside the 
scope of this study, it is proposed to discuss in~eater detail 
those individual rights which may be adversely~~ected during 
a period oteaergency so declared. 
1. Section 2(2). 
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The Right of Life: 
The sanctity of life is safeguarded by all the Consti-
tutions of the newly independent African statesl as well as 
2 by the Criminal Laws. Intentionally to take the life of a 
person is an offence usually capitally punished. However, 
the state, pursuant to a lawful sentence to that effect, may 
authorise the taking of life. Death caused in certain cir-
cumstances is also excused. For example, provided that no 
more force than is reasonably required is inflicted, no 
offence is committed if death occurs in the following 
circumstances: 
la) acting in defence of persons or in certain 
cases of property too; 
(b) preventing the commission ot a serious crime; 
(c) preventing a detained person trom escap'ing 
lawful custody; and 
(d) when effecting an arrest. 
It is for the Court to decide the reasonableness of the 
force used, and in the last exception mentioned, the Court 
would have resard to the grave nature of the otl~nce for 
which the arrest was being made as well as the circumstances 
ot its co .. i8sion. 
The Constitutions, however, recognise another exception, 
3 that is, death resulting from war. It is to be noted that 
althou,. in all other cases there is no distinction between 
a war-emergency and any other type of emergency,· yet in 
1. E. g. s. 18 Nigerian Constitution 1963. 
2. E. g. Ghana Criminal Code 1960 (Act.29) Sections 46-52; 
Tanzania Penal Code (cap.16) Sections 196-200. 
:3. Sec. 29 Nigerian '-,~ Constitution 1963. 
4. Section 70 of Nigerian Constitution 1963. A period of 
emergency is (a) when the Federation isa war or (b) when 
there is a resolutian ot Parli~nt to that effect. 
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respect of depriving a citizen of life, this can only be 
done when the emergency arises as a result of war; which is 
recognised as the gravest type of emergency. This no doubt 
clearly indicates that the right to life is regarded as the 
greatest of all human rights. 
The Right to Personal Liberty 
All African legal systems within our area of study 
acknowledge the right of the individual to the liberty and 
security of his person but usually cases are specified when 
it shall be legitimate to deprive a citizen of his liberty.l 
The extent of such deprivation is important in that it could 
easily become arbitrary. 
Personal liberty has been defined as "the freedom ot 
every law-abiding citizen to think what he viII, to say what 
he will on his lawful occasions without let or hindrance from 
2 
any other persons." In this sense, personal liberty would 
embrace virtually all the civil liberties, but tbe personal 
liberty which can be derogated from mring a period of 
emergency wouldmem to be mucb narrover in meaning than the 
above definition. In its narrow sense, personal liberty, 
it would seem, is better defined aa "the right not to be 
subjected to imprisonment, arrest and any other physical 
coersion in any manner that does not admit (of legal 
jUstification."3 Thus even where deprivation of liberty is 
allowed, the established procedure must be scrupulously 
followed. 
Arrest: A criminal has to be apprehended and brought to 
1. Nigerian Constitution Section 21. 
2. Lord Denning Ope cit. p. 5. 
3. Dicey, Constitutional La~ (9th !do.) pp. 207-8. 
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justice. Therefore, a person who is seen committing or is 
suspected of having committed a crime may be arrested. In 
exceptional cases, arrests may also be made if that is the 
only way of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. 
But the power of arrest is carefully regulated. Private 
persons can make arrests in restricted cases; the Police 
powers of arrest are wider but, even so, they are hedged about. 1 
with listed exceptions, every arrest must be supported by a 
warrant duly sisped by a judicial officer, that is, a 
Magistrate or (very rarely) a JUdge. The warrant contains a 
concise description of the offence eharged and names o~ 
otherwise describes the person to be arrested. He must be 
told the cause of his arrest. 'Dlis rule is relaxed if the 
arrest occurs during the course of the commission of tbe crime 
or wben after committing the crime the criminal is pursued and 
caught, or if the person is arrested wbile eseapUaC"from 
lawful custody. Another recognised exception is where the 
arrested person does not make it possible for the person 
arresting bim to give the necessary information as when he 
assaults the Police Officer making the arrest. 2 
Pre-trial detention: 
A person under arrest must be taken without delay to a 
police station tw' any lawful place of detention.:5 If be is 
not tormally charged he must be released forthwith. It a 
eharge is preferred against bim, be is nvertbeless to be takan 
before a Magistrate within twenty-tour hours.' In Tanzania, a 
1. For Ghana See Part 1 of the Cri~nal Procedure Code 1960 (Act. 30). 
2. ct. N'Juma v. Republic ot Tanganyika (1964) E.A.L.R. 107. 
3. E. g. Nigerian Constitution s. 21(4) 
4. Nigeria Criminal ~ocedure Act, 1945 S. ~ 
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"Justice of the Peace" (who has full powers of arrest) is 
enjoined to take persons arrested by him or on his orders 
before a Magistrate "without unneeessary delay."l If, however, 
no Magistrate is available, he could remand persons arrested 
in prison, lock-up or other place of security for a reasonable 
time up to a maximum of seven days.2 
Until an~cused has been proved guilty, his innocense is 
presumed. It would not be fair, therefore, to confine him 
pending themtermination of his case, unless there are strong 
neasons why he should be so restrained. Bail has been insti-
t*ted to cover this situation. In the African states as in 
Britain, bail is discretionary for all otfences. 3 A Judge 
of fbe High Court alone grants bail for an offence punishable 
by death. For a felony, a Magistrate may admit the accuaed 
to bail if he thinks fit; for any other offence, bail must be 
granted unless the Court sees good reasons to the contrary. 
The law appears to contemplate ready admission to bail for 
le~ serious crimes. In practice, however, police convenience 
is often placed above personal liberty. Bail rea~ably issue 
unless the accused is likely to interfere with the course of 
justice as by influencing and corrupting witnesses or if he is 
likely to fail to appear at his trial. In any case, the law 
requires that 8 trial must be held within a reasonable time but 
there is also a consolation for the victim io that he is 
entitled to compensation~r unlawful deteotioD. 4 
1. Magistrate Courts Act 1963 S. 43. 
2. Ibid. S. fD(S). 
3. Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act S. 118. 
4. See Report of the Rltyal Commission on Nyasaland - Devlin 
Report Cmnd. 814 p. 92. 
-
, 
.. 
-201-
Imprisonment following conviction for an offence known to 
the law creates no problem, because then it would be in a 
manner that "admits of legal justification." 
All these procedural safeguard as well as any substantive 
safeguards of personal liberty are, however, over-ridden in 
periods of emergency. The absolute right of personal liberty, 
subject only to legally accepted exceptions already discussed 
above, becomes restricted by the necesaity for safeguarding the 
interests of the state. The greatest threat to personal 
liberty arises, therefore, when the executive exercises the 
power to arrest, detain or restrict people during periods of 
emergency. Emergency allows arrest without the necessity of 
informing the person arrested of the reasons for bis arrest. 
Emergency allows detention where no oft-.ce can be proved to 
have been aommitted, and preventive detention has become in the 
newly independent African countries a popular measure taken by 
the Government, sometimes in genuine cases of emergency ~d 
sometimes under the pretext that an emergency exist. 
Preventive Detention 
The power to detain and thus restnict the right to 
personal liberty is not usually prteeeded by a judicial inquiry 
and in many cases, the Courts are precluded from reviewing the 
executive order imposing the detention. Thus the Executive 
must in the last resort deter.ine bow far it is prepared to 
allow the right to personal liberty to be inviolate. Thus in 
Nigeria during the Western Region Emergency 1963, the 
Administr~or appointed by the Federal GoverDment to run the 
affairs of the Region was invested with unprecedented powees 
which included authority to detain persons who, to the 
Administrator's satisfaction, bad been concerned in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or in the instigation of such 
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acts. l Pursuant to the grant of power, the Administrator 
ordered the restriction of movements of certain personalities 
to a defined area of the Region. Chief Williams, one of the 
persons on whom a restriction order was served, challenged the 
order as being in contravention of his right to personal 
liberty under the fundamental rights provision of the 
constitution. 2 The Supreme Court was in no doubt that the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
Federation may be invaded for the sake of public interest 
during an emergency,3 just as it was not in doubt that once 
a state of emergency is declared, it is the duty of the 
Government to look after the peace and security of the state: 
a very strong case is therefore, required for the Court to 
enjoin the State or its agencies from enforcing the measures 
adopted for the preservation of peace and security during such 
emergency.4 
The threat to personal liberty during periods of 
emergency has long been recognised and decried. In England 
the executive cl~imed the right to arrest and imprison persons 
without trial only in two cases. (1) It was claimed in 
assertion of the prerogative right and (2) It was exercised 
under powers delegated to the Executive by Parliament. 
1. Reg. 2 Emergency Powers (Detentian of Persons) Regulation 
1962. 
2. Section 26. ~11iam8 v. IIjekodunmi(1962)1 All N.L.R. 413 
3. Ibid. p. 421. 
4. See Williams v. Majekodunmi (3) (1982) 1 All N.L.R. at 
336. Idefbenro v. Attorney-General for Federation 
(1962) 1 A 1 N. L. RO 338. 
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The exercise of the prerogative right was challenged in 
the case of the Five Knights,l when the Court held that, 
although if a cause has been stated, it could examine whether 
it was sufficient, and free the prisoner if it was not; if no 
cause at all was stated, other than the King's Special Command, 
then the subject had no redress. The prisoners were, however, 
released in 1&28. When Parliament opened, Coke introduced a 
Bill to make it unlawful to detain any person in prison for 
more than three months without trial. In the debate that 
ensued, the right of the subject to be immune from detention 
without being charged with an offence according to law and 
being found guilty was emphatically re-affiraed. The Bill of 
Rights contains a similar affirmation. 
In spite of these affirmations, in practice, during times 
of emergency, persons were detained without trial. Prior to 
the First World War this was done by suspending the Habeas 
Corpus Acts for a short time. In Blackstone's opinion these 
Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts were the only proper way of 
proceeding in a national emergency. The Coersion Act of 1881, 
which gave the Irish Executive an absolute pow.r of arbitrary 
and preventive arrest and power to detain in prison any person 
arrested on suspicion for the entire period during which the 
Act remained in force, served as a model for the Executive 
in England to assume powers during the two World Wars. 
During Wbr1d War II, the Emergency Powers (Defence) 
Act, 1939 gave powers under which the Executive prepared Reg. 
18B. 2 In Liversidge v. Anderson,3 the House of Lords had to 
1. 3 state Trials 1. (1627). 
2. Reg. 18B provided power of detention "It the Secretary of 
state has reasonable cause to believe." 
3. (1942) A. C. 206. 
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consider the scope and meaning of the Regulation, and it was 
said: 
"The language of the Act o£ 1939 shows beyond a doubt 
that De£ence Regulations may be made which must deprive the 
subject "whose detention appears to the Secretary of state to 
be expedient in the interest o£ public safety·of all his 
liberty of movement while the regulations remain in £orce." 
It was contended that the regulation ought to be read 
with a limitation in favour of liberty, but the Judges refused 
to limit the natural meaning of the words. l 
The recognition o£ the power of the executive to detain 
without trial is adequately summarised in Lord Macmillan's 
words that "The liberty which we so justly extol, is itself 
the gift of the law of the land and as Ma~a CArta recognised , 
may by the law be forfeited or abridged." 
The right to personal liberty essentially re8ts On the 
tact that machinery exists under which anybody deprived of his 
liberty without legal justification can assert his freedom. 
In all common law system, personal liberty transcend all other 
liberties. A reflection o£ this sentiment is exemplified in 
the Court procedure which Lord Denning instanced: 3 
nWhene~r one of the King's Judges take his seat, there 
is one application which by long tradition bas priority over 
all others. COunsel bas but to say, 'My Lord, I bave an 
application which COncerns the liberty of the subject' and 
forthwith the Judge will put all other .atters .side and 
bear it •••• Tbis is of course only a matter of procedure, 
but the English law respectinl the treedom ot tbe individual 
1. Ibid at p. 219 per Lord Maugham. The decision bas since been 
iUDjected to various criticisms both academic and judicial. 
For some of the opinion see Chap.6 Judicial s~egaards to 
Emergency Powers and Nakgdda Ali v. Jayaratne~9511A.C.bb 
Privy Council decision. . 
2. (1942) A. c. 206 at p. 261. 
3. Freedom under the Law t·1949) p. 2. 
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bas been built up from the procedure of the Courts: and this 
simple instance of priority in point of time contains within 
it the fundamental principle that where there is a conflict 
between the freedom of the individual and any other rights 
or interests then no matter how great or how powerful those 
others may be, the freedom of the humblest citizen shall 
prevail over it." 
This sentiment i. no less true of the African countries 
within this particular area of study by virtue of their 
common law heritage. Application for securing personal 
liberty usually take the form of a motion for a writ of habeas 
. 1 
corpus as prov1ded by the Habeas Corpus Acts 1862. The 
writ of habeas corpus ensures the prompt release of one who 
has been unlawfully detained by anoth.r, be the latter an 
2 
ordinary subject or a Secretary of state. Thus, the writ 
of habeas corpus is the most effectual protection of the 
3 liberty of the person, but as we have already mentioned, it 
may not be available to a detainee during an emergency, not 
necessarily because the Habeas COrpus Acts are suspended but 
usually, because the Courts find that they have been effecti-
vely precluded from reviewing the exercise of Executive 
discretion. 
Freedom from Discrimination 
Discriminatory treatment is defined4 as ~ttordlDI treat-
ment to different persons attributable wholly or in part to 
their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinions, colour, or creed whereby persons of such 
1. 25 & 26 Vict. C. 20. 
2. Act of St~e is no defence. Cf. ~ v. Earl of Gewe ex 
Parte Seksome (1910) 2 I.B. 576. 
3. Cr. Holdsworth 10 H.E.I,. p. 658. 
4. zambian Constitution s. 25(3). 
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description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to 
which persons of another description are not made subject or 
accorded privileges which are not accorded to persons of 
another such description." But given the prevailing condi-
tions in most of the countries under study, a prohibition of 
this nature, without some qualification, is premature. l If 
on the other hand as is nearly all the cases, this general 
prohibition is subject to widely worded exceptions, then the 
result produced would be nearly as good as having no 
guarantee of non-discrimination at all. 
In settled areas, colonial rule bad encouraged the com-
partmentalisation of the society on racial lines and has 
conferred, in the process, special political, economic and 
social privileges on minority immigrant sections of the 
community.2 The African rulers are currently engaged in 
correcting these imbalances. Constitutional provisions which 
stand in their way are unlikely to be observed in practice. 
It is not, of course, in settler areas alone that problems 
of this nature arise. In~eas where tribal differences are 
acute, e.g. Nigeria, the concept of majority DUle may have 
swept the comparatively less advanced tribes to power. 
Unless~cial privileges are conferred on the latter to enable 
them to catch up with other sections of the coamunity, social 
harmony, whicb is the end sought by these non-discrimination 
provisions may be unattainable. 
Thus section 28 of the Nigeeian COnstitution, for example, 
after guaranteeing the freedom proceeds to exempt a law which 
"im~.es any disability or restriction or accords any pri-
vileges or advantage that baviDI resard to the nature and 
1. ct. de Smith. The new Com.onwealth and its Constitutions 
(1964) p. 135. 
2. E. g. KENYA'S Crown Lands Ordinance. 
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circumstances pertaining to the person to whom it appliesm 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society." Another 
exemption clause deals with qualifications which may be 
prescribed for employment in the services of the state, civil 
or military. 
In East Africa, administrative rather than legislative 
measures are being taken to correct racial imbalances though 
the Kenya Government has indicated that if foreign enterprises 
do not co-operate with the Government in realising its policy, 
this will be considered. l Already in Uganda, Government has 
struck against Asian monopoly in the cotton trade, by encour-
aging African co-operative ownership.2 The pattern is the 
same in Kenya and Tanzania. 
When the existing unfair imbalances have been removed and 
if social intercourse is maintained between the races and 
tribes, as the case may be, the temptation to discriminate 
would decrease. Only then would it be possible to enact laws 
prohibiting discrimination with any reasonable hope of 
success. 
In any case, the Atrican Constitutions allow enactments 
and discretionary exercise of power •• icb causes discrimina-
tion during periods of emergency. Hence legislation is 
enacted and regulations made by which aliens are deported or 
3 & expelled from the country, reli!ious sects are banned, 
political opposition parties are wiped out with a stroke of 
the pen,S and freedo. ot movement of a particular race 1s 
1. African Socialism Se8sion Paper para. 142. 
2. G. Delf, ASians in Ea8t Africa (1963) p. 56. 
3. ct. Ghana Tbe Deportation (Othman Larden and Abmadu Baba) 
Act, 1957. 
4. The banning of the Lumpa sect in zambia. See Keesing's 
Archives (1965) July, Col. 20330. 
5. AS recently happened in Uganda following the attempted 
assassination of President Milton Obote: Times December 
13, 1969. 
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restricte~. On tije latter, one may refer back to legislation 
during pre-independence Kenya when in the wake of the ~tau 
~~u emergency, a curfew order was made which provided that in 
the area specified and between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. "every 
African shall" except in accordance with the terms of a 
written permit granted by an authorised officer, "remain 
indoors in the premises in which he normally resides." In 
the case of Attorney-General v. Katherine Njoroge,l one of the 
grounds of eontention was that the order was ultra vires the 
constitution as it was racially discriminatory. The Court 
agreed with the contention but beld that both tbe Constitution 
and the Ordinance2 under which the order was made allowed dis-
crimination in the circumstances. 
The Right to Protection of Law or "FB1r Hearing" 
Judicial independence and equality before the law are two 
aspects of the right to fair trial. 80th of them are safe-
:3 guarded and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Rules of 
substaDtive law and procedure to ensure lair trial are also 
laid down by law and must be strictly follOwed. But other than 
those attached to the rights of an arrested person, which have 
alraady been discussed, the fundamental human rights provision 
in the Constitution of those countries which have them enume-
rate,: other safeguards. 
(a) A prompt and speedy trial - this is a tirst condition 
of a fair trial. In this respect, all the newly Independent 
African countries with common law systems provide that a 
personcharged with an offence is entitled to a fair hearing 
within a reasonable time by a Court. 4 Does this mean that only 
1. (1961) E. A. L. R. 348. 
2. The Public Security Ordinance - a transitioDal emergency 
type legislation. 
3. s. 22 Republican Constitution of Nigeria 1963. 
4. s. 22(2) Nigerian Constitution 1963. 
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the trial has to be promptly initiated or does it also require 
an expeditious disposition of the case? If the latter, then 
it is irregular to reserve judgements indefinitely as happen 
. too often in some states. Also joint trials which may unduly 
prolong a hearing ought to be avoided. On the other hand, an 
unduly hasty trial is likely to produce unjust results. 
(b) The nature of the alleged offence must be clearly stated-
This requires that a person can only be charged for a written 
offence and it also requires that the accused shall be informed 
as soon as reasonably practicable in mlanguage that he under-
stands and in sufficient detail, the nature of the charge which 
be bas been called upon to aa.wer. The Criminal Codes of 
most of the Nations provide for this. l 
(c) Presumption of Innocence - That any person wbo is charged 
with a criminal offence is, unless be pleads guilty, presumed 
innocent until his guilt has been established. 2 But a proviso 
is always made that the principle is not thereby infringed to 
the extent that a law imposes upon a person charged with a 
criminal oflence the burden of proving the particular facts. 
It is ar~able if this proviso has not virtually swallowed the 
principle it qualifies. A number of recent statutes in Africa 
would appear to exemplify the proviso rather than the principle. 
(d) Right to legal representation - Here the problem is not so 
much that the accused may be unable to allord legal represen-
tation but how far should an accused person be able to insist 
on a particular legal practitioner to delend him. In theory, 
all the African states within scope of this study regard the 
right of an accused person to ~be defeDded by Counsel of his 
choice as fundamental, though the right is subject to the 
over-riding interest of the state, and even more so during a 
1. Criminal Procedure Code Section 386 of Nigeria. 
2. Nigerian Constitution 1963 Section 22(4). 
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period of emergency. Thus in Nigeria, it bas been held that 
a trial is vitiated when an accused person is not afford •• 
sufficient time to secure the attendance of his Counsel. l 
On the other hand in Awolowo v. Minister of Internal Affairs, 
the Lagos High Court decided that the right to a legal pratti-
tioner of one's choice protected by the Constitution co.temp-
lates the instruction of a legal practitioner "not under a 
disability of any kind." If outside Nigeria, he must be one 
who can enter the country as of right and (needless to add) 
be must be one who is enrolled to practice in the cOUDtry.2 
The first of these two conditions raised an important 
issue: ought the Executive to be free to impede the course of 
justice without satisfying the courts of the bona tides of its 
action and that the prevailing conditions require the steps 
being taken?3 In Awolowo's case, the Plaintiff, the leader 
of fhe Opposition in the Federal Parliament at the time, was 
accused of treasonable felony and conspiracy. He bad instruc-
ted Mr. Gr~iaen, Q. C from England for his delence. The 
latter on arrival at Lagos Airport was denied entry into 
Nigeria by the Immigration Offici.as on the orders of the 
Minister of Internal Affairs pursuant to the power conferred 
on him by Section 13 of the Immigration Act, 19584 • Chief 
Awolowo contested the validity of the Minister's action and 
moved the Higb Court to declare it ultra vires the Constitu-
tion. Tbe Court held inter alia that the Minister's action 
was lawful and its validity could not be impugned on the 
grounds of malice. Tbe Court, with due respect, ought to have 
I. GokPa v. Pollee (1961) 1 All N.t.R. 423. 
2. (1962) L.L.R. 177. 
3. It must be noted that an emergency had been declared in the 
western Region and several emergency regulations were in 
force. In fact it was as a result of the power of search 
that the evidence on which Chief Awolowo was charged with 
treasonable felony was alleged to have~een found. 
4. cap. 84 See now Immigration Act, 1963. 
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asked whether there were grounds for the Minister to use the 
powers conferred on him by statute to stultify the Constitu-
tion. However, the Court~as of the opinion that "the 
relevant provision of the Constitution is limited and in my 
view limited to legal representatives in Nigeria not outside 
it. Hl The Supreme Court has yet to pronounce on this apparent 
limitation placed on the accused's guaranteed right to __ 
a Counsel of his choice. 
(e) Double jeopardy - No one who has been prosecuted to a 
final conviction or acquittal should be tried once more on 
the same facts whether or not for the same of Ie nee. This has 
been written into the African Constitution,2 but one quali-
fication is usually made: a superior Court may order a retrial 
"in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the 
conviction or appeal." But it has not been inviolate. In 
Ghana, in 1963, five men, including three Senior Ministers,3 
were accused of treason and charged before the Special 
Criminal DivisiOn of the High Court. It was provided that 
the decision of the Court was to be final, thou~ sentences 
passed were subject to the President's confirmation.~ 
1. per Udoms J. (1962) L.L.R. at p. 185. 
2. Uganda 1966 Section 24(5) zambia section 20(5). 
3. Tawa Adamafio, Minister ot Infor.atioD; Ako Adjei, one 
time Foreign Minister and Coflie-Crabbe, an executive 
Secretary of the ruling C. P. p. 
4. Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1961 Act 91 but see 
C. P. (Amendment) Act 1964. 
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After along trial the Court on December 9, 1963, announced 
their verdict, the three prominent accused were acquitted 
because the e~dence adduced against them was insufficient 
to secure conviction. The others weee convicted and sentenced 
to death. The Government's reaction was sharp. President 
Nkrumah got Parliament to give him special pow.es l to set 
aside any verdict of the Special Court. Armed with this power, 
the President set aside the verdict. The retrial of the " .. 
five men was ordered under ~ew Act~ They were retried and 
condemned to death. The President commuted the death sentence 
to 20 years imprisonment. To pursue political vengeance as 
Ghana did is an abject violation of the Constitution. 
It is appreciated that the verdict in the original 
trial was tantamount to an indictment of a regime that could 
lock people up for years without trial, and as the Court 
showed in this case, without their having comitted an offence 
known to the law. But such a superficial view of the meaning 
of. the Court' s decision would be wide off the mark. Tbe 
decision, however, shows the problem which sould create tension 
between the Executive and Judiciary. 
It is, however, provided that no Act of Parliament 
should be invalid by reason only that it provide. tor taking 
of measures which derogate from the provision for fair trial. 3 
In fact, the idea of an emergency is that there is necessity 
for quick and immediate action on the part of the executive)~ 
presumes that there ean Dot be time to eomply with the COD-
ditions of fair trial. AS Dicey states, "speedy trial or 
release of persons charged with crime has been found an incon-
1. ParI. Deb. December 23, 1963. See Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 1964 Section 4. 
2. C. P. (Amendment) Act Section 4. 
3. Section 29 Nigerian Constitution 1963. 
; 
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convenient or dangerous limitation on the authority of the 
executive government"l during periods of emergency. It is 
noteworthy, however, to .ention here that some of the safe-
guards to fair trial are specifically attached to the power 
of detention in some of Uhe Constitutions, for example, in 
the provision that a detainee shall be informed within a 
stated number of days of the grounds for his detention. 2 
Li.itation - treasonably justifiable' 
The extent and scope of the rights which can be dero-
gated from during a period of emergency, it has been seen, is 
indeed very wide. However, it is provided that any measures 
taken in derogation from these rights must be "reasonably 
justifiable for the gurpose of dealing with the situation which 
exists at the time." Thus although by conferring upon Parlia-
ment not only the power to declare periods of emergency, but 
also the discretion to determine Wbat laws are required for 
IIpeace, order ~nd good government", judicial review as to the 
constitutionality of such law is excluded, yet the door is 
left open under the section which allows derogation from 
fundamental human rights for judicial review of actions taken 
under such laws. This distinction between the laws and actions 
taken under them may be subtle, but it is none the less impor-
tant. Section 29 of the Nigerian Constitution, for example, 
although providing that no Act of Parliament shall be invali-
dated which authorises measures that derogate from specified 
fundamental rights, provides that measures taken under such 
Acts shall not be taken "save to the extent that theae measures 
are reasonably justifiable for the pUrpose of dealing with the 
1. Constitutional Law (9th Edn.) p. 229 
2. Sect. 30 Nigerian COnstitution 1963. This point will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
a. E. g. Sec. 29 Nigerian constitution, 1963. 
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situation that exists during that period of emergency."l 
It is thus left to the Courts to review the reasonableness 
of the measures taken. Another route of judicial review lies 
in the language of the section. It says that enactments of 
Parliament shall not be invalidated "by reason only" that 
they provide for measures that derogate from specified funda-
mental rights, that is, freedom from discrimination, depri-
vation of life, personal liberty, and the 'due process' safe-
guards of fair trial. 2 Therefore such measures could be 
invalidated by the Courts on judicial review if they unreason-
ably derogated from other fundamental rights, such as freedom 
of conscience, expression and assembly or freedom from 
inbuman treatment. 
The role which the judiCiary have assumed in the funda-
mental rights cases which they have been called upon to 
decide will be discusaed in greater detail later,3 but it is 
necessary to make a few comments here on their interpretation 
of the phrase "reasonably justifiable." 
In the Liversidge v. Anderson4 case, the crux of the 
decision was the extent of the power of the Home secretary 
under Reg. ISB to detain certain classes of persons if he 
"has reasonable cause to believe" certain things. It might 
mean that the secretary of state have such cause of belief 
regarding the relevant facts as a Court of law would hold 
sufficient to induce belief in the mind of any ordinary 
reasonable man. Or it might mean that he must have such 
cause of belief as he himself deems to be reasonable. In 
Lord ~mcmillan's opinion the requirement that a Cause ot 
beliet shall be reasonable implied a reference to some 
1. See also S. 21 Uganda Constitution 1967. Sec. 26 zambia 
Constitution 1964. 
2. E.g. Sec. 21(5) Uganda Constitution 1967 Sec. 29 Nigerian 
Constitution 1963. 
3. See Chapter 6. 
4. (1942) A. C. 206. 
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standard of reasonableness. By majority decision, the 
House was satisfied that the standard must be Subjective. l 
In interpreting the reasonable justifiability of 
Executive measures during a period of emergency, the majority 
of African Courts have adopted the majority view of the 
Anderson case and have refused to go into the question whether 
on the matters relied on by the Executive to detain, a reason-
able man would have reached the same conclusion. The fact 
that other phrases have been used notwithstanding. Their 
opinion is that it matters little what words are used. The 
question is whether the legislature intended the exercise 
of such powers to be subject to judicial control. 
If the Court recognised its responsibility for determining 
whether or not the law was "reaaonably justifiable", it was 
imperative for it to discover just what that phrase meant. 
It is a vague phrase and clearly cannot, without further 
definition provide the answers to actual cases. Bate J. 
of the Higb COurt of Northern Nigeria, felt that tbe 
standards evolved in India and the United states should 
2 
serve as a guide. Those standards lie paraphrased as 
follows: 
"(1) 1here is a presumption that the Legislature has 
acted constitutionally and that the laws which they have 
passed are necessary and reasonabJr justifiable. 
1. (1942) a. C. at p. 248. 
2. In olawolin~ Attorney-General for NOrther Nigeria (1960) 
N.R.N.t •• be set out to lInd some standard by which to judge whether or not any legislation is 'reasonably 
justifiable'. At the time the case was decided and in 
fact, even today, no definite standards have been suggested. 
by which to make this judgement. 
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(2) A restriction upon a fundamental human right must 
before it may be considered justifiable. 
(a) be necessary in the interest (as in the present caae) 
of publi~ morality or public order and (b) must not be 
excessive or out of proportion to the object which it is sought 
to achieve. "I 
The presumed constitutionality of the statute places on 
the plaintiff the burden of proving that the law was not reason-
ably justifiable. This is a heavy burden to discharge. 
The Courts in Nigeria have also gone further to extend this 
presumption to acts of the executive. "There is a presumption 
that the Legislature has acted constitutionally and-that l.~ 
which they have passed are necessary and reasonably justifiable. 
The same presumption may also apply where the Governor, acting 
as he is and was bound to do, upon the advice of his EXecutive 
council, makes a legislative order in exercise of powers 
conferred upon him by the Legislature.,,2 
Professor de smith3 in analysing the phrase "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society", bas mentioned that it is 
to be nClted that in the fundamental rights provisions of the 
Nigerian Constitution, from Which all the other African 
Constitution derive, there are three standards employed by _. 
that chapter for the Courts to follow. Namely-
(a) reasonably justifiable 
(b) reasonably justifiable in a democratic society 
(c) during a period of emergency, reasonably 
justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation which 
exists at the ti ••• 
1. Ibid at p. ~9. 
2. per Bate J. In Arzika v. Governor NortherDNigeri~ 
following his own lead in cherancl v. Cberanci (1961) 1 All 
N. L. R. at p. 382. 
3. Fundamental Rights in the Commonwealth (10) 1 C.L.Q. 
pp. 83-103. 
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This, therefore, presumes that the standard in each case 
must differ. Certainly as the society moves towards moments 
of great stress, as during a period of emergency, the permis-
sible area of governmental restrictions of individual liberty 
will increase. It is incontrovertible that the fundamental 
rights chapter was and is intended to assist in the preserva-
tion of a democratic society. But this should not mean that 
the rights of the individual must be placed at the uncontrolled 
discretion of the majority in the legislature or the Executive. 
There is evidence that the Courts have used the terms 
interchangeably. For instance, in Williams v. Majekodunmi,l 
the Supreme Court stated that the rights of the individual 
can be invaded only if it is "essential for the sake of some 
recognised public interest." Thus the Courts see no magic 
in the phrase "reasonably justifiable" and adopt the policy 
which they do for reasons other than the dictates of that 
vague phrase. 
For instance, the High Court ot Uganda said, 
"The Article provides that an Act of Parliament may 
authorise the taking, during any period when Uganda is at war 
or any period when a declaration of a state of emergency is 
in force, of measures that are reasonably justifiable for the 
purpose of dealing with the situation which exists during that 
period. The test applicable therefore must be a subjective 
one ••••••• "2 
By following ~he reasoning in the case of Liversidge v. 
AnderSon,3 the Uganda Court have thus keld that the criterion 
of reasonableness must be subjective as was the decision in 
Anderson's case even thougb the phrase involved in the latter 
4 
case vas ditferent. 
1. (1962) I All N.L.R. 324. 
2. Per Udoma C.J. in Ex Parte Matovu (1966) E.A.L.R. 514 
3. (1942) A. C. 206. 
4. This approach will be criticisad later - Chapter 6. 
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In the last resort perhaps it is not the definition of 
the phrase which should matter but that "such meagre safeguards 
as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise 
of power must be jealously watched •••• "l 
COMMENTS 
One of the most important aspects of the relationship 
between the state and the individual concerns the extent to 
which personal freedom is curtailed in the interest of the 
security of the state whether in its institutional aspect or 
viewed as a collection of individuals. 
Internal disturbances arising from riots as well as from 
other causes could quite reasonably justify the proclamation 
of an emergency and the promotion of measures which might 
seriously derogate from the fundamental liberties of the 
subject. External aggression upon a state certainly justifies 
an even more drastic curtailment of individual rights in the 
interest of state security.2 So in England during the two 
World Wars. Defence Regulation 18B made pursuant to the enact-
ment of Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. 1939 empowered the 
Secretary of state to detain without trial certain specified 
classes of persons and the Courts held on several occasions 
that this power of the Secretary of States could not be 
subjected to judicial control. 3 LOrd Denning commenting on 
the decision in Anderson's case stressed that "this wartime 
exception must not be allowed to be introduced into (this) 
country in time of peace or at all events only in the gravest 
emergency. ,,4 
1. Cf. Indian Supreme Court in Ram Krishna v. StateGf Delhi 
(1935) S.C. 318 at p. 329. 
2. Oagos Conference on the Rule of Law (1961) Report p. 16. 
3. Cf. e.g. Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A.C. 206 Greene v. 
Secretary or state (194I) 3 All E. R. 370. 
4. Freedom Under the Law ( 1949) p. 5. 
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However, once this exception is accepted, differences of 
opinion over the necessity of extensive arbitrary powers to 
curtail personal liberty are bound to arise. It may be agreed 
that emergency curtailment of fundamental rights may be inevi-
table, but it has been':'" seent that an emergency can be real of 
imagined or it can be used to bolster up the use of naked 
force. Preventive detention may be necessary in conditions of 
anarchy aDd violent sectionalism within a state at certain 
times but it could all too easily degenerate into instruments 
of tyranny or oppression. 
Once a declaration of emergency is made in accordance with 
constitutional provisions, the power of the Court, it would 
seem, is limited to determining whether measures taken pursuant 
to the declaration are reasonably ju~tifiable to deal with the 
situation. Since certain fundamental rights could be taken 
away completely and others more severely restricted during 
such times, and since it is conceivable that a declaration 
might be MKde even when, prima facie, emergency conditions do 
not appear to exist, it could then be argued that the lack of 
juuicial review or its limited scope, constitutes a very 
serious threat to the guaranteed rights and to this extent 
objectionable. 2 
ribere is some force in this argument but it must be 
realised that constitutional affirmation of fundamental rights 
helS value only on the assumption that those who are to 
operate them intend to proceed on democratic lines. without 
such assumption it might be almost impossible to devise a 
reasonably workable system of government: should the Govern-
ment lack such an intention, however, no amount of safeguard 
1. 
2. 
See Chapter 
See Holland: 
C. L. P. p. 
3. 
"Human Rights in Nigeria" (1962) 
157. 
15 
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could stop such a government if it were intent on abandoning 
democratic courses. 
1bere is danger, however, when the citizenry, whether by 
legislative or executive abuse of power, are made to live as 
if in a perpetual state of emergency. It is to prevent this 
that the executive is required to justify its measures and 
actions. Parliament may be expected to have regard for the 
liberties of the individual. The democratic but slow precess 
of the Court may not be appropriate in a situation in which the 
lawfully constituted authority of the state is threatened with 
subversion or grave civil disorder, and it might be unrealistic 
to suppose that Courts would be entrusted with the extra legal 
exercise of determining when an emergency arises sufficient 
to warrant the use of restrictive measures. Nevertheless, the 
Courts could always be the ultimate judge of whether or not the 
individual's liberties have been infringed. 
The state would go to any lengths to safeguard itself 
whenever its safety is endangered and restrictive measures 
which infringe on the rights of the citizen may be necessary 
but it should also be reasonable for it must be assumed that 
all human beings desire to lead peaceful lives and the Govern~ 
ment must respect this desire and to this extent limit its 
power. 
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CHAP'IER FIVE 
THE JUDICIARY AND EMERGENCY POWERS 
In a state with a written Constitution, as are all the 
African states within this area of study, the Constitution 
declares itself not only to be Law but the over-riding 
supreme law. It is, therefore, an implication of judicial 
function, in peace as in war, that the Courts have power, 
where the constitution and the ordinary law are both applicable 
to any case before them to decide whether the latter is in-
consistent with the former. 
The power of judicial review, in this context, means the 
solemn duty entrusted to the Courts to interprete the Consti-
tution and decide whether in a particular case the legal 
restraints placed upon the legislative and executive organs 
of Government have been transgressed. 
All the countries within this area of study have provided 
in their Constitutions'thata in the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations a person shall be entitled to a fair 
hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other Tribunal 
established by law and constituted in such .anner as to secure 
its independence and impartia~. FUrthermore, there is 
provision that any citizen or person who feels aggrieved as a 
result of the infringment of any of the fundamental rights may 
move the Supreme Court or any of the Higb Courts. These 
provisions provide, therefore, the means of enforcing the 
fundamental rights and have made the Judiciary the guardians 
of the citizen's liberty and privileges. 
1. E.g ot S. 22 - Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1963. 
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It is recognised, however, that it is possible and perhaps 
necessary to suspend or at least limit the scope of judicial 
review during a period of emergency. Experience taught the 
British that there was no need to enact a Special Habeas Corpus 
suspension Act, because the same effect could be achieved by 
careful legislative drafting. Whilst some of the newly inde-
pendeDt -·African states in the Commonwealth have borrowed from 
the British experience, some have preferred to be more specific. 
thus for example, the Republican Constitution ot Malawi, 1966, 
denied the Courts in Malawi power to review the constitutiona-
lity of legislation. The White Paper on the Constitution 
statedl that it should not be function of a Judge "1Q question 
or obstruct the policies of the Executive Government, but to 
ascertain the purposes of those policies by reference to the 
laws made by Parliament and fairly and impartially give effect 
to those purposes in the Courts when required to do so." 
In providing tor emergency, the constitutions of the African 
states by and large have left the ultimate responsibility of 
declaring a state of public emergency with the Legislative 
Assembly, whether it is called Parliament or National Assembly. 
The assumption is, therefore, that there should be no problem 
in this regard. But it bas been suggested2 that the judiciary 
should have the power to enquire into the factual situation at 
the material time to determine whether, in fact, such a decla-
ration is justified. Although the question may now be consi-
dered as settled by the Courts themselves - they had held3 
1. Paragraph 29. 
2. Naish, "Some legal Aspects of Emergency" in The La~er, a 
University of Lagos Law Society Publication (1963) or.l No. 
1. Also the argument of the Plaintiff's Counsel in 
Ade~benro v. Attorney-General for the Federation (1962) 1. 
A. • t. R. 324. _. 
3. See Ade~benro v. Attorney-General for the Federation (1962) 
1. A. N7 t. R. 324. 
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that the Court will not go behind a declaration to determine 
its justifiability - yet one or two comments need to be made. 
If the Courts have to decide whether there is a state of 
Emergency they will naturally refer to the definition of that 
term in the Constitution, and the Constitutional provision being 
entirely specific, then all that they can do is to discover 
whether the required procedure for the declaration has been 
complied with or not. If it has, then they must rule that 
under the Constitution a period of emergency is in operation 
whatever their own personal views on the factual situation may 
be. For example, the Nigerian Constitution provides: 
"Sec. 70(3) In this Section "period of emergency" 
means any period during which 
(a) ..•.•••.•.••••••••••••••.•• 
(b) there is in force a reso!ution passed by 
each House of Parliament declaring that a 
state of Public Emergency eXists".l 
as in the case of Kenya, where it is provided that:-
"Sec. 29(2) the President may by proclamation published 
in the Gazette declare a state of Public Emergency •••••• 
(provided that) every such declaration shall lapse at 
the expiration of seven days ••••• unless it has been in 
the meantime approved by a resolution of the other House 
supported by the votes of two-thirds of all members of 
that House." 
These provisions shows that the function of determining 
whether the situation amounts to an emergency or not is clearly 
granted by the Constitution to the EXecutive Government. Any 
view that would require a different interpretation must nece-
ssarily imply after those provisions quoted above some such 
phrase as "with which resolution the Courts (Supreme or High 
Courts as the case mal be) agrees". Such a supplyinS of words 
1. Constitution of the ~deral Republic of Nigeria, 1963. 
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that are not to be found in an enactment is by no means per-
missible. 
Apart from this, if the Courts are allowed to review such 
obvious question of pure policy, it is not difficult to imagine 
a situation where the whole machinery of Government will be 
thrown into chaos by the uncertainty which will be the outcome 
of a series of challenges in Court. TO permit a non-elected 
and largely irremovable group of five JUdges to enquire into 
allegations of bad faith - if the suggestion is that Parliament 
may abuse the procedure - on the part of a majority of the 
elected representatives of the people must be considered an 
unacceptable principle of democracy and in direct conflict with 
the system of Parliamentary Government. 
It has been seenl that constitutionally guaranteed Bill 
of Rights are erroneously weakened unless there exists provi-
sion for their effective enforcement, particularly during a 
period of emergency when the state in the interest of its own 
security has to limit the freedom of the citizen. The insertion 
of these rights in the Constitution and the guarantee of their 
enforcement by the prerogative writs imply judicial review and 
control of both the legislative and executive acts and organs 
of the state. In so far as there has been any encroachment 
upon the rights not justified by the Constitutional restrictions, 
the COurt will declare the order or statute invalid, unenforce-
able and unconstitutional. Thus the proviSions relating to 
fundamental rights provide the means by which the judiciary are 
able to perform their duty as the guardians of liberty. 
1. See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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But while these rights govern and control the absolute 
power of the state in imposing restriction, they are for the 
most part qualified and not absolute rights. Thus Parliament 
may derogate from all of them at any time by measures which 
are "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society."l and 
during a period of emergency by measures which are 'reasonably 
justifiable,2 (or some similar phrase) for the purpose of 
dealing with the emergency. This phrase brings the Courts into 
the picture, for it is they who must balance the rights of the 
individual against the interest of the community in order to 
determine if any measure infringing the fundamental rights of 
the individual is reasonably justifiable or strictly expedient 
for the purpose for which it was made. The approach of the 
African Judges to this problem has borrowed a great deal from 
the British attitude and approach, not surprisingly, and it 
would therefore be helpful to discuss this approach first. 
During the second World War in BritaiD, the Emergency 
powers (Defence) Act, 1939, empowered His Majesty to make by 
Order-in-Council regulations which appeared to him to be nece-
ssary or expedient for the public safety, the defence of the 
realm, the maintenance of public order, the efficient prose-
cution of any war in which His Majest~ might be engaged and 
the maintenance of supplies and services essential for the 
life of the Community. The Act specified a number of purposes 
for which regulations could be made without prejudice to the 
generality of the above-mentioned purposes. Pursuant to this, 
seveeal regulations were made, inter alia, the controversial 
Regulation l8B of the Defence (Genee.) Regulations, 1939. 
1. E. g. of s. 27 Uganda Constitution 1960. 
2. E. g. S.29(1) Nigerian Constitution 1963. 
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The Regulation provided that Ifif the Secretary of state has 
reasonable cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin 
or association •••••• be may make an Order against that person 
directing that he be detained." Sir John Anderson, the 
secretary of state for Home Affairs acting in good faith issued 
an Order of detention under the Regulation against Liversidge, 
who challenged the order. In the case, Liversidge v. Anderson,l 
the House of Lords had to consider the scope and meaning of 
the Reg. in so far as it affects personal liberty. 
Lord f-1augham did not consider t'lMe the rule that legisla-
tion dealing with liberty should be construed in favour of 
personal liberty. He said: 
"The language of the Act of 1939 shows beyond 
a doubt that Defence Regulations may be made 
which must deprive the subject 'whose detention 
appears to the Secretary of State to be expe-
dient in the interest of public safety', of 
all his liberty of movement while the regulations 
remain in force. There can plainly be no pre-
sumption applicable to a regulation made under 
this extra-ordinary power that the liberty of 
the person in question will not be interfered 
with, and equally no presumption that the deten-
tion must not be made to depend ••••• on the 
unchallengeable opinion of the Secretary of 
state. 112 
In the opinion of lDrd Wright, there was no necessity for 
subjecting all exercise of discretion to judicial control. He 
said:- "All the Courts today, and not least this House, 
are as jealous as they have ever been in upholding 
the liberty of the subject. But that liberty is 
a liberty confined and controlled by law, whether 
common law or statute. It is, in Burke's words, a 
1. (1942) A. C. 206. 
2. Ibid. at 219. 
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regulated freedom it is not an abstract or absolute 
freedom. Parliament is supreme. It can enact extra-
ordinary powers of interfering with personal liberty. 
If an Act of Parliament, or a statutory r.egulation, 
like Regulation 18B, which has undoubtedly the 
force of a statute, because there is no suggestion 
that it is ultra vires or outside the Emergency 
Powers (Defence). Act, under which it was made, 
is alleged to limit or curtail the liberty of 
subject or vest in the executive extraordinary 
powers of detaining a subject, the only question 1 
is what is the precise extenCof the powers given-. 
In his opinion the answer to that question could 
only be found by "scrutinizing the languale of the 
enactment in the light of the circumstances and the 
general policy and object of the measure.,,2 
The precise extent of the power can only be determined by 
interpreting the phrase "has reasonable cause to believe." It 
might mean that the Secretary of state must have such cause of 
belief regarding the relevant facts as a Court of Law would 
hold sufficient to induce belief in the mind of the ordinary 
reasonable man. Or it might mean that he must have such cause 
of belief as he hiaself deemed to be reasonable. In Lord 
f.lacmillan· s opinion the requirement that a cause of belief 
shall be reasonable implied a reference to some standard of 
reasonableness. In answering the question whether the standard 
of reasonableness which must be satisfied was an impersonal 
standard independent of the Secretary of state's own mind or 
whether it was the personal standard of what the Secretary 
of state himself deemed reasonable, his Lordship stated: 
"Between these two readings there is a funda-
mental difference in legal effect. In the 
former, the reasonable cause which the 
Secretary of state had for his belief may, 
if challenged, be examined by a Court of Law 
in order to determine whether he had such cause 
of belief as would satisfy the ordinary reason-
able man, and to enable the Court to adjudicate 
on this question there must be disclosed to it 
1. Ibid at p. 260-1. 
2. Ibid. 
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the facts and circumstances which the ::;ecretary 
of st~te had before arriving at the belief. In 
the latter case, it is for the Secretary of state 
alone to decide in the forum of his own conscience 
whether he has reasonable cause of belief, and he 
cannot, if he has acted in good faith, be called 
upon to disclose to anyone the facts and circumstances 
which have induced his belief or to salisfy anyone 
but himself that these facts and circumstances 
constituted a reasonable cause of belief. "1 
Viscount Maugham gave four reasons why the action of the 
secretary of state should not be subject to the control of 
2 
the Judge in a Court of Law. 
(1) It is a matter lor executive direction, so 
the Court cannot interfere to determine the 
reasonableness of the belief or whether it 
is necessary to exercise control over the 
person in question. 
(2) Since the Home Secretary is not acting 
judicially in such a case, in as much as be 
can act •• hearsay and it is not required to 
obtain any legal evidence and clearly is not 
required to summon the person whom he proposes 
to detain and hear his objection, it would be 
strange if his decision could be questioned in 
a Court of Law. 
(3) It is obvious that in many cases, he will be 
acting on confidential information which could 
not be communicated to the person detained or 
disciosed in Court without the greatest risk 
of prejudicing future efforts of the Secretary 
in defence of the realm. 
1. (1942) A. C. 206 at p. 260. 
2. Ibid. at p. 261. 
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(4) It is to be noted that the Secretary 
of State is a member of Government answerable 
to Parliament. 
In Viscount Maugham's very own words:-
"In the absence of a context, the prima f~cie 
meaning of such a phrase as 'if A.B. has 
reasonable cause' to belief' a certain thing, 
it should be construed as meaning 'if there 
is in fact reasonable cause for believing' 
that thing and if A.B. believes i~. But I 
am quite unable to take the view that the 
words could only have that meaning. It seems 
reasonably clear that if the thing to be believed 
is something within the knowledge of A.B., or 
one for the exercise of his exclusive discretion, 
the words might veIl mean if A. B. acting on 
what he thought was reasonable cause (and of-
course acting in goOd faith) believed the 
thing in question. HI 
There could be no review of the constitutionality of the 
legislation because this is explicit in the language of the 
Act, as regards the liberty of the individual, the exercise 
of executive discretion can only be reviewed by the subjective 
standard of reasonableness. 
Thus the House of Lor~held that the words clearly indicated 
that the exercise of executive discretion was not one subject 
to discussion, criticism and control of a JUdge in a Court of 
Law, particularly in the exigencies of var. Lord Macmillan's 
words inthis behalf are partinent. He observed: 
"In the first place, it is important to have in 
mind that the regulation in question is a w_r 
measure. That is not to say that the Courts 
ought to adopt in war time canons of construc-
tion different from those which they follow in 
peace-time. Tbe fact that the nation is at WAr 
is no justification for any relaxation of the 
yi,i]ance of the Cnurts in s.eejng that tbe law 
1. (1942) A. C. at p. 261. 
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is fully observed, especially in a matter so 
fundamental as the liberty of the subject, rather 
the contrary. But in a time of emergency when the 
life of the whole nation is at stake it may well be 
that a regulation for the defence of the realm may 
quite properly have a meaning which because of its 
drastic invasion of the liberty of the subject the 
Courts would be slow to attribute to a peace time 
measure. The purpose of the regulation is to 
ensure public safety, and it is right to interpret 
emergency legislation as to promote rather than to 
defeat its efficacy·. for the defence of the realm. 
That is in accordance with a general rule applicable 
to the interpretation of all statutes or statutory 
regulations in peace time as in war time."l 
But Lord Atkin in a strongly worded dissenting judgement, 
felt the majority of their DDrdships were taking a stand of 
judicial abdication of responsibility by reading an ambiguity 
into words which he felt were not at all ambiguo.s. He said, 
"It was surely incapable of dispute that the 
words "If A has X" constituted a condition the 
essence of which was the existence of X and the 
having of it by A. The words did not and could 
not mean "If A thinks that he has" (as suggested 
by Viscount Maugham). Reasonable excuse for an 
action or a belief was just as much a positive 
fact capable of determination by a third party as 
w~ a broken ankle or a legal right. That meaning 
1. (1942) A. C. 206 at pp. 251 - 252. 
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of the words had been accepted in innumerable 
legal decisions for many generations; "reasonable:' 
cause for belie~when the subject of legal dispute 
bad been always treated as an objective fact to be 
proved by one or other party and to be de'ermined 
by the appropriate tribunal."l 
On the question of the liberty of the individual he 
said (citing with approval the dictum of Pollock C. B. in 
Bowditch v. Bilchin2 which was cited by Lord Wright in 
Barnard v. Gormanl3 
1. (1942) 
2. (1850) 
3. (1942) 
4. (1942) 
"In a case in which the liberty of the subject 
is concerned, we cannot go beyond the natural 
construction of the statute: In this country, 
amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. 
They may be cbanged, but they speak the same 
language in war as in peace. It has always been 
one of Uhe pillars of freedom, one of the 
principles of liberty for which on recent autho-
rity we are now fighting, that the Judges are 
no respecters of persons and stand between the 
subject and any attempted encroachments on his 
liberty by the executive, alert to see that 
any ~oersive action is justified in law. In 
this case, I have listened to arguments which 
might have been addressed acceptably to the Court 
of Kings Bench in times of Charles I; I protest, 
even if I do it alone, against a strained con-
struction put on words with the effect of giving 
an uncontrolled Power of imprisonment to the 
Minister. n4 
A. c. 206 at p. 260. 
5 Ex. 378. 
A. c. 37~. 
A. c. 206 at p. 284. 
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And then Lord Atkin was forced to add, "I view with 
apprehension the attitude of Judges who on a mere question 
of construction when face to face with claims involving the 
liberty of the subject show themselves more executive minded 
than the executive."l 
One is reminded of the latter statement on reading 
some of the judgements of the African Courts which have 
relied heavily on the decision in Liversidge v. Anderson2 
in spite of the spate of criticisms3 which have followed the 
decision ever since it was handed down, and even in spite. 
of some differences in language between Reg. 18B and equiva-
lent emergency provisions in these countries. There is a 
particular paucity of case - material on emergency legisla-
tion in Africa, however, the few there are show two main 
trends. The approach which leans in favour of the executive 
at all cost and that which tries to steer a middle ~ause 
1. Ibid. 
2. Op. cit. 
3. The Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. Zayaratu (1951) A.C. 
66 at 76. 
Lord Radcliffe delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council observed: "Indeed it would be a very unfortunate 
thing if the decision of Liversidge's case came to be 
regarded as laying down any general rule as to the con-
struction of such phrases when they appear in statutory 
enactment. It is an authority for the proposition taat 
the words "if A.B. has reasonable cause to believe" are 
capable of meaning "if A.B. honestly thinks that he has 
reasonable cause to believe' and that in the context and 
attendant circumstances of Defence Reg. l8B they did 
infact mean just that. But the elaborate consideration 
which the majority of the House lave to the context and 
circumstances before adopting that construction itself 
shows that there is no general principle that such words 
are to be so understood." 
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whilst not leaning completely in favour of individual freedom 
at all cost. The first approach is illustrated by the Ugandan 
decision in the case of Chief Micheal Matovu v. Ugandal and 
also by a series of Ghanian decisions on preventive decision; 
and the second approach by the Nigerian tri-pa~e decisions 
following the western Nigeria crisis. 
THE UGANDA APPROACH - UGANDA v. COM}1ISSIONER OF PRISONS 
.............. 
Ex-Parte Mato~ 
Chief Matovu had been in prison having been arrested 
under the Deportation Act on May 22, 1966. On July 16, 1966, 
he was released and ordered to go. Soon thereafter as he 
stepped out of prison, he was re-arrested and detained. Then 
on August 10, 1966, acting under the authority vested in him 
by Regulation 1 of the Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations, 
1966, the Minister of Internal Affairs ordered the detention 
of the Chief. Among the questionsreferred to the Constitutional 
Court was whether the Emergency Powers Act, 1963, and the 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Reg. 1966, particularly Reg. 1 
were ultra vires the Constitution. The main objection to Reg. 
1 was that it conferred too wide a discretion. 
Article 30(5) of the Constitution permits derogation, 
which must be contained in or done under the authority of an 
Act of Parliament , from, inter alia, article 19 (which protec.s 
personal liberty) during the time of war or emergency, as are 
reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the 
situation that exists during that period. Offence was taken 
to section 3 of the Emergency Power Act, 1963 which gave the 
President power, during an emergency "to make such regulations 
as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the 
public safety, the defence of Uganda, rebellion and riot and 
1. (1966) E. A. L. R. 514. 
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for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community." Further he could by regulations "so far as 
appears to (him) to be necessary or expedient" for the above 
purposes, "make provision for the detention of persons or the 
restriction of their movements, and for the deportation and 
exclusion from Uganda of persons who are not citizens of Uganda." 
purporting to act under this provision, he promulgated the 
Emergency Powers (OCtention) Regulation 1966, Sec. 1 of which 
allows the Minister of Internal Affairs to detain any person if 
he is satisfied that it was necessary. 
The Court over-ruled the objection that this conferred too 
wide a discretion on the Minister of Internal Affairs. The 
essence of the objection was that the powers given to the 
President and the Minister, being unfettered and dependent 
entirely on their subjective opinion, were in excess of those 
authorised by the Constitution. It is Dot clear whether the 
Court clearly understood the real basis of the objection 
because it stated that the Minister was answerable to Parlia-
ment for his conduct: and that Parliament bad entrusted these 
1 powers to him. The Court said: 
"It is noteworthy that these regulations were 
debated and passed by the National Assembly the 
membership of which is in the neighbourhood of 
over 80 (Eighty). It is dlfficult to see how this 
Court can by the application of an objectiW .. test, 
which is an operation in the abstract, hold that 
the powers which over eighty citizens of Uganda, 
Members of Parl'''ent had considered reasonably 
1. L-l9627 E. A. L.R. 514 at p. 542. 
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justifiable to be grante~ to the Minister 
to enable him to deal with a serious situation 
in the country, was (sic) not reasonably justi-
fiable in the existing situation."l 
The Court similarly dismissed jurisdiction to review the 
exercise of these powers by the Minister. It cited Liversidge 
v. Anderson2 with approval, emphasising that the phrase 
'reasonably justifiable' can be interpreted only by the 
subjective standard For 
"To require that every case of detention 
should go to Parliament and that the 
Minister should issue his Order for the 
detention of a person concerned if Parlia-
ment had debated the cause and been satis-
fied would be absurd and would certainly 
defeat the whole object of the exercise as 
the Ninister has to act on secret information. 
In any case, such a practice would be incon-
sistent with and would render the ministerial 
system of Government a farce."3 
4 Liversidge v. Anderson strictly speaking, is irrelevant 
because that decision was merely conceened with 
tion of phrase - 'reasonable cause to believe'. 
was whether this meant that a subjective belief 
the construc-
The question 
of the 
Minister was enough or whether the Court eould examine to see 
if there existed any or sufficient, evidence to produce that 
belief. The House of lDrds, as already seen, opted for the 
former construction. In the Uganda case, the queation was 
1·/I966 7 E. A. L. R. 514 at 542. 
- -
2. Op. cit. 
3. Ibid at 542. 
4. Op. cit. 
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hardly one of constuction. Both the parties appeared to 
1 agree that the natural construction was a subjective one -
this indeed was the basis of the applicant's complaint. 
The Liversidge's case could have been relevant to the 
decision if the Court had examined it in the context of the 
constitutional provisions instead of the emergency legislation. 
It could have been argued that if the House of lDrds upheld 
a subjective view, then the phraseology in the Constitution 
equally well permitted Parliament to grant powers exerciseable 
on this subjective belief. It is not clear, from the judgement 
whether the issue was posed in this form. It is doubtful, 
however, if such a view is correct. In ~versidge2 the 
Regulations did not refer to the belief of the Minister, and 
'reasonable cause to believe' could con~eivably be held to 
import his subjective assessment. In uganda, however, the 
Constitution provides that the authority that can be conferred 
on the President was such as 'reasonably justifiable for the 
purpose of dealing with the situattion.' No reference is made 
to the belief of the President; some objective criteria would 
seem to be contemplated. If, on the other hand, the Liversidges 
case was relevant or cited to show that the subjective test 
was more desirable, then it ought to be pointed out that the 
Court was in a minority, in view of the criticisms which have 
been made on that decision. 2 
1. This construction was the correct one since the wording 
was "if the l-Unister is satisfied" as opposed to the 
British Provision which was, "if he had- reasonable 
cause to believe". 
2. See ante. 
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The second issue before the Court was to determine 
whether any of the provisions of Sec. 31(1) of the Consti-
tution had been contravened in relation to the applicant. 
Under that Section, whenever a person was detained under 
emergency powers it was required that "(a) he shall as soon 
as reasonably practical, and in any case not more than five 
days after the commencement of his detention, be furnished 
with a statement in writing in a language which he understands 
specifying in detail the grounds upon which he is detained, 
and (b) not more than 14 days after commencement of his 
detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette 
stating that he has been detained and giving particulars of 
the provision of law under which his detention is authorised 
and (c) not more than one month after the commencement of his 
detention and thereafter at intervals of not more than six 
months, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and 
impartial Tribunal established by law and presided over by 
a person appointed by the Chief Justice." The applicant 
alleged that he was first detained on the 22nd day of ,.Iay, 
1966, purportedly under the provisions of the Deportation 
Ordinance 1 , he was subsequently transferred to Lurira Prison, 
where he was told that he had been released and re-arrested 
on 16th July. The detention order was served on him only on 
August 11, 1966. TIle Gazette announcement was on 19th August, 
and the Tribunal heard his case on tb. 26th August. This 
Tribunal was alleged not to be independent and impartial 
as apart from its Chairman who was a Judge, its two other 
members weee District Commissioners, nor, it was argued, was 
the Tribunal established by law, as required by the Consti-
tution. 
1. TIle Deportation Ordinance was held to be unconstitutional 
by the Court of Appeal in Ibingir~v. Uganda (1966) E. A. 
306. 
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The Court dismissed all but one of these 
It held that t-fatovu' s detention did not begin 
July, when he was apprehended by the Police. 
complaints. 
on 16th 
Under S. :3 
of the Reg. the police were empowered-to arrest and detain 
any person who has acted, is about to act or likely to act 
in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance 
of public order for a period not exceeding twenty-eight days." 
Such detention not being a detention by the Minister, who 
did not make his Order till 11, August, the day when the 
detainee was also given reasons for his detention, there was 
no violation as to the five-days requirement. There is no 
evidence that the detainee was brought before a Magistrate 
during his custody by the police and there is no requirement 
under Section :3 for bringing a person held by the police 
before a ~~gistrate. The Court relied on this provision as 
justifying his detention for 28 days before be was given 
a-ny reasons or opportunity to present his case to a 
Tribunal. 
There is good reason to believe that section 3 was 
unconstitutional, at any rate, it is an arguable point. 
There was no justification for it in the Constitution; a 
person could either be arrested and detained under the 
ordinary law, in which case he had to be brought before a 
~mgistrate as soon as possible or under emergency legislation, 
in which case the provisions of Section 31(1) of the Consti-
tution applied. Police powers under Section 3 of the Regula-
tions clearly came under emergency legislation, and because 
they disregarded section 31 of the Constitution, they were 
unconstitutional. The Court did not address itself to this 
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issue'~ even if the Counsel had not argued the issue, it is 
clearly the duty of a Court to do so when the liberty of an 
individual is at stake. While so much discussion centred on 
the powers of detention of an exulted Ninister, there was no 
question of the grant of important, though limited, powers 
to the Police Officer, free from direct control Gf Parliament 
or Public Opinion. 
The Court also held that the Tribunal was established 
by law, and was independent and impartial. It was established 
by the Regulations l which had been approved by parliament in 
the prescribed manner. As to the complaint of impartiality, 
the Court "regarded with disfavour the imputation that the 
other two members of the Tribunal were not independent of the 
executive influence." Tbey held that there was not a shred 
of evidence produced before them in support of such a serious 
allegation: 
"One would have thought that the two men 
concerned, who undoubtedly must have done 
well in the public service of Uganda to have 
risen to the Senior Posts of District COmmissioners, 
and who owed their appointment to the Public 
Service Commission, ought to be regarded as men 
of integrity and high reputation with independent 
minds. It would be wrong and unjustified to 
assume otherwise. 1f2 
On the contrary, the presumption might well be that they , 
were not independent; they were executive officers, and.as 
District Commissioners very much concerned with the maintenance 
of law and order. The Courts have always been anxious to 
1. S. 5. 
2. (1966) E. A. L. R. 514 at p. 545. 
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emphasise the maxim that justice should not only be done, but 
seen to be done. The Court did recommend, however, that the 
Government employellS should be replaced as members of the 
Tribunal. ""Such a change, we believe, woul.d be all to the 
good and might serve to place the Tribunal, like Ceaser's wife, 
above suspicion".l 
In one respect only did the Court find fault with the 
Government. The Constitution, as already noted, prescribe. 
that reasons for detention be given to a detainee. The Govern-
ment had merely informed Matovu "the grounds on which you are 
being detained are that you are a person who has acted or is 
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and 
maintenance of public order." The Court held that the statement 
appeared to be in a stereotype form and did not provide 
sufficient details of the reasons for detention, and ordered 
the Government to supply the details. 
Two comments may be made on the manner in Which the Court 
dealt with this issue. Firstly, the Court shoved little 
sympathy or understanding of the Constitutional requirement 
of detailed reasons: 
"It is not clear to us why article 3l{l){a) 
of the Constitution should have required 
the Minister to furnish a detainee with 
a statement in writing specifying ill detail 
the grounds upon which" is detained. 
One wonders the extent to which the Minister 
could go in the specification of the grounds 
for detaining a person. Tbe ~tinis ter of 
1. Ibid. at p. 545. 
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Intcrnal Affairs, in virtue of his .. position, 
must of necessity obtain his information through 
secret and confidential sources. It might not 
be in the interest of public security that such 
sources be discloscd."l 
In the next paragraph, the Court does, however, go on to 
state the obvious, "we do not think that the mere specification 
of the grounds would necessarily involve the disclosure of the 
source or sources of information." It is a little surprising 
that the Court did not ap~reciate the reasons for the require-
ment - for there would have been no point in providing a review 
Tribunal unless the detainee knew what case he had to answer. 
The giving of reasons, with the subsequent review, is a funda-
mental part of the scheme for the protection of the detainee. 
Secondly, even though the Court found the reasons in-
sufficient it regarded the deficiency as a matter of procedure, 
not substance, which could be cured. Further, the Court held 
that it was not a condition precedent but a condition subsequent. 
Therefore, the Minister's Order of detention WaS not invalid; 
it was necessary, however, for him to provide reasons. No 
time limit within which reasons should be given was laid down 
by the Court. 
It is a little difficult to understand what the Court 
meant by saying that the deficiency in qu~ion waa a procedural 
one, and being a condition subsequent could not be fatal. It 
is generally accepted that non-compliance with procedural 
requirements can invalidate an Order, nor does it matter that 
the requirement is in the nature of a "condition subsequent". 
1. (1966) E. A. L. R. at p. 546. 
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The Indian Supreme Court has been very explicit on this. 
Under somewhat similar legislation, it has held that failure 
to communicate the grounds within time makes the detention 
illegal, entitling the detainee to release. l 
In fact, the best judicial approach in the opinion of 
the Indian Supreme Court has been characterrised by its 
remark in the decision in the case of Ram Krishna v. state 
of nelhi2 , when it stated that: 
"Preventive Detention is a serious invasion 
of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards 
as the Constitution has provided, against the 
improper exercise of the power must be jealously 
watched and enforced by the Courtso,,3 
The safeguards in Uganda and indeed in most of the other 
newly independent countries in Africa are even more meagre 
than in India, but the Court failed to show any particular 
concern for a person detained under these special powers. 
This is indeed a dangerous prcedent because similar legislation 
also prevails in Kenya4 and in the new Uganda Constitution. 5 
By it the Government is sanctioned extensive powers, w~thout 
any effective check even if they are arbitrarily exercised. 
lihile the rights of the individual must be subordinated to 
the greater good of society, there is no reason why the 
Courts should not make an attempt to examine whether there 
has been abuse of powers. 
1. s!ate of Bombay v. Atmaran (1951) s. C. 157. 
2. (1953) S. C. 318. 
3. Ibid at p. 329. 
4. Art. 27 of the Constitution 1965 (Nov 83(2) of 1969 Const.) 
5. Art. 21. 
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That the function of the judiciary as a cbeck on the 
excessiveness of the executive is bound to generate occa-
sional conflicts between the judiciary and the other arms 
of Government is not impossible, and therefore the judiciary 
must exercise some restraint. Clearly cases involving the 
rights of the individual during a period of emergency are 
very difficult to resolve. They inevitably involve the 
Courts in question of policy. A Court must consider the 
nature of the individual and community interests which 
are involved. It must examine the degree to which the 
individual's interest undermines that of THE COM}IUNITY and 
which is the more important. In arriving at a decision 
upon this last question the Court must consider its relatioa-
ship to other agencies of Government and to the Police. 
This will force it to do some thinking about the Government 
generally and about its position as a non-elected body in 
a democratic society in particular. 
TIlE NIGERIAN APPBOACH 
As the Federal Supreme court of Nigeria &aid in the 
case of Chike Obi v. Director of public Prosecutions,l i~ 
role is not merely to rubber sta.p the acta of the legislature 
and the executive. The Court must be tbe arbiter of whether 
or not any particular law is reasonably justifiable. 2 Als01n 
the case of Olawoyin v. Attorney-General for Northern Nigeria,3 
1. (1961) 1 All N. L. R. 182. 
~. Ibia. at p. 196. 
3. L-196Q7 N. R. N. L. R. 28. 
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the Court was certain that judicial restraint did not mean 
judicial abdication. "It is the duty of the Judges to deter-
mine finally the constitutionality of an impugued enactment. 
For this they must, after considering all the relevant factors, 
rely on their own judgement. It does not necessarily follow 
that because the legislature has passed a law that every pro-
vision of the law is reasonably justifiable. The Courts have 
been appointed sentinels to watch over the fundamental rights 
secured to the people of Nigeria by the Constitution Order and 
to guard against any infringment of those rights by the state. 
If the Courts are to be effective auardians then the Judges 
must not only act with self-~straint and due respect for the 
judgement of the Legislature but they must also use their own 
impartial judgment without undue regard f.r the claims either 
of the citizen or the state."l 
Questions concerning the state of emergency came before 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria on five occasions in 1962. Three 
of these were sta~es in Williams v. MajekOd~,2 the decision 
on an ex-parte application for an interim injunction, the 
decision on motion for an interlocutory injunction and the 
decision in the action. The other two weee stages in Adegbenro 
v. Attorney-General of the Federation and Ors,3 the decision on 
motion for an interlocutory injp,Dction and judgment in the 
action. Both Plaintiffs contested the general validity of the 
declaration of emergency, and of the Acts and regulations con-
sequential thereon. 
In ~illiams v. Majekodunmi (No.3),' Chief Rotimi Williams 
who had beensarved with a restriction order commenced an action 
in the Supreme Court seeking declaration and injunction; 
1. (hQra..(\.(t.~. ~t..-('~(.t.. or- LJ:- . 
2.(1962) 1. All N. L. R. 324. 
3. (1962) W.N.L.R. 185 (1962) 1. All N. L. R. 338. 
4. (1962) 1. All N. L. R. 418. 
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declaration to the effect that the Emergency Powers Act, 1961 
or at least Section 3(1) of the Act, the negulations made 
under the Act (to the extent that they authorised the Admini-
strator to restrict him) and the restriction Order itself were 
all ultra vires, unconstitutional and void; also an indunction 
restraining the Administrator from restricting his movements. 
The Plaintiff's argument appears to have been advanced 
under three main heads, two of which are relevant here. The 
first was that there had been such an extensive delegation of 
power by the Governor-General-in-Council under Section 3 of 
the Emergency Powers Act, 1961 as to be unconstitutional. 
The Nigerian Constitution carefully balances the powers of the 
Centre and the Regions; it also seeks, statutorily to preserve 
individual rights from government encroachment. se~against 
the background of the Constitution as a whole, no delegation 
of powers should be such as could destroy the whole purpose 
of the Constitution. It was.therefore, contended that to 
allow Parliament, to enact legislation providing for detention 
or restriction of movement which power could be delegated was 
unconstitutional because it would amount to an abdication of 
Parliament's control over legislation. 
This argument was summarily rejected and it was pointed 
out that Parliament still retained control by reason of Sec. 
5 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1961. In the words of Bairaman 
F. J. whomlivered the judgment: "The volume of our laws 
begin with primary laws passed by the Legislature itself and 
go onb give the subsidiary legislation made by a person or 
body authorised by the legislature to supplement its enactments. 
This convenient method of legislation has been in use over the 
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years, and there are specific prOVl.Sl.ons in the Interpretation 
Act which regulate the making and~fect of subsidiary legisla-
tion. It is a fair inference that everyone who assisted in 
the fmning of the Constitution, and in plrticular the legal 
advisers who attended the Conference (a reference, no doubt 
to the applicant who was one" of the ~gal Advisers) were all 
aware of this method of legislation, and that there was no 
intention to require that every bit of legislation made after 
Independence bad to be made by the Legislature itself, whether 
Federal or Regional, or else it would be of no effect. '!bere 
is, of course, no abdication for the Legialaturc still has 
control under S. 5 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1961;to subsi-
diary legislation ~er se there can be no objection. If Parlia-
ment choose to go a step further and authorises the subordinate 
Legislator in his~rn to authorise another person to do one 
thing or another, again there can be no objection to that taken 
by itself. Suppose, for example, that the emergency is that 
the Federation is at lilr, it would be desirable to conserve 
petrol for military operations and undesirable to expend it on 
frequent meetings of Parliament which would make it wise to 
have regulations made by the Governor-General-in-Council, and 
as aDtion should be swift, it would be desirable to enable, say, 
the Administrators of some remote parts of Nigeria, to do what 
may be necessary in his area forthwith. 1I1 
No doubt the Supreme Court had expediency in mind in re-
aching their conclusion, well realising that there may be 
situations of national emergency when centralised power is a 
necessity, but nevertheless their reasoning may perhaps have 
overlooked the fact that the Nigerian Constitutional situation 
is quite different from the British. There, as in other 
countries with controlled Constitutions, the Constitution exists 
to safeguard the people from arbitrary and excessive use of 
Powers, as well by Parliament as by other authorities. 
1. (1962) 1. All N. L. fl. at p. 420. 
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On the question of the restriction order, it was 
contended that it was not 'reasonably justifiable' for 
the purpose of dealing with the situation and the Court 
was urged to reject the view that the Administrator's 
satisfaction was conclusive. The Attorney-General urged 
that the question whether measures taken in a period of 
emerbency are reasonably justifiable, could not be deter-
mined by abstract principle of right or reason, but by a 
pragmatic approach to the delicate issue of state security 
and public welfare, a question on which the Court might 
prefer to be guided by the evidence of those charged with 
the day to day maintenance of law and Order. l 
Without necessarily rejecting the evidence of "those 
charged with the my to day maintenance of law and Order", 
the Court, and it is suggested rightly, refused to follow 
the line of judicial abdication of duty suggested and said: 
"Those words ••••.•• must be read in the context 
of the Constitution and more particularly in the 
mntext ~ Chap. III in which they occur. The 
Chapter confers certain fundamental rights which 
are regarded as essential and which are to be 
maintained and preserved; and they are to serve 
~ a norm of legislation under majority rule, which 
is the form of rule pervading the Constitutions. 
If they are to be invaded at all it must be only 
to the extent that it is essential for the sake 
of some reco~nised public interest, and may not 
be farther." 
1. (1962) 1. All N. L. R. at p. 428. 
2. Ibid. 
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TIle Supreme Court came to the conclusion that "there is 
nothing in the evidence of the Plaintirf or in that of Mr. 
~lodge (a Police Officer) who was the only witness called for 
the Defendant, from which it can be fairly inferred that it 
was reasonably justifiable to restrict the Plaintiff's freedom 
of residence and movement". I Therefore, the Court declared 
that the restriction order in so far as it applied to the 
Applicant was ultra vires and unconstitutional. But it should 
be added that although the Court had not let it.elf be bound 
by the slackles of the Liversidge's case subjective test of 
exercise of executive discretion, the Court . was not disposed 
to grant tlle injunction which the Appellant asked for a~ainst 
the executive Administrator. "'.nlere should be no need £or an 
injunction," the Court said, "the defendant will no doubt 
take note, and so~ll the police, of the Court's decision, but 
if it becomes necessary, the plaintiff should have the liberty 
to apply for an injunction.,,2 Subsequent events showed that 
the reluctance of the Court to order an injunction against the 
defendant after setting aside therestrictioD oorder, placed 
the Plamtiff at the mercy of the mfendant executive. It 
was reported that fifteen minutes before the Plainti!"f heard 
the result of his suit at his place of restriction, a second 
restriction order was~rved on him. 3 Though, the Plaintiff 
was allowed by the Administrator to attend the Supreme Court 
to argue his case in1he substantive action, he was refused 
permission to be present when judgment was delivered. 1bere 
is no doubt that this approach of the Court besides being 
unusual is not in the least favourable to the cause of 
personal liberty. 
1. Ibid. 
2. See ~illjams v. ~jekQdunmi"(no.l)(1962) I AIl.N.L.R. 324 
3. See Odumosu op.cit., p. 290. 
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The Nigerian approach to the problem of judicial review 
is somewhat between the brend and the strict narrow approach; 
the broad liberal approach as represented by the practice in 
the united states Supreme Court and the strict and narrow 
approach as represented by tiritain and some parts of the 
Commonwealth. l At a meeting held in Nigeria in 1960 for the 
discussion of problems whicn would face a post-independence 
Federation of Nigeria, Mr. Justice Brett then of the Federal 
SUpreme Court of Nigeria made the following statement: 
"The Courts throughout the British Commonwealth 
have traditionally regarded questions of poiicy 
2 
as outside their scope." 
This statement is significant in shedding some light on the 
role which the African JudiCiary have assumed on adjudicating 
on "Emergency POlver" cases. 
More recently the Nigerian judiciary was faced once 
again with the problem of protecting the individual liberty 
from undue encroachment by the executive. In the case of 
Chief A. M. F. Agbaje v. Commissioner of pOlice,3 the 
applicant who had been detained under the Armed Forces (Special 
Powers) Decree 19674 brought an application for a \iri t of 
Habeas Corpus to secure his release, on the ground that his 
detention was ultra vires the powers of the detaining 
authority under that decree. 
-1. MCWhinney: Judicial Review in English Speaking World 
Chaps. 5 & 6. 
2. tiThe role of the judiciary in a Federal Constitution with 
part reference to Nigeria" in Constitution problems of 
Federation in Nigeria (1960) p. 21. 
3. Court of Appeal western state CAW/81/69. See also High 
Court of Lagos Suit No. M/84/69. Reported in the Council 
of Legal Education Information Sheet No. 40, 1969 (supple-
ment) Lagos. 
4. Decree No. 24 of 1967. 
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The Applicant was detained on an Order sit;ned by the 
Inspector of Police by reason of powers vested in him under 
Sec. :3 of Decree No. 24. Section:3 of the Decree provides: 
"If the Inspector-General of Police, or as the case 
may be, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is 
satisfied that any person is or recently has been 
concerned in acts prejudicial to public order, or 
in the preparation or instigation of such acts and 
by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control 
over him, he may by order in writing direct that that 
person be detained in a civil prison or Police Station, 
and it shall be the duty of the Superintendent or 
other person in charge of any Police or the Police 
Officer-in-Charge of any Police Station, as the case 
may be, if an order made in respect of any person under 
this section is delivered to him, to keep the person 
in custody until the order is revoked. (2) An Order 
made under sUb-section (1) above shall be full autho-
rity for any Police Officer or member of the Armed 
Forces to arrest the person to whom the Order related 
and to remove him to a civil prison or Police Station." 
Thus, it is quite clear that the power vested in the 
Inspector-General is only exerciseable where be is satisfied 
(a) that any person is or recently has been concerned with 
acts prejudicial to public order, or (b) in the preparation or 
instigation of such acts, and (c) that by reason thereof, it 
is necessary to exercise control over him. The Order under 
which the applicant was detained read: 
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"Whereas I, ham Salem, Inspector-General of 
Police, am satisfied that the arrest and 
detention of the person specified in the 
Schedule hereto as at the date shown against 
each person are in the interest of the security 
of the Federation of Nigeria and it is expedient 
to make this detention order accordingly:-
Now therefore, I Kam Salem, by reason of the 
powers vested in me under S. 3 of the above-named 
Decree hereby order that: 
I (1) The persons so specified shall be detained 
in Civil Prisons •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " 
Therefore the reason for the detention of the applicant on 
the face of the Order was the interest ot the security of 
the Federation of Nigeria. It was on this ~ound that the 
applicant challenged the Order. He claimed that the 
Inspector-General could order his detention only on the 
grounds stated in Decree 24. If bJs detention could not be 
justified on any of those grounds, then the action of the 
Inspector-General was ultra vires and his detention order 
invalid. 
In the judgment in the Higb Court of Western Nigeria2 , 
the Court said: 
"It should be noted there are wide and arbitrary 
powers in derogation of the entrenched clauses 
of the COnstitution relating to fundamental rights 
as contained 1n Chapter III of the Constitution. 
It 1s clear and I have not the slightest doubt in 
1. Chief Agbaje's name was mentioned in the Schedule. 
2. Suit No. M/22/69. Dr. Justice Aguda preaidiag. 
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my mind that in that circul~tances, there is 
cast upon the Inspector-General of Police the 
onus to establish before any Court in which the 
exercise by him of powers conferred on bim by 
(above) provision has been challenged, that he 
has complied strictly with the enactment under 
which he has acted. Not only that, but it must 
also be shown that every other person acting 
under his control or in purported execution of 
his orders complied strictly with the provision 
of the Act. (See R. ~ Halliday ex-parte zadig 
(1917) A. C. 260 at p. 274; R. v. cannon Row 
Pglice Station Inspector ex-parte Brady (1921) 
126 L. T. 9 at p. 13). Any material deviation trom 
the provision of the Act must, in my view, render 
the detention of any citizen of this country null 
and void, an act for which the writ of habeas 
corpus is an appropriate remedy". The Judge 
continued "I bear it~in mind that where the 
liberty of the citizen comes into conflict with 
the safety and the corporate existence of the 
state, liberty of the person has to give way to 
the latter, salus populi suprema Ie!, especially 
during times of war or national emergency as we 
are ina the moment ••••••• Howeve~ it is clear 
~ in the.proce~s the Courts have a vital role 
~lay - in fact it is partly for the resolution 
of such conflicts that the Courts of tbe land bave 
~ established. If the resolution of such a con-
flict is left in the bands of an arm of the executive 
as in tbis case, where the power to put a citizen in 
custody tor no proved offence is lett at the discre-
tion of the Inspector-General of Police by an act 
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of the legislative body, then the role left for the 
Courts to perform is to make sure that the Inspaetor-
General of_Polic!-£onformed strictly with the enabling 
legislation." 
In the Court's op1n10n, the Inspector-General of Police 
failed to conform strictly to the provisions. The Order did 
not allege that the applicant had committed any of the 
offences in the enabling legislation. Therefore, "without 
such an allegation, the vresent order exhibited within suit 
is null and void as they are not in conformity with Decree 
No. 24 and any arrest and detention carried out under them 
are illegal." 
The Inspector-Gener41 of Police appealed against this 
ruling,l and the western state Court of Appeal, in rejecting 
the appeal mentioned that the writ of Habeas Corpus has often 
been used to test the validity of acts of the ikecutive and 
in particular, in time of w~ or under emergency legislation, 
like the case before them,2 and referred to the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of India in the case of Singh v. Delhi3 
where it was said that, 
"'Ibis Court has often reiterated before that 
those who felt called upon to deprive other 
persons ~f their personal liberty in the dis~ 
charge of .batl,they consider to be their duty, 
must strictly and ~rupulously observe the forms 
and rules of the law." 
The Court of Appeal felt constrained to delimit their 
duty and in doing so adopted the words of Chier Justice 
Marshall in the famous case of ~rburl v. Madison. 4 
1. CAW/81/69. 
2. Se~ JL,.. v. Secretary of State for Hoaqe ',fairs ex-parU 
Q'Brien (1923) A.C. 603. 
3. 16 ~uprc;: court Journal 326. 
4. 1803, I ncb 37. 
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nIt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law. is. Those who apply the rule 
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule. If the two laws conflict with each other, the 
Co~rts must decide on the opera&ion of each. so if a law be 
in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the 
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court 
must either decide the case conformably to the constitution, 
disregarding the ·law; the Court must determine which of these 
conflicting· rules governs the case. This" the very essence 
of judicial duty." 
Thus, the Court set to interpret the provision of law 
under which the Inspector-General purported to have acted, it 
came to the conclusion Ghat "The true position, it must be 
admitted, is that S. 3(1) of that Decree doea ~call upon 
the Inspector-GeQeral of police, to be "SATISFIED" on "THE 
ARREST AND DETENTION" of a person; WHAT he must be "SATISFIED" 
upon is the EXISTENCE OF CERTAIN DEFINED ACTS. In other words, 
for the sake of clarity and for avoidance of all doubts, the 
Inspector-General of Police, must first be "SATISFIED" under 
Sec. 3(1) of Decree No. 24 of 1967, as to the EXistence of 
certain Defined Acts; thereafter, the question of Detention 
under that Sub-Section only arises after a Decision to be made 
by him, as a Consequence of his being further "SATISFIED" that 
those Acts, Concern the person to be detained." The Court 
was, therefore, satisfied that the police order which purported 
to detain a person in the interest of the security of the 
I:)tate was invalid .. 
The Counsel for the Appellant &ad submitted that any 
Act which threaten the preservation of pUblic Order ineVitably 
tends to threaten the security of the country. But the point 
is not whe*ber the Inspector-General is satisfied as to the 
need for detention but whether he is satisfied that the 
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applicant had committed the stated offences or acts. If he 
is $0 satis·fied then he must say so and also state that those, 
are the grounds of the applicant's detention. 
Thus the Court whilst.seeming to have accepted that 
they may have no power to question or inquire into the validity 
of a Decree, it has maintained that it bas the power - indeed 
it considered it its duty to enquire into the validity and 
enforcement of orders purported to have been made under the 
Decree in the same way as it would question the exercise of 
executive discretion in a civilian emercency administration. l 
However, a most surprising stand point was recently 
adopted by the supreme Court when it adrogat •• to itselt the 
power to question the validity of a Decree promulgated by the 
Federal Military Governaent, on the cround that it infringed 
the provisions of fundamental human rights in the ~onstitution. 
Tbe case in point is E. O. LAKANMI & ORS v. THE ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (WESTERN STATE AND ORS). 2 The case is (essentially) 
. 3 
an appeal from the western ~tate c~urt of Appeal which heard 
and dismissed the appeal of the appellants from the jude_ent 
of the High Court of the western state sitting at Ibadan. 
The application before the Bil~ Court was for an order of 
certiorari to remove into COurt an Order dated the 31st day 
of August, 1967, made by Chief Justice so.olo in his capacity 
1. "A legislative, an executive, and a judicial p~er coapre-
hended the whole of what is lIeant and understood by 
Government. It is by balancing eacb of these powers 
against the.,otber two, that the eftorta in hUllan nature 
towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, aDd 
any treedo. pre.eryed in tile (,;ODstitution,· in Alan IJIltll: 
Government Ii Investi~on, at p. 3 quoted by Mr. Justi. 
Idemola in _baje v. ~l,.iQner of PoliCI: CAW/8l/69 . (Unreported) • . , 
2. S.C. 58/69 (Unreported). 
3. The western ~tate court of Appeal judgaent is reference 
l1968) C.A.W./35/68 lUDreported). 
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as the ~hairman of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the assets of 
Public Officers of the western state, for the purposes of 
quashing it. The Order was made under the provisions of 
Section l3~l) of ~dict No.5 of 1967 ~of the western state) 
which ordered the Plaintiffs or their agents and other persons 
not to dispose of any of the properties of the plaintitfs 
until the Military uovernor of the western ~tate shall other-
.i8. direct. The learned Judge of the High court dismissed 
the application,l holding that the Order was not ultra vires 
and that ~dict NO. 5 of 1967 was validly made, since, accordi~ 
to him, the ~'ederal Military Government oecree NO. 51 of 19662 
was not in operation in the western ~tate of Nigeria wben the 
Edict was made. The learned Judge went further to say that 
the validity or otherwise of the Order made by tbe chairman 
of the Tribunal could not be cballenged since Section 21 of 
~dict No.5 of 1967 states that: 
"No defect whatsoever in anything done by any 
person with a view to the holding of, or other-
wise in relation to, any inquiry UDder that 
uecree and this Edict, shall affect the validity 
of the thing so done or any proceeding, finding, 
order, decision or other act whatsoever of any 
person, the tribunal, or the special tribunal and 
in particular, no action or proceedings in the 
nature of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, 
prohibition, injunction or declaration or in any 
form whatsoever against or in respect of any such 
thing, proceeding, finding, order, decision or other 
1. 21/12/67. . 
2. p~ Officers (Investigation of Assets) Decree paased .. 
28th JUDe, 1966 by the wational Military Government, as it 
was then called, provided for the investigation of asse~s 
of Public Officers throughout the country. . , 
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act, as the case may be, shall be entertained in any court 
of LaW.·i 
It may appear clear from the praNision in section 21 of 
the Edict that the Order of the Tribunal cannot be challenged 
in any ~ourt of Law but this provision can apply only if the 
whole of the Edict itself was intra vires the legislative 
autbori ty of the ~lili tary Governor of the western Region. 
'the Military Government which came into office on January 15, 
1966, by its Decreee No.1, 1966 retained the Federal structure 
of the country and maintained the division of legislative 
authority contained in the Republican constitution, 19631 
namely the EXclusive Legislative and Concurrent Legislative 
listS. Thus, it provided in Sectiao 3(2) of Decree No. 1,1966. 
liThe Military Government of a Region -
(a) shall not have power to make laws with 
respect to any matter included in the 
Exclusive Legislative List; and 
(b) except with the prior cansent of the 
Federal Military Government, shall not 
make any law with respect to any matter 
included in the Concurrent Legislative 
List. It 
But on 24th May, 1966, Decree No. 34 of 1966 was passed. 
Section 1 reads-:"; "Subject to the provisions of this 
Decree, Nigeria shall on the 24th 
May, 1966 ••••••• cease to be a 
Federat ion. • •••••••• it 
By Section 2(1). The Federal Military Government shall 
be known as the National Military GOvernment. 
Section 2(1)(c) makes the Regions a group of Provinces 
Section 2(3) deprives a Regional Military Governor of 
r 
his powers to make laws except by express delegation from the 
National-Mili$.ry Govera.ent. 
- " Tbe National Military Government, as it was then called 
1. ti. 69. 
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on June 28, 1966 passed the Public Officers (Investigation of 
Assets) Decree,l which gives powers as to certain assets of 
Public Officers to be investigated: Section 5 of this uecree 
delegated powers to each Military UOvernor "in relation to 
their respective group of provinces" to carry out inveatigations 
in their provinces, and sub-section. (3) states that no Order 
shall be made by a Military Governor except with the prior 
consent of the Head of the National Military Government. Thus 
far it is clear that only the National Military Government 
could legislate on investigation of assets throughout the 
country. 
On 1st ~eptember, 1966, however, the country was once 
again l".turned to a J:t'edera tion by the repeal of De cree NO. 3 42 
and the Government once again assumed the name Federal Military 
Government and position before the Decree No. 34 was promul-
gated. The problem which this change raises is whether all 
the Decrees promulgated under the National Military Goveromen. 
could be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated. A positive 
answer would make nonsense of Con8titutional government as 
this would mean that a cbange of Government at any time would 
automatically put all the laws of the old Government into 
abeyance until they are either specifically adopted or re-
enacted by the new Government. The answer to the problem must, 
therefore, be in the negative. 
On 14th April, 1967, the Government of ~e8tern Nigeria 
passed the Public Officers and Other Persons (Investigation 
of Assets) Edict, 1967.3 This Edict eovees the 8ame groUDd 
as the Decree NO. 51 of 1966 of the National Military Govern-
ment, and 1n fact, certain sections of the Edict were in direct 
1. Decree No. 51 of 1966. 
2. By Decree NO. 59 of 1966. 
3. Edict No.5 of 1967. 
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conflict with some pro~isions of the ~cree. It was by virtue 
of this Edict that the Appellaats in this case had the Order 
made against them by the ~hairman of the Tribunal. 
The Attorney-General of western btate, whilst admitting 
that the Edict covered the same field as the veccee and that 
there were inconsistencies with the Decree, sought to show 
that at the time the ~dict was enacted, the vecree had DO 
force as a Decree in the western Region. He argued that the 
cumulative effect of uecree NO. 34 and 59 of 1966 was to make 
vecree NO. 51 unrecognisable. What he was, in effect, say1ng 
was that theconstitutional changes in the country during the 
period had affected the operation of the Decree. I have 
already pointed out why this conclusion is unacceptable. The 
chang~s made by the various vecrees did not at'any time 
deprive the Federal Military Government of its right to legis-
late as the ~upreme Legislative ~ody. The Decree ~o. 51 was, 
therefore, still the only exhaustive and exclusive code a8 to 
what was the Law governing the Investigation of Assets of 
~ublic Officers, throughout the country. It follows then that 
any other law made by any other Region on the same subject 
is void. 
That was the conclusion arrived at by the supreme 
Court when it rejected the decision of the High COurt (Western 
Hegion) and held that the ~dict was ultra vires tbe oecree of 
Jf'ederal Military Government. 
TO go back a little bit in time, after the Judgment 
of the High uourt, the appellaats appealed as4iBst the judgaeDt 
to the western state court of Appeal. 
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While this appeal was pending, the i"ederal Military 
Government promulgated tt~ee oecreeswhich in effect confirmed 
the judgment and went further to reassert the point that no 
decision of any tribunal of inquiry shall be subjected to 
judicial review. These oecree were, The Investigatian of 
1 Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Decree 1968 , the 
Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and other persons) 
2 Amendment uecree 1968, and the Forfeiture of Assets (valida-
tion) Decree, 19683 • The first of those uecrees, uecree ~o. 
37 of 1968, repealed both Decree NO. 51 of 1966 and Edict NO. 
5 of 1967 as from the 29th July, 1968. 4 
Section 14l2) of oecree No. 37 provides that tbe repeal 
of any enactment or law by this Decree shall not affect any 
Order, notice or other documents made or thing whatsoever done 
under the provisions of any enactment or law bereby repealed 
and every such order, notice shall continue or have atfect by 
virtue of this vecree. ~ection l4l2) while validating every-
~~~ thing that had been done .. by the tribunal of inquiry set up 
under ~dict No.5 also ensured the continued existence of the 
tribunal of inquiry. ~ection 12 ou.ts the jurisdiction of the 
court in challenging the validity of aaytaing do.e under tbe 
vecree or any enactment or otber law repealed by tbis Decree. 
The circumstances under which any such thing had been done 
shall not be inquired into in any court of Law, and. accqrdingly, 
nothing in the provisions of chapter III of the Constitution 
lthe Provisions deal ina with fundamental human rights) shall 
1. Decree "0. 37 of 1968. 
2. oecree ~Oi 43 of 1968. 
3. Decree No. 45 of 1968. 
4. The repealed laws are the contentious Ones upon which the 
Judge of the High Court was called upon to adjudicate and 
upon which the appeal was pending. 
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apply in relation to any matter ar~s1ng out of this uecree 
or out of any enact.ent or other law ~epealed by this Decree. 
The'~effect of section 14 is that although, sub-section (1) 
repeals Edict No.5 of 1967, under sub-section (2), the 
Tribunal of Enquiry about which this complaint arose is to 
conUinue its function, and all orders already made by it are 
validated and are to continue to operate. On the other hand, 
the effect of Section 12 is that despite the provisions as to 
FUndamental Human Rights in Chapter III of the Constitution, 
validity of Orders, notices and directions made should Dot be 
iDquired into !!r..",'f!7 ~!>~ .¥~~~;.ftion l(b) of 
Decree No. 4'~~gatne juri~d~ction of the Court. 
But a few days later, perhaps the most important of 
these Deerees, was promulgated. Decre. No. 45. section 1(1) 
validates all Orders specified in the schedule. 
section 1(2) refers specifically to Edict No. 5 ef 1967 
(Western state) and validates the Order by which the proper-
ties of the appellants were attached. 
section 1(3) provides a general cover validating all 
other Orders, notices or documents made or given or anything 
done by virtue of any anac:tments wi thin the conteilplation of 
the Decree NO. 45. 
section 2(1) brought back the exclusion of the jurisdiC-
tion of the Courts 10 questioning the validity~f any thins 
done or powers exercised by virtue of the enactment eontemp-
late by the Decree No. 45. 
And Section 2(2) which is perhaps moat significant shuts 
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out completely any proceedings pending in Court either at 
NISI PRIU or on APPEAL, in any Court whatsoever, with respect 
to matters contemplated by the Decree. Such prOceedings shall 
abate as from the date of commencement of the Decree. 
Applying this to the case, the section would thus have 
shut out the appeal filed on the 27th day of December, 1967 
in the western ~tate court of Appeal. Hence, the filing of 
a notice of preliminary objection by the western state Govern-
ment to the effect that the western state Court of Appeal 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. After hearing 
arguments on the ousting of its jurisdiction, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the validity of the Decree and declared itself 
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It was against this 
judgment that an appeal was lodged to the supreme Court. 
Essentially, therefore, the appeal was to determine the 
validity of the Decree No. 45. 
The Supreme Court held that the Decree was ultra vires 
the Constitution because it infringed the judicial power. 
The Court said, 
"It ••••••••. the Government, however well-
meaning, fell into the error of passing 
legislation which specifically in effect, 
passed judgment and inllicted punishment 
or in other words eroded to the jurisdiction 
of the Courts, in a manner that the dignity 
and freedom of the individual, once assured, 
are taken away, the Courts must intervene. 
Decree No. 45 of 1968 was not in form of 
an alteration of any existing law but it was 
clearly a legislative sentence and the Decree 
was spent on the persons named in the Schedule. 
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we must point out that those who took over the 
Government of this country in 1966 never for a moment 
intended to rule but by the constitution. They did, 
in fact, recognise the separation of powers and never 
intended an intrusion on the judiciary. section 3(1) 
of the Decree No. 1 of 1966 does not envisage performance 
of legislative functions as a weapon for exercise of 
judicial powers, nor was it intended that the Federal 
Military Govern_ent should, in its power to enact 
Decrees, exceed the requirements or demands .f the 
necessity of the case. In thepresent case we are satis-
fied that Decree No. 45 of 1968 did go beyond tbe nece-
ssity of the occasion •••••••••• It purported to abate 
all action and appeals pending before any Court. In 
short, it stops the pending appeal of the appellants 
in the western state court of App •• l.'~fwe have come 
to the conclusion that this Decree ia noth1.g short 
of legislative j~gment, an exercise of judicial 
power. It is in our view ultra vires and inyalid." 
In his argument before the court, the Attorney-General 
for the western state said that what took place in January, 
1966 was a revolution and the Federal Military Government 
is a revolutionary Government which seized power on 15th 
'" January, 1966. It accordingly has an unfettered right from 
the start to rule by force and by .eans of Decrees and 
therefore nothing from the Republican Constitution of 1963 
can be implied into the new moae of ruling the country; 
that section 3(1) of Decree No. 1 of 1966 gave the Federal 
Military Government unlimited power of legislation on any 
subject either by Decree or by part of the Constitution which 
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has not been abrogated. In short, his submission was that there 
was nothing in the Constitution which can make a Decree void. 
He further submitted that once a document purporting to be a 
Decree is Signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government, 
it cannot be challenged and no Court has any jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on its validity. 
Tbe Counsel for the appellants, Chief Williams, submitted 
that the Federal Military Government is not a revolutionary 
Government but a constitutional interim Government, which came 
into being by the wishes of the representatives of the people, 
and whose object is to uphold the Constitution, excepting so 
far as it had to derogate from it under the doctriDe of nece-
ssity whereby it was granted power. Th~~ tbe Federal 
Military Governw~nt assures the continued existeDce of tbe 
Constitution and in its Decree No.1 of 1966 impliedly 
provided for a separation of powers between the legislative, 
the executive and the judiciary as did tae constitution of 
Nigeria; that this m~t be perpetuated unless necessity other-
wise arose compelling it under ::;ection 3 of Decree No. 1 of 
1966 to make laws by Decree "for the peace, order and good 
governllent of Nigeria on any mat1ll8r wbatsoever." This power, 
it was submitted, must not be read as an unfettered power to 
legislate to amend the Constitution save in so far as properly 
justified by the doctrine of aecassity. FUrther, that a 
Decree prevails over the constitution only to tbe exten.t .that 
the Decree, if otherwise properly made, could aMend the 
lX)nstitution. l"in811y, that Decree No. 45 of 1968 was a lec1da-
tive act which impigned lIpon the spher-e ot the judiciary and-
to that extent invalid as an executive interference into the 
sphere of the judie~ary. 
. -, 
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when the Army assumed Government,l following the coup2 
of ~anuary 1966, the first of the legislative enactments of 
the Federal Military 60vernment was the constitution (Suspen-
sion and Modification) Decree, 1966,3 which empowered the 
new Government to make laws for tne peace, order and good 
Government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to 
any matter Whatsoever!. And in section 6 of the same 
Decree, it was provided that no court of law shall have the 
power to entertain any question as to the validity of any 
.l)ecree or Edict. 
It is evident from these sections that the Federal 
Military Government was empowered to legislate for the whole 
of ~igeria and that its powers are no way derogatory to the 
powers that ...... Parliament had under ~. 69 of the Republican 
Constitution, 1963. The power conferred by the uecree No. I 
is qui te clear. The F'ederal Military Governmen t could rule 
by uecree to any extent, it could legislate as it thought 
fit and could suspend or modify portion of the Constitution. 
On assumption of power, the I"ederal Military Government could 
have chosen to set aside the Republican constitution comple-
tely and replace it with another, or rule without any consti-
tution whatsoever. 5 AS the western state court of Appeal 
said, " A new legislative power was created which doe8 not 
1. See Government Notice NO. 148 of 26th Jaauary, 1966. 
2. It is the opinion of the present writer that it was a . 
'coup' in spite of the fictitional 'banding over' of Govern-
ment by tbe council of Ministers to the Head of the Arm" 
~orces. ~ven if the event was mereLy AD army mat1ny, it 
was clear that the civiliaaacould not contain it and the 
army who could contain it were prepared to do so only if 
the CivilianS abdicated power. The Civilians ha4 8e eh.iee. 
Hence, there waa a forcible substitution of a new fo~m of 
Government. 
3. vecree No.1, 1966. 
4. Section 3 
5. bee T.O.Elias, "The Nigerian crisis in International LawM-
a paper read at the conference of the Nigerian bociety of 
International Law in March, 1970. 
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derive its authority from any provision of the pre-existing 
~onstitution.ul 
Wben there is a revolution, bowever, either in the form 
of a change of uovernment by force as in the Obote 'coup· of 
1966 in Uganda or in the form of an armed rebellion against 
the civilian regime as in the three western African countries 
of Ghana, Nigeria and ~ierra-Leone, the constitution is 
initially suspended and, therefore, all the fUndamental human 
rights provisions go into abeyance. The new regime autbo-
rises itself to legislate by decree on any matter without 
need or necessity to ensure that such measures are 'reasonably 
justifia'le'. The validity of such decrees can not be 
challenged in any Court on the groUnd that they infringe the 
individual'. fundamental right and the possibility of sucb 
a challenge is avoided by the terms of the Decree. For 
example, it is provided in the ~tate ~ecurity (Detention of 
Persons) Decree ~o. 3 of 1966 of Nigeria that the fundamaat. 
human rights chapter of the constitution tCbapter III) shall 
be suspended and also the rights of a detainee to apply for 
a Writ of Habeas corpus. l However, provision is made for an 
ordinary tribunal to review the case of any detainee. 2 And 
there is no doubt that action taken in excess of statutory 
powers would entitle the aggrieved party to judicial remedy.3 
1. sections 4 - 6. ~ee also Ghana's N. L. C. protective 
custody Decree NO.2, 1966. 
2. to the provision made in the S. 30 of the 
respect of a detainee during a period of 
3. see 
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The fiction, of 'handing over' of the reigp of goverm-
ment by the remnant of the defunct civilian regime to the 
military personnel does not imply that the military took over 
only on condition that they ruled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Con*titution. If that were so, there would 
be no basis or justification for the Decree No.1, 1966. 
Since the Supreme Court does not doubt the validity of that 
decree, it is difficult to see how they can come to the 
conclusion that the power of the ~'ederal Military Government 
to legislate during the period of the emergency must be 
circumscribed by the doctrine of necessity. 
The learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the 
object of the Military Government is to uphold the Constitu-
tion excepting in so far as necessity arose for it to derogate 
from the COnstitution. Approving of this, the supreme Court 
said that the Military Government made it clear that only 
certain sections of the Constitution would be suspended. But 
this statement cannot be used to justify any legal limitatian 
or fetter on the Federal Military GOvernment. If a Government 
has a power to suspend part of the constitution - and the 
supreme Court does not deny this - then it follows that it 
has the power to suspend the whole of the constitution. The 
mere fact that it did not do so immediately, probably-tor 
administrative convenience, does not t.ply that it should be 
assumed that it would Dot do so, when it considers that the 
occasion bas 8Jrisen to do so. 
Tbe Supre.e Court says that "It 1s wren, to expect that 
Constitution .ust *-ke provis1oDa for all Emergencies. Ne 
Constitution can antiCipate all tbe different forms of 
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phenomena which may beset a Nation."l This is quite acceptable 
but when an emergency such as cannot be anticipated by the 
constitution arises, there is no reason why the ambit of the 
Constitution should be artificially stretched to accommodate 
•• ch a situation. Particularly when such a "reading into" 
the Constitution would result in the chaos and instability 
which the Constitution seeks to protect. The change of 
Government such as happened on 15, January, 1966 was such as 
was not anticipated by our constitution,but both the remnant 
of the civilian regime and the Head of the Armed Forces who 
agreed to take over power of GOvernment tried to create the 
impression that they were acting in accordance with the 
Constitution. This could not have been, because as already 
mentioned the Constitution neither envisage. nor provides for 
a change in this manner, and therefore the Military GOvern-
ment must have derived its legislative authority from source 
or sources outside the Constitution. 
The issue of the validity of the Federal Military Govern-
ment and of its legislative measures bave been before our 
Courts before. Aside from the court of Appeal .t tbe 
western state's decision in the present ease ia which that 
Court upheld the validity of Decr.e No. 45; there are the 
cases of 0tanlesi and Ors. v. Attoroel-General oltha 
Federation and the supreme Court decision in Adamelek .. v. 
The Council of the university of Ibadan. 3 In the qgunlesi 
case, two Decrees of the Federal Military Goveroment, by 
which the salaries of certain grades of public corporations' 
staff were reduced, were challenged as being ultra vires 
1. S. C. 58/69 (unreported). 
2. (1970) L.D/28/69 (Unreported). 
3. (1967) S.C.378/1966 (Unreported). 
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the Federal Government which took over from the civilian 
Government which it overthrew and which could not therefore 
exercise legislative powers in excess of those laid down in 
the pre-existing Constitution of 1963, since suspended and 
modified by Decree No.1. The High Court of Lagos state 
held that the two Decrees - the statutory corporations 
(Salaries and Allowances etc) Decree, 1968 and the statutory 
Corporations Service Decree 1968, were valid as being intra 
vires the Federal Military Government whose Decrees can 
over-ride the Constitution. In Adamolekun's case, the 
supreme court held that the Courts cannot question the vires 
of the Federal Military Government "in making a Decree or 
an Edict on the ground that there is no legislative autho-
rity to make one. The stand point of the supre.e Court on 
the present time is therefore, to say the least, most 
untenable. 
The Federal Military Govamnment was, therefore, forced 
into a position where it had to restate its right to un-
fettered and UD~imited legislative competence by promul-
gating, a few days after the judgment, a Decreel by which 
the Courts of Law are barremfrom entertaining any question 
as to the validity of a Decree and also an Edict wbich is 
not inconsistent with a Decree; and that if any such 
decision had been given, it shall be void and of ,0. et£ect. 
, ~," " ." 
, . . l ~ ~ .A-
This is the type of inevitability which reaaltslro. an 
open confrontatien between the judiciary and the lesls1atar •• 
It has been earlier submitted tbat such should be kept to a 
1. Federal Military Goveenment lSupremaey and Enforcement 
of Powers) Decree NO. 28 of 1970. 
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minimum in any democratic government, because the interest 
of the citizen which is sought to be protected usually is in 
more danger when the legislature is made to feel that its 
authority is being threatened by the judiciary under the 
guise of protecting the citizen's rights. The unfortunate 
part of it all is that the jutticiary may find itself un-
supported by the vast majority of reasoned opinion within the 
~tate, as actually was the position in this instance. 
An editorial in one of the Nigeria daily newspapers l 
captioned "Laws and ::super Laws", gives a pithy summary of the 
whole conflict. It reads, 
"In declaring null and void the "'ederal Decree NO. 
45 of 1968 and western ::sta,te Edict No.5 of 1967, 
the ::supreme court took its stand on a banana skin. 
And not surprisingly, it has been helped to slip. 
This, unfortunately has the effect of weakening the 
authority of the Judiciary as a whole. No ODe, 
including the Federal Military GOvernment, should 
rejoice about this. The concept of the rule of law 
has taken a great deal of bashing in the couatry. 
It cannot take much more. 
Hut the ::supreme court has itself to blame. The 
Federal Military Government arsues that by nullifying 
the forfeiture of stolen public money, the Court did 
"give the impression that fraud is being encoaraged 
by legal technicalities. n we cannot but agree with 
this. The ::supreme court,choGse a singularly i.-
appropriate and unpopular measure on which to 
challenge the authority of GOvernment. It cannot 
expect syapathy from any quarters OD tkis particular 
issue. There is no doubt as to who is responsible 
for ensuring the atability of this Coantry. The 
decision of the Supreme court i& declaring Decrees 
and ~dicts enll and void was one that threatened to 
undermine the stability of the countrY.M 
1. See New Nigerian, Tuesday, l~ MaY, 1970. 
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The problem of judicial interpretation is to hold a just 
middle way between excess of valour and excess of caution. 
while judicial timidity may be failure of the judicial oath, 
a too daring exposition merely aggravates the areas of con-
flict between the arms of Government, to the ultimate detri-
ment of the individual's rights. 
GHANa'S APPROACH TO PREVENTIVE DETENTION , 
The legality of the Governor-General's order for detention, 
and from July 1, 1960, when Ghana became a Republic, the 
President's order for detention, has been repeatedly and fear-
lessly tested by Counsel in courts by application for writs 
of habeas cODpus. Thus in the case of He Okine and 42 ors,l 
the High Court refused to make an order. Mr Justice smith, 
said in his judgment delivered on January 10, 1959. 
"The Preventive uetention Order sets out that the 
Governor-General is satisfied that it is necessary 
to make the detention order in question. It is 
signed, as I have said, by the Minist~ of Defence: 
there is nothing against his signing this order 
either in law or in the circumatances of this case. 
Ttte question of this necessity of making the order 
at all is not for the court to considee ••••• it also 
appears well established that where a staiute requires 
only tbat a Minister sball be 'satisfied' tbat certain 
action is aecessary the effect 18 'Virtually to 
exclude all judicial review on the around tbat 
Ministerial action taken under (such) autbority is 
purely administrative'. Many cases and authorities 
have been cited in support of this. In Land Reali-
sation c. Ltd~ v. P. M. G. (1950) 1. Ch. p. 434 at p. 
1. (1960) G. L. R. 84. 
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445. Lord Romer said: 'It is well settled that where 
a statutory provision empowers a Minister to do some-
thing if he is satisfied with regard to a certain state 
of affairs then a statement by him that he is so satis-
fied will be accepted by these courts n • l 
On April 21, 1961, the Hig8 ~ourt gave a ruling in another 
detention case: the case of Van dee pujie & 4 ors.2 The 
submissions by the applicants for the release of the detainees 
were based on ~y grounds, the chief of which are: 
(1) The grounds upon which the applicants weee 
detained alleged the commission of offences 
punishable under the criminal code ana .iDce 
the Preventive oetention Act waS a preventive 
and not a punitive Act the orders made by the 
President were punitive and therefore ultra vires. 
(ii) By sec.39 of the Magna ~arta the detention violated 
the bulwark of the liberty of the citizen. 
(iii) Under the Habeas ~orpus Act, 1861, Sec. 3, the 
~ourt should have inquired into the truthfulness 
of the facts set out in the grounds. 
The Court rejected all these grounds and refused tne 
application. In the course of a lucid judgment Mr. Justice 
Ol]enu, maintained that the essentials for a valid order made 
under Sec. 2(1) of the Preventive Detention Act were:-
"(i) Tbat the person agai~t whom the order 1s 
made must be a citizen of Ghana, in other 
words question of nationality and jurisdiction; 
1. Ibid. p. 86. 
2. (1961) G. L. R. 733. 
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(ii) the identity of the person; 
(iii) satisfaction of the President that the order is 
necessary to prevent, i.e. the good faith of the 
President". He went on: 
"A number of cases local and English were cited to me by 
both sides and I have given careful consideration to everyone 
of them. Tbe majority of the English cases are based'upon 
the interpretation of regulation l8B of the English Det.nce 
(General) Regulation, 1939, the relevant part of that regula-
tion is as follows:-
"If the secretary of state has reasonable cause 
to believe a person to be of hostile origin etc 
and that by reason thereof it is necessary to 
exercise control over him, he may make an order 
against that person directing that he be detained." 
-
"It is important to observe in contrast with this regula-
tion that Sec.2(1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not 
prescribe any special premise which should lead the President 
to the satisfaction upon which alone he could make the Order. 
The President is the sole Judge of his satisfaction and the 
grounds for it, once he says .. he is satisfied that an order 
is necessary for one or other of,the purposes laid down in the 
section, his satisfaction cannot be questioned unless bis bona 
fides is challenged. Of-course, if there •• ee a way, apart 
from his own assertion of determining whether or not be was in 
fact satisfied before he made the Order, that would bave been 
, ' j 
a proper matter for enquiry into, because if it is shown that 
he was not in fact satisfied, tbe order would be invalid. In 
this regard, I share in the views of Lord Atkin expressed in 
his minority speech in the case of Liveesidle v. Anderson 
(1941) All E. R. 338 at 349-363, and I would apply it to tbis 
" I case •••••••••••• 
1. Ibid. p. 742. 
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~vhen the Act was again challenged the Supreme Court of 
Accra, which became the final Court of Appeal in the new 
Ghana Constitution of 1960 gave judgment in the appeal of 
Akoto and ors l from the decision of the High Court in which 
an application for release by writ of habeas corpus had been 
refused. 
Baffoi Osei Akoto, Senior Linguist to the As.thene and 7 
others were detained pursuant to the provisions of the Preven-
tive Detention Act, 1958, on the grounds that the Governar-
General was satisfied that they had acted in a manner pr&-
judicial to the security of the state. writs of Habeas 
corpus having been refused by the High court, the detainees 
appealed against the refusal to the Supreme court. The 
appellants advanced, inter alia, the contention that the 
Preventive Detention Act was invalid because it was in 
canilict with the provisions of Ar~. 13(1) of the CODsti-
tution. 2 
Tbe court held that preventive detention could not be 
deem~d unconstitutional in itself, since the Constitution 
has expressly authorised legislation providing for it. And 
by its very nature, preventive detentioD did not adait of 
laying down any 'objective standards' of conduct warniag the 
citizen what be must do or avoid doiac in order to keep his 
liberty. Therefore, the argument against the operative 
section of the Preventive Detention Act, namely, that it 
left determination of the 'necessity' of making the order of 
detention to the 'subjective satisfaction' of tbe executive 
must fail. a FUrthermore, the provision of Art 13(1), it was 
1. (1161) p. L. R. 523. 
2. Op. cit. President's declaration of human rights. 
3. Note Kania C.J. Gokpalan v. state of Madras A.I.R. 1950 
S.C. at p. 43 "It is clear tnat no .uch obJective standard 
of conduct can be prescribed, except as layiag down 
conduct tending to achieve or to avoio a particular 
object." 
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held, did Dot create legal obligations enforceable by a Court 
of Law. The only concession that the Court wou~d make in 
favour of human freedom against the executive was to agree that 
where the grounds of detention are made known, though these 
are not justiciable yet they would be prepared to enquire 
whether the grounds are sufficiently detailed to enable a 
detainee to present his case for review to the tribunal 
provided for by the Act. 
The Court emphasised that it would not consider itself 
authorised to scrutinise whether that 'grounds' are 'suffi-
cient' to justify the detention, such de.ermi~ation being 
left to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. 
Thus in Ghana, the Preventive Detention Act seems to have 
been equated to the English nefence Regulation 18S. The 
dec is Dons would seem to represent the low water-mark for 
human liberty. It need hardly be said tbat preventive 
detention is a detetable evil and the very nelation of liberty, 
but the Courts, who are supposed to be the guardians of the 
citizen's rights, should not have denied themselves the 
authority to go into the reasonableness of the actual 
detention especially where the petitioner seeks to establish 
mala fides on the part of the detaining authority. 
As there is no decision yet on the Tanzanian legislatj,on, 
it would be wroD8 to prejudie *hat the a.ttitude of the Court 
would be or to assuae that it would necessarily. follow the 
lines of Ghana. But perhaps the opi.ion of one ot the Judges, 
in fact the ~hief Justice'of Ube High Court would seem to be 
somewhat indicative. He wrote: 
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"It should be noted unlike many of the newly inde-
pendenC countries, the Constitution of Tanzania 
does not set out a declaration of human right •• 
Where that is done, the Courts would normally have 
the jurisdiction to procure on legislation and to 
declare it invalid where it infringed any of the 
enumerated rights. It may well be that the High 
Court of Tanzania bas no such power. It seems 
unlikely that the Courts would seek such a role 
though it could be urged tbat they could legiti-
mately pronounce against any law which patently 
cut across any of the arms for which the consti-
tution has been established. l 
GENERAL 
In mo~t countries, there is usually a spate of proceedings 
brought to challenge an Act of the Legislature alleging that 
the impugned Act is contrary to the fundamental rights and un-
constitutional. Tbe Constitutional duty of a Court in such 
a case is still subject of controversy. The Courts, it haa 
been suggested, should on occasion when it 1s seized of a case 
in which infringement ofa fundamental right is alleged, 
firstly to think of the Act not as that passed by individual 
legislators some of whom he may not share their views, but as 
the Act of the Legislature - the great continuous body it.elf, 
abstracted from all the transitory individuals who maT b8ppeo 
to hold its power.2 Thus "to set aside the acts of such a 
1. "The Court in a one-party-state" - Tanzania 1n W"rtcl. \odaj.Vot-ll.· 
For Preventive detention action must be taken on good suspi-
cion. It is a subjective test based on the cumulative effeit 
of difterent actions, perhaps' spread over a considerable 
period. As observed by Lord Finlay in The King v.Halliday 
(1917) A.C. 260 at 269 (86 L.J.K.B.1119) a COurt Is tbe 
least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whe-
ther circumstances of suspicion exist warranting the restra-
int of a person." 
2. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting opinion in west Virginia 
state Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 699 
body , representing in its own field, which is the very highest 
of all, the ultimate sovereign, should be a solemn, unusual and 
painful act. tiomething is wrong when it can ever be other 
than that."l 
However, "it does not necessarily follow that because the 
Legislature bas passed a law that every provision of that law 
is reasonably justifiable.,,2 Tbe presumption of the Consti-
tutionality of statutes is based on the premises that the 
Legislature represents the people and as such would not prima 
facie wish to exercise its power illegitimately. The basis of 
this presumption is questionable for there is no warrant for 
saying that the Legislature, in making laws, always bas the 
interest of the people at heart. At best, it may represent 
the views of the majority, but what of the minority which 
might be substantial. And even then the interest of the 
majority may be and often is in conflict with that of the 
minority. The application of the preaumptioD to laws alleged 
to contravene fundamental rights whether guaranteed in the 
~onstitution or by common law is indefensible. It is primarily 
to pre~ent minorities being oppressed by the majority that 
the rights are entrenched in the constitution, but the opera-
tion of this presumption is bound to affect their efficacy. 
It is gratifying to Dote that the Nigerian Courts in parti-
cular haye not completely sacrifised the guar .. teed rights to 
the presumption, particularly in the difficult circ~ta.c.s 
of an emergency. 
1. Ibid at 670. 
2. ~ee Bate J. in ~heranci v. cheranci Ope cit: 
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liThe Lourts have been appointed santinels to watch over 
the fundamental righis secured to the people {of Nigeria) by 
the Constitution, and to guard against infringement of those 
rights by the ~tate. If the courts are to be effective 
guardians, then the Judges must not only act with self-
restraint and due respect for the judgment of the Legislature, 
but they must also use their own impartiality without undue 
regard for either the claim of the citizen of the state. Hl 
During a period of emergency, Governments operate in an 
atmosphere of haste and urgency and the range of judicial 
obstructionist interpretation of their activities they would 
allow vary. Thus, in Nigeria and Uganda, for example, .~ 
any alleged infringement of rights by emergency measure may 
be subject of judicial review, and while Ghana has not 
specifically excluded review, the TaDzania preventive 
Detention Act, 1962, specifically excluded judicial review. 
There must be an acceptable compromise of equipose. The 
EXecutive might argue that it is objectionable that the views 
of the judges as to what the constitution means should be 
allowed to thwart the will of the people AS expressed through 
their representatives in the legislature, 2 as it was done in 
Nigeria at the time of the western crisis in 1962. 3 
After an Ibadan High Court had ruled that chief 
Williaas, one of those restricted on the Administrator's 
Order, could Dot appear as counsel in the case of Akint.la 
v. Governpr of western Region of Ni,eria~4 the defendants 
decided to retain Mr. Dingle Foot, a British Q. C. But 
1. Bate J. in £heranci v. Cheranci Ope cit. ~.p 2B 
2. Wheare, K. C~ Federal Government(3rd Edn.) p. 67. 
3. See: Odumosu: The Nigerian Constitution (1963) p. 290. 
4. (1962) W.N.L.R. 158. A case which came to the privy 
Council. see (1963) A. C. 314. 
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shortly after his arrival in Nigeria with Mr. colthorpe, 
a Solicitor also from Britain, an expulsion order was served 
on them to leave the country within 24 hours. NO official 
reason was given, but the time limit on, the order was 
waived to enable Hr. Foot to make his submissions to the 
Federal Supreme Court on the constitutional issues referred 
to it from the Ibadan High Court. commenting on the expul-
sion of ~~. Dingle Foot from Nigeria, a Regional premier 
stated that it was left to the Administrator o£ western 
Nigeria to use the powers conferred on him by the Emergency 
Powers Regulations, 1962 to put a scop to the "legal 
quibbles" designed to flout the legally established dec,ision 
of the Federal Government on the matter. He said: 
"There is emergency in a part of the country 
and you don't need to fumble in court in such 
a situation. If there were an emergency in 
Britain, would any Nigerian Lawyers be allowed 
into Britain to challenge the authority of the 
British Parliament in declaring a state of 
emergency? I think this democracy of ours 
is being misinterpreted". 1 
As a Commentator has said: 
"to some people, being bound by the Constitution 
is bearable but being bound by what somebody 
saysthe Constitution means is not bearable ... 2 
1. Quoted in west A£rican Pilot, JUDe 4, 1962 p. 5 as 
cited by Odumosu OPe cit. 
2. Black Jnr. The people and the constitution. (1960) p. 13 
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It is however, necessary that the court should not be regarded 
as an institution which attempts on~ to obstruct the Govern-
ment in the execution of its policy; and therefore as 
expressed in the classical exposition of Chief Justice 
ftlarShall,l "There should be no misunderstanding as to the 
function of the Court. It is sometimes said that the Court 
assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the 
people's representatives. This is a misconception. The 
constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and 
established by the people. When an act of the congress is 
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to 
the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the 
Government has only one duty - to lay the article of the 
Constitution wbich is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter square with the 
former. All the Court, dO~b and can do, is to announce its 
considered judgement upon the question. The only power it 
has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. 
This Court neither approves nor condemns aoy,legislatiIe 
policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain 
and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with or 
in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution, and 
baving done that, its duty ends". Its duty must end there 
because as Cooley bas stated:-
1. Marbury v. Madison (1803) 1 cranch. cited by Mr. 
Justice Owen Roberts in United states v. Butter 297 U.S. 
I at 62. 
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liThe legislative and judicial are co-ordinate 
departments of the Government; of equal dignity 
each is alike supreme in the exercise of its 
proper functions~ and cannot directly or in-
directly, while acting within the limits of its 
authority be subjected to the conirol or super-
vision of the other, without an unwarrantable 
assumption by that other power which, by the 
Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The 
Constitution apportions the powers of the 
Government, but it does not make anyone of the 
three departments subordinate to another, when 
exercising the trust committed to it."l 
But even both these eminent writers must agree that in 
declaring a law uncoD&itutional, a court must nec •• aarily 
cover the same ground which has already been covered by the 
legislative department in deciding upon the propriet.r of 
enacting the law and they must indirectly over-rule the 
decision of that 'co-ordinate' department. The task is a 
delicate one and made more invidious by conditions of emer-
gency when every constitutional issue may bear the tinge of 
political power, particularly in Africa where the emergency 
powee of detention and restriction has become a punitive 
rather than a preventive measure. 
While the representatives of the people should be in a 
position to decide when a state of emergency exists and it 
may be undesirable that such matters should be made subject of 
eviaence in a Court of Law, the task of safeguarding the COn-
1. Constitutional Interpretation (8th Edn) p. 332. 
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stitution and thereby the citizen's rights should not also 
be left entirely to the '. reftresentati ves of the people. 
There must be an arbiter to scrutinise laws and measures 
taken under them to see whether they are constitutionally 
justi.fiable. 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
Having considered the scope of judicial review of 
emergency powers, one must agree' that any court saddled 
with this function is saddled with an immense and onerous 
responsibility; also that the successful accomplishment of 
this vital responsibility uncompromisingly calls for such 
a Court manned by Judges of the highest calibre, strictly 
impartial independent and cour.geous. Those responsible 
.for the administration of justice should Dot be inter.fered 
with in carrying out this great task. They should be in a 
position that would ensure impartiality and therefore they 
should be insulated from politics; Thus bir Winston 
Churchill said: 
"The principle of complete independence of 
the judiciary from the EXecutive is the 
foundation of many things," •.•.••••••• 
and Professor ~charwz is equally certain *hat judicialinde-
pendence is largely dependent upon the type o.f person who 
are called to serve, thus, 
" ••••• The quality of justice depends more upon 
the quality of the men who administer the :! ~ 
law than on the content of the law they admInister. 
Unless those apPointed to the Bench are competent 
and upright and!rree to judge without fear or 
favour, a judicial system, however sound ita 
structure may be on ~aper, is bound to fudction . 
poorly in practice." 
1. American constitutional Law (1955) p. 130. 
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Nonetheless, one must necessarily be concerned with the Ipaperl 
safeguards of judicial independence perhaps to the same extent 
if not more than the 'morality' of each individual appointee. 
~ir Kenneth Roberts - wray writing about the independence 
of the judiciary in the Commonwealth countries states: 
"To the question how the independence of the 
judiciary is preserved I suggest a four-fold answer: 
first, by appropriate machinery for appointment of 
Judges; secondly, by giving Judges security of office; 
thirdly, by such general acceptance of, and respect 
for judicial iQdependence that the members of the 
Judiciary can rest assured that it is not likely to 
be challenged and bas not continually to be fought 
for; fourthly, by the terms of service of members of 
the judiciary ... l It is now left to consider the 
efficea.cy of these factors in ensuring judicial independence. 
Sonstitutionscreate organs of government with defined 
functions allocated to each. The underlying belief is that each 
organ shall be able to fulfil its functions without hindrance 
and would, in its turn, let others fulfil theirs with the same 
degree of freedom. The executive controls the use of force, 
members of the legislature are invested with privileges that 
they may ~e better able to discharge their duties. To the same 
end, the judicial branch of government - under whatever politi-
cal system - is in need of a special protection from possible 
interference by the other branches of government as well &8 
from intimidation by ordinary citizens. How far the Constitu-
tion should provide for an independent judici~y has not always 
been a settled ~ of dispute. 
1. See Ch~ng Law in Developing countries 
Anderson at p. 63. 
edited by J. N. D. 
-284-
APPOINTMENTS 
Opinions are sharply divided as to whether the manner by 
which a judge is ~pointed could afterwards influence him in 
the discharge of his duties. l The stuart Kings picked their 
supporters as Judges but were subseqoently disappointed that 
some of the latter took an independent line in time of political 
crisis. Up till now judges in aritain, who by all accounts are 
among the most independent in the world, are appointed by the 
executive though the convention is fairly settled that the 
appointing Prime Ninister and the LOrd Chancellor would ignore 
political considerations when making an appointmeDt. 
When it is pointed out that the Lord Chancellor, the bead 
of the judiciary, is a cabinet Ministar and appointed OD the 
advice of the Prime Ministee, that, therefore, the judiciary is 
not completely tree of the executive, then it is not sUrprisingly 
that Professor de ~mith declared: 
"In England judicial independence is maintained 
i~ spite of rather than because of the rules 
governing apPointmeots"2 
Professor de ~mith went on to argue vigorously against the un-
diluted export of the westminstar appointment procedure to a new 
emergent commonwealth country. There should be a presumption 
against leaving the power of appointments entirely in the ;'" ,~ 
hands of the EXecutive in such a case, be ~d because: 
"Even when the goyernDlent bas a tull appreciation 
of the need for maintaining public confidence in 
the administration' ot justice and -endea".urs;. to 
exclude all considerations otller-than professi-onal 
1. ,It'or a survey of the methods adopted in the leading Countries 
of the world. see Marsh "Working papel: OD the Rule of Law io 
a Free Society pp. 281-88. 
~. New Commonwealth and its ~onstitutionaat p. 137. 
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re~utation and personal qualities in making 
its choice, it will have a strong incentive 
to give undue weigh' to the political inclinations 
of potential candidates. For Juages who have the 
power to determine the constitutionality of legis-
lation can seriously impede the implementation of 
political policies, they can cause a Government to 
lose momentum and lose face, they can become (per-
haps to their own embarrassment) the darlings of 
the opposition. If it is too much, in such 
circumstances, to deny the executive any voice 
in judicial appointments, there is nevertheless 
a strong case for limiting the range of temptation." 
But since all the newly independent ~tates of Africa 
within the Commonwealth were recently emancipated from 
British Rule, it is obvious that the Constitutional provision. 
must have been influenced, .to a varying degree by the 
westminster procedure. In these states, three braod appoint-
ment procedures are discernible. 
(a> The COmprom1se procedure; 
This is so designated because it is an 
obvious .CDlBpromise between leaving the appoint-
ment of superior Judge. absolutely in the hands 
of the Executive, as o.btain in England and the 
opposite extreme of denying ~e exeeutive any 
voice in such judicial appointments. Under 
this pr.ocedure" the Chief Justice generally 
and the President of the Court of Appeal in 
appropriate cases, are appointed either on the 
. . 
advice of the Cabinet. or Prime Minister or 
directly by an Exacutive-President and the 
rest of the Senior Judges are appointed on the 
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advice of an independent Judicial service 
Commission. This procedure exists (with variations) 
in Uganda, ~~lawi and zambia. 
By section ~2(1) of the Uganda constitution 1966, the 
Chief Justice of Uganda shall be appointed by the President 
of Uganda in accordance with the advice of the cabinet. By 
Section 92(2) the puisne or other superior Juuges shall be 
appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. 
Under the Republican Constitution of Malawi 1966, Section 
63, the Chief Justice shall becppointed by the presiaent, 
while other superior Judges shall be appointed by the president 
only after consultations with the Judicial Service COmmission. 
The Commission comprises the Chief Justice as Chairman, the 
Chairman of the Public Service commission, a superior Judge 
designated in that behalf by the Chief Justice and one other 
member appointed by the President. It was possibly erroneous 
not to include the Attorney-General to sit as of right on the 
Commission. As the principal legal adviser of the Government, 
be should have been a useful l'ink between the Commission and 
the Government. l 
B. THE WESTMINSTER TDIJE PROCEDURE 
Here the Prime Minister (i.e. the EXecutive) enjoy a 
monopoly of superior judicial appointments. FOr example, 
under the Nigerian Constitution of the first Republic, the 
Chief Justice of the Federation and other superior Federal 
Juuges were appointed on the advice of the prime Minister. 
1. The Amendment of 1965 in Kenya rectified this ommission in 
its own composition of the Commission. 
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Under this Head an EXecutive presidentl has absolute discre-
tion as to the appointment of his superior Judges from the ChEf 
Justice downwards. This type of appointment procedure is very 
similar to the Westminster type in that in both procedure" a 
Senior Judicial appointment is an exclusive preserve of the 
Executive. The difference however is that while uDder the 
westminster ,:type, the Prime Minister or Lord Chancellor has to 
advise the ~~narch who does the appointment, here the Executive 
Presiaent choose and appoints them himself. He advises bimself, 
as it were, as to wbat appointment be 1s to make. This is the 
procedure in Tanzania2 and Ghana3 aDd tb~the Chief Justice has 
to be consulted, ~ it needs no stretch of i.agination to 
visualise the position where such consultation beco.es a .ere 
forma~ity on paper. 
~. SECURITY OF TENURE 
A Judge who is in fear of a possible summary dismissal, on 
account of his considered decision which happens to displease 
, 
the powers that be, is _-not likely always to decide cases 
according to law. It is essential, therefore, that neither the 
executive Dor the legislature should be entrusted with discipli-
nary powers over the j~cli.ciary. This policy has been adopted 
by a number of African CQ~ntries though some have rejected it, 
but in all of them a Judge normally holds office until his 
retirement at a fixed ag~.4 
1. A President vested with full executive powers like for 
example in the United states at America. 
2. See 57(1)(2). 
3. Art. 44(1) Ghana Constitution 1960. 
4. S. 64(3) Malawi Constitution - at 62. 
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In almost all of the states, for example, Sierra-Leone, 
Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya, Nalawi and Zambia, an adhoc 
tribunal appointed by the President or the prime Minister, as 
the case may be, and consisting of a Chairman and at least two 
other members who must themselves be superior Judges or ex-
Judges, decides whether a superior Judge should be removed from 
office. Tanzania has retained this procedure in spite of its 
de-jure one-party system. l 
Nigeria replaced the foregoing procedure for the less 
satisfactory British procedure, sub-sec. 2 of section 124 of 
the Nigerian constitution, 1963 now provides that a Judge may 
be dismissed pursuant to a parliamentary address to that 
effect, provided that the motion 'or the address vas passed 
by the vote of no less than two-thirds of all members of the 
respective Houses of ~arliament. 
Ghana while retaining the provisions for the Judge's 
removal by parliamentary address, had gone further by placing 
the fate of judiciary in the hands of one man, the President. 
tly an amendment to the Constitution in 19642 sequel to the 
verdict of the :special Criminal Division of the High Court in 
the treason trial of some Ministers, the presiden.'s existing 
power to dismiss the Chief Justice was extended to all Judges 
of the :supreme Court and the High Courts. The reason given 
for this remarkable departure from the practice of other 
African countries was that Socialist Ghana could not tolerate 
a judiciary which "is far above the people and becomes an 
independent power H3 
1. ~. 58. 
2. Act. 224. 
3. ~ee "Our charge against the Judges", an article published 
in the Ghanian 'rimes of December 20, 1963. 
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Professor de Smith argues that the procedure that places 
the question of removability of a superior Judge in the hands 
of a judicial body rather than leaving it in the hands of the 
Legislature as the westminster system does is much preferable. 
This is because, 
liThe English system places a premium on the 
self-restraint of the government and its 
supporters, a party commanding a majority in 
both houses might not find a great difficulty 
in procuring the address necessary for displacing 
a Judge of whom it strongly disapproved. In a 
young ~tate a Government enjoying overwhelming 
legislative support might experience fewer in-
hibitions in dealing peremptorily with an UD-
helpful or indiscreet Judge, if only pour 
encour!&er les autres. But it is clearly of great 
importance that a Judge who may be called upon to 
interprete a justiciable bill of rights or a 
}4'ederal distribution of powers shall not be inti-
midated by fears of loss of office ... l 
This fear proved justified in Ghana, when ur. Nkrumah, 
the then President of Ghana ch .. se to remove the country's 
Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah who bad dared to give a judge-
ment of which the former disapproved. 2 
1. New commonwealth and its (;onstitution pp. 140 - 1. 
2. See "Treason-Trial and j)isilissal of CIliaf Juatice", (1964) 
11 Africa Digest 116-117. Art 44 of the Ghanaian Consti-
tution provides: '''lbe Appointment of a Judge as Chief 
Justice may at any time be revoked by the president by 
instrument under the Presidential Seal. 1I 
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3. PHOTECTION FROM INTIl-lIDATION 
Judges must be able to carry out their functions without 
undue embarrassment. That is why, as a rule, judicial affairs 
may not be raised or debated in Parliament unless there is 
a substantive motion to that effect. In addition, superior 
Juoges enjoy immunity from civil and criminal suits in 
respect of utterances made in the course of their judicial 
duties. The law relating to contempt affords Judges a 
further measures of protection. Any action or inaction which 
amounts to interference with due administration of justice 
or which tends to have these effects is everywhere treated 
as contempt of Court. 
Apart from these, no judicial office may be scrapped 
while there is a sUbstantive holder of the office, and the 
salaries of Judges is charged on the Consolidated Revenue 
~und, hence ensuring that it is not subject to parliamentary 
discussion every year. 
COMMENTS 
The citizen is now dependent upon the state, the two are 
intertwined, the one created by the other. Hence profesaor 
H. W. R. Wade can say, 
"During tbe last hundred years the conceptioD 
'of the proper sphere of governmental activity 
has been completely transformed. Iastead of 
confiraing itself to defence, public order, the 
criminal law, and a few other general matters 
the modern state also provides elaborate social 
services and undertakes the regulation of much 
of the daily business of mankind. The state bas 
seized the initiative, and has put upon itself all 
kinds of new d*ties. In order to carry out so many 
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schemes of social service and control, powerful 
engines of authority have to be set in motio.. To 
prevent them running amok there must be constant 
control both political and legal. Ultimately, the 
political control rests with Parliament, though in 
reality much power is in the hands of Ministers and 
officials. The legal control is the task of the 
Courts of Law. "I 
Judges are generally looked upon as conservative members of 
the community whose decisions ought to be watched carefully 
lest they stultify the democratic will. 2 This feeling has 
resulted in reaction from Judges who are over-cautions to use 
their power effectively. There are of-course exceptions as 
shown by the Nigerian decision. 3 The principle of judicial 
restraint is the dignified term in which this reaction is 
checked. The eX-Pabriate Judges in East and Central Africa 
are more sensitive in this regard thougb this is not unexpected. 
But such is the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on 
the Judges as the guardians of the constit.tion that those 
who sit in the Supreme Court cannot on occasions avoid a 
confrontation with the elected government. constitutional 
disputes necessarily intrude into the field of politics, for, 
there stands in the background of every constitutional issue 
a political question 
question of power. 4 
which is capable of developing into a 
It is not suggested that (Judges should 
1. Administrative Law (1961) p. 1. 
2. See de smith "Federation, human rights and the protection 
of minorities" p. 29. 
3. See v. Coam~ss1oner tor prisons 
OPe c~. nrepor e 
4. The opinion of a G.~man Court quoted by G. Leibholz, "The 
Federal Constitutional Court in the constitutional system 
of the Federal Republic of Germany" in Legal ESsays, 
p. 491 at 497. 
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exercise this power recklessly, oblivious of the political 
order in which their decisions are to operate. HOwever, self-
restraint judiciously resorted to is distinguishable from an 
abdication of responsibility. 
At the same time, it is important to stress that the 
notion of "a Government by the noblesse de robe" as an 
explanation of the nature of judicial power is clearly mi&-
taken. There is anly one supreme power in the state, namely, 
the Legislat~e, the Executive and the Judiciary acting in 
a partnership in which each organ undertakes to accord due 
respect to one another. 
Some African states give the impression that this deal 
is impractical. The executive predominates, instructing a 
docile legislature on what to do and keeping the judiciary 
out. The inheritance of colonialism increases the problem. 
It was only natural in colonial days to think of the Courts 
as one of the mechanisms through which the metropolitan 
power exercised its domination. In the struggle for indepen-
dence deliberate challenges to the law were the order of the 
day for the import~Dt leaders and their more dedicated follo-
wers. A prison sentence or at the very least a conviction 
was the hall mark of devotion to cause. The COUDts were 
certainly not viewed in the light of stalwart champions of 
individual liberty. 
Now the position has changed. A new image must be created. 
The Courts must be seen as being no longer a mechanism for 
repression in the interests of the preservation of "Order and 
good Government". In other wordS, the concept of judicial 
review presupposes a political system in which those who 
wield effective power acquiesce in the maintenance of limi~ 
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on the scope of their authority - limits which are set by 
by a superior law and determined in particular instances by 
a body of persons over whose decisions they have no control. 
In a number of African states political conditions have 
already reached the stage where recognition of judicial 
review as a basic concept is out of the question. But even 
in those states where political diversity is still tolerated 
there are great difficulties in the way of making judicial 
review an effective reality. 
There is a genuine and widespread feeling that judicial 
review is anti-democratic. Those who have long been denied 
their right to express their will on political questions 
resent any implication that they cannot be trusted to express 
it wisely through their chosen representatives. NO doubt 
Lawyers are experts on the construction of legal documents, 
but the Constitution is no ordinary legal document; its 
spirit can be apprehended by politicians who have need to 
depute the Judges to act as communal mentors. Everyone is 
for the rule of law (approximately defined, of-course,) but 
why must this entail submission to the rule of Lawyers? 
Until the principle of judicial review has established 
itself as a regular feature .. of constitutioBal lire the 
Juages will be conscious of the need for the greLtest cir-
cumspection in handling politically inflamable issues. If 
a Judge in an African state is European - and in East African 
many of the Judges are - he will inevitably be aware of the 
weakness of his personal position. If he is an indigenous 
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African he may have had a political past that does 
not endear him to the party in o£fice, he will in any 
event know that in asserting the superiority of the 
values embodied in the constitution over the values 
that move the holders of political power he will be 
riding an unruly horse which is capable of trans£orming 
itself into a tiger. In which case, the citizen may 
in the long run be no better safeguarded against the 
abuse of exercise of discretionary power. In the last 
resort, the role of judicial review and its efficacy 
in safeguarding the citizen's righas particularly 
during a period of emergency, or more realistically, 
during the exercise of emergency power, will be deter-
mined by the prevailing political climate, though it 
may be influenced by the personal qualities of the 
individual Judges and the machinery for sa£eguarding 
judicial independence. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CHECKS ON THE EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS 
Tbe fundamental problem of organised society is tbat of the 
use and abuse of power: how men may best prevent its abuse and 
direct its use to good ends. It is axiomatic that power in the 
sense of the will and capacity of men to ens~e the obdience of 
other men is neither good nor bad in itself but only according 
to the end which it serves. perhaps there can be no complete 
assurance or guarantee against the abuse of power so long as men 
remain human, nevertheless, it is important and perhaps not 
impossible to try to tame power so that its exercise shall not 
be capricious. 
In the modern world the problem of power bas become parti-
cularly urgent. Thus to quote a distinguished American 
historian, Profes80r C. H. McIlwain: 
"The one great issue that overshadows all 
others in the distracted world of today is . 
the war between constitutionalism and arbi-
trary government ••• The world is trembling 
in the balance between th~ ordinary procedure 
of law and the processes of force which see. 
so much more quick and effective. Never in 
recorded bistDry, I believe has the individual 
been in greater danger from lov.rDllent than·now."l 
The learned Professor was speaking in tbe immediate~ 
period of po~t-war reaonstruction following tbe Second World 
War but his words are no less applicable to the p~riod 
following the independence of the new Nations of ~t,r~ca, w~o 
it may be said, are facing an emergency of a difterent kind, 
the emergency of proving tbat they .re able to stand on their 
own feet. It bas a~ready been seen, tbit While the older 
1. COnstitutionalism Ancient and Modern (1947) p. 1. 
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nations of the world have used emergency powers to deal with 
war-time emergency in the main, the newly independent nations 
of Africa are using equal and sometimes more stringent emer-
gency powers to deal with emergency of subversion or alleged 
subversion. During such times, the tyrranical use of power 
is one of the greatest problem. The question, therefore, 
arises as to what guarantees or safegaards there are to 
ensure that government does not overstep its bounds. 
In a vountry with written ~onstitution as are all the 
countries within this area of study, the Constitution itself 
provides certain safeguards, and these are going to be con-
sidered first. 
A. Fundamental Human Rights Provisions 
In nearly all the newly independent states of Africa,l 
the Constitution contains the most comprehensive set of pro-
visions on fundamental rights and freedoms. These fundament. 
rights are found in the entrenched clauses so as to ensure that 
they are not wantonly done away with by the legislators. In 
addition machinery is provided for their enforcement, as has 
already been discussed7
2 by •• ans of writs of habeas corpus, 
injunctions and declaratory judgements, which are available 
to those who allege an infringement of any of these rig~t •• 
Their specific entrenchment has a psychological value 
particularly for the ordinary inhabitant'of the new states 
and perhaps a more psychological deterrent on the government. 
It is regarded as a charter of liberties no less significant 
for them than the great Magna ~rta must have been to the 
Barons at RUnnym.ne. It provides a yards-tick by Which to 
measure many of the possible misdeeds of the rulers. 
1. Except Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia. 
~. Chapter 4. 
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\ve have seenl that during a period of emergency, the Consti-
tution allows derogation from a specified number of these rights 
in the interest of national security, but such measures as are 
taken in derogation of them must be 'reasonably justifiable' for 
the purpose of dealing with the situation created by the emer-
gency. Thus, in so far as there is an encroachment upon the 
rights not justified by the Constitutional restrictions, the 
Court will declare the order or statute invalid. Also only 
limited rights may be affected and this is subject to the 
provision that whatever measures are taken in derogation of 
them must be reasonably justifiable. The fact that the phrase 
'reasonably justifiable' may not be easy of definition does not 
completely wipe out the limitation it creates on the exercise 
of emergency power. 2 
A Madras High Court referring to the fundamental rights 
recognised in the Constitution had this to say: 
"'nle t'undamental rights recognised in the consti-
tution no doubt to some extent constitute limita-
tions on the powers of parliament and the state 
Legislatures to enact laws and tbese were intended 
in the interests and tor the benefit of the citizen& 
TO what extent the control should be permitted and 
whether the legislature in enacting the particular 
law transgressed its limits without any justifica-
tion and whether such tranS!ression is witbin 
reasonable bounds are matters left open for the 
Courts to decide."3 
1. Chapter 4. 
2. See Sec. 29 Nigerian Cons ti tutio'rf 1963. 
3. In L. T. Swamear v. Commis!ioner A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 
613 at 638. 
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It is not only laws, however, which must comply with the 
conditions as laid down. by the constitution in the fundamental 
human rights provision but also executive acts. If the 
Executive is conscious that its acts can be questioned, it may 
not be willing to take rash and impulsive actions. 
It is true, as we nave already noted, that war or emergency, 
is no doubt a compulsive circumstance and its existence may 
justify the exclusion of judicial review of executive or 
legislative action interferring with citizen's rights, and the 
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended. But this must be de-
nounced as it was in quite stron~ terms by Mr. Justice Davie. 
of the United states Supreme Court when he said: "No doctrine 
involving m9re pe5nicious consequences waS ever invented by 
the wit of man than that any of its (citizen's rights) provi-
sions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of 
a government ... 
The exception provided may be so extensively wide that they 
may nearly deprive some of the rights of their efficacy, never-
theless their value as a safeguard against abuse of power is 
notcompletely wiped out. Here we may reiterate the statement 
of the minorities Commission in Nigeria that even though the 
provisions are difficult to interprete, "Neprtheless we think 
that they should be inserted. Their presence defines beliefs 
widespread among democratic countries and provide a standard 
to which appeal may be made by those whose righla are infringed. 
A government determined to abandon democratic courses will find 
ways of violating the.. But they are of great value in preven-
ting a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and the 
unobstrusive encroachment of a gov&ro .. nt on individual rights." 
1. In Ex-Parte Milligan (1886) 4 val ~. 121. 
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The encroachment may be 'unobtrusive' in peace-times but 
it is usually more blantant during a period of emergency and it 
is during this time that the citizen looks more towards these 
provisions. 
In Ghana and 'ranzania and r-lalawi where there are no cons ti-
tutionally entrenched Bills of Rights, one may well wonder 
whether this means in effect that the citizen is less safeguarded 
against abuse of emergency power. This may well be the case 
as has been shown by the decision of the Ghana Court in Re 
Akoto. l In this case, the Court held that the controversial 
Art. 13, wbicb proclaims a series of rights and freedom to 
which the president swears at his installation to uphold, ',. 
have no more force than the Queen of England's Coronation Oath 
and imposes no legal obligation or limitation on the power ~ 
the President. Perhaps the ultimate guarantee in these 
countries would depend on whether the Courts would assume juri-
sdiction to pronounce on legislation which patently cut across 
any of the aims for which the Constitution was established. 2 
Declaration and EXtension of Emergency: 
Most of the countries within this particular area, as has 
been seen, leave it to the Executive to declare a state of 
Imergency in the first instance, but within 'a stated period, 
the Executive must obtain confirmation of its declaration. 3 
Thus in Malawi and Zambia, for instance, the president by 
Proclamation published in the Gazette may declare'emergency, 
but the declaration shall cease to have effect lIin the case of 
I. t..I96!7 Ghana Law Rep. 523. 
2. The role and attitude ef the Judiciary bas been discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
3. Kenya: Sec. 39(2) Uganda Art. 145, 1966 Republic Constitution 
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a declaration made when Parliament is sitting or has been 
summoned to meet within five days, at the expiration of a 
period of five days beginning with the date of the publication 
of the declaration,,,l and in .any other case, "at the expira-
tion of a period of twenty-one days beginning with the date 
of publication of declaration unless, before the expiration 
of that period, it is approved by resolution passed by the 
National Assembly.n 2 
This provision for reference to parliament constitute a 
safeguard to the extent that it allows the elected represen-
tatives of the people to consider whether the circumstances 
and the situation justify the action which has been taken 
by the Executive. Parliament it is assumed will always bave 
the interest of the people who have elected them as a 
primary consideration if .ot the most important consideration 
in allowing a declaration which would necessitate the 
granting of or taking of extensive discretionary powees by 
the Executive. 
Although it is conceded that the fact that the 
Executive would have been able to proclaim the emergency 
before seeking Parliamentary approval gives them the edge 
yet the threat of disapproval by the Legislature cannot be 
lightly disregarded.~ 
1. constitution of ~mlawi 1964 S.26\2) zambia constitution 
1964 s. 29(1). 
2. bee also Ghana 1960 Constitution. 
3. In Nov. 1964 after the Kenya House of Representative had 
approved a resolution proclaiming a stat. of emergency, 
the senate, the K.A.D.U. Opposition 'Yotedagainst it, 
thereby preventing its approval by the constitutionally 
required two-third majority. 
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Perhaps an even more effective safeguard is that 
provided in the Constitutions of ~igeria and Sierra Leone, 
where except in the obvious case of war, the sole responsi-
bility of declaring a state of public emergency is left 
with the Parliament. Thus ~ec. 70(3) of the Nigerian Consti-
tution1 provides that a period of emergency is any period 
in which 
"(a) The Federation is at war 
(b) there is in force a resolution passed by each 
House of Parliament declaring that a state of public 
Emergency exists, or 
(c) there is in force a resolution passed by each 
House of Parliament supported by the votes of not less than 
two-thirds of all members of the House declaring that 
democratic institutions in Nigeria are threatened by sub-
version." 
One must admit that sub-section 3(b) which requires only 
a simple majority to pass a resolution in each House is ~ ,'.': 
open to abuse and no doubt could easily become an instrumEnt 
for scoring political advantage. Also one cannot imaiine 
that a Government which bas this easy procedure would try 
to achieve the same ends - proclaiming a state of public 
emergency - by using the obviously more .ifficult procedure 
,.' 
of sub-section 3(C). It would seem that the ,greater majority 
required by sub-section 3(c) can be explained on the basis 
that activities which could be characterised 8Ssubversive 
of and a threat to a democratic institutions would be less 
obvious, hence the require.ent ~ th. two-thirds majority 
of the members of each House must be convinced. Although, 
1. Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963 No. 
28 of 1963. 
-30~-
the Provision for a two-thirds majority affords a safer 
protection, yet ns efficacy is much reduced by the alter-
native provision for a simple majority - which is the common 
procedure in all other African states - which a Parliament 
determined to encroach upon the rights of the citizen will 
obviously prefer. Apart from this, how efficacious is a 
special majority provision in fact? 
Where approval or declaration itself demands the 
marshalling of certain parliamentary majorities, mostly 
two-thirds, it is doubtful whether these provisions are 
really efficacious in fact, in all cases. For it is general~ 
conceeded that the underlying assumption ia. these provisions 
is that the Government of the day would not have such large 
majorities at its command and so in order to be able to 
declare an emergency or have the period of emergency exten-
ded,l it bas got to have the co-operation of the Opposition 
Party and wbere this is not forthcoming, it is impossible to 
have the emergency. In other words tbe wbole speCial majori-
ties clause depend for their success on the existence of 
two or multi-party system in which the party for the time 
being in power is in fact prevented from unilaterally under-
taking a declaration or extension without falling foul of 
the Constitution. 
It does follow that in.'a One-party state where all 
types of majorities, however huge, can with ease and alar-
crity be mustered by the Government for the time beiag in 
1. For instance S. 30(3) Uganda COa.tit*ttoD proyides i,o 
part: "Provided that the National .!sse.bly may, by 
resolution passed by Dot less than two-thirds majority 
of all members of the Assembly extend its approval of 
the declaration. 
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power, the whole special majorities clause will in fact appear 
peculiarly inappropriate and worthless. It seemshighly ques-
tionable, therefore, whether in Zambia, for instance, a special 
majorities clause will have any restraining effect whatever, 
should the Government in power wish to be totalitarian. l 
Even where there is a two or multi-party system, but in 
fact the Government power is so extensive as to command an 
overwhelming majority in the Legislature, then the situation 
is akin to a One-Party state. This was the case in Ghana 
just after the independence in 1957 and during the whole of 
the Nkrumah regime. 
But the importance of Parliamentary approval whether by 
simple or special majorities must not be belittled in any way. 
In order to ensure that the EXecutive do not keep the 
citizenry in a permanent state of emergency, there is also 
provision for Parliamentary review of the situation at a 
fixed interval in the provision that Parliament must approve 
any extension over a stated period, which in most cases is not 
less than three months and not more than twelve months. 2 One 
might perhaps suggest that the renewal period should in no 
case be more than three months. 3 
Special Provision for Detainee under the Constitution 
The power of detention is easily the best known type of 
emergency power and Constitution framers in recognition of the 
fact have dealt at length with detention under an emergency. 
1. Also Tanzania (which is virtually a One-Party state) and 
Malawi. 
2. In Kenya and Uganda - six months; In Nigeria - 12 months. 
3. An Amendment to the Constitution of Kenya removed any re-
newal period. see 1969 Constitution. 
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In recognition of the fact that such detention is tifferent 
from detention under the ordinary law of the land e.g. 
Criminal Code, it proceeds "upon the principle that a person 
should be restrained from doing something which, if free and 
unfettered, it is reasonably probable he would do, it must 
necessarily proceed in all cases, to some extent, on suspicion 
or anticipation as distinct from proof"t it is provided in 
general that the detainee shall not only have the right to 
know why he is detained~ but also have his case considered 
by an Advisory Tribunal. Thus Sec. 31 of Uganda Constitution 
'd 3 provl. es: 
"Where a person is detained by virtue of such a law 
as is referred to in Sec. 30(5) of this Constitution 
the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) he shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and 
in any case not more than five days after the commence-
ment of his detention, be furnished with a statement 
in writing in a language that he understands speci-
fying in detail the grounds upon which he is detained; 
(b) not more than fourteen days after the commence-
ment of his detention, a notification shall be pub-
lished in the Gazette stating that he bas b~en 
detained and giving particulars of the provisions of 
law under which is detention as authorised; 
1. per Lord Atkinson in ~v. Halliday ex parte zadig 1917 
A.C.·at p. :169. 
2. Cf. Cbristie v. Leacbinsky. UQ't5] 2,. All. E. Ro. ~5 .. C·A. 
3. : ..... , ,; There are sillilar provision. in all the otlaer African 
titates - sec. 30 tc'ederal Republic of Nigellia Constitution,.> 
1963; Sec. 26(2) zambia Consti tution;;1964 and Malawi Consti-
tutions 1964 sec. 24(2) Kenya 1969 ~onstitution Sec. 83(2). . 
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(c) not more than one month after the commencement of 
his detention and thereafter during his detention at 
intervals of not more than six months, his case shall 
be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law and presided over by a person appointed 
by the Chief Justice; 
(d) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult, 
at his own expense, a legal representative of his own 
choice who shall be permitted to make representations to 
the tribunal appointed for the review of the case of the 
detained person; 
(e) at the hearing of his case by the tribunal appointed 
for the review of his case he shall be permitted to appear 
in person or, at his own expense, by a legal representative 
of his own choice. 
2. On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of 
the case of a detained person, the tribunal may make recommen-
dations concerning the necessity or expediency of continUing 
his detention to the authority by which it wU"ordered but, 
unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority shall 
not be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations 
3. In every month in Which there is a sitting of parli~ent, 
the Prime Minister or a Minister authorised by him shall make 
a report to Parliament of the number of persons detained by 
virtue of such a law as is referred to in Section 30(5) of 
this Constitution and the number of cases in which the 
authority that ordered the detention has not acted in accor-
dance with the recommendations of a tribunal appointed in 
pursuance of this section." 
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Thus, a detainee is given two opportunities of trying to 
secure his release, either by judicial review on application 
to the Court that his fundamental right has been infringed, 
but if for any reason he is unable to get redress from the 
Court, his other protection is by way of the Advisory 
Committee. 
The Constitution of an Advisory Board for the purpose of 
reporting to the government its opinion on the detention of a 
person may be said to have been introduced for the very reason 
that review by the law Courts may be excluded. This no doubt 
ensures that the detainee is not left unprotected. FUrther, 
this elaborate provision may b~ re~arded as an argument against 
holding that absolute discretion nas been conferred en the 
government. Tbe Advisory Board thus stands perhaps midway 
between the judiciary and the executive. But it is necessary 
to ensure that it is an himpartial and independent tribunal." 
It is usually pro~ded that its Chairman shall be 'a person 
appointed by the Chief Justice, but the other members could 
presumably be appointed by the Executive, as in practice they 
usnally are. 
Apart from the criticism of imputting bad faith to the 
Executive in constituting the AdYisory Board, the erficacy of 
this safeguard is much reduced by the fact that its decisions 
have only recommendatory value and its advice need not be 
accepted. But one's disappointment should be a Ii ttle ;".~j;, '..~~ 
relieved when it is realised that in 80me of the African 
titates,l the Executive is required to inform Parliament at 
regulated intervals or the number of detainees, the ftuM~ers 
of cases which have been dealt with by the Beard and the number 
1. Uganda: Sec. 31(3) OPe cit. 
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of cases in which the advice of the Board has been rejected. 
The detainees case is subject to continuous review at stated 
intervals l whenever he considers that the circumstances have 
changed sufficiently to make his restriction no longer 
reasonable. 
But it is not only the constitution which has provided 
some necessary sa~eguards. The Constitution being the Supreme 
Law has demarcated the limits and scope of all the arms of 
government, that is the Legislature, EXecutive and the Judiciary 
The complexities of modern government, however, necessarily 
blur the demarcation line of separation of power between the 
Legislature and the EXecutive. In an emergency, in particular, 
it becomes necessary for the Legislature to delegate some of 
its law-making function to the EXecutive. One of the problems 
which must arise from such delegation is the problem of 
controlling governmental powers without necessarily hindering 
the Executive in bringing the situation within control. It 
is beyond possibility and it is perhaps not even desirable that 
Parliament should control in detail all the activities of the 
executive during a period of emergency. But having delegated 
powers to deal with the things or details for which they have 
neither the time nor competence, it is their concern to ensure, 
as much as reasonably possible, that these powers would not be 
abused. tlroadly this haw been done, outside of constitutional 
provisions, in two ways: (i) by providing that any rule or 
regulation made pursuant to the declaration of emergency and 
the operation 01' the main emergency legislation, must be laid 
before Parliament for its approval or disapproval and (ii) by 
the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, ,: 
1. Sec. 83(~) Kenya 1969 Constitution - every three months. 
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which ensures that Parliament will be informed, by questions 
and answers, of the state of affairs at any time. 
It is now proposed to discuss these tao methods of control. 
In addition, there are other safeguards, as for instance, those 
provided in the specific legislation conferring emergency power. 
LAYING OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION: 
within the African countries, there are noticeabLy two 
main approaches to Parliamentary control over subordinate 
legislation made pursuant to a declaration of emergency. These 
two a-pproaches it might be said represent the negative and 
positive approaches. 
(a) 'rhe Negative Approach -
By this procedure, the legislation is allowed to go 
into operation immediately subject to subsequent affirmation 
or disaffirmation by a resolution of Parliament. This approach 
is represented by the Nigerian provision. Sec. 5(2) of the 
Emergency Powers Act, 1961 provides that "every regulation made 
under S.3 and every order or rule made in pursuance of such a 
regulation shall without prejgdice to the validity of anything 
lawfully done thereunder, cease to have effect at the expiration 
of a period of two months from the date upon which it came into 
operation, unless, before the expiration of that period, it 
has been approved by resolution passed by both Houses of 
l ' t fI Par 1amen . 
It is further provided that any such regulation, order or 
rule, may without prejudice to the validity of anything lawfully 
done thereunder, at any time be amended or revoked by resolution 
passed by both Houses of Parliament. Thus, although the 
regulations are allowed to go into operation immediately on being 
made, they cease to have effect either automatically at the 
expiration of the stated period or by an adverse vote in 
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in Parliament. This procedure gives the advantage of time to 
the Administrators without necessarily prejudicing the ultimate 
authority of Parliament in theory, but in practice its 
efficacy may be a little doubtful as is shown by the example 
of Nigeria itself. No sooner on ~~y 29, 1962 had Parliament 
passed a resolution declaring a state of public emergency 
than the Executive laid before the Houses thirteen regulations 
for its approval. There was no doubt that the members could not 
have had the opportunity of giving adequate consideration to 
the provisions of these regulations. Perhaps the saving grace, 
provided Parliament continues sitting during the emergency, 
is that whatever measures had been taken under a hastily 
approved regulation, order or rule may at any time be amended 
or revoked. 
(b) The Positive APproach 
By this approach, no regulation is allowed to go into 
operation unless and until it is approved by resolution of 
Parliament. This approach is represented by uganda. sec. 
5 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1963 provides: 
"(l) All emergency regulations, if not sooner revoked, 
shall cease to have effect when the emergency proclamation in 
pursuance of which they have been made ceases to have effect. 
(2) No emergency regulation shall have effect -
(a) during a period when an emergency proclamation 
is in force by virtue of having been approvea by a resolution 
of the National Assembly under sub-section 2 of Sectian 38 
of this Constitution; or 
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(b) during a period when an emergency proclamation is in 
force by virtue of having been extended by a resolution of the 
National Assembly under sub-section (3) of section 30 of the 
Constitution, unless the National Assembly has, by like 
resolution in such case, affirmed that those regulations shall 
have effect during that period. 
Perhaps in practice this procedure is no more efficacious 
as a safeguard against abuse of power than the 'negative' 
approach, because the National Assembly may still find itself 
approving regulatioDs which it has hardly had time to eDnsider, 
but at least it attempts to ensure that no action is taken 
without its prior approval. This may also be the reason why 
there is no further proviso allowing ~pe National Assembly to 
amend anf regulation after it might have gone into operation. 
It is suggested that this 'positive' approach is preferable 
to the 'negative' approach but it is also suggested that 
Parliament should have the power to amend any regulation at 
any time subsequent to its operation. 
Perhaps the best way of all to ensure that par14"ent 
maintains an effective control is to appoint an ad hoc Select 
committeel to scrutinise all such regulations before they are 
laid before Parliament. As the position now stands "no doubt, 
everything comes back in the end to the question what action 
members of a party or a group or a combination are res.lVe. to I 
take in proceedings on the floor of the Bouse. tt2 ! 
------------------------------______________________________________ 1 
1. On the basis of the war-time instituted British Select 
Committee on S*atutory Instruments. 
2. per Viscount Radcliffe in Akintola v. Adeibenro /I9637 3 
All E. R. at 549. - -
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Ministerial Responsibility to parliament 
As a general sort of limitation, the necessity for the 
Hinisters to answer in Parliament any questions relating to 
their office aonstitutes a form of limitation on the abuse of 
power. This ensures that by means of' frequent parliamentary 
debates and criticism and also in the reports to Parliament 
on the numbers detained and the numbers of cases in which the 
Executive or the l\'linister responsible for the exercise of 
power of detention, has refused to follow the Advisory's 
recommendation, a safeguard is provided. This serves as a 
safeguard of a general' sort but its efficacy in any individual 
case is doubtful since there is no way in which the Hinister 
can be compelled to give the particulars in any case. This 
difficulty was recognised even in such an advanced parliamen~ 
tary democracy in Britain during the second World War and led 
to the suggestion that the discretion be bounded by an appeal 
to an independent tribunal whose,decision would be binding, 
but most legislators recognise the need for the full respon-
sibility of the executive and the difficulties involved in a 
judicial review of preventive detention. "One must take into 
account an abundance of considerations and decide •••••••• 
between the liberty of the individual and the security ~f the 
state, not only yesterday and tOday, but the day after tomorrow 
and in different conditions which may come into existence."l 
It is quite possible of course to suspend the sitting of 
Parliament during this period. 
1. Home Secretary Morrison. sec. 376 H. C. Debates (5th 
sc. 1941) 961, 998. 
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Safeguard to Preventive Detention under Preventive Detention 
Legislation: 
A discussion on the control of executive discretion by the 
legislature would be incomplete without a look at what safe-
guards if any, are provided against preventive detention 
under specific Preventi~e Detention legislation. Within this 
area of study only Ghana and Tanzania have preventive Detention 
Acts, but all the others have the power to make sucb laws; 
All their Constitutions provide that parliament may make laws 
which it considers necessary for the protection'of public order, 
public security and good Government. 
Usually the legislative power over preventive detention 
is subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed in the::Consti-
tution. Therefore, a person who has been detained under a 
preventive detention law should be able to contend that be 
has been deprived of his guaranteed liberty, in as mucb as his 
deprivation was c·; ,lei' under OIl'.' i •• ClI'\ invalid law, the 
enacting legislature having ~o competence to pass such laws. 
However, the emergence of the new principle invalidating 'any 
law' abridging the fundamental rights has practically no impact 
on ~e legislative power concerning preventive detention where 
there are no constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rig .... 
In both Ghana and Tanzania, the President issues the 
detention Orde~s.1 In 'Ghana, within five days of bis detention,l 
the detainee must be furnished with the grounds of bis I 
detention, the corresponding period io taaaaDia is 15 d4ya.3 I 
Unfortunately, the grounds are otten too brief, and perhaps 
vague. Here is a typical example: "Acting in a manner pre-
judicial to the security of the state, in that you bave 
encouraged the commission of acts of violence in the Ashanti 
1. Ghana Act 240, S. 1. 
2. S. 6. 
3. s. 6. 
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or Brongo-Ahafo Regions and have associated with persons 
who have adopted a policy of violence as a ~eans of achieving 
political aims in these Regions."l 
The detainee must be afforded an opportunity to make 
representations to the President, but in neither country is 
he in a position to confront his accusers on whose sworn 
testimony the detention was based. His representations must 
be made in writing. 
In Tanzania, but not in Ghana, there is an Advisory 
Committee whose Chairman and two members are appointed by the 
President while the other two members are appointed by the 
Chief Justice. Tbe Committee advises the president whether, 
in their opinion, an order made should be continued or 
rescinded or suspended, though the President need not act on 
2 the ad~i8e tendered. The Committee is expected to act soon 
after the President has received the detainee's representa-
tions or where no such representations have been made, within 
a year of the detention order being made and thereafter at 
intervals not exceeding one year.3 The Committee must be 
informed by the detaining authority of the grounds on which 
the order has been made and of such other matters relating 
to the persoll detained as may be relevant to his continued 
detention. A copy of the representations made by the detainee 
is lodged with the Committee who .. y interview him if 
neces.ary. 
1. Taken from the affidavit in support of application for 
habeas corpus by ~Ir. B. o. Akoto op. ci t. 
~. s. 7(6). 
3. S. 7(4). 
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It will be seen that a detainee under a preventive deten-
tion legislation is much less protected than a detainee 
under the emergency legislation. The former is deprived 
of the rights to defend himself with the aid of legal counsel, 
nor is the detaining authority obliged to do anymore than 
give the grounds of detention to the Advisory committee. 
Moreover, there is no way of ensuring that the provisions 
are scrupulously followed because it is expressly pr~Yided 
that the detention orders cannot be questioned in any 
Court of Law. l Although no such blantant bar is placed on 
judicial review in Ghana, the Courts have all but declined 
jurisdiction. Mention has already been made of the Akoto 
case in which a futile attempt wa. made to get the Courts 
-to declare ,the 1958 Act ultra vires Art. 13(1) of the 
Constitution. The Courts have further held that the writ 
of habeas corpus would not lie in respect of any detention 
order made pursuant to the Preventive Detention Act. 
Neither in Ghana nor in Tanzania are provisions made for 
parliamentary control of detention in lieu of judicial contr.l. 
Nor is there an obligation to publish the names of those 
in detention. 2 
The Judiciar;r: 
We have already discussed the approach of the judiciary 
towards the use and abuse of emergency power and it;. has been 
shown that the judiciary could be made completely powerless 
by a Government intent on totalitarian measures. 3 In 
1. Act. No. 17. S. 3. 
2. By practice Ghana announces the names of detainees in the 
Gazette while in Tanaania questions on preventive detention 
are admissible in Parliament. 
3. See Chapter 5. 
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exceptional cases the Courts have granted relief when preven-
tive detention orders have been challengea, but there 
is no doubt that tllere is very limited opportunity for 
judicial review. It is sometimes necessary for Courts to 
review substance and not merely form. This does not mean 
that the Court may substitute its own 'satisfaction' for 
that of the detaining authority, but the Court should be 
able to intervene if the grounds alleged for detention are 
not inconsistent with the objects of the detention legisla-
tion or if mala fides is proved to exist. This has been done 
in west Pakistan in ~miraj Muhammed Khac v. Government of 
west Pakistan, and of course the Judicial committee of the 
Privy Council has held that the phrasing of a power in 
subjective terms does not necessarily dispense with the audi 
alteram partem rule. 
As the preventive detention aases show, the challenge to 
official action based on bad faith is not easy to sustain. 
Proof of personal animosity or ill-will on the part of some 
officials or even the Chief Minister of the state Government 
w~ not considered enough to enable the court to quash a 
detention order on the ground of bad faith unless the deten-
tion order was also shown to be unreasonable or perverse; in 
this respect, the Court could not ignore the requirements of 
public order in a time of emergency. Thus, in times of grave 
emergency the Courts may decline to undertake any inquiry 
into the reasonableness of the groUllds on wilieh' a responsible 
Minister, entrusted with the maintenance of national security, 
choose to exercise powers vested in him, notwithstanding that 
. , 
he is required by statute to have reasonable cause before 
exercising those powers. The courts have very little scope 
for protection of a person preventively detained. 
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The danger is ever present that the conferment of wide 
emergency powers on the executive and their liberal inter-
pretation by the Courts abet their abuse. This danger was 
recognised in Britain for as Lord Dunedin observed; "That 
is true. But the fault, if fault there be, lies in the fact 
that the British Constitution has entrusted to the two 
Houses of Parliament, subject to the assent of the King, an 
absolute power untramelled by any written instrument obedience 
to which may be compelled by a judicial bouy. The danger of 
1 
abuse is theoretically present." But as we have seen in 
previous chapters, the danger is practically present as well,. 
in Africa, and that in spite of the fact that unlike Britain, 
the African states have tla written insteument" obedience to 
which should be compelled by a judicial body. 
The tenor of interpretation of emergency laws undoubtedly 
tends to be liberal in an emergency, but in the United states 
of America for instance, the judiciary did not allow its 
appreciation of emergency conditions to cloud the constitu-
tionallimitations. 2 There should be no reason why the 
judiciary in Africa should not attempt such objective 
position as well. 
PUBLIC OPINION 
In the words of Lord wright: liThe safeguards of British 
liberty is in the good sense of the people •••• ua There is 
no doubt that in a Parliamentary democracy, a vigilant 
public opinion could well be the best and greatest safeguard 
1. The King v. Halliday (1917) A.C. 260 at 270. 
2. See Ex Parte Milligan 4, wal 2, i20. 
3. Liversidge v. Anderson. (1942) A.C. 206 at p. 261. 
-317-
of liberty and check against the abuse of governmental power. 
But this presumes many things, inter alia, a high proportion 
of educated public and the freedom to express such opinion not 
only by words but by action through free and fair elections. 
The high proportion of illiteracy in Africa makes it 
impossible to reach large sections of the people through the 
press, which it is accepted is the mouth organ of the public; 
it is, therefore, impossible to assess not only how far the 
press represent the public but also how far the press help to 
formulate public opinion. Other media,lof information are not 
in a better position because of vast distances which they 
cannot reach due to lack of good access roads and modern 
amenities, like electricity. 
Although there are provisions for elections but whether 
these are sufficiently free and fair to justify them being 
regarded as representative of the peoples feelings must 
remain a matter for conjecture. Allegations of rigging abound, 
and allegations of pre-election intimidation of opposition 
members are now becoming a commonplace. But one major factor 
which would appear to give a lie to the freedom of exercising 
one's choice is the trend towards one-party states in Africa. 
They bave been achieved through various w~s in the different 
countries, by mergers, dissolutions, absorption or suppression 
of opposition parties. Speaking on west Africa in particular, 
Professor Arthur Lewis finds "it significant tbat DO party DOW 
in power went to the polls in a free electioD s.eking,a .sndae 
to create a Single-party syste ••••• Single-Party power was 
seized, not granted by the voters.~l This is true of East 
aDd:Central Africa as well. He examine, the different reaSODS 
given to justify the system, and finds that the single-party 
1. Politics in west Africa (1965) pp. 34-5. 
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"fails in all its claims. It cannot represent all the people; 
or maintain free discussion; or give stable government; or, 
above all reconcile the differences between various regional 
groups ••••.. it is partly the product of the hysteria of the 
moment of independenee, when some men found it ~ossible to 
seize the btate and suppress their opponents. HI Though these 
conclusions are based on reasoned examinations of the facts, 
the progressive adoption of the single-party by one African 
country after another attests to its popularity with the 
African leaders. Their popularity perhaps show more clearly 
that they are considered effective in preventing criticism 
and opposition. Opposition or criticism within a single-party 
system presupposes that opposition must be confined within the 
limits set by the leadership and the ideology and programme of 
the one party. 
CON C L U S ION 
The need to equip the state with necessary powers in 
order to resist subversion or its threat is obvious. Indeed 
it may be suicidal to deny the state adequate powers in its 
hour of peril. But it is equally necessary to ensure that the 
extra-ordinary powers vested in the state are not open to 
abuse, otherwise it would be hig~ly detrimental to the interest 
of democracy and the Rule of Law. It is, therefore, necessary 
to provide for adequate checks against the possible abuse of 
wide emergency powers. As the proceeding chapters show there 
is hardly any limit to the powers of the Government in an 
emergency. There is DO denying the fact that in a democratic 
state the effective safeguard against abuse of powers whether 
in peace or in an emergency, is ultimately to be found in the 
existence of enlightened, vigilant and vocal public opinion. 2 
A constitutional declaration cannot by itself make a country 
1. Lewis: Politics in west Africa (1965) p. 63. 
2. See Gajendragadkar J. In Makhan Singh v. state of Punjab A. I. R. 1964 S. C. ;)81.-----.:~;;w.;;; 
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democratic and free, nor does universal sufferage overnight 
make it so. Granting adult frachise is undoubtely a great 
step in the direction. In countries where illiteracy and 
poverty exist on an extensive scale it takes at least a few 
decades for democracy to become an accomplished fact. In 
Africa, the political safeguard in the shape of enlightened, 
vigilant and vocal public opinion is not as effective today 
as it should be. 
While meeting grave emergencies in England both Parliament 
and Executive have generally shown great self-re~raint in so 
far as interference with civil liberties of the subject was 
concerned. That is due to the effectiveness of the political 
safeguards viz "the good sense of the people and in the system 
of representative and responsible government which has been 
evolved,,,l and a vigilabt press. In the United states, 
besides the political safeguards, there are effective judicial 
safeguards. There, the judiciary plays a vital role in check-
ing abuse of emergency powers by the state. Intbe absence 
of similar safeguards the chances of abuse of emergency powers 
are very present in the newly-independent African states of 
the Commonwealth. To quote the opinion of an eminent writer: 
L~e was speaking on India but it would appear that his 
observation is equally well applicable to Afri~-r. 
"Power has a tendencey to be all-embracing and to remove 
from its path all impediments and obstacles. Therefere it 
is the course of wisdom to circumscribe power as much as 
possible ••••••••••• We still lack the great democratic 
1. per Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) A. C. 206 
at 261. 
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corrective of an opposition. Our Parliamentary 
institutions, although based on those of England, 
lack the one salutary check which England provides to 
dictatorship. We have here the rule of one party with 
very little possibility of that party being replaced by 
any other. There is no more dangerous dictatorship than 
the dictatorship which wears the garb of democratic 
institutions. A dictatorship which has been raised to 
power by a popular vote has nothing to fear and need 
suffer no qualms of conscience. nl 
It has been shown that in some cases, in the African 
states within this area of study, emergency powers have 
already been used for purposes other than the absolute 
necessity of state security. There is need to guard 
jealously *hat little safeguards are provided and 
strengthen them. The insistence upon the safeguards 
already discussed ought to be used to protect the citizen 
sufficiently against abuse of emergency powers. 
1. M. C. Chagla, Individual and the state (1958) p. 11. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MILITAR~.' TAKE-OVEBS 
Between the middle of June 1965 and the middle of March 
1968, military coups d'etat caused the downfall of nine 
African governments,l including three of the newly-independent 
African states within the Commonwealth, that is, the mili-
tantly "African Socialist" regime of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, ostensibLy committed to 
western-style parliamentary democracy, as well as Sierra-Leone. 
And the beginning of 1971 saw yet another one in Uganda. 2 
Tbese coups were not, unfortunately, isolated events, but 
only the latest of an increasing number of political upbeavals 
that have scarred the young lives of at least twenty-seven 
of the thirty-seven independent African - governed States 
in general. 
Coups, counter-coups, assassination attempts and 
communal violence seem to have become almost commonplace in 
tbe newly-independent African states. Given the facts, the 
temptation to explain the prevailing instability in ter.. ot 
some single sweepinl set of generalisations is difficult to 
resist. Many Africans as well as the socialist friends of 
these newly-independent states, prefer the thesis that it 
Is all caused by massive- neo-colonialist interterence. 3 
AS an explanation it is as demeaning and condescending as 
that advanced by those who argue the basic political incompe-
tence of Africans. It is clear that the tacts support 
neither explanation. Those interim .. sess •• nts that can be 
1. Congo Kinsbasa NOV. 25, 1965; Dahomey Dec.22,1965; Central 
African aepublic JaD.I,1966; upper Velta Jaa.3,lel'; 
NIGERIA Jaa.15,1866; Buru.i Nov.28,1966; TOIO Jan.l:5,1967; 
StEm lEONE March 22,1967; GHANA Feb.24, 1966. 
2. JANUARY 25, 1971. 
3. This argumen~ bas ~be.dual utility of preserving the myth 
of the polit1cal v1rg1nity of Africans and of permitting th) 
those ~ho are fearful of the consequence of independence to 
evade 1tS responsibilities. 
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made of recent military interventioniD politics in these 
newly-independent.> Commonwealth Ai'rican states reveal that 
explanations, if there are any, must be sought within the 
particular situation of each troubled African state. 
It is worth remembering that African politics remain, 
by and large, territorially limited; in all but a few of the 
Itates the primary political imperatives of ~overnment still 
include the consolidation of power, the extension of central 
authority to the whole territory and the creation of stable, 
reliable civic loyalties. With this in mind, examination of 
post-independence instability in commonwealth __ Africa 
suggests a discussion of the role and intervention of African 
military in politics. 
Overt political intervention by Africa's military at its 
own initiative is a recent phenomenon. Before 1964, almost 
all examples of military involvement in pelitic.l crises 
e.uld be explained aa respoDses to iDitiatives taken by 
politicians. Militaty men were the instruaent o~ politic~ans 
in the mutinies in the three East African Countries of Tan-
ganyika, Uganda and Kenya. Hence a well-known writer statecl:-
"While the armed forces of Africa remain small in proportion 
to the total populations and te tbe areas of the countri •• , 
they may well intervene in polities in conjunction with otber-
elements, perhaps from the police and civil s.rvice; but they 
are unlikely to be able to consolidate tbeUo post tiona and . 
establish military regilles. They, geDe .. ally lack,the n • .,.. ... y 
profeSSional cohesion and have oot"su.tficient technical 
'know-how' to be regarded as uoiquely capable of running a 
cowatr1. This is allaost certaiDly the aoawer to 'thoae wile) 
pose the question of the possibility of military coups io 
Nigeria or more particularly Ghana when ennui or resentment 
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against the current regime become dominant emotions".l 
Within a short period, however, the military became the prin-
cipal initiator of changes in regimes, marching against all 
poli ticians in Ghana and J."igeria presumably because "ennui or 
resentment against the current regime had become dominant 
emotions." 
The armies of contemporary Africa are the direct descen-
dants of forces created by the colonial Administration. Pre-
colonial raiding forces and palace armies were disbanded or 
placed under severe. restrictions. The prime duty of the 
colonial army was internal paCification, not international 
involvement. Horder defence involved some troops, but since 
most frontiers in Africa separated non-antagonistic colonial 
powers, the main objective was prevention of smuggling. 
, . 
In the colonial period, the armies of Africa were kept 
small, pri.arily because they were intended as adjuncts of the 
administration, used to suppress do ••• tic violence. They 
supplemented police forces in restoring·calm, or by show of 
force, a reputation of rapacity, and occasionally outright 
brutality. Soldiers were often recruited from "martial" tribes, 
then stationed far from their place of origin, otten among 
traditional enemies. Ill-trained aDd ill-disciplined in many 
instances, colonial armies "were tools of the white conquerors.& 
At independence, most African military establishments were 
small, ill-equiped and short of indigenous otficers. EXpatriate 
officers tended to dominate the top command echelons. Bowever, 
1. W. Gutteridge: The ~litary Institutions and Power in the 
New states. (1964 Pall Mall Press) P. 143.. 
2. VeriG4.raerghe. "The Role ot the Army in contemporary Atricaw 
in Africa Report. March 1965, p. 14. 
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in both Nigeria and Ghana, a significant number of African 
officers could be found. Initially, the politicians enter-
tained some suspicions of their military establishments, pro-
bably because they feared that their officers, having served 
under the colonial flag, mighl still harbour divided loyalties. 
The African officers responded by positive affirmations of 
their devotion to the new regimes, and the politicians in 
turn begao to see their armies as valuable adjuncts to the 
exercise of civilian power. uradually the various officers 
corps built up. The possession of a properly equipped national 
army became a matter of national prestige, a proo.1 of the 
authenticity of independence, and sometimes a welcome aid for 
governments seeking to maintain internal peace. Within a 
couple ot years the new armies, small as they were, began to 
acquire a sense of their own importance. They were usually 
well taken care of, told of their significance, paraded in 
front of visiting dignitaries and their officers deferred to 
and consulted; officers traini(ig schools were opened in various 
countries and young intelligent men could see in the military 
stable careers aa officers with promotions and rewards coming 
as rapidly, if not more rapidly, than in civilian government 
service. 
~ tracing military intervention in .frica, one ean 
distinguish tbre~ types. The first type, relative paasivity 
and absention from political interference, was usuall, 
confined to the immediate post independence period. The armies 
remained under substantial expatriate'i~fluenee, which pre-
, . 
eluded (or certainly made more diflie~~) any •• ddling in 
politics. This was the period of "jpon-political army",l 
1. For a cattstic view of the "non-political army" in Ghana, see 
Geoffrey Bing, Re4p the whilwinp: An account of KW_e. 
Nkrumah's Ghana troll XD56-1966, (I.oodon Macgibbon & lee 
1968) pp. 416-38. . '. 
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in which a commander such as General Alexander could proclaim, 
"in the armed forces we were practically free froID this taint 
(of politics)".l The second type of involvement saw resentlDent' 
against European officers and African political leaders explode 
in mutinies. These outbursts were not intended - at least not 
directly - to unseat the government in control. They were 
aimed rather at forcing the government t9 ad9pt-certain 
policies, notably higher pay, pension privileges, or immediate 
Africanisation of the officer corps. COup d,'etat, the third 
type, brought full-scale military involvement iD politics. 
The occupants of presidential palaces were removed, possibly 
executed; into their offices moved the initiators of the 
intervention or their nominees, intent on "restoring" the 
country to "normal" patterns. 
By 1963 mo~t armies in the newly-independent AfricaD 
countries had become important political tools, a stable and 
reliable prop for the regim., They bad diSCipline, cobesioD 
and purpose. These characteristics increasingly stood out ia 
relief as their political systems turDed sour around the.. Not 
surprisingly many African military leaders became more and more 
estranged from politicians and the temptation to intervene to 
'save' the country was probably becoming too stroag to resist. 
EVidence suggests that tbe key officera in Nigeria aad Ghana 
had become convinced by late 1965 tbat only they could rescue 
their countries from collapse, chaos or disaster, or alltbree. 2 
They were saving the national patrimony, :they 8aiu, andwheD 
they succeeded in seizing and holding pow~r, they were believed, 
applauded and bailed as saviou&'S. ADd in each of the countries, 
the politicians (described in such ter.s as greedy, corrupt etc) 
were the particy!ar tarsets. 
1. H. T • Alexander, Atrica Tightrope: J.\Ytwo years as ~ '. 
Chief 01 Stafl (New York, Praeger, 1966) p. 20. 
2. See Afrita, A., Tbe Ghana coup (London 1966) and Gutteridge 
w. F. The Military in African Politics (Methuen 1965). 
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It was no surprise that in these countries, following 
military takeover, political parties were banned altogether 
or temporarily dissolved and that the new governments were 
typically composed of a combination of military men and 
"technicians". It must be added that rationalising their 
interventions apparently did not completely free the new 
military rulers from all lingering doubts abo~ the pro-
priety of their actions. They promised that at some later 
date when the policy bad been purified, civilian rule would 
be permitted to return. It is true that in Nigeria the 
promise have become increaainly vague as the magnitude of 
the job of ruling became clear to the military rulers. 
Tbe Military seizures of control that rocked the sub-
Saharan area, particularly that within this area of study, 
from mid-1965 on cannot be attributed to a single factor. 
Tbe complexities of events belies simple, unicausal analysis. 
It is tempting to speculate that a successful military 
coup in one African country may have encoaraged officers in 
others to try the same thing. There is, however, no direct 
evidence that anyone coup was connected with any other, and 
it has yet to be demostrated that there has developed in 
Africa what some analysts call 'a culture of violence' in 
which resort to violence or coup d'etat becomes a natural 
and accepted way of bringing about po·li tical change. However, 
the major political upheavals caused by military intervention 
in some of the newly-independent African count~ies have this 
in common, that they took place in countries whose political 
- , 
or economic systems were on the verge of collapse or at least 
appeared to be, which to the military men involved amounted 
to the same tbing. The specific connection between economic 
and political cri.es and military intervention is admittedly 
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hard to prove. The evidence does, however, permit the con-
clusion that there may have been some connection in the sense 
that incipient governmental collapse contributedto or trig-
gered military intervention. The distinction between real 
and imagined is made because what is important was the per-
ception of the situation by the military actors. One may say 
that neither of the three west African countries, nor Uganda, 
was really on the verge of political or economic chaos, but 
it is a fact that in the west African countries, either 
political or economic conditions had deteriorated to the point 
where the soon-to-be displaced rulers themselves publicly 
voiced alarm about t~em. It is also a fact that in all these 
countries, there was a declining prestige of the major poli-
tical party, as exemplified by (a) increased reliance upon 
force to achieve complIance, lb) a stress upon unanimity in 
the face of centrifugal forces and (c) consequent denial of 
effective political choice. TO illustrate these generalisa-
tions each country must be examined individually. 
The case 01" Ghana. 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had pioneered tbe route to freedom from 
colonial rule in Africa. In so doing he bad.procl~ed an 
idealism concerning African unity which appealed to the youtb 
of Ghana as well as in other states of tb~ c()nt:i.nent.. Gbana 
was, moreover, at independence more ecoDomically sound and 
more homogenous and tberefore more politically stabla.tban 
otber African atates. In other words Ghana was Dearer to 
being ODe nation than most of ber conte.por~i.8 and to 80ae 
extent ripe for exploitation and leadership by a man who 
sougbt to glorify Ghanaian and thereby African aChievement. 
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As a country also it possessed an exceptionally well developed 
elite, including an efficient civil service and sound security 
forces in which a professional code of behavioup was noted. 
These facts to a certain extent inhibited the emergence of 
open protest and dissent against an authoritarian regime. 
Pronouncements by the leaders of the 1966 coup almost invari-
ably stress their original reluctance to be involved in uncon-
stitutional action. The seeds of the Ghana coup inevitably 
germinated slowly. 
In 1957 newly independent Ghana inherited from the 
British a small army of three battalions of infantry and 
ancillary troops which vas still commanded by Briti.~ Officers. 
Africanisation of the office~ corps was proceeding at a reason-
able speed and was already being reinforced by the selection 
of more senior ranks for staft and specialist training. In 
the next three years plans were made to accelerate officer 
productioD and to expand the army over a period ot'years. 
At this stage, the foreign support lor the Ghana armed forces 
came primarily from Britain, though Indians and Israelis were 
introduced to help the development of the Air Force. 
In a small Dew state the Army is necessarily less 
isolated lrom political developments than in advanced western 
countries, particularly where there is one all pervasi" 
politic a party and not mucb formalised opposition. Never-
thelessthere were 'yery few military persodael in 1960wbo 
were nup to their aecksin party politics- in .pita of the 
personal promotion advat\tages wIlieb might ba.. bee. ass.ed 
to aCCrue to individuals who chose this line of action. 
The early months of 1960 vere characterised bY'Nkrumah's 
-329-
taking a more constructive interest in the armed services. 
Late in 1959 he had initiated the training of an air force 
and had also spent mcuh time disussing officer provision. 
The result was the establishment in March 1960 of the Ghana 
~1ili tary Academy at Teshie, east of Accra on the road to Tema; 
here a cadet course was organised on ~andhurst lines with a 
British Commandant, Director of Academic studies, and supporting 
staff of whom a small minority were initially Ghananian. The 
objective was accelerated Africanisation on the best terms 
possible. 
In July 1960 the establishment of the Republic of 
Ghana with Nkrumah as President was followed closely by the 
Congo crisis. These two events can in retrospect be seen to 
have marked the beginning of the real deterioration in Nkrumah's 
relations with the Army and its attitude towards hia. Though 
he cultivated the officer corps with.b ... uets and other signs 
of anxiety to .aintain their loyalty, the combination of a 
greater power of interference by the presi~ent in military 
affairs with the strain of actual operations in the interna-
tional limelight created foci of infla.ation which eDlars-. 
over the years as the regime became more fea«al and oppressive. 
The revision of the Ghana constitution in 1960 was 
important in this connection in that it entrenched the position 
of the President in a number of ways. Effectively, only the 
size and formal initiative or raising ar.ed torces rested with 
Parliament thereafter. The H.ad of ~tate acquired powers to 
dismiss or suspend Military PersoDnel aDd to exercise a veto 
on an officer's authority. He could require the defence forces 
to engage in an operation tor any or a .amber of specific 
purposes or for "any other expedient purpose.-l 
1. Republican Constitution of tihana 1960. Art. 54. 
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1be immediate involvement of the Ghana Army in the Congo 
in July 1960 was in part ma'. practicable by the president's 
newly acquired authority. Broadly speaking, the experience 
of the Army in the congo devel.ped the Ghanaian soldiers pride 
and confiuence in themselwes. But they also began to be dis-
trustful of political leadership, first of all that of others -
particularly in view of the chaotic disorder into which the 
Congolese people and the "Force PUblique" had got themselves 
and then their own. It was not only the special initiative of 
Nkrumah in providing Ghanaian troops for the Congo in antici-
pation of United Nations intervention which tended to place 
those troops in anadbiguous position, it was also the special 
relationship of Ghana's President with Patric.Lumumba. The 
relationship of Ghana's conti~geDt to the United Nations 
command was continually .. barrassed by the activities of the 
two Ghanaian political representatives in Leopoldville, Andrew 
Djin and N. A. Welbeck. This began a process which was tiDally 
to erase confidence in the political leadership from the minds 
of many officers. 
In political terms then the COngo operation vas a scaring 
and formative experience for the Ghana contingent. Colonel 
Airifa in his book The Ghana coup, 24th February, 1966,1 
expressed this view: 
"The fault was that of our politicians at hom. 
who bad placed us ander the co.mand of the 
United Nations, aD~ at the .. me tiae takeD 
active and sinister sides in tbe whole Congo 
Affair • • • Ivame Nkrumab bad placed us 1n 
a terrible·dilemma threugb aD ~r141.d pOli-
tical adventure. He appointed and directed a 
stream of stupid aabas8~.rs like A.Y.K. Djin 
and N. j. Welbeck ••• could it~ibat we bad 
been sent to the Congo to foster the ambitition 
of Kwame Nkrumah?" 
1. London 1966, page 66. 
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Thereafter the fear that the presiaent would commit the. 
to some potentially disgraceful and disastrous adventure was a 
matter of intense concern to some Ghanaian Officers. A 
succession of events at home also tended to reinforce the dev~ 
loping distrust of politicians. The general strike starting 
in western Ghana in 1961 involved the use of Army units and 
the virtual ringing of Accra by a force. The coincidence of 
the ending of the Sekondi - Takoradi strike with the dismissal 
of several British Officers reflected both: Nkruah's largely 
unwarranted doubts about the willingness of such officers to 
carry out his orders in a serious internal political crisis. 
From 1962 onward the upward spiral of Nkrumah's fears for 
his own security began to affect the Army. The attempted assa-
ssination by bomb at Kulungugu in the North of Ghana on 1st 
August 1962 followed by aD explosion Dear Flagstatf House, 
Accra, early in september evidently caused the President to 
rethink the problem of his protection. He sought help from 
communist countries in constructing a personal guard 'unit and 
tried to establish tighter personal control over 'the pollee 
force. The suspicion that army personnel were impiieat •• in 
Kulungugu bomb affair caused bim to turn to non";'-Atricans tor 
protection. At this.tage he created the preaident's Own 
Guard Regiment and stocks of Russian weapons were aecummulated. 
The regular ~1Js reaction to these aanoeuvres, wbieb 
were accompan~ed by a rUQ-dewD of equip.ent.and geDeral neglect 
of their interests, was naturally one of resentment. At an 
earlier stage, tbere had beeD so •• att •• pt to insiall political 
agents ar "Coamisars· in arm~ nnits which lneitably involved 
a disruption of the Army hierarchy •. , BY 1964: it was clear tbat 
there was a real danger that the only iaatttll.'iioD capable of 
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resisting Nkrumah by force would before long lose its 
effectiveness. However, there is no evidence of any serious 
propositions of resisting the determination of the Army's 
national position. Colonel Afrifa claims "that the possibility 
crossed his mind in 1962 and was revived more practically only 
to be blocked by the suspicions of the counter intelligence 
organisation in 1964."1 
The development already described and other indications 
such as the tentative steps to militari •• the workers Brigade 
seemed to the Army a threat to its own professional existence 
and the Air Force and the Navy were equally nervous of what 
might follow. The threat to the integrity of the various 
elements in the Ghanaian elite combined with the Pres1i.nt's 
rapidly declining foreign prestige and the economic chaos in 
the country arising from prestige spending seemed to bring 
the situation to a head and to precipitat.a coup. Unti. 
further evidence is published there see. small reason to doubt 
the account given by Colonel Afrifa in his book. a They see. 
to have been reinforced in their intentions by tbe overt 
relationships of some of the officer corps w1tb the politi-
cians. Alrita refers to the tear that Nkrumab would order 
the Army to take inaependent action against Rbodea1a and 
confirms his belief in a "non military solution". He says:3 
"Among our troops Nkrumah became unpopular 
because of this. They realised that be was 
sending them to war without proper equipment 
and without adequate preparation. The ~eDt 
they started complaining I knew that the days 
of the Convention peoples' party were numbered." 
1. The Ghana coup, 24th February 1966, (London, 1966) p. 85. 
2. Afrita OPe cit. p. 96. 
3. Ibid. pp. 104-5. 
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whether the rank and file were as disconcerted as 
Afrifa implies, is doubtful but it is clear and obviously 
tenable that the coup was not only the last resort against 
an unpopular government but also the only means, in .he 
circumstances, of overthrowing President Nkrumah. Colonel 
Afrifa's words are categorical: 
"Where there was no constitutional means of 
offering a political opposition to the one-
party government the Armed Forces were auto-
matically made to become1the official opposi-
tion of the Government." This and the ripeness 
of popular discontent - there were hundreds of people in deten-
tion for unstated and undisclosed reasons - carried the select 
group of officers trained in the allegedly ~olitical British 
tradition through the resistance of their own consciences, but 
only their own ingenuity and discretion enabled them to achieve 
surprise in an informer-ridden society. Nkrumah's departure 
for Peking and Hanoi was cho~en as the signal because it was 
probably rightly felt that his absence would make the coup 
easier and less bloody. On ~ebruary 23, the military toppled 
Nkrumah's regime and the following day colonel Kotoka2 announced 
on the air that lithe myth surrounding Nkrumah •• ,been broken. ,,3 
within a brief time the whole superstructure of the 
Nkrumah regime collapsed in such a way as to de-oastrate the 
unique degree to which even the (Onventio. People8' party 
had been dependent upon Nkrumah's own inflated personality. 
1. Ibid p. 31. 
2. col. Kotoka was killed in a subsequent attempted 
counter coup. 
3. AfriIa, Ope cit. p. 35. 
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Almost without a break the administration of the country 
was picked up by the National Liberation ~ouncil (NLC). 
The leaders of the Ghana coup were no exception to the 
usual rule that military leaders intervening in politics 
rarely have preconceived policies which they intend to apply. 
Essentiall~such groups beg~n by administering rather than 
governing: they are caret~ers whose initial intention is 
often to end a trend of which they do not approve and to 
provide the framework within which government can be enabled 
to set off on a fresh' course. They are not likely to have 
plans for wide-spread change and the effect of their seizure 
of power may be virtually to wipe the political and consti-
tutional statls clean. 
tiThe immediate post-revolutionary state of the 
successor government is the political equivalent 
of that of the newborn babe. In it the functions 
of government are reduced to the minimum compatible 
with the survival of the social organism and the 
extension of political control throughout it from 
the initial stage of mere existence ... l 
The first phase of the post-coup administration was 
predictably a condemnation of the corruption< add malad-
ministration of its predecessor - thos~ fac~were its 
raison d'etre, but even in his first major speech, a radio 
broadcast four days after the coup, General ADkrab2 stressed 
the intention of returning to genuinely democratic practices. 
He also said that the new government would resist all actions 
aimed at the undeemining of the integrity of other African 
1. Peter A. R. calvert, t4Re.elution" the Polities of 
Violesce" in Political studies, vol. 15 No.1, February, 
1967, p. 11; 
2. He was named the chairman of the National Liberation 
council. 
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states and would cultivate a gen.ine non-alignment in 
foreign policy. 
The first weeks and months of the new administration in-
volved the dismantling of the complex ramifications of the 
old regime. While Nkrumah's opponents held in prison under 
the Vreventive vetention Act were released en masse, 
political parties were banned and polticiansand administr~ 
tors with known (';onvention peoples Party affiliations were 
arrested and placed in protective custodyl pending a 
screening procedure which was, on the whole, operated with 
a reasonable sense of urgency. 
Just over a year after the original coup, an amateur 
counter-coup came near to success and in the process caused 
the death of General Kotoka. This counter-coup bas gene-
rally been described as not essentially political and as 
ari.ing from the discontent of Junior Officers. In so far 
as its motives 'are at all clear, it might be classified a$ 
primarily an inter-generational conflict of the kind which 
is prone to emerge in rapidly expanded armies when promotion 
pro.pects eventually decline. The murder ot General 
Kotoka had grave implications for the l;ouncil's effectiveness 
which it subsequently managed to weather. In many respects 
the attempted counter-coup did not alter the re-development 
of the country by the Dew regime. 
The extent ,to which Ghana,bec8JIle a .tlttar,. regia. is 
disputable. Martial law was Dever declared at any ataa. 
alt~\lgh it is true that the Army was at aa early a~.e 
given the arbitrary power .f arresting perSOD. tbought to 
be engaged in subTeraive activitie., &aU the CODstitaiie. 
1. Protective Custody Decree 1966. NLC Decree NO.2.' 
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was suspended together with its already inadequate protection 
of fundamental human rights. In this respect it might 
thereby bave attracted some of the dislike directed against 
the previous regime, but it appears that at no stage did 
the use of arbitrary emergency powers approach the height 
it did during the Nkrumah regime. 
'rhe Ghana coup reflected clearly the power of the 
security forces especially in a small and compact country 
to take over the administration and to provide the opportu-
nity for a reappraisal of the political situation. stability 
in Ghana has involved a reversion to knowovalues. Nkrumah's 
creation oL rival institutions, especially to the Army, was 
probably more important than the kind of idealism expressed 
by colonel Afrifa in spurring the Army into action against 
his regime. The superior organisation ot the Army enabled 
them to assume power. They made progress in many cases 
towards cleaning up the mess left by politicians, but to do 
so the officers had to rule by decree like an old-time 
colonial government or the post-independence civilian gover.-
ment assuming emergency powers. But the question is whether 
in future the armed forces will be able to resist intervening 
again when a new political party in office pursue policies 
which they are disposed to criticise. 
SIERRA LEONE AND THREE COUPS. 
In some respects the sequence of events in Sierra-
Leone has adhered to the African 'pattern'. Tbe political 
leadership of a post-colonial state had been under$iDed by 
corruption and the quest for personal power, and was 
replaced by a military junta. If the 'pattern' were to be 
maintaiued, the stability of the country might. be further 
endangered by conflict within the army itself, arising from 
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the personal ambitious and tribal affiliations of individual 
officers. Until 1967, however, there had been reason for 
hoping that Sierra Leone might have avoided this process of 
post-colonial decay. That Sierra Leone should have suffered 
the same fate as that of many other new African states 
confirms the fact the future depends more than anything on 
the personal characters and ambitions of the men in power. 
The instability of 8ierra Leone dates not from the attainment 
of independence in 1961 but from the death of its first pri.e 
Minister, Sir Milton Margai in 1964. 
The Sierra Leone Peoples' party (SLPP) bad won the post-
independence elections in 1962 under bir MiltDn's leadership, 
but had suffered considerable loss of popularity since his 
death. His successor, his brother sir Albert Margai, never 
enjoyed his popularity with the electorate. Faced with 
accusations of corruption and with a sharp decline in the 
country's economy, Sir Albert had good cause to fear the out-
co~e of the 1967 elections. Support tor the Opposition All 
Peoples' congress (APe) was' growing rapidly, especially among 
the northern tribes and in Freetown, while opposition to him 
within his own party was likewise growing. sir Albert, an 
adviser of Nkrumah, had been advocating the introduction of 
a one-party state to secure his own position. Nkrumah's down-
fall cast shadow over this plan, and the pressure of public 
opinion forced him to abandon the idea. He made a subsequent 
attempt to amend the constitution in his own favour by pro-
posing a new republican form of government, under which his 
own powers would have been greatly increased. constitutionally, 
however, this proposal could only be fiDally ratified by the 
House of Represantatives atter a general election, so that he 
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was unable to avoid going to the polls. Election were 
scheduled for March, and he resorted to a variety of measures 
to ensure that he would retain power. 
With the fate of the political leaders of Ghana and 
Nigeria fresh in his mind, Sir Albert was understandably 
nervous of the role his army might play during the elections. 
The Commander, Brigadier Lansana, waS a close friend and a 
member of the same Mende Tribe, but the effectiveness of his 
command was in doubt, and he had been defied in 1966 by some 
of his junior officers. Opposition was expected from tbe 
northern officers in particular, led by Colonel sangura, and 
it therefore came as no surprise when Sir Albert announced 
the discovery of a 'plot' against him, early in February 1967. 
Colonel Bangura was arrested together witb six of his fellow 
officers, all of them nortberners or Guineans. Tbe p~aetical 
effect of their removal was to leave the army firmly in the 
control of Brigadier Lansana. As an extra precaation, Sir 
Albert adopted tbe course of threatening the country with a 
foreign arllY; be bast1,ly concluded an anti-subversion pact 
with President Sekou Toare of Guinea, and units of the 
Guinean army took up positioDS along the border. 
Sir Albert DOW felt secure enough to deal with the 
threat from tbe electorate. Before the electiofts weee beld, 
six of the SLPP candidates were declared elected Runopposed, 
including Sir Albert hillse'lf, bis younger brother Sam and two 
of his Ministers. Tbis disqualification of their opponents 
vas subsequently upheld by the Mende-dominated Electoral 
Commission. Ensuing demonstration by APe supporters were put 
down withihe help ot the army. 
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Tbe sixty remaining seats for ordinary members of the 
House were contested on Narch 17, 1967, and the APe was able 
to secure a majority over the SLPP. All the main mass 
information media under the control of sir Albert announced 
the results in such a way as to make it appear that the SLPP 
had won. 1 The Governor-General Light-Foot-Boston attempted 
to resolve the situation by inviting the APe and the SLPP to 
form a coalition, but biaka btevens the Leader of the APe 
rejected this offer. On March 21, the Governor-General 
ignoring threats from Brigadier Lansana, swore Siska stevens 
as the new Prime Minister. 
constitutional Justification. 
Tbe Constitution Law concerning the Governor-General's 
action is clear. paragraphs 58(2) and 64(1) of ~be QOast1-
tution empower him to appoint as Prime Minister, "in aceordance 
with his own deliberate judgment", that .ember or parliament 
"who appears to him likely to command tbe support of :tile 
majori ty of members of the house." In this context, the . 
Dove-Edwin Commissiort'recalled that the appointment of Sir 
.Hilton Margai as Prime:'Minister in 1962 bad Ret beeD.qu.eati.onet, 
th&ugh the election of that year bad no,t given aDy part,. an 
over-all majority in the Honse, and concluded that .the. 
Governor-General's interpretation ot his powers OD 21 Maroh .. 
bad been entirely jUstified. 3 The Attorney"'Qeneral, Bertbaa 
Naeaulay, bad advilSed the GOYernor-lieneral,that in hi. 0 •• 
view 'that the duty of the Governor-General is Bo,t to d.eter-
mine 'What person has tbesupport of tile, Il&~rit.y of til., , 
members of the House.' His duty1si "te .. aenniDe vqat .per.~n 
1. See HulBpbey .. :laher,· 'Elections aud coups in Sierra Leone, 
1967.' in Journal of MOliern African btudies (1969) Vol.7 No. 
4 pages 6~4 ~ 6~6.J _ . 
2. set up to iDquire into a~legations of illegal practices :In 
connection with the election. 
3. Report of the l)ove-Edwin c.;ommission pp. 16 '& 19. 'Wade and 
~yer refuted as 'baseless' LaQ$an~'s occusations that the Go~ernor-uenera! acted anconst1tut10nally. see Annual 
Survey of Commonwealth Law 1967 (London 1968) p. 78. 
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is likely to command the support of the majority of the 
members of the house."l 
This emphasises that the tiovernor-General hus the' 
right and even the duty to exercise his discretion. He did 
so, and to disagree with his judgment is not at all to prove 
that he should not have done so. Even if the tiovernor's 
critics had a legitimate grievance, that would be far from 
demonstrating that military revolution was the proper way 
to express it. 
Declaration 01" Nartial Law. 
Brigadier LansaDa acted with military promptness, 
martial law was declared before Siaka stevens could leave 
~tate House. The Governor-General was accused of baving 
acted unconstitutionally in appointing Steveasas prime 
Minister and Lansana, adopting the title of "Chief custodian 
of state Security", announced that the two men were under 
house arrest iifor their own safety." In his broadcast to 
the nation be saia, " •••••• No party has as yet got a 
sufficient number to form an overall majority of the members 
of Parliament. Only this morning at about 10.30, the 
Governor-General asaared me that he would not proceed with 
the appointment of a Prime Minister unti' he had bad con-
sultations on Wednesday March, 22. That is tomorrow. This 
(the swearing in of stevens as Prime Minister) is an attempt 
to ignore the constitution and seize power by force. This, 
as I assured the Governor-General this morning, will lead 
to chaos and civil war. As a custodian of state security, 
I bave,decit1ed to protect the constitution and maintain 
law and order. Therefore, fro. Dew •• , we are operatiag 
under martial law.· I repeat, we are operating under 
martial law.-
1. Letter of 4th t"ebruary, 1967 from AttorneY-General to 
Governor-General quoted by Fisher: Ope cit. p. 627. 
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Lansana then summoned the newly elected members of the 
House of Representatives to a meeting in Freetown in order 
to resolve the crisis. But the meeting never took place. 
Popular feeling was outraged in Freetown when they heard 
of the Lansana "coup", and barricades were thrown up by a 
huge crowd and a number of people were killed and injured 
in sporadic incidents. It wa. apparent that Sir Albert 
would not be able to retain power against the strong tide 
of public opinioB and that Brigadier Lansana was also UD-
popular both with the populace and the army for him to be 
able to exercise effective control on ~ir Albert's behalf. 
The ~ounter-coup 
Accordingly on 23rd Narch, two days after he Ilad taken 
power, Brigadier Lansana was arrested by three of bis junior 
officers and taken into "protective custody" along with 
Siaka ~tevens and .;)ir Albert 1'1argai. 
'lbe new junta said, ........ we, the senior Officers, 
have since noticed tbat the attitude of the tlrigadier was 
not to bring about the creation of a national government but 
to impose ~ir Albert Margai as Prime Minister." So they 
immediately suspended the constitution, deposed the Governor-
General and dissolved all forms of r.presentative government 
both national and local. Political parties were banned and 
the press subsequently forbidden to indulge in any political 
,\.; , 
comment or 'defamation' of the military regime. Tbe junta 
assumed absolute power itself, adoiting the title of 
National Reformation council lNRC) and claimed to have 
1. Lt.col.uenda was appointed aa tlae~ t;ilainaan o£<tlle NRC. 
Genda had been sent into diplomatic exile in New York 
in 1966. However, before be had tbe to return to S&rra-
Leene, he was replaced by Col. J. Smith it was alleced that 
be was prevented from entering the country. 
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a variety of patriotic motives. 
At first a long tradition of freedom appeared to have 
ended, for Col. Juxtoa-Smith speaking to the nation explained 
the effect of martial law thus " ••..• Let me say this now, 
there is martial law in Sierra Leone. Perhaps it wasn't 
explained to the populace what martial law means. It means 
that military law is supreme to civil law, and that anybody 
who does any act or conduct or neglect (1) which is ••••••• 
which is prejudicial to the interest of the state, that 
person will be immediately court-martialled, the maximum 
sentence for which is death. And I'll have no scruples in 
whatsoever to confirm the sentence, because as commander-
in-Chief and Head of State it comes to me for confirmation 
•.•.••• you will be immediately apprehended, you wilL be 
tried by Court-martial and you will be shot by a firing 
squad. That is what martial law means ••••••••• "l 
within a few days, however, the pressure of public 
opinion was already reasserting itself in the capital and 
the army - although supported by the police - began to feel 
insecure in its new govermag"role. The s.all size of the 
army, combined with the doubtful loyalties of its rank and 
file, made it impossible for the NRC to impose any violent 
measures. Tbe release of Brigadier Lansaua from detention 
a lIere forthnight after his "act of treason" was net vell 
received in Freetown, bowever, and the regime soon found it 
necessary to release Siaka stevens and seven other army 
officers who bad been detained by Sir Albert in February. 
Hewever, the NRC OD ~arch 26, tight •• ed arma relulatio •• 
and former ministera and other deplltiea were o~r" t. 
return government ears aad vacate geveMHllent Ia.UiOSi. .i. 
may bave been' the first sign of the NRC's realisation of past 
1. See Fisher, Ope cit. p. 635. 
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political corruption. NRC proclamation of the same date 
suspended parts of the Constitution, authorised the NRC to 
suspend auy others at any time and reiroactively to March 
23, and empowered the NRC to detain at will in the interest 
of public order and sarety.l 
After a series of demonstrations in April in Freetown, 
a civilian National Advisory Council was appoi.~.d to work 
out a new Constitution and the eventual return to civilian 
government. The NRC had in fact lost much of its effective 
power during its first few weeks and government policy was 
increasingly determined and controlled by the civil service. 
The de facto Government began to look les8 like a atratocracy 
and more like a bureaucracy, in which the military NRC ruled 
by decree on the advice of government officials. 
The Third Coup. 
Amid spreading rumours that the NRC Chairman Lt. Col. 
Juxton Smith was planning to declare Sierra-Leone a Republic 
with himself as President, the NCO's2 and enlisted men 
staged their own coup during the night of Apri1 18, 1968. 
By the next day, nearly all officers of the army and police 
had been rounded up and locked in Pademba Road Prison in 
Freetown. The NCO's set up a National Interim Council that 
V .. pledged to restore civilian rule and on April 26, after 
consultations between the All people Con,ress (APe) aDd the 
Sierra Leone Peoples' party (SLPP) leaders, Siaka St •• eDs 
wal once again sworn in as Prime Minister, this time ~s Head 
of a coalition Government of APe, SLPP and independen~s. The 
new Civilian Govern_ent bas kept on the books tbe NRC decrees 
allowing for preventive detention and forbidding meetiDgI of 
political parties. 
1. s. 6. 
2. NON-Commissioned Officers. 
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It could be said that the original bierra Leone coup 
leaders and the NRC which they forlled, disregarded in a 
unique fashion the recip~ for a successful coup. They 
seized power for predominantly selfish reasons and in so 
dOing thwarted the popular political will. In power they 
failed to live up tb ·the image of the upright patriotic 
soldier and thus provoked an 'other rank' rising o£ tbe 
kind which has rarely been successful. By interfering with 
political evolution, however briefly and accidentally, they 
showed clearly that while the Army is the convenient &gent 
for the suspension of activities in a deterioratiDg situation, 
it is inherently unsuited for the task of political reorien-
tation, and when it fails even for a time to 'clean-up' tbe 
administration, it may become a force tending to encourage 
instability rather than the reverse. 
'£he Nigerian Tragedl. 
At the beginning of 1966 there were about ten thousand 
Nigerians professionally und~r arms, of whom about eigh* 
thousand were in the Army. The Army was organised in normal 
circumstances into two brigades with headquarters at Apapa 
in Lagos and at Kaduna (in the then Northern Region) 
respectively. There were five infantry batallions each of 
between seven and eight hundred men, three of which were 
stationed at Abeokuta (Western state), EDugu (in the former 
Eastern Region) and Ikeja (near the Lagos International Air-
port) and two more located at Kaduna. Largely because of the 
attitude of the former Northern Region Government the 
greatest concentration of troapswas at Kaduna, where the 
batt~ion barracks were conveniently close to tbe Government 
buildings and Ministerial residences. The Kaduna District 
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also included the Military Academj, the Air Force Training 
Centre and the Ordnance Factory. Like most African Armies, 
the Nigerian at the time of the coup consisted essentially 
of Second World war Infantry Battalions plus certain 
ancillaries. 
lbe Nigerian Army had served with relative distinction 
in the United Nations Force in the Congo and in 1964 replaced 
the Royal Marine commando in helping the Tanzanian Govern-
ment through the difficult perion after the Army Mutiny 
there. AS far as training and procedure wer~ concerned 
the Nigerian force conformed to the Commonwealth pattarn 
which had proved useful in terms of standardisation in the 
congo operation. 
As far as personnel was concerned, the Army was widely 
regarded as the leaS:t tribalistic of Nigerian institutions 
even by those who in 1966 appeared by their actions to con-
tradict the valiaity of this view. Nevertheless it is true 
that at the time of the initial coup the three most senior 
Officers promoted to their ranks on a combination of merit 
and length of service represented respectively the three 
main regions and that both the battalion commander at Enugu 
and the Brigadier in Kaduna were Yorubas, while the Distri~ 
commander in the South was a Kanuri from the North. It maY'.'J 
well be that this kind of common sense dispersion was in 
itself a precaution against tibalism not far beneath the 
surface. l 
1. During the earlier emergency in the f.r.e~ western 
Region capital, Ibadan, the expatriate G. O. C. had him-
self bad virtually to take command to obviate tribal 
difficulties in spite of his own delicate position. 
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'!'he coup of 15 January 1966 did not, of course, derive 
solely, if at all, from tensions within the Army itself. 
Discontent with the distribution of power was more widely 
based than a single institution but perhaps also found its 
expression in the Army. There was also resentment against 
corruption in high place both at the l"ederal and Regional 
levels and in the former western Region acute dissatisfaction 
with the results of the alleged rigged election of October 
1965 and the manner of their achievement. Hostility to 
individual politicians varied in intensity; the Federal 
Prime ~Jinister, the late :::,ir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, seemed 
simply to lack the power to pursue his own policies and to 
control the excesses of his colleagues; to the Federal 
Finance ~iinis ter; the late Chief .r'es tus Okotie-Ebob, was 
popularly and probably righily attributed massive misappro-
priation of the nation's financial resources; and the late 
sardauna of ~okoto and late Chief a. L. Akintola, then 
Premier of Western Region, were regarded as baving secured 
to themselves political power and influence beyond that 
which they could rightly claim to be based on popular 
support. l suspicion that the Sardauna intended by some 
means to tighten the Northern grip on the Federal power 
machine was also an important factor in the timing of the 
coup. Though it will be difficult in view of the deaths of 
so many of the participants to eataQlish fin~lly the whoile 
truth, there is no doubt that, by a number of offi~ers who 
were responsible for the events of January 15, 1966, their 
action was seen as preempting decisive intervention by the 
opposing taction. 
1. All the aiore-mentioned personalities were kill .. 
in the coup. 
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The Reg~onal Election of 1965 in the former western 
Region had been followed by such a degree of violent dis-
order that the possibility of using the Army on a large 
scale had clearly been in the minds of some political 
leaders. A massive action against opposition elements 
in the former western Region was Dot acceptable to Ibo 
Elements at least in the Army and the fear of such a 
decision seems to have been the key factor in bringing 
plans for a coup to a degree of ripeness. Tb8ugh there 
are good and obvious grounds for believing that tbe plotters 
felt it necessaryio any case to wait for the end of the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in Lagos before 
taking action, the spark whiGh caused the explosion appears 
to have been a meeting in Kaduna on ~Tiday, 14 January, 1966, 
at Which it was alleged plans were made for military action 
aimed at settling the state of disorder in tbe former 
western Region. 
On tiunday, 16 January" 1966, those members of the 
Nigerian cabinet who were still available in Lagos met 
under the Chairmansbip of Albaji zanna oipcharima and agr~ed 
to band over Government temporarily to the Army and the 
Police. l At 11.50 p. m. on that night, the acting president2 
announced in a braadcast that the council of Ministers had 
unanimously agreed to hand over the uovernment of the, : 
!flederation to tbe armed It'orces with Major-General Aguiyi-
Ironsi as ~upreme ~ommander of the Military UQvernment, wbo 
promptly decreed tbe creation or Regional Military Govern-
mentsresponsible to the }o'ederal Military Gover.JlIIIent.:3 ' 
1. For a detailed account of the course of events of1be coup 
see west Africa. Jan. 22,1966. ' 
2. G. N. 147 Federal Gazette 1966. President Azikiwe was 
absent on leave in Britain for health reasons. 
3. G.N. 148. Decree No. 1 of 1966 Constitution (Suspension 
and Modification) Decree. 
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When the Military came to power they met with a great 
welcome from those echelons who wished for modernisation 
and nation-building and who were impatient with the corrup-
tion of the old order. Almost all sections initially welcomed 
the change. In spite of a careful beginning, however, rela-
tionship between the various groups in the Army and the 
Government deteriorated almost from the startaC Ironsi's 
administration. In spite or perhaps because of the carefully 
impartial selection of Regional Governors to suit local need~ 
the suspicions and mistrusts generated earlier and brought to 
a head by the event of January 15 inevitably festered. 
with the overthrow of civilian rule, the peculiar 
violence of tribal confrontations arose from the Military 
Government's ineptitude in dealing with a situation of 
cleavage and its initial lack of skill in the task ofco.flict 
resolution. Tbe Military tailed to realise that they bad 
a political function to fulfil in terms of representation of 
diverse interests aDd mobilisation of opinion. Their Datural 
bitterness with the corraption of the political cIa •• pre-
viously in power blinded them to the fact that political 
ecbelon had some real skills in conflict resolution and that 
there were many politicians wbo were not discredited. 
The hostility of the Military to the political ecnelen 
springs from a variety of caases. Soldier. belieye tbat 
politicians are too talkative, tbe Militar1 etboa is like . 
tbat contaioed in the Hausa proverb "aai facia ba aai.,.i 
SU8utu ba" (the warrior is not talkative). They believe that 
politicians do not speak tbe truth and tbat •• ldler.do, 
that politiciansceDcentrated Gil t~. ibatd1v1de 1n order 
to muster su~port whereas the Miliatry create unity. The 
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Military are accustomed to controlling their lower ranks by 
a strict command in which obedience and loyal~y are the 
prime values. The idea of leaders taking advice from the 
led or altering their course according to the feeling 
expressed by the lower ranks is repugnant to their idea of 
command. 
After the take-over, even though, there were no longer 
any formal institution of representation,l the function of 
representing divergent interests bad to be aggregated and 
uneducated people mobilised not just by orders but by a seDse 
of participation; and sense of legality bad to be created and 
conflicts bad to' be reconciled. It'or these tasks tile aeans 
whiCh have proved adequate for rUDDing a regiaent are insuffi-
cient within the body politic.. The 8mall proportion of 
Military in the administration meant a heavy reliance tor 
guidance upon the Senior Civil servants. 
'Ibe July counter;coup. 
Instead of using political intermediaries to bridge the 
gap betweaa the leaders and tbe led, tbe Military reli •• 
sol.ly on tbe Civii Service. Vbe. they atruck at the 
iaterest of theae intermediaries ia the HOrta ~~ decr •• ~. 
34 aD the uaiticatien of the Civil serYice, t~. May riot. 
occured aad many. people, particularly Ibo resid.nts were 
killed. Between, May and July the Aray itself became 'increas. 
ingly po11tlclsed aad two rival groap. aros. baaed OD 
regional origin. 
Throughout Ju •• and earl~ July the e~torta or the aembera 
ot the Military GovernmeDt showed a continuedeoncern tor th. 
1. See Public Order Decree 1966 No. 33 and ClInatitutioD 
lSaepeDsien and Modification) (NO.1) Decree, 1966. 
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basie problems with which the administration was faced. 
Both Federal and Regional Military Governments then made 
considerable effort to make clear their intentions, but 
the flight from the North on the part of the Ibos had 
already begun and from this time onwards there were fre-
quent rumours of scares within Army UDits about one tribal 
group taking violent action against another. 
The counter-coup of July, for this it was, was clearly 
on tribal lines, the objects of attack in each station 
being the Ibo Officers and men. ~~r almost a day, Nigeria 
had no Government,l but at the end of it, Lieutenant -
Colonel Yakubu Gowon (as he then was) was proposed as Head 
of the GoverDBent. 2 Gowon thus took over Ironsi's rule 
faced with the tact that the basis lor Ni,eriao un~ty had 
been dissolved, which be bravely interpreted as lIeaniDi 
simply that thetproposed unitary structure was totally 
impracticable and that Nieeria would bave to be recon -
structed. 
Events from the end of July through to October 1966 
traDStor~ed the situation. certainly with the reconstruction 
of the Nigerian FOrces and subsequent break-flown 18 co_uni-
cation with what was then the EasternaegiOD and,eveatually 
1. Accounts of the events of theday are atill aot ~~. It 
is generally accepted that the units in the west ,enerally 
and in Kadaa. were in a atate Gt rebe111Gn, Hajor '...aeDeral 
Ironsi whow.a on a visit to the ,ve.tera RepoD.cap1tal, 
Ibadan, was killed together with the Military Governor ot 
that Region. It was reported that the Ilollt--senior survi-
ving Otficer, Brigadier Ogundipe, atter an abortive 
atteapt to recatn .. control of the. rebel torce., at IkeJa, 
retused to assume command of the Army aDd (iOverDlletlt. 
2. See X •• siag's op.cit 1916 p. 21613-21'~. and (1966) 
AnDual Survey of Co_onveal th lAw; (1967) PUblic La" -p. 70. 
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the preparation for war, Nigeria really ceases to be a 
valid example at least for comparative purposes of Military 
intervention in politics. 
However, like most African coups, the Nigerian event 
was partly about corruption and malpractices and a general 
disgust with wealthy politicians. a~ more accurately it 
was about the distribution of power complicated by the fact 
that the various factions were distinguishable on a tribal 
basis. "A situation which cannot be changed by const.itutional 
means invites the use of violent measures in the same way as 
a life president can only be removed by force or assassi-
nation. Hl 
Gowon Emergency: 
Gowon, tiring of the vain effort to use conciliation 
to halt the drift to disintegration,2 took personal'power 
from the Military Council by the declaration ot a state 
of Emergency in May 1967 and cut the Gordian knot by 
. 3 
creating twelve ~tates in a kind ot rough surgery. This 
action raises constitutional proble~s, but in order to 
appreciate the problems, it is necessary to go back in tim. 
to the original coup d'etat on January 15, 1966. The 
Federation's Executive and Legislative powers were vested 
in the sole person ot the Head ot the Federal Military 
Govern.eat (FMG) and Supreme Commaader of the ~ed ~rc.s 
i.e. Major~eneral Agufy! IroDsi, and the Federal EXecutive 
1. Atri!a .p. cit. 
2. hr •• tailed acc01lDt or the eveDts at conciliation ~ee 
lee.ing's op cit. w. F. Gutteridge. Tbe military in 
African politics (Henthuen 1968) p. 80 - 90. 
3. see state (Creation and Transiti.nal PrOVisions) Decree 
1967. 
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council under him. The Federal Executive Council was made 
up of the Head of the Federal Military Government and supreme 
COmmander as Presiaent, the Military Governors of the four 
Regions, the Heads and Chiefs of Statf of the three Armed 
Services and the Inspector-General of Pelice and his Deputy, 
with the Attorney-General of the Federation as adviser. l 
Its main function was to exe»cise powers vested in Ministe~ 
under the 1963 Federal Constitution. Thus the Federal 
Executive council exercised general direction and control over 
all Federal Government departments; specific executiwe powers 
vested in the Head of the Military Government by law could 
be delegated to the Feder~l EXecutive council, but Dot his 
entire executive authority, which extended to the execution 
and maintenance at the CODStitution of the Federation. 
Altbough, for the sake of convenience, the word 'Federal' was 
retained after the establi8hrDent,; of Military rl1le, in actual 
fact, the exclusive division of executive and legislative 
powers, whicb tbe term connotes, bad gone. In practice, the 
country was under the control of a Military junta known 'u 
the Supreme Military Council, which exercised tbe powers lecaa 
lly vested in the Federal Military Government. Within the 
supreme Military Council (SHe) tbe status and powers of the 
Head of tbe Federal Military Government, the PreSident, were 
much more those of a primus ibter J!r... Wbile be was 
empowered to del.egate t~ the Supr_e Military COUBctl or tbe 
Federal EX.cutiye COuneil any fUDctions unGer tbe'executive 
powers vested by law in the Head oftbe Federal Military 
Government, ke could DOt delesate· b.ia entire exec.tin 
authority. 
1. Tbe Military Adainistrator or the Federal Territory was 
later made a member of the council. 
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This situation obtained until 24 May, 1966, when Major-
General Ironsi issued his Decree 34 abolishing the Federation, 
unifying the public servicls and declaring Nigeria a unitary 
1 System of Government. On September 1, 1966, Lt. Col. 
Gowon (as he then was) who had replaced Ironsi following 
the July counter-coup, repealed Decree 34, restored the 
Federal system and revested the Federation's Executive and 
Legislative power in the Head of the Federal Military Govern-
ment, that is, himself and the Federal EXecutive Council 
under him. He reverted to the practice of allowing the 
Supreme Military Council to exercise the powers legally vested 
in the Federal Military Government. 
Early in 1967, a Decree2 was issued which vested authority 
for~erly held by Lt. Col. Gowon (as he then was) as a.ad of 
the Federal Military Government and Supreme commaader, in 
the Supreme Military Council. However, in the exercise ot 
the most important of its powers on the exclusive and 
concurrent list of the 1963 Constitution, the council was 
to b8 ~obliged to have the 'concurrence' of the Head of the 
Federal Military Government and all the Regional Military 
Governors. 
Under the 1963 constitution, the Federal Government bas 
the power to declare a state of Emergency and to legislate 
1. This action as already mentioned set off a chain of 
events that ended in his overthrow and assa •• ination in 
July 1966. 
2. Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 8 
of 1967. This Decree was ostensibly to foraalise what 
was agreed between the Military Governors at a meeting 
in Aburi (Ghana). The Aburi meeting was called by 
leneral Ankrah of (GHANA) to reconcile the differences 
which had arisen between Lt. Col. Ojukwu on the one hand 
and the rest of the Military Government on the other. 
• 
-354-
during such an emergency on all matters, including those 
normally outside central legislative competencel and in 
cases also where Regional Executive authority might be so 
exercised as to "impede or prejudice the exercise of the 
EXecutive Authority of the Federation."2 
Although, Decree No.8 made all important matters 
affecting the country as a whole subject to the veto of any 
Regional Military Governor, and Simultaneously made each 
Regional Governor supreme in his own Region - for example -
exercising all executive and legislative functions - there 
was one important restriction. Tbe Decree revived sections 
3 70 and 71 and 86 ot 1963 constitution and empowered the 
supreme Military Council to declare a state of Emergency 
and to legislate as it should think necessa/ry after such a 
declaration or to take appropriate measures against any 
Region that "shall exercise its executive authority so as to 
impede or prejudice the executive authority ot the Federation 
or endanger the continuance of Federal'aovernment in Nigeria." 
Under such sections, the supreme Military Cooncil was empowered 
to act "with the concurrence of the Head of the Federal 
Military Government and of at least three ot the Military 
Governors.-
The se~ies of measures' and counter-measures' in late Mal 
1967 ended in the formal announcement ot Eastern Nigeria 
secession. Tbe declaration of a state of Emergency throughout 
Nigeria by Gowon 08 May 27 was, therefore, probably taken 
under the provision of Decree No.8. Bot with the abolition 
1. Sections 70 aDd 71. 
2. Sec. 86. 
3. AIJ above. 
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of the supreme 1'1ilitary Council at the same time as the decla-
ration of emergency, all the powers to take any appropr1ate 
measures vested in him and the Federal Executive Council under 
him. However, if the declaration of a state of emergency 
throughout Nigeria and the abolition of the SMC had been taken 
without complying with the requirements of Decree No.8, Gowon's 
action would have been unconstitutional but that point counts 
little in the situation. 
Simultaneously with the de.la.ation of emergency, Gowon 
brought political and civil figures into the Government at 
the level of the Federal EXecutive COuncil and the state 
EXecutive Councils. The experiment in mixed government bas 
been successful. Tbe political figure. enjoy their new atatus 
as leaders by co-option. They still fulfil something of a 
political function, in that they make alliance and seek support 
and remain sensitive to local opinion withl. their own atates 
and among potential allies. This bad probably ainlatse. the 
problem of working out some intermediate form between the full 
mobilisation 01 the masses characteristic of the polities of 
the old reg i.e and the military bureaacratic in.enaitiveness of 
the Irons! re~.e. 
Neverthelesa, Nigeria still has to work oat tbe coaatitu-
tional problem of return to civilian rule. TIleproble.haa 
been very mucb complicated by the tragiC civil war whiobhas 
more than emphaaised the cleavases iaberent iD a aalti-tribal 
state. l 
UGANDA. THE FIRST EAST AFRICAN CASUALTY: 
The eveDta wbich bave apparently taken ,ower trea Dr.' 
Milton Obote, Pre.ident of Uganda, follow a pattera tbat ie 
l.Lt.Col.Ojukwu (as he tben was) refused to accept the authority 
of Gowon on the ,;roDnd that he (Gowen) and'lllls aupp ... tera 
seized power "illegally" in the July counter-coup. He 
refused to accept Decree No.8 on the ground that it was a 
departure from what was agreed at Aburi, particularly, the 
emergency prOViSion, which he insisted were not discussed at 
Aburi. He regarded it as an indication that the Federal Gover-
nmheQthiQtenQed to ~oer~e the East into acceotance otiFederal (w 1C 1n h1S opln10n 1S synonymous to Northern) DOm natlon. 
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becoming all too familiar in the African Commonwealth. 
The pattern has two distinctive features, one the absence 
from home of the elected leader, and two, a position of 
personal leadership whereby it is possible bytle re.o~al 
of one man to change the fundamental intention of the whole 
society. 
Both points were made in tbe removal from power five 
years ago of Dr. Kwame Nkrumab, first presideDt of Ghana, 
when he was on an Asian tour. In what was almost a blood-
less coup, the one strong point of resistance was in t~e 
Presidential guard at Flagstaff House where Dr. Nkrumah 
lived. This resistance would most .1~el1 bave been a great: 
deal stronger if Dr. Nkrumah had been inresideno., ~ 
though it might not ha:te altered ~be eventual OUiCOIH, t;be 
prospect of intense fi5hting woald v.~,li~.lY bay. deterred 
the coup plalp1ers. 
ur Nkrumab's personal lead.rs~ role was iD.p~.uing 
socialism of a fairly 1deological kind. Tbe breakdown in 
power seems to occ~ when tbe ideas of tbe individual leader 
carry bill far~ber tban be is able to carr1 tbe people. Thi. 
is particularly .notable among leaders ioclioe' towards the 
left where recipes call for self _o:l,al, 1n .a ~.itua~~C)D where 
tbose in. power clearly do bave a:b1P J.1ving.tandard." 
Judging. from early co_enta, the. U&an~ cOlli> .~¥ ,tl1~ iQ~. 
evi table res.ul,t. of, poli tic~l. represaioll t ; .f;lQancial ~.o.rruption 
and tribal an1.osity t o~17; requ~riDg. Obot.. 'a ab.en~.' tA. ' 
Singapore to,., make it successful. . But Ob,,~te' '" ~d beeJl~oad 
before when the.se problems were eveD. Ilo.fe aCalt, aDd ,r,eturlled. 
. , . - . .. . 
wi tb h.is aut,hority illtact - part.u:ularly shert4 ~:ter tb. 
exile of the Kabaka in 1966. 
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By contemporary African standards - and perhaps world 
standards, Obote's repression of opposition inside his country 
was perhaps not unusually excessive. Be outlawed the opposi-
tion Democratic Party in December 1969, (but only after when 
it was alleged that the party bad aligned it •• lf with 
regional separatist tendencies and be himself had suffered 
a further assassination attempt. Obote's dictatorial behaviour 
turns out to have been less important in starting the coup 
than in providing his successor with another set of leaders 
to choose from. 
Financial corruption itself does not really explain the 
present coup. Though by no means angelic in a tiaane1al .eD8e, 
the Obote regime was only accused of tinancial misdemeanours 
by the successor regime after preliminary teelers hy Jain 
bad proved abortive. Then the 'main thrust of Gen~ral Amin's 
displeasure was directed, not at exee.alye retention of ' 
profits by the Obote regime but-at its plans for a wider dis-
tribution through partial nationall.atton of local aad 
expatriate-owned companies •. 
Tribalism has been suggested by aeveral commentator. as 
a major cause ot friction in Uganda, both between the aray 
and the people and within the army itself. But in this eaa., 
tension between the army and people upon cultural and 
linguistic grounds, the torme~ cootaining a majoritr ot 
Nilotic-speakers aDd the latter .. ost of the santa •• ,.,.d ••• 
not seem to have been particularl1 obstruaive •. Indeed,' a 
major aspect of the'o.up appears to have been·an i~licit 
alliance between the •• two groupings. Early reports speak 
of people plaCing banana leaves before army trucks, replacing 
photographs of Dr. Obote with ones of Sir Edward Mutesa, the 
~~8-
former Kabaka of Bugand~ who is now rumoured to be shortly 
reincarnated. If these reports mean anything, it is surely 
that "Nilotic" troops were welcomed rather than opposed by 
"Bantu" peasants in this particular coup. 
~possibilities are suggested as triggers. The first 
is the unwise remark Dr. Obote made in singapore that if 
British arms were sold to South Africa be might not be able 
to guarantee the safety of British citizen in Uganda, a 
remark that was quickly countered by a close colleague in 
Uganda. The second is Aminls evident fear that he migbt be 
assassinated. 
When President Milton Obote left for the Co.monwealth 
Prime Minister's Conference in Singapore, it bad been decided 
to remove General Idi Amin from his post as Army Commander. 
The citizens of K~ala Uganda's capital, expected a sbow 
1 < down. What came as a surprise was tbat at the end ot the 
day it was not Amin who was outted.' ,. 
. 2 
Obote's head of the secret police, Akena Odak., had 
over the last few years built up a vast security network 1n 
Uganda and had helped the President form a para-military 
unit called tbe special Force,recruited mainly trom Obote's 
Lango Kinsmen in-the North. This force was specially picked 
to counter-balance the mainly Acholi ~y. 
1. Obote haa since cODfir.ed tbis ia ~is Pre •• COafereDce 
in Dar-es-Bala. where he said that he bad called on AmiD 
before he left for Singapore, to eXplain the growing 
Dumbers .t weap... disappeariag Ir.. ar~ ar.ouri.. aad 
the iDcreasjDg missing sums of money., , 
2. He is Obote's Cousin. 
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While Obote was in Singapore, Mr. Ntende, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Internal Affairs Ministry also flew from 
I~mpala to Singapore to report how the move. against Amin was 
going. Amin was already suspicious and people in Kampala ha~ 
asked the question wby be did not seize power earlier. In 
fact Obote delayed his departure from singapore by two days 
waiting to hear of Amin's downfall. The story bas gained 
ground that Amin did not act until a loyal private Solaier 
came running with the new. of an impending coup aroUDd mid-
night on Sunday. He then alerted the army units loyal to 
himself and started the well-known chain of events - twelve 
hours of fighiing between the different factions of the army 
police and the Special Force. 
Although Obote bad declared some montbs ago t~~ be was 
the African leader least susceptible to a military coup, he 
never really believed tb.at, which 1s ; ~prec1sely why he tried 
to build up his own counter force to tbe army. Having been in 
, , ' 
charge of Uganda since its independence in 1962, he bad bad 
time to read the silns. 
Back in 1966, wben Obote ousted the Kabaka of B~andaJ 
the King of the moat populous region in the country, it seemed 
that he had finally triumphed over all opposition. He then 
abolished the trad! tional lCillidOIlS and passed a new Consti t,ution 
that gave hi. full powers. The power which Obot,e .Ja~b~~ed i~io 
his hands in 1966 and later was highly dependent"on 'arm-l' . :, 
o { , . 
support. His 10ya1al11 in the Congo lold smuggling scandal 
. .' ~ , . " '. ~ \ 
and tb~ Kabaka crisis which follow'- was Idi Amin whose 
loyalty was rewarded by the promotion over the head of the 
Senior Army Officer Brigadier Opolot who. was suspected of ' anti-
Obote sympathies. He was first removed from command and then 
detained. 
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By relying so heavily on Amin, Obote gave him power and 
opportunity to think for himself. In the years aiDce 1966, 
intrigue and suspicion began to .pread between tbe two meD. 
When in December 1969 a Baganda attempted to assa •• inate 
Obote, hitting him with a bullet in the .outb, Amin signi-
ficantly did not visit him but merely sent a message of COD-
dolence. One .onkh later in January 1970 came the mysterious 
death of Brigadier Okoya, the secoDd in comaand of tbe army 
and the man Obete was allegedly gro •• iag for t~e top peat. -
It was believed tba' his death was a. poltieal a •• aasinatioD. 
The conflict between the two men deepe.ed further a. 
Obote and Odaka pushed ahead witb t~e buildi_g of tke Special 
Force and attempts were made to decentrali.e .ilitary contro~. 
As Amin seelDed to accept tbis pp.t*i •• nObete 'becaae 
increasingly confident and went oa with planDing to reaove 
bim wbile he (Obote) was away. TIle plaD weDt awry. The 
crowd that spilled into the Kallpala stnets rej.iotas wah 
the Baganda still sll8rting froll tbe 108S .~ their ling aad 
tbe brutality of the use 
people and sympathiaer •• 
in the saddle in Uganda. 
ot e.ergeBoy p.-era against tbeir 
Ge.eral-Idi Amin se ... to be sa~ely 
Tbought be is a soltier; be coald 
hardly have survived so loag under tormer President Obote -
witbout learning the el .. nts ot politics. He is pattillg his 
knowladgeto gooduae. He is cenciliaiing tbe laiaoda people 
whose braod sappor' is essential to ally 'stable GoyerBIeat ia 
tbe cou.try. Tke Army fi.ally put down ·BagaDdare.1atance 
upon Dr. Obote's orders in 1966, with bloods bed but evidently 
the Baaanda do no'l bear a grudgeagaiDst General Alain, then 
deputy Army Commander. They are relieved to see the Baganda 
detainees emerge from continement. Events have taken the 
Kabaka from them, and Obote's administrative changes preclude, 
at least for the moment, any attempt to re-establish a Buganda 
Kingdom within the country. General Amin can, therefore re-
build a contralised administration on Obote's undou.tedly 
important work but without the Baganda hostility which dogged 
him and led him to repressive measures. In fact, according 
to reports from the capital,l General Amin bas 8Dnounced 
that be will not restore the monarchies, but that the present 
republic of Uganda will remain, with bimaelf Dominated as the 
President. He bas also annoUDced that tbe army would remain 
in power for five years to enable tkem restore the couatry to 
its proper position - whatever that tlley meaD. 
To a considerable extent, the military regime i.e 
IUely to take over the tbiakiDg of Dr. Obote, becau •• it too 
will want to resist aay recrudescence of tribalism. 
The Amin coup bas certainly cbaD,ed the balance and 
seems to be a warning to all Uganda's neighbours. NQ doubt 
the General acted because be ~oresaw that be bilD8el~,wou.ld. be 
eliminated as a possible rival for power, nevertheless tbe 
condition for a military take-ov~r had to be ripe, aDd tbey 
were. Dr. Obote bad done great service toll!s country but Ri. 
autocracy had fiDa11ymade him too many enemies. lD. U,~nda's 
neighbouring countries, Amin's adveat is a ~emiDder that it 
conditions become too difficult the army exists aiL a.+, , a;a,ter-
native regime, or the means of introducing an alternative 
regime. 
1. See Times (London ) February 22nd. (Edi torisl) • 
COM MEN T S: 
Tbe different froms which military intervention bas 
taken in the examples taken from the newly-independent states 
of Africa within the Commonwealth indicate the shape of the 
contest for establishing a new kind of state. The first 
coup in Nigeria was organised by adhoc groups of officers 
and men divided into Ifassassination squ~ds". the Ghanaian 
coup of February 1966 was planned at Brigade headquarters 
in the North and carried out under the guise of routine piece 
of training. The political action taken within the army of 
Sierra Leone has been at three difference levels; (1) by 
the Commander himself who on his own initiative prevented the 
Governor-General from swearing io a new Prime. Minister; 
(2) by the groups of senior Officers who overthrew their 
Co .. ander in order to establish the National Reformation 
Council and (3) by the Senior warrant Officers. who renounced 
the policy pursued by the military rulers. 
These examples, bowever, are aaLfieient to illustrate 
tbat the size of armed forces in relatioa to the total popu-
lation-of a country has little beariBK on their liability to 
intervene in politics. Though the nature of a subsequent 
military administration is likely to be considerably affect.d 
by the number of trained men in uaiforaevailable to play 
administrative parts~ Yery few soldiers can, ~n the first 
instance, effect a coup especially if they are seeking .pr,1-
marily to deny power to a political tyrant or. perhaps .transfer 
power from one IJ'OUp to aaother. It :i.., Df ~ur •• , the 
possession of &rIlS which sives iIl_ the capacity to do this. 
- .~ 
Arms, their use or very often only the threat to use .. iilell, 
are the sine qua Don of military intervention. 
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The qualities of an army which give it the capacity to 
intervene in politics are, as it were, a form of reserve 
power existing witbin a state, the use of which is commonly 
regarded as unconstitutional or illegal. The term 'legitimate' 
as'applied to ~1ilitary action under considerable politieal 
provocation would, of course, be misleading in that the con-
sequence is often necessarily the establishment of a regime 
which then has to discover a new basis for constitutional 
legitimacy. Tbe fact that the action taken is legally aDcon-
stitutionall though in some cases it might reasonably be 
regarded as in the defence of the Constitution, is often dis-
turbing ,to the Military Leaders responsible. TIle fact that 
General Aftkrah tried to justify the Gbana coap by claiming 
it was not unlike a traditional 'destooling' of an UDsatis-
factory chief, confirm. tke aervousae.8. This .. pect is 
2 
clearly expres8ed b~ Colonel Airifa iD his beok. He wrete, 
"A coup d I etM U the last resort i.a tile l"aD&e of •• aDS 
wh.reby an unpopular Gover .... t may b. overthrowD. But in 
our caae, .h.re there ... no cODstitutional aeaDS of offering 
a political oppositioB to oae-party Gov.r ••• at ,iRe ~ed 
FDrces were automatically made to beco.. the .tficial 
oppoai tion of ihe Government. tl 
It .ay be true that the Army is 8.~n as the only'Means 
of firmly ~econeilin~ interests and ee-ordinating tlie aational 
effort when discord is dangerous to tbe whole tabric'of 
society. This is a possible explabat10D for the relatively 
more frequent 'coup in developing than in developed countries, 
but whether this is •• y indicat1onof the real baais tor 
reduciiQD iii, however, b1ghly questionable. 
1. See lalsen: 'Gener_1 Tbeory of Law and State (1961 Edn.) pp. 
117-118. (c) The Principles of Legitimacy; (d) change of 
the basis norm and l~ Hirth and Death of The state a8 Legal 
Problems and at p. 220. 
2. Afrifa, OPe cit. at p. 31. 
The charge of corruption and misappropriation is fre-
quently made to justify military-coups in Africa as else-
where. The question is not whether it exists but whether it 
is of any great importance in promoting such events. In a 
poor country or community conspicious expenditure is an 
incitement to protest and violence on tbe part of those who 
are deprived. Thus, it may be that the late Cbie~ Okotie-
Eboh, l"ederal Minister of Finance in Nigeria, would not have 
been selected for abduction and murder if his financial 
manoeuvres bad not appeared unusually reprehensible. Tbe 
trap lies in the danger that tbe new rulers will become 
known to bave succumbed in however marginal a way to the 
same temptations. l 
Once Civilian GO'Yernments have been outed,.the Leaders 
of Military intervention seek to justify. :their seizve of 
control •. To ·prove- that installatioD'ofan army regime 
was necessary is a first order of Buuees. Bat the Dawly 
installed rulers .uat go a step fartber, aDd proclaim their 
goals for the country. Possibly the .at I eol&OD tn_e 
sounded by the~ilitary Leaders bas been "Dati •• al reconsruc-
tion". Tbough wording varies, the Importre.aiaa identical: 
PoliticaADs have failed to resolve the fUDdamental eooDomic, 
political, and social proble •• cootrontiagtbe state; only 
a transitional period of military rule caq purge the 
political sy.ie_, of its iDadequac~es. 
. ! 
1. GeBeral Aakrab. of Ghana was alleged to .. have\ received a 
bribe from a foreign embassy officUlla· and· tne're are 
rumblings i~ Ni@;eria of corrupti ... 811ellg·tb.. top .~heloDs 
of the Army. 
Rhetoric must not be confused with probability of 
action, however, 
may pr'ove hollow. 
more successfully 
The promises of renovation and rebuilding 
Can a military-based Government cope any 
with the difficulties which Civilian 
regimes encountered? The tendency to resort to violence 
exists in all Military - ,dominated Governments. After all, 
how else did the Military gain control7 Devis4!d to ... use 1'orce 
in the most efficient manner, armie. may mor.readily turn 
to violence than to palaver, to repression rather than to 
compromise. 
security forces may be ~e to stand in at an emergency 
for any breakdown on tbe legal order but tbey usually find 
it difficult to create a new political order, therefore, 
difficulties arise from trying to keep 1ft po.er or to find a 
formula for a return to civilian rule. The basie problem is 
that military administratioDs take effiee because ot alleged 
defects of politicians and once tbere tbey may beco.e avare 
of their own general superiority ia this respect. There bas 
a. tar been the remarkable case of Sierra-Leone ia APriL 
1968, of the counter - coup of Junior Military personnel 
organised allegedly purely to facilitate tbe proeess of 
"reciviliansation", though there has been in Ghana successtul 
succession of the Military Regime by a Civilian Govera.ent. 
The difficulty lie8, it 8eellS, in the process of deli-
berately organising the transfer of power and the crux of it 
is, perhaps in the reviv.l ot .elitieal partie.. Tbe beDDing 
of such parties bas generally been the e ••• ntial concoaittant 
of Military rule, l»ut it i8 hard to ••• bow vi"lloat tllem a 
civilian regime can be re-created. ~t the .... ti .. , the 
essentially 'holding' nature of a Military Government makes 
it unlikely that the process can reasonably begin at a point 
of development very much different irom that at which it 
was forcibly suspended. 
It is notoriously easier for the armed forces to 
seize control then to give it up. Having taken the reigns 
of power in order to bring certain changes - a Government 
freed from corruption; an opportunity tor wider political 
choice; an end to political meddling in military affairs -
the ruling officers may be reluctaat to returD to the 
barracks witbout strong assurance that the civilian regime 
will not revert to its previous way.. such assurances can 
Bever be absolute. Hence, the return to tbe barracks may 
be deferred agaiD aDd again pending conviction on tbe part 
of the GoverniDg military croup that taeir reforms will not 
be undone. Having tasted the power, excite.ent and rewards 
of political life, officers may be personally reluctant to 
step aside. Second thoughts and procr .. ~iDaiion about 
handing over to civilians tbua become co.-on phenomena. 
Withdrawal otten does not occur through a simple de.ire to 
restore civilian rule, but *hrough a traa~r .. tioD of tbe 
military itself. 
Military withdrawal in Simplest ter.l, co.e. about 
in two ways. First, governance leads to division .witbin the 
armed forces. To~n between a prote •• ional ethic tbat 
respects civilian supr .... y and a deSire to protect prble8-
sional autoDollyby torestalli.g pe.litical iatartereDoe, 
officers may fall into two camps, thus wbo woald carry 
fortb tbe·dutie. of the ar.ed .ervice. by .sea.wiDI direct 
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political involvement, and those who would retain military 
autonomy by precluding significant civilian control. When 
the advocates of withdrawal gain the upper hand, withdrawal 
may occur. becond, over a period of time, a military 
government may so transform itself as to become practically 
indistinguishable from a civilian regime. Officers shed 
uniforms sometimes partially - for business suits; they 
participate in electoral campaigns, and thus build a 
foundation for legitimate political authority. 
In Sierra Leone, for instance, withdrawal occurred 
after young officers and men in the raaka overthrew their 
superiors, who had earlier seized conirol from civilians. 
If Nilitary regimes set thellselvea up aa DGctors • .r the 
body politic, they risk being iDfected by the ills from which 
the previous civilian Governments suffered; or, should the 
patient fail to improve, the physician may be discharged. 
There is thus a dual danger. On the one hand, the Military 
Regime may fall prey to corruption, unwarranted use of force, 
the denial of political rights, - all weakness that helped 
, ., justify, or at least rationalise, the toppling of the 
civilian Government. To avoid such "iD'ection" the army 
may preter withdrawal - e.g. as in Ghana. On the other hand, 
the popular welcome that may have accompanied the Military 
takeover may soon be exhausted. Accordingly, the pro-with-
drawal group maffol"ce their colleaguea to accept a retreat. 
Let us illustrate this by briefly ex..ibing Sierra-Leone. 
'!be first coup in Sierra Leon .• grew out of the 
results of tldemocracy". After a bitterly contested election 
in May, 1967, the oppeaition African peeples Congress (APC) 
apparently ousted the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party 
(SLPP). When the leader of the APe., siaka stevens, had been 
sworn in as: Prime Minister, however, Brigadier David Lansana 
intervened; in turn, he was supplanted witbin two days by 
a National Reformation Council (NRC) composed of young 
Officers drawn from all ethnic groups. subsequently, the 
Dove-Edwin report and Government White paper noted, 
"The whole of the Government's arrangements 
for the 1967 election was rigied and corrupt 
••••••• they were determined to use all means 
fair or foull, to win and remain in office and 
if all failed to get tlrigadier Lansana to take-
over ••••••••• (delay in repDrting election 
results) could have developed into a tribal 
war if the National Reforaation Council had 
not stepped in or March 23, 1967."1 
Publication of the Dove-Edwin report in December, 1967, 
provided strong incentive for the Sierra-Leone Military 
to withdraw. The Commission of Inquiry criticized the ... , 
ways in which the SLPP bad attempted to ensure a majority, 
such as baving returning officers declare APe Domination 
papers invalid and raising the required deposit by 150 per 
cent. In ita commentary on the report, the NRC announced the 
appointment of a Civilian Rule Committee, wbose terms of 
reference were explicit: 
"(a) ~Nationa1 Refor .. tion COuncil bas 
decided to band over the Government 
of Sierra Leone to a Civilian GOvernment. 
(b) The Civilian RUle committee bas been invited 
to deliberate and advise on the ff: 
1. Africa Research Jlulletin IV, NO. 12 (1967) Col.929B. 
(i) The necessity for a fresh General Election; 
(ii) If (i) above is in the negative, the method 
of forming a National Government; if (i) above 
is in the affirmative, the stages in which the 
handover spould be effected; 
lii1; AnY other action which the Civilian Rule 
Committee considers necessary to effect a 
1 peaceful handover." 
These terms of reterence foundered, hovever, on two 
unforseen factors: growing unwillingness aaong .embers of 
the National Reformation council to step aside, and the 
growing dis tate for the NRC among tbe ranks. ID what was 
described as a lIutiny with political reperena.ions, an 
Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement led by warrant 
Officers i~risoned all but tvo of the commissioned 
Office.s of the Sierra-Leone army and almost all 'Police0 
Officers on April 17 and 18, 1968. Tbe rebelIio .. 
soldiers anDo.UDced that the tbirteen IIOntha interlude of 
army and police rule would eDd and civilian" supremacy would 
return. As a spokesmaD for the Ant1-c~rruption Revolut1oaary 
Movement commented: 
"Little did we realize that the people we had 
chosen to direct our .. tiO~,18 aftaira were .. re 
cor~upt" and selfia~ than tbe outed civilieP 
regime. 
It has~: ai.c. become absolutely clear that moat 
of the so-called National ReformatioD council • .-bers 
1. Ibid. Col. 929C. 
only wanted to benefit their selfish ends; the 
rank and file of the Army and Police have been 
ignored. All that was practised in both the 
Army and the Police were nepotism and blatant 
victimisation. 
Fellow sierra-Leoneans, we cannot continue any 
longer under such adverse conditions. The so-
called NRC members have greatly mismanaged the 
nation's affairs. They have failed to fulfil 
their boastful promise to bot~ Civilians and 
members of the Armed Forces. And above all, they 
want to remain in office indefinitely. 
Soldiers and police have no business in the 
running of this country. Our immediate aim is to 
return to Civilian Rule".1 • 
A National Interim council was quickly fora .. by Army 
and Police Officers. Within 10 daya,Siaka,steve .... 'waa 
sworn in as Prime Minister. Sierra-LeOne returDed to 
civilian rule still confronting etbnictensions and ecoDomic 
vicissitudes that the NRC could Dot overcame. 
Tbe tendency of tbe Military and police to intervene 
in the political areaa again after handing over *0 a 
Civilian Regime depends in part upon tbe levels of compe-
tence and conflict in the new Political s1stell and in part 
upon the orientations, interests and'cohereDce of 'hese' 
institutional groups. 
, i ' 
1. Africa aeseareh Bulletin, V. No. 4 (1968) Col. l035C. 
There is at one level, a strong orientation against 
arbitrary Government and authority and for democracy. An 
awareness of this sentiment could help set limits to 
political behaviour by new political elites. But the 
orientation itself could also serve as a pretext for future 
intervention. Speaking to cadets at a passing-out parade 
at the Ghana Military Academy in late 1966, General ADkrah 
exhorted that "as professional soldiers we are not 
interested in politics, (but) our pre-occupation ••••••••••• 
is to ensure that the people of this country •••••••• will 
no longer be subject to the caprice and dominatioD of a 
single political party or individual". This concern 
imposes "additional responsibility" on the soldiers as 
"guardians of the freedom and liberty of the peopl •• " 1 
Another primary military orieaiatioD is to order 
and stabilit~should evasion and violence attend political 
competition in the future, the military may well teel tur 
more disposed to intervene than it did ia the paat, and 
with less excuse. Respect for peliticians .. ODg tbe 
Military and Police is not high. Tbe promiaes of politiciam 
are suspect, their inability to fulfil tbaa and their 8elf-
enrichment anticipated. 
Lastly, since Military leaders assuaed political 
authority, some have developed a tsate tor it. The now-
established precedent ot a Military route to political 
power in Ghana has already enticed some military men and 
will undoubtedly excite others. A funny thing happened on 
the way to Civilian Rule. A~ the last moment, the NLC 
1. Ghana News, IV. No. 10, (Embassy of Ghana, London 
October, 1966), pp. 7-8. 
asked the Constituent Assembly to reconsider a motion 
to substitute fDr the presidency for five years a Presi-
dential Commission composed of the Chairman (Brigadier 
Afrifa) and Deputy Chairman (Harlley) of the NLC and 
the Chief ot Defence statt (Ocram). The Assembly 
agreed to do so for a period not exceeding three years 
and at the next ParliameBt's discretion. Thus, a core 
of the NLC stays in otfice, thougb Brigadier Alr!fa 
bas said that be will not go back to the Army after 
his term of office and botb Police Inspector-GeDeral 
Harlley and Police COmmissioner A. K. Deku bave 
resigned their police posit1Qu. The. NI£'. re .. on8 
for pushing for tbis change are unknown. 
'ftlere are no certain guarantee. against Military 
intervention. Tb- best assurance of civilian supremacy 
is a Government that ean demonstrate that is bas both 
popular and elective legitimacy and a high level of 
capability. 
CHAPTER EIGHT. 
CON C L U S ION. 
In the preceeding chapters an attempt has been made to 
present a picture of the development of emergency powers, 
the variety and scope of emergency legislation and powers, 
the way in which they are provided for and exercised, the 
effect of the operation of emer«eocy powers and the controls 
which the legislature and the Courts seek to exercise over 
thea. 
Tbe development of emergency powers in the dependent 
territories of the British Commonwealth began 1n the early 
days of exploration with the necessity to protect not only 
the trading companies but also the early missionaries.- The 
circumstances in mOtit of Africa in the early days ot the 
trading company rule necessitated the declaration ot martial 
law on a number of occasions. There were hostile powers, 
for example, threatening the safety and public order ot the 
possessions, further th~ people were inclined to rise in 
rebellion. It vaa, therefore, thought expedient to give 
the administration power to declare martial law. wben' 
British rule became officially formalised, the Governor in 
council~' s ordinance making pover includ.d not on11 the power 
to declaremart1al 'lav but also to make legislation during 
period of emer«ency to eeve. exteDsiv. ~i.l.s. • •• ever, as 
we haye seen; till 'ar ... d tbe t1 •• ef •• rld war I 1a ,1914 
the ordinance .aklD~ pe.er '.a. DO. freqa.atly .... d. Af~.r 
the second VorldW&r, the ri,,'of .at10nall ••. ln-.aified not 
only the enactment of emergency legislation but also the 
use of emergency powers to curb violent nationalist 
activities. 
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At independence, all the A£rican states within this 
area of study had inherited the colonial legislation on 
emergency, viz, the Emergency Power orders-in-CoUDcil 
1939 - 1956, and most of them also had other public security 
measures confering emergency powers on the executive at such 
times when it is considered that the security of the state 
is endangered,in the latter cases, a state of public 
emergency need not necessarily be proclaimed. 
The use thathaabeen made of emergency powers, .. in 
colonial days, has been mainly directed at alleged anti -
government activities or suspicions of anti-Government acti-
vities. The situation and circumstances which justified the 
colonial administrators in providing for and uaing emergency 
powers still exist, as has been shown, in the newly indepen-
dent states. Admittedly, the use has been .ore intensive 
and there is no doubt that instances have been frequent wbere 
emergency bas been conjured up in order to use emergency 
powers to bolster the use of naked force for purpose other 
than genuine preservation of national security. For when 
the power of preventive detention is used to wipe out an 
organised OppOSition party or to create a single - party 
state so tbat absolute power may be concentrated in tbe bands 
of one mao, the Presiaent, one is bound to feel that the 
security of the state may not be the only and perhaps the 
primary consideration. 
Emergency powers bave become a permanent feature of 
maintaining law and order and bave virtually Buperceded 
the ordinary laws of tbe land in some of the states. Various 
excuses have been given for this state of affairs. But 
, , 
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emergency powe~bave been designed for and meant to be used 
when an emergency occurs. If there is a genuine emergency, 
then the Government should and ought to be able to rely on 
and use these powers simply because the situation would be 
such that the ordinary criminal laws may noj be effective. 
But the important con~idaration is that the emergency should 
be genuine. All the constitutions of the African s.tates 
under study make provision for the declaration of emergency 
and bringing into operation of emergency powers for this 
purpose. If there is a genuine emergency, surely this 
provision would ensure that the Government had authority and 
. 
power to deal with it. The safeguard of. the ~~~oval of the 
majority of fhe representatives of the people in parliament 
would ensure that no government took emergency powers without 
, t· 
the people being assured of the justification for it. But 
if the emergency, is imagined, then the people ·through their 
representatives may prevent any rash actions by the Govern-
ment. 
Unfortunately, with the introduction of preventive. 
detention legislation and public security bills, the govern-
ment may now take and use emergency powers at any ttae with-
,out any proclamation of emergency beiQg made in accordance 
with constitutional provisions. 
Tbe lDternatioD~ COmmission ~!Juriat8 .for.ulated four 
principles to whicban emergency must be subjected. 
Tbe four p~iDCipl.s are, 
. \ (l)' A state ,of e~ergeDcy should be decl~ed only where 
.~irc ... taao.a IIU' it absolutely necessary to do so in the 
interests of the nation. 
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(2) The period of emergency should Dot be prolonged 
further than is absolutely necessary. 
(3) Restrictions placed on fundamental rights and freedom 
should be only such as the particular situation demands. 
(4) The legality of emergency legislation and emergency 
orders should be subject to review by the ordinary Courts of 
the land. l 
Acceptance of these principles would mean providiDg effective 
checks over the emergency powers of the state, without nece-
ssarily prejudicing the interests of state security. While 
most of the African states have drafted their emergency pro-
visions with these four principles in mind and incorporated 
them, the effect is much reduced when the same states also 
have enactments under which emergency powers may be assumed 
without a proclamation of emergency. The normal powers of 
any Government are surely wide enough to permit the state to 
carryon its security precautions and defence with speed and 
efficiently. Neither the proviSions of the Constitution nor 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by it are capable of causing 
any serious impediment to the security efforts of the state. 
As and when the state feels compelled to resist subversion, 
a proclamation of emergency can be issued. 
The threat to citizen's rights is great enough where and 
when there is a proclamation of emergency and use of emergency 
powers in spite of all the safeguards. Where there is no such 
declaration or proclamation, it is even greater when emergency 
pow.es can be used in non-emergency times, without the limita-
tions and safeguards ,attached to a proper e.ergency 
proclamation. 
1. The Dynamic Aspects of the rule of Law in the Modern Age, (1965) p. 42. 
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The best situation is obt~ined in a country which has 
no preventive detention legislation at all in times of peace. 
When a government feels obliged for reasons of security to 
invoke preventive detention legislation, however, then such 
legislation must be hedged with reasonable safeguards to 
ensure its preper and not indiscrimiDate use by the EXecutive. 
Reasonable safeguards would include the risht to make repre-
sentations to the authority concerned and the right to appear 
before an independent tribunal. There ahould be opportaaity 
for judicial review: the Courts should always be able to 
inquire, in times of peace at leaat, into the grounds of 
detention and decide whether they are adequate, and the 
objective rather thaD the subjective t.at should be followed. 
A final safeguard woald be tor the legislature to receive 
regular reports from the ExecutiYe er through Ministers, of 
the number of persons detained and of occaaioDa whee the 
Executive have and bave not followed the a.vice tendered by 
the independent tribuDal. None of the African states which 
bave enacted preventive detentioD legillatioD hal all of 
these lafeguards aDd 80.e bav. non •• 
In virtually every newly-independ*nt African state; 
iad.peaden'e was cranted to a goyernmeat endowed with popular 
support. UDdertbe circumstances, courts charged witb 
enforCing limitations on $overnmental powe~, baving D~ com-
-' '\,.. . . 
parable popular political support ot their ewo, were cast 
in an exc.edingl.y delicate' role. 1.1 Gaa.D ..... TaP.-1., the 
constitu.tion substantially'atrippe4 tbe Co-.rts of·aDT. role 
, . '. . :' 1) I;. '. ,', ' 
in umpiripg the c.D.titutionalpr~ce ••• p~.I .. rriDC tber1sky 
theery that fund8llental rights and d.t1e ..... e moat·· equitably 
-:ms-
disposed in a democ»atic society where the government is 
responsible to a fpeely elected Parliament representative of 
the People •••••• Hl 
Thus, where the judicial role was to be preserved, there 
are clearly advan,tages to (i) circumscribing the limits of 
fundamental rights with clearly-stated if elaborate exceptions 
giving the political arm of government those powers necessary 
to the operation of a new and frequently volatile society 
and (ii) arming the judiciary with detailed, specific formula-
tions on which to base a politically-unpopular confrontation 
with other branches of government. 
It is in tbi~ connectioDintere~ting to note that in no 
new nation of the Commonwealtb exeept Gban~, during Nkrumah 
regime, has independence or revolution brought about either 
a curtailment of judicial functions or a significant dlmindltion 
of judicial prerogatives. This is no doubt, in part, because 
the role of the judiciary has from the beginning been compara-
. . 
tively strictly' defined and comparatively strictly limited. 
Whatever may be the position in a future sitUation, it would 
seem unreasonable to urge the Courts of the newly-independent 
nations into decisive confrontation with the politicians. 
A MarburY~.Madisonl confrontation has been avoided 1n the 
1. Preamble to Interi. OeQstitutton ot 1aDsaata No •. 4a of 1965. 
2.(1803) 1 Cr.ct,l.t 137'~8hA11 C.J. stated "It is .eQhati-
cally the proviJlce and duty of the juuicial department to 
say what the law. Certainly all those who have written 
constit11tioDS~ftteIlip1ate them &&£01"11181 the fundamental 
and paramount law of the nation, and cODsequently, the 
theory of every such government must be that an act of the 
legislati*e repugnant to the constitution 1s void." 
~-
African states, io part, because the role of the judiciary 
has from the beginning been more exactly defined and, in part, 
because the Judges wisely have not sought to e~~ the. 
politicians in a power polemic. Presiaent Nyerere of TaD.ania 
has said "our constitution differs .trom the American system 
in that it avoids any blurring of tbe line of responsibility, 
and enables the executive to function without being checked 
at every turn. For we recognise tbat the system of "checks 
and balances" is an admirable way of applying the brakes to 
social change. Our need is not for brake. - our lack of 
trained man-power and capital resources, and eveD our climate, 
act too effectively already_ We need acce~erators powerful 
eDough to overcome the inertia bred of poverty, and the 
resistances which are inherent in all societies. nl 
Bat conflict between ~be judiciary and the ex ••• t1 •• 
or legislature cannot always be aveld.. as has been shown in 
the recent conflict between the Sapre.e court of 8iseria and 
the Federal Military Goverament in the ease of LAKANHI vs. 
m- AT1'ORNEY*GENEBAL (WESTERN STA.lE) &: O~. 2 when the extent 
of the power of'the Government toabrosate by decree the 
fundamental human rights of a citizen was challenged. The 
Govera.ent was forced to reass~t its right to untettered l , ' 
and unlimited legislative authority to the extent, it,it 
wi8hed~ of ov.r-ridins aaY,or all of the ~.o.l.ise ••• d 
1. Ny.rere, "Sow Muob Pawer for a leader·, LondoDO' •• ryer, 
reprint ••.. 1n Africa Report, July, 1962. 
2. S.C. 58169 - Already discussed supra chap. ~. 
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entrenched fundamental human right •• l But the citizen's 
rights should not be sacrifised to avoid such conflict, par-
ticularly during an emergency or the operation of emergency 
powers. Although politicians and even mi~itary leaders of 
revolutions such as those of zanzibar and Nigeria bave goae 
out of their way to reassure the jadges of their complete free-
dom to administer law impartially, Dr. Nkrumah's political 
dismissal of his Chief Justice2, aDd more recently the 
resignation of the Chief Justice of Z8abia3 are all indicative 
01' the type of conflicts that caD arise from a poli tioally 
charged issue. The use of emergency powers in Africa, as we 
have seen, has been mainly against political opponents, and 
any cases for the determination of such person's rishts can 
give rise to a politically unpopular confrontation. It is, 
therefore, suggested that another body or tr~bunal might be 
charged with the determination of issu,s arising iro. use of 
emergency powers. It is already provided that an independent 
tribunal should review emergency detention, perhaps the 
function of such a tribunal should cover otber ~owera. Also 
the use of the tribunal might be more e~~ective if its decisions 
are not on11 obligatory but bindigg on the executive. This 
should not. however, be in substitution ot,the ~ower of 
. . 
1. It diG this}'y promulgating, a few days after the'judgment 
of the Sup r e .... · COlIrt, a Decree title. -"ederal"Military 
GoyerDDJeDt(sapre_cy Be Enforcement ef pOwers) &ecree NO. 28 
of 1970" Whicb reatated that the Courts are probibited trom 
entertaiBiDg aa.,. que.tlon as to the validit,. of any Decree 
or Army Edict. ~ , . . 
. . . 
2. In 1963 following the decision ill ~he 'l're48oD Trial CUe.' 
. , 
3. In 19'9 following the detentien and trial of two portuguese 
infIltrators. ~ee Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969. 
judicial review of constitutionality of statutes and enactment&. 
There are precedents for this, e.g. in the Ghanaian special 
Court and the German Bandesvarfassungericbt. 1 
The Constitutional and institutional safeguards to 
emergency should be sufficient to ensure that emergency powers 
are not abused but it has been shown that in actual practice, 
they are not. 1be entrenchment of ri;Jp1ts may not mean much, 
since most of them can be derogated from in an emergency, 
howbei t by measures which are "reasonably jus'tifiable", the 
use of that phrase or similar phrases provide a standard 
which, properly applied, serves as an in.dispensable check on 
capricious and officious disregard of private rights by 
bureaucrats. In de' jure and de facto one-party states, 'tbe 
requirement of a special majority for constitutional 8IIendDlent 
is not an adequate protection, and in such states, it 1s not 
difficult to imagine that the Constitution may not relDain 
sancrosanct from the hands and ambltionsof a-pow.r hungry 
leader. It is, however, impossible to suggest a . 'fool-proof' 
~~safeguardc .. to abuse of emergency powers. perhaps the best 
safeguard would still be the power of the people to control 
their own destiny when they fiDei, probably at· the instigation 
of a minority, that they are no longer bapp,. under a totali-
tarian Govera.ept. 
1. Art. 100(1) ot the German FeQ.r.al .public COD.~i tutton 
1949 provides: "If a Court considers unconstitutional a law 
the validity of which is pertinent to itsdecisioD:,}'pro-
ceedings are ~o be stayed, and a de~ia1on.~s ,to .be ~tained 
from the l~nd Court competent for constitutional disputes 
it the matter concerns a violation'o'f 'tbe"con.t1tut1:onof 
the lanel,or troll tbe Fe~era.l. COIW.J1fltutlon Court (BUDdesver-
fassungsgericht) if the matter concerns a violation of 
this Basic Law." 
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The interference of the military into politics has pro-
bably indicated one method of effecting change. But the 
question still remains whether the military is competent to 
cope with the various political and administrative problems 
which are inherent in the efficient running of government 
machinery. The intervention of the military in politics ia 
modern Africa, however briefly, probably indicates that while 
the Army is the convenient agent for the suspension of acti-
vities in a deteriorating situation, it is inherently un-suited 
for the task of political reorientation, and when it fails even 
for a time to "clean-up" the administration it may become a 
force tending to encourage instability rather than the reverse. 
Independence, as the natioDalists have always insisted, 
.akesi~a lot of difference. It transfers much of the effective 
power to individuals and structures internal to the country. 
It gives the governing elite many levers to reclaim still 
more power from outside agencies. There are, however, lIIany 
claimants to the exercise of this power~ all internal· to the 
country. Unless the power is effectively exercised by • 
central agency, and unless the rules of the power game are 
generally accepted by all the cOOlpetitors, disintegration and 
secession become not merely possible but probable. 
All newly-independent Anglo-phonic African states do not 
have long histories as nations. Their ~ationbood baa been 
created in the crucible of a revolutionary struegle against a 
colonial power. The unity of the nation was for~d in tbe 
fi9h.t against the external enemy. colenial ~overDlD.nt. bred 
their own dissolution and nationalism came about as a resolu-
tion of aaDy of the basic strains of the colonial situation. 
The government of a new nation, immediately after 
independence, is a very unstable thing. For one tbing, the 
existence of an external enemy-the major motivation for unity 
in the nationalist movement has largely disappeared. Tbe 
political mobili.ation, the subordination of private and 
sectional claims to the needs of the whole, is inevitably 
diminished. The country's sense of tension, and of antagonism, 
is partly abated, partly turned inward. Moreover, there is 
a sense of disappointment at unfulfilled expectations. 
In nationalist activity in Africa tbere was an implicit 
promise that the tension resulting from oppression and anta-
\ 
gonism, from the restraints of tbe colonial ruler and from 
the discipline of the nationalist organisation wou~d be tem-
porary. There was a touch of the utopian bope cbaracteristic 
of every revolution, even wben nationalist movemeDts were 
peaceful and unmilitant, as they were in some of the African 
states that gained independenc8# ADd there were many in all 
the African states who thought that freedom meant the end of 
social control or the iamediate redistribution of wealtb. 
The cadre of the nationalist parties may Got have bad sucb 
naive expectations, but it is understandable that among the 
peasants and uneducated urban dwellers sucp, illusions existed. 
Even if these illusions were only momentary, unfulfilment 
meant a sense of disappointment. Independence was not magic. 
In country after country in Africa, during the first iew 
months of independence, the leaders felt the need to make 
speecbes on the theme that independence means hard work and 
self-reliance. 
The removal of the prod to unity, that is, colonial rule, 
combined with disillusion, and hence oppOSition, created by 
the new government ineVitably causes the ethnic, regional and 
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other particular interests which had teillporarily held back 
their claims to reassert them. The assertion of the rights 
of private interests to their share of the community's assets 
is the business of all Governments, not only those in Africa. 
What is different in the new nations is that the government 
cannot assume a residual loyalty to the state among the 
majority of its citizens. 
The independence governments saw as their earliest tasks 
the promotion of national unity and the raising of living 
standards. The first of these was the more pressing, since 
political solidarity and stability were the prerequisite for 
any genuine economic advance. The geographical units over 
which the new governments were to rule were in every case 
essentially artificial creations carved out of Africa by the 
colonial powers in the late nineteenth century. only rarely 
had the European administrations paid much attention to ethnic 
considerations in delineating the new frontiers. yet the new 
leaders felt compelled to create a sense of national identity 
within the eXisting frontiers, because to try to change the 
existing borders would only increase the divisive forces inhe-
rent in long-standing tribal enemities ,whiob in so •• countries 
already threatened to destroy the new nation. 
The national political parties sougbt to miniMise the 
effects of these forces by exploiting the wave of enthusiasm 
which accompanied independence. To reinforce the sebse of 
national community as well as to give the individual citizen 
a sense of partiCipation in the great WOrk ot national d.~lop­
ment, selt-help·schemes were organised, frequently bas.d on the 
same tribal societies that had served 'earlier aa party Duclei. 
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The enormous reservior of collective energy which had been 
marshalled for the independence struggle had now to be 
channelled into activities which would produce the concrete 
improvement in the lives of the people which had been promised 
as the aftermath of political independence. 
The tasks facing the new governments were staggering. 
The day-to-day problems of administration were complicated by 
the departure of many key colonial administrators, and even 
to keep a bare minimum of governmental services in operation 
men with little or no experience were called upon to replace 
them. Even in countrie. such as Nigeria, where preparation 
for independence bad been under way for some yeara, African'-
aation of the civil service was far from complete. The 
governments were called upon immediately to make decisions on 
both internal and external policies for which virtually no 
planning had been done. 
Confronted by circumstances and pressures coincident 
with independence, it is not surprising that the leaders of 
the African states found little time to reflect on the esta-
blishment of the democratic process and on the plKce of an 
opposition in the domestic political spectrum. 
Tbe We.tern-style institutions of parliamentary govern-
ment created by the British bave in manp of the countries been 
eclipsed by the continuing phenomenon of the single party. 
Africans are insisting that while they might build on 80me 
parts of the European foundation, their ultimate goal was to 
devise institutioDs which would be more suited to the African 
conception of the functions of government and which would 
correspond more closely to the traditional African sty" of 
policy (~.li'i.ai) decision making. Tbe single-party system 
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which was the product of the mould into which nationalist 
politics fitted prior to independence was thus carried over 
into post-nationalist politics to the point where it has 
become the single most characteristic feature of the contem-
porary African scene. 
with few major exceptions (such as Nigeria and Kenya) 
single parties dominate the government. of all the newly-
independent African states. They are for the mo~t part those 
parties which came to power at independence and have many of 
the same leaders who were most active in the earlier nation-
alist period. These are the parties which were able to 
construct the most effective organizational net works before 
independence and which have been able to maintain wide 
national support through their local branches since. Although 
they go through the motions oJ periodiC elections, there is 
no effective opposition in an institutionalised tDrm and 
hence elections serve only as a method of reaffirming the 
solidarity of the nation behind the existing leadership. 
African arguments supporting the single~party system 
are based on both pragmatiC and theoretical grounds.~e 
pragmatic justification derives from thev1ew that in the 
crisis following independence a strong government is needed 
to weld the nation ~ogether. Tbe needs of econqlDic develop-
ment are imperative and eviuent; there can be no argument 
about goals and therefore p~ties representing different 
points of view are superfluous. The Single-part" it is 
claimed, repre,ents the wil:l of the. people. ,It perlQits Ila8S 
participation in decision m~ing aDd in so do;i.ngencourages 
the development of a sense of personal responsibility in 
government. ~~reover, since it does not represent only the 
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interest of a group or section of an economic class in the 
population, it is basical~y more democratic than the western 
multi-party sy~tem. 
western critics of the single-party system in Africa 
have argued that instead of promoting democracy it bas given 
rise to dictatorship which refuse to permit the formation of 
an opposition party, or in those few cases where an opposition 
exists, have not permitted it to play its rightful role as 
the continuing critic of government policy. It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that the future of democracy in 
Africa would have been more ensured ha~ the African majority 
parties allowed fu~l rein to opposition parties within a 
parliamentary structure. Underlying the argument for an 
opposition is the implicit assumption that a western-modelled 
parliament is applicable to all societies regardless of their 
cultural back-ground. 
In those African states where opposition partie. were 
permitted to exeDciae their prerogative freely after iDdepen-
dence, it rapiJdly became clear that the concept of the "loyal 
opposition" was by llomeallS clear to the opposition leadera. 
They appear to bave telt that their role was 'net that of 
offering construetiTe criticism but rather .t seeking tbe 
downfall of the governmeDtby beiag as destructive as possible. 
There is certainly so •• truth in the compla1ats of tDe Bajori*y 
)MIPt7 .r •• derabip that tbe oppositioD regarded its chief function 
as that of hampering the govern.ent in carrying out any policy 
whatever, nor did theoppos1tion feeltbat tbe eau. of pro-
viding alternatives to the programae. it criticised fell upon 
its shoulders. 
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While there is no doubt that some govern.ents have 
repressed opposition movements beyond any point justified 
by the oppositions activities, there is no proof that the 
opposition, had it been in the same position would have 
acted differently. All too often the opposition leaders 
have made it apparent that their goal in seeking otfice is 
for the sake of power alone (to the point where they have 
not hesitated to seek to overthrow the government by force 
if they felt that an appeal to the voters would fail) and 
not to provide better solutions to the problems of govern-
ment. 
In a recent speech, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania 
made the point that it was of vital importance that in a new 
state the institutions of government be und.~stood by the 
people. If they are not, they cannot hope to encourage 
national unity. Nyerere's point is well taken. The 
Western nations have taken generations to develop those 
political institutions which they feel w111 best serve their 
needs of their societies, and the process is by no means 
finished. The Parliaments and parliamentary forms devised 
by Britain and ceeded to the colonies in Africa, were deve-
loped as a felt response over the course of centuries to 
the needs of European societies. It is not to be expected 
that these institutions will always meet the needs of 
African societies, whose traditions and'back-grounds differ 
rrom~ own. President Nyerere went On to add that for 
his own country; 
"There must be no confusing ou'twa.....rd, forms which are 
meaningless in the light of our own experiences in history. 
'this alone requires a 'Republic, and one with an execut'ive 
President. TO us, honour and respect are accorded to a chief, 
Monarch, or a Presiaent, not because of his symbo'ism but 
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because of the authority and responsibility he holds. we are 
not used to the division between real authority and formal 
authority. 
The President must not only carry the responsibility 
for the actions of Qoveenment, he must have power to fulfil 
his responsibilities •••••• Tbe Government are aware that 
some of our friends may be overconscious of the dangers of 
dictatorship, but they recognise an over-riding need to 
provide leadership. 
we have to acknowledge that although the people of 
Tanganyika can understand the idea of law being made by 
groups, they see leadership and enforcement of law as the 
responsibility of a person, with authority, answerable for 
his actions to the group but not hampered by it in effecting 
them. Under our proposals therefore, ~e it is necessary 
to lead, the President has the powers to lead • .,l 
President Nyerere went on to .... phasis.. however, teat 
within this structure of the strong EXecutive, Parliament 
must remain sovereign and expressive of the will of 4he 
people. yet the soverei~nty of Parliament does n~tt in his 
view, necessarily mean the existence within it of a two-p~ty 
system since, U he contends, "where one party is identified 
with a nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are 
firmer than they can ever be wben you have two or more 
parties, each representing only a section of the community." 
While he recognizes that the checks and balances provid..~y 
the party system and those bui~t into the constitutl~n in the 
American presidential system are necessary to pre •• rve 
democracy in 8' developed country, intbe ca •• of the African 
developing nations such a system of brakes en social obaase 
1. Quoted in Africa Report, July, 1962, p. 5. 
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isuneecessary. "Our need is not for brakes - our lack of 
trained manpower and capital resources, and even our climate, 
act too effectively already. We need accelerators powerful 
enough to overcome the inertia bred of poverty, and the 
resistance, which are inherent in all societies." 
The outside world has been prompt to lay the blame of 
what appears to be the growing political instability of 
the African st@tes at the door of the one-party system. The 
argument is that the attempts by the governing parties to 
satisfy all sections of their population have not been suc-
cessful. The dissatisfactions engendered hava led to such 
frustrations on the part of the opposition, which has had 
no legitimate outlet for its grievances, that they have 
culminated in repeated attempts to overthrow thegovernmeots 
by force. So endemic have these attempts become that a 
prominent African newspaper had, in mid. 1963, begun to run 
a column entitled "The Plot of the week." 
The succession of plots a1 •• d at overtarowing the 
governments in such countries 88 Uganda, Malawi, eyeD when 
they bave failed, expoaed the African aiagle parties to the 
charge that io their baste to le'1ti.i.etb .... l ••• aDd.-, 
push ahead with national development tbey bave onlY'laid the 
foundation for chroaic inatability. 
In some degrees, a part of the'instability whicb plagues 
many African states is the result of a clash between the 
western - inspire. parliamentary .ystem and the'-indigenous 
consensus democracy. But the newly-independent African 
states suffer also from a built-in instability wbich derives 
fundamentally from the rapid process of modernisation. 
The rise of nationalism, the drive toward independence, and 
finally the stage of independence itself have profoMndly shaken 
the foundations of African society. The vast movement of 
population from rural to urban areas, the spread of education 
and technical training, have combined to create a world in 
which new anticipatioIBand ambitions may be realised but 
which at the same time has within it complexities and un-
certainties that were never faced in traditional society. 
In government many new types of authority have come into 
being; one day a man may be a farmer in his fiela and almost 
the next day, a member of Parliament, or a Minister. The 
expansion and Africanization of the bureaucracy have created 
new decision-making and positions of influence at the local 
community level have sprang up within the hierachy of the 
nationalist parties. Economic development has created new 
roles for the African entrepreneur out of whicb grow ever 
more complex patterns of roles which combine the authority 
of the new wealth with that of a high position within the 
political party. The foundations of a bighly stratified 
and multi-dimensional modern society are slowly being laid 
alongside a structure of traditional society which has by no 
means lost i~s vitality. The conflicts between the authority 
resulting from these new roles and that from traditional 
roles, and the jockeying for power which is an inevitable 
part of the still-limited opportunities .tfered to the 
growing educated elite, create a social instability which 
becomes readily reflected in the political proces8. 
NO matter what their education, or the degree to which 
they have been acculturated to a western tradition, the 
leaders of many of the new states have deep, underlying 
doubts as to whether they and their people can measure up 
to the challenge of a modern technological world. The 
insecurity bred of this lingering doubt of the ability to 
achieve modernisation provides a r.tiona~tor continued 
control of fhe political process through the single-party 
system. In British Africa, Kwame Nkrumah ex-President of 
Ghana has urged that the economic independence which gives 
substance to political independence can be achieved only by 
the welding of national unity. Respect for the new Nations 
of Africa, he insists, will only come in international 
community when they have proved that they are capable of 
comp~ting as modern states with the states of the more 
developed parts of the World. To tosure lull mobili8'8tion 
of the society behind the drive to create a new nation, a 
high degree of control in the immediate post-independence 
period is necessary. Under 'the psychol'ogical pressure 
resal ting trom the olien over ambitious goals ot th$ leadel'lp 
the nationalist party becomes increasingly-impatient of 
criticism and of what it considers obstructive tactics, and 
in the process, even genuillely constructive critics may find 
themselves the victims or Preventive Detention Legislation. 
Unfortunately, the leaders have gj.ven little eonsideration 
to the possible long';'range eonsequ'ence of the' 16$s ot 
individual libe~ty which the drive tor national identifi-
cation entails. Their aim, .. they •• e it, is to proc •• d 
as rapidly as possible with the transtormativD-ofsociety' 
wbile trying to keep in ~beck those forces of dislocation 
create. in the process BO as to prevent them from tearing 
asunder the very framework of the society itself. 
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It is this precarious process of balancing change 
against stability that has often resulted in the greater 
reliance on emergency powers by the leaders of the newly-
independent African states. 
While there may be some validity to president Nyerere's 
argument that a strong form of government is necessary for 
Africa at this stage, and that ~t corresponds to the desire 
of the majority of the people, the fact cannot be brushed 
aside that experience over the past few years of Afric~ 
independence has indicated that a strong EXecutive may well 
assume dictatDrial characteristics in the haste to achieye 
the progress which is so often seen as tile primary ~le,ce 
aecessity. The tragedy of Africa is that the urgency of the 
need to release the brakes on social cbange has all too often 
led to the personalisation of power. It can of course, be 
argued that in tbe colonial period powe~ was personalised 
in the hands of the Governor, whose position had a generous 
element of authoritarianism built into it. Yet in the last 
analysis his powers were never absolute. Clearly there is 
danger inherent in placing full constitutional authority in 
the hands of ODe mao even for a temporary period. The 
degree of danger, however, depends on the personality of the 
individual in whom the powers are vested. If the personality 
of the leader is such that tae pos.assion of power becomes 
for him an end in itself without resard to popular consent, 
be will resist the surrender of that power to the point 
vaere he can only be displaced by an act of violence. The 
delusion ot omnipotence can frequently be far more perilous 
to the state tban the personal exercise of .apreme power in 
a period of national crisis such as prevails in many of the 
newly-independent African states tooay. 
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It is clear that heavy emphasis is being laid in 
African political systems on those values which tend to 
solidify and integrate the community and less upon the 
individualism. In consequence, therefore, there has been 
less concern with civil liberties and the protection of the 
individual under the rule of law than the ~est is accustomed 
to. Within the traditional African village, the rights of 
the individual, ~well as his privileges, were regarded as 
distin~tly secondary to those of the co..unity and family. 
The in.ividual who, by bis acti4ns, endangered the solidarity 
or the continued existence of bis extended family and of the 
families who made up the community rendered bimself liable to 
the ultimate sanction, that ot being cast out of the group. 
His life depended on the support of those around him; in 
turn they claimed the right to prescribe, often very narrowly, 
the confines of his liberties as an1'ndividual. The new 
community of the nation state is only now in the process of 
creatieD. Its fonrldations are tragile and the cons .. 8U8~apo~ 
which it is being built is not always secure. Acts which 
threaten this consensus threaten the state and will be harshly 
judged by the new leaders, more particularly so if tbey 
appear to tavour the tnterests ot aD ibdividual or a group to 
the detriment of tbepeople as a whole. 'so long as the 
leadership feels itself engaged in the Itr11lg1e for legitimi-
sation of iis' eXist-erice, and evlator the existence of the 
nation itself, it will continue to insist on tbe use of 
emergency powers and justify sucb use bYJ).l •• d1Dg nece •• ity 
forstrong-ar ... gover~.D",. 
In the colonial 8i tuation, At~ic~an nationalist movements 
had taught their 'fOllowers to think of the state as "they" not 
"we-. Independence demands a rapid reversal in out-look from 
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opposition to support Of the state's authority. This 
transition is difficult even for the educated and trained 
cadres of the movement. In scve.tu1. 01' the newly-independent 
African states within the Commonwealth, we find governments 
inveighing against bureaucrats wbo have not learned tbat 
"sabotage" is no longer a legitimate tool of argument, that 
the anarchy which nationalists had demanded before had now 
become archaic and daugerous. The governments thus feel 
themselves forced to achieve a reorientation with as little 
waste of time as possible. Loyalty to the state is 
measured by the sense of self-restraint which its citizens 
feel in pursuing their opposition to specific policies of 
the government. If they oppose the particular government 
in power but stop at a point short of destroying the state 
or seriously weakening it, they can be said to be loyal. 
This kind of legitimation of the state rather than of a 
particular government is something that is inculcated in 
the population over a period of time. All the newly-
independent African states have hardly had time for this. 
When they achieve this state of development, there is 
surely bound to be less tendency in seeing every opposition 
to government as part of a plan towards the disintegration 
of the nation and hence less need for repressive emergency 
measures. The problem ot establishing the integrity of the 
state is precisely that of strengthening the hand of the 
state. 
Demoeraey' in most of the nev11-in4epebdent AtricaB 
states is still a top dreSSing on a soil. The average man 
is not really obsessed with the notion that government is his 
business. He is apt to endorse Pope's couplet, if a slight 
emendation is adopted. 
"For forms of government, let dons contest, 
what ever is best administered is best". 
Whut"he wants is not so much democratic government as good 
government which will provide him with the necessaries of 
life and probably a rew co.forts too. Thus the economic 
condition of the masses tend to tilt the balance against 
the way of life. From "Aristotle down to the present, men 
have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively 
rew citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist 
in which the mass 01' the population could intelligently 
participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals or irrespon-
1 sible demagogues"_ A society divided between a large 
improvished mass and a small favoured elite would result 
either in oligarchy or in tyranny. "It is possible that 
Max Weber was right when he suggested that modern democracy 
in its clearest form can only occur under 
tions of capitalist industrialisation,,2. 
are aill in the process of developing and 
economic levels. 
the unique condi-
African states 
raising their 
It is against this background that the provisions for 
and the use of emergency powers in British Africa must be 
viewed. It is true the boundary between the curtailment of 
civil liberties during a crisis in accordance with constitu-
tional provision and tbeir abrogatio~ by a dictator relyial 
l'. S. M. Lipset, SOlie social Requ1sities of Democracy, 
The American Political Science Review, March 1959. p. 59. 
2; Ibid. 
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only on his political power is easily crossed, but 
perhaps it is one of the growing pains which the 
developing nations must unavoidably suffer. There 
may be plenty of reasons for seeing difficulties 
but none for disillusionment. l The replacement of 
the personalised and often authoritarian aspects of 
the newly-independent states in Africa is bound to 
come. Africa is still in search of the type of the 
system most suitable to its needs. The search for 
and building of a democracy that does not rely on 
emergency powers to maintain its national integrity 
and security cannot be completed without false starts. 
1. Basil Davidson "Difficulties, Not Disillusionment" 
in Africa Report D~t 1967 p. 27. 
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